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Strategic imperatives, British defence policy, and the case of the Falklands War 1982Gibran, Daniel Kahlil January 1990 (has links)
This analysis proposes the thesis that in the formulation of post-war British defence policy, wider strategic developments taking place in the international environment are as important as, if not more than, domestic economic considerations, and examines the motivations that lay behind the British government's decision to recapture the Falkland Islands after their seizure by Argentine forces in April 1982. It is a first and comprehensive attempt to explore these two themes. It presents a challenge to the dominant view that British defence policy has, over the past two decades, been influenced by purely economic factors. Throughout the post-war era, defence analysts have come to accept the orthodox paradigm of British defence policy which attributes the reduction in the size of Britain's defence dispositions entirely to financial and economic pressures. While not negating the role of economic factors, this work rejects the gravamen of the orthodox paradigm and attempts to bring balance to the intellectual debate confronting British defence policy. Using the Falklands War as a case-study, this analysis demonstrates the salience of strategic imperatives and underscores the view that economic constraints can be pushed aside for what decision-makers perceive to be higher national and politico-strategic interests. It argues that while several factors may appear to have influenced the British decision to retake the Islands, only two interlocking sets are truly credible. These relate to national honour considerations and the fight for principles. Moreover, it argues that the credibility of the latter flows from the primacy of pride and prestige, thus making national honour considerations the dominant motif or explanation. The analysis begins with a review of the literature and shows the gaps which this work attempts to fill. Chapter Two examines the strategic and economic trends and developments in British defence policy prior to the Falklands War. Chapter Three presents a comprehensive picture and explanation of the Falkland Islands as an issue of long-standing dispute between Argentina and Britain. In Chapter Four, the factors that prompted the Junta to launch its attack are examined and the British response discussed. Chapters Five and Six utilize the Falklands War as a formidable case to support the major theme of this work. Chapter Seven provides a summary, and concludes with a short examination of four basic issues relating to the analysis.
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Ficciones de una guerra La guerra de Malvinas en la literatura y el cine Argentinos.Vitullo, Julieta. January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2007. / "Graduate Program in Spanish and Portuguese." Includes bibliographical references (p. 188-192).
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War in the South Atlantic : the mythology of the Monroe Doctrine and the Western Hemisphere idea : the Falkland Islands : a case study /Meunier, Renee Monique. January 1999 (has links)
Thesis (M.S.)--Central Connecticut State University, 1999. / Thesis advisor: Dr. Alfred C. Richard Jr. " ... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science International Studies." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 130-137).
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Conventional deterrence and the Falkland Islands conflictBeattie, Troy J. January 2010 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making And Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Russell, James. ; Moran, Daniel. "March 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 30, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Deterrence (Strategy); Conventional Deterrence (Strategy); Deterrence-Psychology; Falkland Islands War, 1982; Great Britain; Argentina; Defense Policy Includes bibliographical references (p. 109-112). Also available in print.
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Malvinas myths, Falklands fictions cultural responses to war from both sides of the Atlantic /Williams, Laura Linford. Graham-Jones, Jean, January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2005. / Advisor: Dr. Jean Graham-Jones, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Interdisciplinary Program in the Humanities. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Aug. 30, 2005). Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 367 pages. Includes bibliographical references.
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Britain and the Falkland Islands crisis, 1982 : an analysis of crisis decision-makingFlahault, Michel January 1987 (has links)
No description available.
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Britain and the Falkland Islands crisis, 1982 : an analysis of crisis decision-makingFlahault, Michel January 1987 (has links)
No description available.
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Logistikprincipers användning vid militär planering : en studie av Falklandkriget 1982 och Gulfkriget 1991 utifrån fem principer för logistikWetterberg, Niclas January 2009 (has links)
Att använda erfarenheter, i form av principer, vid militär planering är inget nytt fenomen. SedanNapoleontiden har det vuxit fram riktlinjer för militär planering och genomförande i form avKrigföringens grundprinciper och principer för att skapa en framgångsrik logistik. Exempel påprinciper och hur de ska tolkas finns i de flesta av världens försvarsmakters doktriner.Syftet med uppsatsen är att ge exempel på hur principer för logistik kan användas för att reflekteraöver de logistiska utmaningar, som en befälhavare eller stabsofficer ställs inför vid en militärplanering.Som empiri, för att värdera principerna mot, har Falklandkriget 1982 och Gulfkriget 1991, med ettbrittiskt/amerikansk perspektiv använts. De är båda konventionella krig med ett tydligt militärtslutmål, men har väldigt olika förutsättningar för logistiken i både en tid-, rum- ochstyrkejämförelse.Uppsatsen använder abduktion som metod. Fem principer för logistik bildar hypoteser förframgång som ställs mot empirin, i form av de två krigen. Krigen ställs mot varandra, medprinciperna som analysverktyg, och komparationens likheter och skillnader gör det möjligt attvärdera och dra slutsatser av principernas innebörd.Resultatet visar att principerna har ett värde och analysen ger vid handen ett flertal slutsatser somkan användas vid militär planering. Principerna ska inte ses som ett krav som måste uppnås för attnå framgång, utan som stöd och riktlinjer för att ta tillvara beprövad erfarenhet. / Using experience, in the form of principles, in military planning is not a new phenomenon. SinceNapoleon there has been development of guidelines for military planning and execution in theform of Principles of War and principles for creating successful logistics. Examples of principlescan be found in most of the world’s defense forces’ doctrines.The overall aim of the thesis is to give examples of how to use principles for logistics to reflecton the logistic challenges you face, as a commander or a staff officer, in military planning.The empirical material used to test the principles against are the Falkland War and the Gulf War,from a British/American perspective. They are both conventional wars with a clear military endstate, but differ a lot in the logistic requirements, both in a time-, space- and forces comparison.The thesis uses the method of abduction. Five principles of logistics make five hypotheses forsuccess that are contrasted with the empirical evidence, in the form of the two wars. The wars arecompared to each other, with the principles as analytic tools, and the similarity and thedifferences in the comparison make it possible to draw conclusions about the principles’ content.The result shows that the principles have value and the analysis gives a number of conclusionsthat can be used in military planning. The principles should not be seen as requirements forsuccess, but rather as a support of, and as guidelines for your planning in order to make use ofprevious experience. / Avdelning: ALB – Slutet Mag. 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 07-09
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Center of gravity analysis : an actual or perceived problem?Andersson, Jonas January 2009 (has links)
Centers of Gravity (CoGs) analyses deliver vital input to the operational design. However, there are a great number of theories regarding the phenomenon which can create a certain degree of confusion. The diversity in theories may lead to misdirected mental energy where the focus is to discuss theories instead of using the theories at hand efficiently. The question is if the diversity in theory is an actual problem or if it just perceived as such? This research identifies the similarities and differences in the theories of Milan Vego and Joseph Strange & Richard Iron regarding CoGs, their sub elements and methods for analysis. The impact of the differences on the practical result is then surveyed by implementing the theories on adelimitated phase of the Falklands War, in order to conclude if the differences have a decisive impact on the product of the CoG analysis. The result of this thesis indicates that the diversity in theory is a perceived problem. The identified divergence does not reflect crucially on the CoG analysis and the variation of the input provided to the operational design is minor. The CoGs and the critical vulnerabilities identified are the same or at least similar, no matter which of the two theories was used in this research. / Avdelning: ALB – Slutet Mag. 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 07-09
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Artillery and warfare 1945-2025Bailey, J. P. A. January 2009 (has links)
For millennia battles were essentially affairs of linear encounter. From the 10th Century to the 20th Century, artillery generally fired directly in the two dimensional plane,limiting potential effects. The development of indirect fire changed this , two-dimensional model. Warfare became not so much a matter of linear encounter as one of engagement as cross and throughout an area; and artillery dominated land operations in both the First and Second World Wars as a result. Firepower was subsequently often applied in even greater weights, but its effects were frequently excessive and high-value targets proved elusive. During the Cold War in Europe,the importance of field artillery wanded relative to other arms. Artillery could only regain its utility by acquiring the highest-value targets and engaging them effectively with the appropriate degree of force in time and space true precision, as opposed to mere accuracy at a point. Improvements in target acquisition and accuracy will enable land systems once more to engage targets effectively throughout the battlespace with implications for warfare analogous to those precipitated by the introduction of indirect fire a century ago. Land operations will become increasingly three-dimensional and Joint. The effects of fire will increasingly be applied in, not merely via, the third dimensions, since targets themselves will increasingly be located, not just on the area of a battlefield, but in the volume of three-dimensional battlespace with values of indetermined by considerations of the fourth dimension, time. Fire, lethal and non-lethal, will also be targeted in other less tangible dimensions such as cyber-space and new types of 'virtual counterfire' will also emerge in the forms of legal and moral restraint. All will be viewed through the lens of perceptions. The burgeoning of firepower from all sources now becomes the spur for changes in the relationship between the land and air components, mindful of those novel factors that will increasingly inhibit the application of that firepower.
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