This analysis proposes the thesis that in the formulation of post-war British defence policy, wider strategic developments taking place in the international environment are as important as, if not more than, domestic economic considerations, and examines the motivations that lay behind the British government's decision to recapture the Falkland Islands after their seizure by Argentine forces in April 1982. It is a first and comprehensive attempt to explore these two themes. It presents a challenge to the dominant view that British defence policy has, over the past two decades, been influenced by purely economic factors. Throughout the post-war era, defence analysts have come to accept the orthodox paradigm of British defence policy which attributes the reduction in the size of Britain's defence dispositions entirely to financial and economic pressures. While not negating the role of economic factors, this work rejects the gravamen of the orthodox paradigm and attempts to bring balance to the intellectual debate confronting British defence policy. Using the Falklands War as a case-study, this analysis demonstrates the salience of strategic imperatives and underscores the view that economic constraints can be pushed aside for what decision-makers perceive to be higher national and politico-strategic interests. It argues that while several factors may appear to have influenced the British decision to retake the Islands, only two interlocking sets are truly credible. These relate to national honour considerations and the fight for principles. Moreover, it argues that the credibility of the latter flows from the primacy of pride and prestige, thus making national honour considerations the dominant motif or explanation. The analysis begins with a review of the literature and shows the gaps which this work attempts to fill. Chapter Two examines the strategic and economic trends and developments in British defence policy prior to the Falklands War. Chapter Three presents a comprehensive picture and explanation of the Falkland Islands as an issue of long-standing dispute between Argentina and Britain. In Chapter Four, the factors that prompted the Junta to launch its attack are examined and the British response discussed. Chapters Five and Six utilize the Falklands War as a formidable case to support the major theme of this work. Chapter Seven provides a summary, and concludes with a short examination of four basic issues relating to the analysis.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2007. / "Graduate Program in Spanish and Portuguese." Includes bibliographical references (p. 188-192).

Thesis (M.S.)--Central Connecticut State University, 1999. / Thesis advisor: Dr. Alfred C. Richard Jr. " ... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science International Studies." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 130-137).

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making And Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Russell, James. ; Moran, Daniel. "March 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 30, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Deterrence (Strategy); Conventional Deterrence (Strategy); Deterrence-Psychology; Falkland Islands War, 1982; Great Britain; Argentina; Defense Policy Includes bibliographical references (p. 109-112). Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2005. / Advisor: Dr. Jean Graham-Jones, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Interdisciplinary Program in the Humanities. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Aug. 30, 2005). Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 367 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

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No description available.

Att använda erfarenheter, i form av principer, vid militär planering är inget nytt fenomen. SedanNapoleontiden har det vuxit fram riktlinjer för militär planering och genomförande i form avKrigföringens grundprinciper och principer för att skapa en framgångsrik logistik. Exempel påprinciper och hur de ska tolkas finns i de flesta av världens försvarsmakters doktriner.Syftet med uppsatsen är att ge exempel på hur principer för logistik kan användas för att reflekteraöver de logistiska utmaningar, som en befälhavare eller stabsofficer ställs inför vid en militärplanering.Som empiri, för att värdera principerna mot, har Falklandkriget 1982 och Gulfkriget 1991, med ettbrittiskt/amerikansk perspektiv använts. De är båda konventionella krig med ett tydligt militärtslutmål, men har väldigt olika förutsättningar för logistiken i både en tid-, rum- ochstyrkejämförelse.Uppsatsen använder abduktion som metod. Fem principer för logistik bildar hypoteser förframgång som ställs mot empirin, i form av de två krigen. Krigen ställs mot varandra, medprinciperna som analysverktyg, och komparationens likheter och skillnader gör det möjligt attvärdera och dra slutsatser av principernas innebörd.Resultatet visar att principerna har ett värde och analysen ger vid handen ett flertal slutsatser somkan användas vid militär planering. Principerna ska inte ses som ett krav som måste uppnås för attnå framgång, utan som stöd och riktlinjer för att ta tillvara beprövad erfarenhet. / Using experience, in the form of principles, in military planning is not a new phenomenon. SinceNapoleon there has been development of guidelines for military planning and execution in theform of Principles of War and principles for creating successful logistics. Examples of principlescan be found in most of the world’s defense forces’ doctrines.The overall aim of the thesis is to give examples of how to use principles for logistics to reflecton the logistic challenges you face, as a commander or a staff officer, in military planning.The empirical material used to test the principles against are the Falkland War and the Gulf War,from a British/American perspective. They are both conventional wars with a clear military endstate, but differ a lot in the logistic requirements, both in a time-, space- and forces comparison.The thesis uses the method of abduction. Five principles of logistics make five hypotheses forsuccess that are contrasted with the empirical evidence, in the form of the two wars. The wars arecompared to each other, with the principles as analytic tools, and the similarity and thedifferences in the comparison make it possible to draw conclusions about the principles’ content.The result shows that the principles have value and the analysis gives a number of conclusionsthat can be used in military planning. The principles should not be seen as requirements forsuccess, but rather as a support of, and as guidelines for your planning in order to make use ofprevious experience. / Avdelning: ALB – Slutet Mag. 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 07-09

Centers of Gravity (CoGs) analyses deliver vital input to the operational design. However, there are a great number of theories regarding the phenomenon which can create a certain degree of confusion. The diversity in theories may lead to misdirected mental energy where the focus is to discuss theories instead of using the theories at hand efficiently. The question is if the diversity in theory is an actual problem or if it just perceived as such? This research identifies the similarities and differences in the theories of Milan Vego and Joseph Strange & Richard Iron regarding CoGs, their sub elements and methods for analysis. The impact of the differences on the practical result is then surveyed by implementing the theories on adelimitated phase of the Falklands War, in order to conclude if the differences have a decisive impact on the product of the CoG analysis. The result of this thesis indicates that the diversity in theory is a perceived problem. The identified divergence does not reflect crucially on the CoG analysis and the variation of the input provided to the operational design is minor. The CoGs and the critical vulnerabilities identified are the same or at least similar, no matter which of the two theories was used in this research. / Avdelning: ALB – Slutet Mag. 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 07-09