Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:23:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2011-02-08Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:30:20Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 fraga_js_me_arafcl.pdf: 570399 bytes, checksum: c4d98662c4b2a66e86a84c364b2ae848 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a experiência do Japão após os colapsos das bolhas especulativas dos ativos na década de 1990. Aceitando que o pior já passou, ou seja, que a crise financeira japonesa foi finalmente resolvida, uma coisa é certa; não antes de uma “década perdida” caracterizada por um longo período, de baixo crescimento, aumento das taxas de desemprego, deflação nos preços dos ativos, falências bancárias e persistência dos no-performing loans. Nesse contexto, as principais respostas obtidas por este trabalho foram: a crença que a recuperação econômica viria com o passar do tempo e a falta de entendimento sobre o tamanho do problema que a morosidade de atuação levaria ao sistema, explica em certo ponto a tolerância inicial do governo japonês frente à crise econômica. A política fiscal expansionista foi eficaz, mas, não utilizada de forma consistente, a natureza “stop-start” dos estímulos realizados, e em particular as prematuras reversões fiscais diminuíram a sua eficácia, outros fatores prováveis para a baixa eficácia durante os anos 90 foram: os estímulos fiscais podem ter sido prejudicados pela queda dos multiplicadores fiscais; os efetivos investimentos públicos foram menores que os anunciados e ao invés de se dar ênfase a obras públicas, priorizou-se cortes em impostos. De outra forma, um caminho fundamental de maximizar os estímulos fiscais é através da restauração do crédito do setor bancário, caso a recapitalização e as restaurações do setor fossem realizas em uma fase inicial, os efeitos dos estímulos poderiam ser de curta duração, se o sistema financeiro estivesse em boa saúde. No Japão, as injeções nos bancos “em grande escala” ocorreram apenas em 1999. Por outro lado, a política monetária, com base em uma versão alternativa da armadilha da liquidez levou o BOJ a tomar algumas medidas... / This dissertation intend to analyze the experience of Japan after the collapse of speculative bubbles in assets in the 1990s. Accepting that the worst is over, that is to say, that the Japanese financial crisis was finally resolved, one thing is certain; not before a “lost decade” characterized by a long period of low growth, increasing rates of unemployment, deflation in asset prices, bank failures and persistence of no-performing loans. In this context, the main responses received for this work were: the belief that economic recovery would come with the passage of time and lack of understanding about the size of the problem that the slowness of action would lead to the system; this explains in some degree the initial tolerance of the Japanese government by the economic crisis. The expansionary fiscal was effective, but not consistently used, the nature of “stop-start” of the stimuli made, and in particular the early tax reversals decreased its effectiveness, other likely factors for the low efficiency during the year 1990 were: the fiscal stimuli may have been harmed by falling tax multipliers; the effective public investments were lower than those advertised instead of giving emphasis to public works, the priority was tax cuts. On the other hand, a fundamental way to maximize the tax incentives is through the restoration of credit from the banking sector, if the recapitalization and the restorations of the sector were held in an early stage, the effects of stimuli could be short term, if the financial system was in good health. In Japan, the injections in banks “large scale” occurred only in 1999. Moreover, monetary policy, based on an alternative version of the liquidity trap led the BOJ to take some innovative measures since 2001. Centered on a strategy to ensure liquidity and extend the warranties on direct purchases of assets, quantitative easing was implanted... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)

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[pt] O objetivo deste trabalho é verificar qual dentre as teorias de Trade-Off e Pecking Order predomina nos anos de crise financeira para explicar a forma como empresas brasileiras de capital aberto tomam suas decisões de financiamento. No Brasil, quatro crises financeiras relevantes aconteceram no período de 1998 até 2016: as crises de 1999, 2002, 2008 e 2015. A decisão da estrutura de capital das empresas tem implicações no valor de mercado da companhia e seu custo de capital. Por esse motivo, os estudos sobre a estrutura de capital têm se apresentado como um dos temas mais estudados e relevantes na área de finanças corporativas. Dentre as teorias estudadas, existem duas correntes teóricas que discutem como as empresas determinam sua estrutura de capital: a teoria de Trade-Off e a teoria de Pecking Order. Desta forma, inicialmente foram verificadas quebras estruturais no nível de alavancagem das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto nos anos de crises financeiras mencionados e, em seguida, aplicado o modelo de Tong e Green (2005) de regressão múltipla em cross section, a fim de verificar qual teoria melhor explica as decisões de financiamento das empresas nesses anos. / [en] The objective of this study is to verify which of the theories - trade-off or pecking order - prevails in the years of financial crisis to explain how Brazilian publicly held companies make their financing decisions. In Brazil, four major financial crises occurred from 1998 to 2016: the crises of 1999, 2002, 2008 and 2015. A company s decision on its capital structure is important because the composition of its different financing sources has implications for its market value and cost of capital. For this reason, capital structure has been one of the most studied and relevant topics in corporate finance. Among the theories studied, there are two theoretical currents that discuss how companies determine their capital structure: trade-off theory and pecking order theory. Thus, a methodology was initially applied to verify the existence of a structural break in the level of leverage of Brazilian publicly traded companies in those previously mentioned years of financial crises. Later, a model of multiple regression in cross section, based on Tong and Green (2005) was applied, in order to verify which theory best explains the financing decisions of the companies in those years.

La crise qui a démarré en 2007 a remis en cause les fondations de la théorie et du système financier. Cette théorie s’articule autour des postulats de la finance classique dont la « main invisible » et l’hypothèse de rationalité des investisseurs dont découle celle d’efficience des marchés.Cette crise a mis en lumière l’aspect psychologique des marchés financiers, aspect abordé par J.M Keynes lorsqu’il développait la notion d’ « esprits animaux » pour rendre compte de l’incertitude de l’économie. Jusqu’au début des années 1980, la compréhension de la psychologie a été le fruit d’une approche informelle.Depuis lors, la psychologie des marchés financiers est formalisée par la finance comportementale. Tout au long de son développement, ses tenants ont remis en cause l’hypothèse de rationalité des investisseurs sur des bases empiriques. Néanmoins, aucun évènement de l’ampleur de cette crise n’a autant invalidé les postulats du mainstream dominant.La théorie financière est à la croisée des chemins. L’hypothèse de rationalité des investisseurs est-elle valide ? Si oui, quelles sont les conditions de sa validité ? Si non, doit-on sortir du cadre de la finance classique et adopter celui de la finance comportementale? Ce sont autant de questions qui appellent à une refondation de la théorie financière.Le jury du Prix d’économie en la mémoire d’Alfred Nobel ne s’est d’ailleurs pas trompé en décernant le prix 2013 aux deux écoles. Cependant, les académiciens ne semblent pas trancher entre elles, reconnaissant ainsi leurs apports respectifs pour la théorie et la pratique financière. Cette récompense suggère néanmoins la question centrale suivante : les deux écoles sont-elles parallèles, complémentaires ou antinomiques?Le premier chapitre traite de la remise en cause des hypothèses centrales de la finance, à la base des modèles de gestion les plus courus. Le cadre de la finance classique n’a pas permis de donner une explication à la formation de la bulle immobilière pas plus qu’il n’a permis de fournir une solution unifiée à la crise. L’inadéquation des hypothèses du cadre classique avec la réalité apparaît notamment dans un contexte de forte volatilité et d’incertitude exacerbée. Cette remise en cause ouvre la voie à l’introduction de paramètres psychologiques dans la compréhension des phénomènes du marché.La finance comportementale développe la psychologie des marchés financiers. Le second chapitre aborde les concepts centraux de ce courant. L’analyse de ces concepts et du développement historique, épistémologique et paradigmatique du courant montre qu’il s’inscrit à l’opposé et, parfois, en complément du classique. Il n’en demeure pas moins que le cadre théorique de ce courant n’est pas encore achevé pas plus que la formation d’un paradigme dominant.Parmi les principaux résultats de la finance comportementale, les outils psychologiques apportent des clefs de lecture pertinentes des marchés financiers. Le troisième chapitre aborde les biais et heuristiques à la lumière de la crise. L’analyse de la crise montre que les heuristiques et les biais émotionnels ont pu conduire les investisseurs à des erreurs de jugements. L’attention et l’analyse se sont focalisées sur des croyances dans un contexte d’opacité de l’information et de l’environnement.La finance comportementale cherche à établir un cadre conceptuel plus élaboré. La théorie des « esprits animaux » a repris de la vigueur notamment chez les comportementalistes à orientation néo-keynésienne. Le retour à cette notion s’explique par l’importance prise de concepts liés comme la confiance, la corruption ou le rôle des histoires. D’ailleurs, les collusions corruptives et le fonctionnement du système ont failli saper durablement la confiance dans l’économie financière. Ce quatrième chapitre montre que la confiance et la corruption procèdent de la psychologie humaine et montrent le poids de celle-ci en situation d’incertitude et le rapport des hommes aux gains. / The crisis that started in 2007 have challenged the foundations of the financial system and the financial theory. This theory is based on assumptions of conventional finance including the "invisible hand" and the rationality assumption of investors which builds that of market efficiency.This crisis has highlighted the psychology of financial markets, aspects already addressed by J.M Keynes when he developed the concept of "animal spirits" to reflect the uncertainty of the economy. Until the early 1980s, the understanding of psychology has always been the result of an informal approach.Since, the psychology of financial markets has been formalized by behavioral finance. Throughout its development, its theoricians have questioned the rationality assumption of investors on empirical bases. However, no paramount event such this crisis has struck much the postulates of the dominant mainstream.Consequently, the financial theory is at the crossroads. Is the assumption of rationality of investors valid? If so, what are the conditions of its validity? If not, are we departing from the scope of conventional finance and adopt that of behavioral finance? These are all issues that are calling for an overhaul of the financial theory.The Jury of the prize in economics in memory of Alfred Nobel did not err in fact by awarding the 2013 prize to these two schools. However, academics do not seem to decide between them, recognizing their contributions to financial theory and practice. This award suggests the following central question: are the two schools parallel, complementary or contradictory?The first chapter deals with the questioning of the central assumptions of finance, at the base of the most popular business models. The framework of conventional finance has failed to give an explanation to the formation of the housing bubble nor has it helped to provide a unified solution to the crisis. The inadequacy of the assumptions of the classical framework with reality appears especially in a context of high volatility and heightened uncertainty. This challenge opens the way for the introduction of psychological parameters in understanding the phenomena of the market.Behavioral finance develops the psychology of financial markets. The second chapter covers the central concepts of this trend, in order to answer the central question of this thesis. The analysis of this trend and its historical epistemological and paradigmatic development shows it is opposite and sometimes in addition to the classic one. The fact remains that the theoretical framework of this trend is not yet completed nor the formation of a new dominant paradigm achieved.Among the key findings of behavioral finance, psychological tools provide relevant insights to developments in financial markets. The third chapter addresses the biases and heuristics in light of the crisis. The analysis of the crisis shows that heuristics and emotional biases may have led investors to judgment errors. The attention and analysis has focused on beliefs in an abstruse information and environmental context, allowing the development of heuristics. Consequently, the tools of behavioral finance can develop a mental map to this crisis.Behavioral finance seeks to establish a more sophisticated conceptual framework. The theory of "animal spirits" has regained momentum especially among behaviorists of neo-Keynesian orientation. The return to this concept is explained by the growing importance of certain concepts such as confidence, corruption and the role of stories in the context of this crisis. Moreover, collusion and corrupt system operation almost permanently undermine confidence in the financial economy. This fourth chapter shows that trust and corruption stem from human psychology and show the weight of the latter in situations of uncertainty and the relationship between men and earnings.

The Great Recession is the manifestation of some fundamental problems in the real sector of the global economy, related basically to the loss of competitiveness of the U.S. and other central economies, reflected in continuous external disequilibria in the form of parallel current account deficits and financial account surpluses. Domestic monetary and fiscal (or domestic adjustment) policies have not reached a solution to the problem because we are now dealing with a global problem that requires multilateral solutions seeking to adjust some fundamental relative prices and the closing of some key structural imbalances in order to make a sustainable recovery possible. Besides, the difficulties in finding and engineering a solution show the need to reassess the theoretical paradigms underlying the economic policies that preceded the current crisis (e.g., supply-side economics). / La Gran Recesión es la manifestación de ciertos problemas fundamentales en el sector real dela economía global, relacionados básicamente con la pérdida de competitividad de los Estados Unidos y otras economías centrales, y que se han reflejado en sucesivos desequilibrios externos en la forma de paralelos déficits en cuenta corriente y superávits en cuenta financiera. Las actuales políticas de ajuste doméstico no están funcionando porque se trata de un problema global que requiere de soluciones globales que permitan el ajuste de ciertos precios relativos fundamentales y la reversión de algunos desequilibrios estructurales básicos, a fin de hacer posible una recupe- ración sostenible. Además, las dificultades para encontrar una solución muestran la necesidad de reevaluar los paradigmas teóricos que sirvieron de base a las políticas económicas previas a la crisis actual (por ejemplo, supply-side economics).

This master dissertation aim to chart the genesis and trends of the recent banking regulations in the context of the dynamic events which have occurred on the financial markets from year 2008, first of all in the framework of sovereign risk regulation. On the base of analyze these processes try to find solutions how to improve the banking regulations.

Submitted by Beatriz Sousa Rocha (sousarocha.beatriz@gmail.com) on 2015-03-10T15:30:30Z No. of bitstreams: 1 BeatrizRocha_The influence of the global crisis on the slowdown of the EM.pdf: 1365314 bytes, checksum: 82f9b310310d1e4103974d5d4aceeb3c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luana Rodrigues (luana.rodrigues@fgv.br) on 2015-03-10T18:01:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 BeatrizRocha_The influence of the global crisis on the slowdown of the EM.pdf: 1365314 bytes, checksum: 82f9b310310d1e4103974d5d4aceeb3c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-11T12:48:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 BeatrizRocha_The influence of the global crisis on the slowdown of the EM.pdf: 1365314 bytes, checksum: 82f9b310310d1e4103974d5d4aceeb3c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-11-14 / This paper investigates the empirical relationship between the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the 2010-2012 sovereign debt crisis and the recent emerging equity markets slowdown. The exposure of the emerging markets to the crisis of the developed markets is quantified using an interdependence factor model. The results show that emerging markets did suffer a shock from both crisis, yet they recovered while the developed markets were still struggling. After the sovereign debt crisis emerging markets slowed down synchronized with the developed market’s recovery. The paper further analyses whether capital flows explain the connection between these two events, finding this relationship exists. / A presente dissertação investiga a relação empírica entre a crise financeira de 2007-2009, a crise da dívida soberana de 2010-2012 e a recente desaceleração dos mercados de capitais nos mercados emergentes. A exposição dos mercados emergentes à crise nos desenvolvidos é quantificada através de um modelo de interdependência de factores. Os resultados mostram que estes sofreram, de facto, um choque provocado por ambas as crises. No entanto, este foi um choque de curta duração enquanto os mercados desenvolvidos ainda lutavam com as consequências resultantes das sucessivas crises financeiras. A análise do modelo mostra ainda que após a crise da divida soberana, enquanto os mercados desenvolvidos iniciam a sua recuperação, os emergentes desaceleram o seu crescimento. De forma a completar a análise do modelo foi efectuado um estudo sobre a influência dos fluxos de capitais entre os mercados emergentes e desenvolvidos na direcção do seu crescimento, revelando que existe uma relação entre estes dois eventos.

Submitted by João Ricardo Costa Filho (joao.costa@gvmail.br) on 2011-08-25T17:38:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - final.pdf: 669830 bytes, checksum: ec0f074857246db42ad241ecf116ce89 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-08-25T18:34:43Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - final.pdf: 669830 bytes, checksum: ec0f074857246db42ad241ecf116ce89 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-08-25T18:34:58Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - final.pdf: 669830 bytes, checksum: ec0f074857246db42ad241ecf116ce89 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-08-25T18:36:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - final.pdf: 669830 bytes, checksum: ec0f074857246db42ad241ecf116ce89 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-19 / The aim of this paper is to analyse whether the economic policy response capability was a relevant factor for minimizing the 2008 financial crisis severity within its first year. The research hypothesis is that countries with a larger space for expansionary policies – higher interest rates and better fiscal results – have registered a less severe crisis. The econometric results corroborate with the hypothesis for the monetary policy. In relation to the fiscal policy, the sign of the parameters was the opposite of what was expected, signaling that, even countries with good fiscal results can experience limitations to Keynesian stimulus due to debt intolerances. However, the interation between central govern result and gross debt confirms the research hypothesis, whereas a better management of the fiscal flow and debt stock simultaneously seems to be relevant. Adding an investment grade variable to the specifications highlighted that the crisis was more severe within the developed economies. / Este trabalho tem por objetivo analisar se a capacidade de resposta de política econômica foi fator relevante para minimizar a severidade da crise financeira de 2008, no primeiro ano do episódio. A hipótese da pesquisa é que países com um maior espaço para políticas expansionistas – maiores taxas de juros maiores e melhores resultados do governo central – tenham registrado uma crise menos severa, tudo mais constante. Os resultados econométricos corroboram com a hipótese em relação à política monetária. No que diz respeito à política fiscal, o sinal dos parâmetros encontrado é oposto ao esperado, sinalizando que, possivelmente, mesmo países com bons resultados fiscais possam ter limitações a estímulos keynesianos em função da tolerância ao seu nível de endividamento. Entretanto, a interação entre o resultado do governo central e o endividamento está em linha com a hipótese da pesquisa, uma vez que uma melhor gestão tanto do fluxo fiscal, quanto do estoque da dívida no ano anterior ao evento mostrou-se relevante. A adição da variável de investment grade às especificações ressaltou uma crise mais severa nas economias desenvolvidas.

Depuis la stagflation observée consécutivement à la forte hausse du prix du pétrole en 1973 et 1979, les chocs pétroliers sont considérés comme l’une des sources de fluctuations potentiellement les plus importantes aux États-Unis comme dans de nombreux pays industrialisés. De nombreux articles ont étudié le rôle des chocs pétroliers dans la fluctuation des principales variables macroéconomiques à savoir, la croissance, le chômage, l’inflation et les salaires. Cependant, ces travaux n’ont pas encore permis d’aboutir à un consensus. Le débat s’est même intensifié au cours de cette dernière décennie, en raison d’une absence de réaction forte de l’économie réelle pendant la période d’augmentation du prix du pétrole entre 2002 et 2007. En effet, la récession qu’aurait dû engendrer une telle hausse des prix ne fut observée qu’au moment de la crise des subprimes en 2008. Plusieurs hypothèses furent avancées pour expliquer la différence entre les crises des années 1970 et 2000. Blanchard & Gali (2009) et Blanchard & Riggi (2013) évoquent, par exemple, la réduction de la quantité de pétrole utilisée dans la production, la plus grande flexibilité des salaires réels et une meilleure crédibilité de la politique monétaire. Hamilton (2009) et Kilian (2008) suggèrent quant à eux de l’expliquer par l’origine différente des deux chocs pétroliers : un choc d’offre pendant les années 70 et un choc de demande pendant les années 2000. L’objectif original de la thèse était de réexaminer l’impact des chocs pétroliers sur l’économie réelle par le canal de la dette. [...]Le développement de ces travaux entamés dans la thèse pourra aboutir à un cadre alternatif de modélisation décisif pour l’intelligence de la macroéconomie. Il devrait permettre une meilleure compréhension de l’évaluation des relations réciproques entre la sphère financière, la réalité des cycles macroéconomiques réels, l’énergie et le climat dans ce qui est sans aucun doute l’enjeu de notre génération : la transition écologique. / Ever since the stagflation that followed the oil price run-ups of 1973 and 1979, oil price shocks have been considered one of the most influential sources of economic fluctuation in the United States and other developed countries. A large body of literature has analyzed oil price shocks as sources of variation for leading macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth, unemployment rate, inflation, and wages. However, scholars have yet to reach a consensus as to the true impact of oil shocks on the macroeconomic environment. Furthermore, the last decade has seen the debate intensify as the results of the relatively (in comparison with the 1970s) muted reaction of the real economy during the 2002-6 oil price run-up. Indeed, the recessionary effect was only observed during the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008-9. Numerous hypotheses have been put forward to explain the difference in impact during the 1970s versus the 2000s. For instance, Blanchard & Gali (2009) and Blanchard & Riggi (2013) evoked the reduction of the quantity of oil used of a unit of production, more flexible real wages, and a better credibility of the monetary policy. Hamilton (2009) and Kilian (2008) pinpointed a difference in the nature of the shock: whereas the oil shocks of the 1970s were driven by supply, that of the 2000s was led by demand. The original aim of this thesis was to reevaluate the impact of the oil shock in the 2000s through the debt channel. First, based on the work of Banchard & Gali, we proposed a new dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE), which includes oil as an input of production as well as a consumption good. By relaxing some of the hypotheses of Blanchard & Gali, especially the decoupling of the output elasticity of oil with the cost-share in the production, our work demonstrated that oil is still a fundamental variable of the GDP in the United States. Furthermore, we found that energy efficiency is a key factor that explains the muted macroeconomic impact of an increase in oil prices. A third line of inquiry that may explain the difference between the shocks of the 1970s and the 2000s considers the extra costs implied by a higher price of oil that were absorbed by private debt (which was itself exacerbated by low interest rates set by the Federal Reserve in the 2000s). However, we found that DSGE modeling is unable to replicate the macroeconomic environment that led to the subprime mortgage crisis. In light of these considerations, I reoriented my thesis along the lines of a new angle of research that seeks to represent economic mechanisms differently. Under this new frame-work, private debt is at the core of macroeconomic analysis. It provides an alternative view of the financial crisis that occurred in the 2000s.[...]The conclusions of this thesis demonstrate great potential for providing foundations for new perspectives in macroeconomic modeling. The papers included in the thesis allow, in particular, for a better understanding of situations that most macroeconomic models are not able to cope with, including the over indebtedness crisis. As a result, the framework introduced here may provide an alternative and improved perspective for public policy. Further development of the research presented in this thesis may lead to the improvement of other frameworks in the field of macroeconomics. This would allow for a better understanding of complex interactions between the financial sphere, real business cycles, energy, and climate in what is certainly the biggest challenge of our generation : the ecological shift.

The determinants of audit fees and report lag: A comparative study of Egypt and the UK Despite the occurrence of recent economic and political events such as the global financial crisis and Arab spring in the Middle East, researchers have not addressed the effects of such events on the auditing profession. That is has given a motive to this study to explore this point of research. This study has three main objectives. The first objective is to investigate the determinants of audit fees and audit report timeliness in the Egyptian and UK contexts. The second objective is to point out how the economic and political events could affect these determinants. The third objective is to make a comparison between the response of auditors towards economic and political instability in both countries. These objectives are set to solve the research problem of this study which is to investigate how the price behaviour of audit fees and report timeliness can vary in two different contexts: Egypt and the UK, and to highlight how auditors respond to such economic (Global Financial Crisis) and political events (Egyptian Revolution). A special attention has been addressed to tourism industry while investigating audit pricing and timeliness decisions throughout this study for two reasons. First, tourism industry play a critical role for the economy of many developing and developed countries. Second, tourism industry is highly affected by any economic and political events. For these reasons, tourism industry is surrounded by high risk during the economic or political instability, and thus this might result in special procedures and decisions taken by the auditors regarding tourism industry clients during instable periods. To take into account the most recent economic and political events, the study sample covers the period of six financial years from 2008 to 2013. This sample period has been chosen to capture the global financial crisis that has taken place during 2008-2009 and also to investigate the effects of the Egyptian revolution that has taken place on January 25, 2011, and subsequent political events. The study sample includes 212 Egyptian companies listed in the Egyptian stock market and the top 350 companies (FTSE 350) listed in the London Stock Exchange. For guaranteeing the preciseness of the findings, advanced panel data Prais-Winsten statistical analysis technique has been used throughout this study. Results of this study reveal consistency between Egypt and UK in most signs of coefficients of audit fees determinants. However, a lot of differences exist between the audit report lag determinants in the Egyptian and UK context that suggest that a one-size-fits-all approach cannot be generalized in audit report lag determinants for various countries. Despite that tourism is a very risky industry that is easily affected by economic and political instability, results reported in Egypt and UK reveal that audit fees charged and audit delay reported for tourism did not differ from other industries in both contexts. Results also reveal that Big N auditing firms in the UK have competitive advantages of not charging an audit fee premium and offering a more timely audit report than non-big N. These advantages increase the demand of Big N in the UK and increase their dominance. On the other side, in Egypt, Big N auditing firms do not offer such advantage of timely audit reports than non-big N, besides, they charge their clients with audit fee premium. That enabled medium sized and small auditing firms to penetrate the Egyptian auditing market and increase their market share, and thus, Big N dominance is not high in the Egyptian audit market as that in the UK. Different auditor responses to global financial crisis (GFC) have been documented in both countries. As auditors in Egypt decreased their audit fees and offered more timely audit report to face the economic recession and the anxiety of investors accompanied with the GFC. However, neither the pricing of auditing services nor the audit report lag have been affected during the GFC in the UK audit market. According to the results of this study, during the Egyptian Revolution, auditors tended to charge audit fees premium without increasing/decreasing audit delay. This implies that the increase in audit fees during revolution was a risk premium due to the instability in economic and political conditions and was not accompanied by any increase in audit effort and delay.