我國中央政府在1980年代以前，財政政策向採取穩健保守的策略，財政收支結果大體能維持均衡，80會計年度以後，由於經濟發展、政治開放及社會型態的轉變，為推動重大國家基礎建設及各種社會福利措施，使政府實質收支結果多為短絀，且政府債務比率亦呈上升趨勢，為因應償債高峰期及達成財政平衡目標，政府開始進行一連串的制度改革。 財政紀律係根基於一國的政治制度，使國家財政或預算政策，須在某些限制下，經由特定且透明的程序而形成，其目的在穩定國家財政，避免政府過度支出及稅基流失，造成財政短絀。預算程序既為形成國家預算的制度與規則，必然存在一定的財政紀律效果，以約束政府收入、支出及舉債的規劃。 本研究經由文獻探討、比較分析及實證研究結果，發現我國中央政府預算籌劃擬編、審議及執行過程，確具一定程度的財政紀律，其中，以擬編階段有較佳的財政紀律效果；雖然在執行階段藉由辦理追加（減）及特別預算，有減弱財政紀律之虞，但實證結果並不顯著；此外，我國中央政府的非營業特種基金數量，隨著財政紀律約束效力的提升，確有增加設置的趨勢，因此，可以合理懷疑非營業特種基金極有可能已成為規避財政紀律的工具；另當遭逢組織調整及政黨輪替等二項事件時，預算程序的財政紀律約束效果有相當程度的減弱，致使政府支出在當時有增加的趨勢；同時也發現，因政府各部門的業務屬性、政策或政治特性不同，預算程序對其也有不同的財政紀律效果。 此外，本研究也發現，我國中央政府在擬編預算階段即使經過二次的改革，仍無法完全擺脫政治因素，如選舉因素及執政者的政策偏好等之影響，顯示作業流程的變革僅為提升財政紀律的手段之一，要進一步提升財政紀律，似乎需要更強而有力的作法，但現階段期待藉由立法或修法程序來進一步強化財政紀律，實非易事，所以我國若要持續提高預算程序的財政紀律效力，應可參考德國的經驗，朝提高預算透明度的方向著手。 / The fiscal policy of the central government always took a more steady but conservative approach before 1980, which also created a generally fiscal balance. After fiscal year 1980, due to economic development, political reforms and an inner transformation of the society, the government has been promoting several important national infrastructures and social welfare policies, the real income and expenditure has incurred deficits, and the public debt ratio increased. The government then began a series of institutional reforms to meet the peak periods of paying off debts and reach the goal of fiscal balance. Fiscal discipline is based on a nation’s political system, which demands specific and transparent procedures under some kinds of limitations for the national financial or budget policies to consolidate national finance and avoid over-expenditure and a loss of tax-basis in the government. Since the budget procedure contribute a lot to the formation of national budget system and regulations, there must exist certain fiscal disciplines to control and manage the income, expenditure and debts of the government. The thesis finds the government stage, parliamentary stage and implementation stage of the central government do exist certain degree of fiscal discipline through literature review, comparative analyses and empirical research. The government stage, specifically, has better fiscal discipline among the three. Although there may exist some possible risks of curtailing fiscal discipline at the implementation state through supplementary budget, the empirical research does not show the significance. Besides, the installation of the number of the special funds of the central government does have a tendency of increase. Therefore, we have reasons to doubt the special funds have been used as tools to avoid fiscal discipline by the central government. The binding effect of the fiscal discipline in the budgetary process is curtailed especially when there is some institutional adjustment or a party change in the central government, and the government expenditure is thus caused to increase. The thesis also finds the budgetary process has different fiscal disciplines due to the differences by the division of labor, policies and political characteristics of each section of the government. The thesis also finds the central government cannot get rid of political interference such as elections and preferences of those in power at the government stage albeit through two fiscal reforms. It shows that a reform in the task flow only serve as just one of the measures to enhance fiscal discipline. It requires more powerful and effective measures to further enhance fiscal discipline. However, it’s not an easy job at present time to expect the enhancement of fiscal discipline through legislative procedures or amendment of laws. The government may look to the experience of Germany to enhance the transparency of budget if it seeks an enhancement of the effectiveness of the fiscal discipline in the budgetary process.

European fiscal integration in euro absentia. Budgetary compliance as a step stone to a fiscal union Author: Ștefania-Felicia Pavel Student ID: 31195144 Degree: Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Programme European Politics and Society Supervisor: Mitchell Young, PhD. Institution: Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences Institute of International Studies Submission: June 2020 Defence: September 2020 English abstract This research investigates fiscal convergence via disciplined budgets in non-euro Member States. The thesis hypothesizes that 1) post-2010 enhanced macroeconomic governance is conducive to a fiscal union and 2) fiscal stance of non-euro Member States is not correlated with their attitude to euro adoption. The fiscal convergence in euro absentia is dually tested through theory application and intensive case studies. The results show that countries can be fiscally compliant, but reject the euro or be euro enthusiast, yet fiscally deviant. Thus, the single currency can be either backstop or driver of more integration, nonetheless, European integration continues. The findings substantiate the proposition that a fiscal union is building up even in euro absentia.

Economia / Doctoral in Economics / A constatação da existência de um desequilíbrio importante entre as vertentes política e económica do processo de integração europeia, com a primeira num clima de debilidade e a segunda quase no limite máximo, constitui o ponto de partida para a presente dissertação. Associando-se tal situação aos principais défices actuais da União Europeia (UE) de competitividade, crescimento e emprego, de peso político, de participação e legitimidade democrática, e de capacidade de decisão e acção e ao actual modelo de organização política, institucional e económica da União, argumenta-se a favor de uma profunda mudança no mesmo. Nesse contexto, são observados vários modelos sugeridos no passado recente, com base numa análise custo-benefício assente nas respostas dos mesmos aos binómios unidade/diversidade e flexibilidade/compromisso . Associando a essa análise alguns elementos históricos e o êxito do modelo federal em sociedades com larga diversidade, argumenta-se a favor da evolução da UE para uma Federação de Estados-Nação fortemente descentralizada, baseada numa Constituição e com organização institucional federal, cujas características básicas são descritas. Nota-se adicionalmente que a mudança para este modelo deverá ser acompanhada por alterações importantes ao nível económico. Confrontando a literatura do federalismo fiscal com a actual situação ao nível da definição e implementação das políticas orçamentais nacionais e ao nível da composição e aplicação do orçamento comunitário, conclui-se que a UE se encontra ainda bastante longe de uma situação de federalismo orçamental. Neste âmbito, procede-se a um conjunto de sugestões de mudança a dois níveis temporais distintos. No médio e longo prazo, aponta-se para a necessidade de alargamento da dimensão e de alterações no modo de financiamento do orçamento comunitário, incluindo-se a sugestão de criação de um novo recurso próprio assente na tributação do rendimento individual, como forma de possibilitar uma resposta eficiente aos novos desafios da União e de permitir algum exercício da função de estabilização macroeconómica ao nível central. No curto prazo, aponta-se para a necessidade de alteração ao enquadramento institucional relativo à coordenação das políticas macroeconómicas, de construção de um mecanismo limitado de absorção de choques assimétricos, e de uma reforma mais credível do Pacto de Estabilidade e Crescimento, incluindo a possibilidade de diferenciação temporária das regras de disciplina orçamental, em função da dimensão e do nível de desenvolvimento dos Estados-Membros, e de tratamento mais favorável dos incentivos à Investigação e Desenvolvimento, sugestões assentes na apresentação e resolução numérica de um modelo de união monetária a dois países. / The existence of an important disequilibrium between the two faces economic and political of the process of European integration is the departing point of this thesis. By associating such disequilibrium with the major present deficits in the EU of competitiveness, growth and employment; of political weight; of participation and democratic legitimacy; of capacity for decision and action and the present model of political, institutional and economic organisation, we argue for a profound change in such model. In this context, we analyse several models that have been suggested for the case of the EU in the last years. A cost-benefit analysis is thus carried and based on the capacity of these models to deal with two essential binomials unity/diversity and flexibility/compromise. By adding several elements from the European history and the success shown by federal models in societies with large diversity, we argue for an evolution of the EU towards a highly decentralised Federation of Nation-States . This Federation should be based on a true Constitution whose characteristics we describe, together with those of a federal organisation. We also note that the evolution towards this model should be accompanied with important changes at the economic level. By comparing the theory of fiscal federalism with the current situation in terms of the definition and implementation of national fiscal policies and of the composition and use of the European budget, we conclude that the EU is still far away from the case of fiscal federalism and that several changes should happen at two distinct temporal levels. In the medium to long term, we call for an important enlargement of the EU budget together with substantial changes in its financing, including the creation of a new own resource based on individual income taxation. This measure would raise the capacity of the EU to deal with its new challenges and allow the EU to have a significant role in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation. In the short run, we argue for a relevant change in the institutional framework for the coordination of macroeconomic policies, the creation of a limited shock-absorber mechanism and a more credible reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. This reform would allow for a temporary differentiation of fiscal discipline rules, by taking into account the economic dimension and level of development of the Member-Countries, and for a more favourable treatment of public expenses related to Research and Development, with these suggestions sustained by the numerical solution of a model of monetary union with two countries.

The thesis evaluates a need of the Fiscal compact measures, its adequacy and impacts on the Eurozone namely based on evaluation of indebtedness of selected member states. The evaluation is carried out by the empirical-analytic research, where the euro zone is analyzed from the perspective of the theory of optimal monetary area, the issue of member countries indebtedness and impacts of indebtedness on the entire euro zone. The thesis also evaluates the existing instruments of fiscal discipline and their deficiencies and new Fiscal compact as an instrument for stabilization and correction. The thesis examines the accuracy of the initial hypothesis that the Fiscal compact as an instrument of fiscal discipline is entirely essential measure of the future euro area functioning. It had been proven that a monetary union can not effectively operate without the long-term fiscal union.

Les fonctions administratives du gouvernement consistent à fournir les services publics, et à opérer la gestion publique et administrative. Cela nécessite l’utilisation en continu d’importantes sommes d’argent. Or, le principal revenu provenant de la collecte des impôts ne suffit pas pour opérer les missions et les nécessaires activités de l’Etat. C’est la raison pour laquelle, celui-ci doit emprunter davantage aux institutions financières intérieures et extérieures. En Thaïlande, le premier emprunt fut créé à l’ère du Roi Rama V. Et après la Révolution siamoise de 1932, le pays commença à emprunter de plus en plus aux institutions financières internationales et aux gouvernements étrangers pour son développement. Ce sont les crises économiques mondiales qui ont obligé divers pays dans le monde à contracter la dette publique et qui ont fait accroître ladite dette en Thaïlande. La notion de gestion de la dette publique devient alors indispensable et, à cet égard, plusieurs pays ont rendu des lois spéciales. En Thaïlande, la Loi portant sur la gestion de la dette publique B.E. 2548 (2005) et la désignation d’un mandataire constitue la loi fondamentale autorisant le gouvernement à contracter la dette publique, et à la gérer diversement -en raison d’un changement de situation- comme la dette contractée pour le développement économique et social, pour la restructuration de la dette et la mise en œuvre de la politique sur les transactions financières en vue de réduire le risque de dette publique, etc. / The government, as the administration, is responsible for public services, public affairs and administrative missions. It is, therefore, necessary to spend a great number of money consecutively. The main income of the government earned by the tax collection is not enough for its missions and the other necessary things. That’s why it had to loan more and more money from the domestic and international financial institutions. In Thailand, money has been loaned since the reign of King Rama V. After the Siamese Revolution of 1932, Thailand has incurred more public debt from the international financial institutions and foreign governments for country’s development. Public debt of Thailand and different countries has enormously increased while the notion of public debt management has also developed and the special acts on public debt management have been issued in many countries, because of the necessity of incurring public debt of several countries as well as economic crisis happened around the world. In Thailand, the Public Debt Management Act B.E. 2548 (2005) is considered as the principal law authorizing the government to incur and manage public debt in various ways for adapting to changing circumstances such as public debt incurred for social and economic development, for debt restructuring and financial transaction used for reducing the risk on public debt, etc.

From recent research on optimum currency areas it is clear that the European Monetary Union does not represent an optimum currency area. Since 2008 the countries of southern part of the eurozone have found themselves in a financial, economic and debt crisis. Therefore a question about the economic importance of splitting the European Monetary Union arises. The aim of this thesis is to give answer to the question of how to divide the eurozone so that the newly formed monetary unions could be considered optimum currency unions, alternatively, so that the newly formed monetary unions are more optimal than currently the eurozone is. Using the method of analysis and synthesis we have reached a decision to divide the eurozone into two parts. One part comprising the southern countries -- Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Malta and Cyprus and the other part comprising the rest of the eurozone.

In this thesis I am concernced with a Foucauldian analysis of neoliberal government and application of this concept in the Petr Nečas's government. The Foucauldian analysis of power is a constant critical process that is supposed to modify according to changing terms. Foucault argues that the core of the art of government is a conflict. He doesn't understand the modern history as a history of law and peace. From the Foucauldian point of view the modern history has always been the history of conflict of two races. The winnig race determines law and rules of the whole society. It means that law and freedom are tools of governance. The basis of Foucault's concept is a relationship between power, knowledge and subject. This relationship constitutes technologies of governance. Foucault talks about three techniques - pastoral power, disciplinary power and bio-power. The bio-power is especially in the modern age. The modern art of government uses knowledge of experts (statistics, analyses, reports) for conduct of conduct. The inidividuals are not only the recepients of effects of power, but also they are distributors of power. The identity of subjects is formed by family, teachers and co- workers and they are also formed by their milieu. The consequence of this process is mentality of a modern person. The...

Cette thèse s’intéresse au rôle du Ciblage d’inflation (CI) et des règles budgétaires (RBs), ainsi qu’à celui de leurs interactions, sur l’environnement macroéconomique. Après avoir posé les bases conceptuelles et empiriques de ces deux cadres de politique basés sur des règles (Chapitre 1), la thèse met en évidence de nouveaux résultats relatifs à leurs conséquences macroéconomiques. Premièrement, l’adoption du CI permet d’attirer plus d’investissements directs étrangers dans les pays en développement (Chapitre 2). Deuxièmement, dans ces pays, l’adoption du CI incite fortement les gouvernements à entreprendre des réformes destinées à améliorer la qualité des institutions (Chapitre 3). Troisièmement, l’introduction des RBs numériques au niveau national constitue un remède crédible contre l’indiscipline budgétaire, surtout dans les pays politiquement stables et avec un grand nombre de RBs en place. Mais cet effet disciplinaire des RBs diminue avec la durée de temps consécutive à leur adoption et est affaibli en présence de RBs supranationales et dans les pays à gouvernement fragmenté. Plus intéressant, cet effet varie en fonction du type de règles : tandis que les règles de solde budgétaire et les règles de dépense exercent un effet disciplinaire sur la conduite de la politique budgétaire, l’effet des règles de dette s’avère statistiquement non significatif (Chapitre 4). Les trois derniers chapitres de la thèse analysent le rôle de l’interaction entre le CI et les RBs, et dans une plus grande mesure de l’interaction entre les autorités monétaires et budgétaires. Le premier résultat qui en découle est que le CI, qui est un cadre de conduite de la politique monétaire, s’avère aussi suffisamment contraignant pour les autorités budgétaires de sorte à les inciter fortement à améliorer la discipline budgétaire, notamment dans les pays en développement (Chapitre 5). Par ailleurs, d’une part, le CI et les RBs agissent de façon complémentaire, puisqu’adopter à la fois le CI et les Rbs conduit à de meilleurs résultats budgétaires et inflationnistes qu’adopter seulement l’un ou l’autre de ces deux cadres de politique. D’autre part, la séquence qui consiste à introduire d’abord les RBs avant d’adopter le CI produit de meilleures performances inflationnistes et budgétaires que la séquence inverse (Chapitre 6). Finalement, une meilleure cohérence du Policy-Mix, c'est-À-Dire une meilleure coordination des politiques monétaire et budgétaire conduit à une plus grande croissance économique dans la Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) (Chapitre 7). / This thesis is concerned with the role of Inflation Targeting (IT) and Fiscal Rules (FRs), as well as of their interactions, on macroeconomic environment. After laying the conceptual and empirical backgrounds of both these rules-Based policy frameworks (Chapter 1), the dissertation highlights new evidence on their macroeconomic consequences. First, IT adoption does help attracting more Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries (Chapter 2). Second, inthese countries, IT adoption provides strong incentives for governments to undertake reforms designed to improve the quality of institutions (Chapter 3). Third, the introduction of national-Level numerical FRs does stand as a credible remedy against fiscal indiscipline in these countries, all the more in politically stable economies and where the numberof FRs in place is important. But this discipline-Enhancing effect of FRs decreases with the time length since their adoption, and is weakened in the presence of supranational rules and in countries with more fragmented government. Interestingly, this effect varies with the type of rules: while Budget Balance Rules and Expenditure Rules have significant disciplineenhancing effects, the effect of Debt Rules proved not significantly different from zero (Chapter 4). The last three chapters of the thesis focus on the role of the interaction between IT and FRs, and to a broader extent, on the interplay between monetary and fiscal authorities. The first result that emerges is that IT, which is a framework for conducting monetary policy, proves also sufficiently binding for fiscal authorities to providing them with strong incentives for improving fiscal discipline, notably in developing countries (Chapter 5). In addition, on the one hand, IT and FRs act complementarily, as adopting both IT and FRs leads to better results in terms of running fiscal surpluses and in terms of bringing down average inflation than adopting only one of these two frameworks. On the other hand, the sequence which consists of introducing FRs first before adopting IT yields better inflationary and fiscal performances than the opposite sequence (Chapter 6). Finally, better Policy Mix coherence, that is, better coordination between monetary and fiscal policies, is conducive to higher economic growth in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Chapter 7).

Cette thèse s’intéresse d’une part aux effets macroéconomiques des régimes de change, et d’autre part, aux récentes évolutions sur la politique budgétaire et la décentralisation. La partie I met essentiellement l’accent sur l’interaction entre les régimes de change (RC) et la politique budgétaire, monétaire et fiscale. Tout d’abord, nous mettons en évidence que les RC peuvent avoir un effet stabilisateur sur la politique budgétaire (chapitre 1). Cependant, cet effet stabilisateur des RC n’est pas automatique mais dépendrait plutôt des conséquences d’une politique budgétaire laxiste. Le chapitre 2 s’intéresse quant à lui à la causalité entre RC et crises (bancaire/financière, de change et de dette) et remet en cause la vision bipolaire qui prétendait que les RC intermédiaires sont plus vulnérables aux crises que les solutions en coin (RC fixes/flexibles). Il ressort de notre analyse que les fondamentaux macroéconomiques (la volatilité du crédit au secteur privé, le financement du déficit, et le ratio dette sur PIB) jouent un rôle considérable. Le chapitre 3 met en évidence un lien entre les RC et la politique fiscale. Les pays à RC fixes montrent une plus grande dépendance aux recettes domestiques –telles que la TVA-, comparativement aux pays en change intermédiaires/flexibles pour compenser les pertes de recettes de seigneuriage (effet de substitution). De plus, ces pays avec RC fixes collectent plus de recettes domestiques en compensation de la perte de recettes douanières, suite à la libéralisation commerciale (effet de compétitivité). Dans les trois derniers chapitres (partie II), nous mettons le focus sur la politique budgétaire et les effets de la décentralisation. Le chapitre 4 révèle une relation non-linéaire entre la politique budgétaire et le cycle économique, qui dépend du niveau de la dette publique. Lorsque celle-ci dépasse un certain seuil (87%), la politique budgétaire perd toute propriété contra-cyclique. Nous montrons par ailleurs que l’effet disciplinaire ex-ante des règles budgétaires aide à restaurer la contra-cyclicité de la politique budgétaire. A travers le chapitre 5, nous montrons que la décentralisation budgétaire, dans un cadre politico-institutionnel sein et dépourvu de corruption, améliore l’offre de biens et services publics. Le chapitre 6 conclut que la décentralisation impacte positivement le solde structurel. Cependant une asymétrie entre la décentralisation des dépenses et celle des recettes accroit la dépendance des gouvernements locaux vis-à-vis du gouvernement central en termes de transferts, et amoindrirait considérablement à l’effet positif de la décentralisation. / This thesis explored, in two parts, the macroeconomic impacts of exchange rate regimes (ERR), as well as the recent developments in fiscal policy and fiscal decentralization. Part I has reconsidered the role of ERR and its interplay with fiscal, monetary and tax policy. The first result that emerges (Chapter 1) is that fixed ERR can serve as a credible policy tool for stabilizing fiscal policy. However, this stabilizing effect is conditional upon the inter-temporal distribution of the costs of loose fiscal policy. In assessing the linkage between ERR and crises (banking/financial, currency and debt), Chapter 2 evidenced that the bipolar view is no longer valid, and that, crisis proneness rather depends on the macroeconomic fundamentals (the volatility of private sector credit, the deficit-financing mechanism, and the debt-to-GDP ratio). In Chapter 3, we unveiled a strong relationship between ERR and tax policy. Countries with pegged regimes have greater reliance on domestic taxation -such as the VAT- to make up for the loss of seigniorage revenue (substitution effect). Moreover, peggers tend to collect more VAT revenue to offset the shortfall in cross border taxes following the trade liberalization reform (competitiveness effect). Part II discussed the cyclical response of fiscal policy in high debt periods, and focused on fiscal decentralization issues. In Chapter 4, we showed that the reaction of fiscal policy to the business cycle is non-linear and conditional to the level of public debt. When the debt-to-GDP ratio goes beyond a certain threshold (87%), fiscal policy loses its counter-cyclical properties. Further, we highlighted that carefully-designed fiscal rules help maintaining counter-cyclicality through an ex ante disciplinary effect. Chapters 5 and 6 analyzed the impact of fiscal decentralization on the efficiency of public service delivery and fiscal policy performance, respectively. Chapter 5 revealed that a sufficient level of expenditure decentralization, coupled with revenue decentralization, improves the efficiency of public service delivery. However, the political and institutional environment is critical for reaping decentralization-led benefits. Lastly, Chapter 6 concluded that fiscal decentralization has destabilizing effect by reducing the counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy. In addition, we found that decentralization strengthens the structural fiscal balance; however, vertical fiscal imbalances reduce the benefits of decentralization. It is therefore critical to limit asymmetries between expenditure and revenue decentralization, so as to reduce the transfer-dependency of local governments to the central level, and thus prevent decentralization from weakening the fiscal stance at the general government level.