Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2008. / Thesis directed by David Solomon for the Department of Philosophy. "July 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 359-378).

In this thesis, I compare the intellectual trajectories of René Descartes (c. 1596 – 1650) and Abū-Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (c. 1058 – 1111). In Part I, I begin by considering their initial skeptical phases, where the two thinkers are at their most similar, philosophically, methodologically and narratively. I argue that while they begin their projects almost identically, especially in their methods and course of argument, they nonetheless differ in crucial respects. I locate the principal difference to be in their particular uses of the dream. While al-Ghazālī uses the dream to doubt reason itself, Descartes uses it merely to doubt sense-perception and particulars. I analyze this difference by drawing distinctions between dream consciousness and waking consciousness, local and global states of illusion, and which position in time each thinker argues from. I conclude Part I by showing how, despite arriving at the same formal, global skeptical conclusion, our two philosophers nonetheless arrive at it in characteristically different ways. In Part II, I consider how the two thinkers attempt to defeat skepticism. I pay particular attention to their epistemological, phenomenological and metaphysical claims, and their negotiations between reason, experience and the supra-rational. In virtue of comparing their parallel journeys out of skepticism’s void, I am able to argue that the substantive content of their skeptical phases is integral to their positive conclusions. I show that their positive conclusions are direct inversions of those early skeptical structures. More generally, I argue that skepticism –– to its own demise –– is never empty of content.

The key issue in recent debates of Christian apologetics is whether there is any common ground of data and criteria between believers and unbelievers. Two main schools are divided on this issue, namely: evidential and presuppositional apologetics. The evidential apologists claim that a common ground exists, and that objective proofs of theism are possible from this common ground. In contrast, the presuppositional apologists argue that there is no common ground; and they maintain that theoretical arguments (including apologetic ones) are unavoidably prejudiced by religious presuppositions. In this study, both sides are claimed to have their own flaws. The former apologetics has the flaw that its epistemic foundation (i.e., “classical foundationalism”) is fatally defective; and it is criticised by the reformational philosophical tradition, as well as secular contemporary (postmodern) epistemology. In contrast, the latter apologetics has the flaw that when the existence of common ground is entirely denied, the problems of circular reasoning (hence, relativism) and total communication breakdown are unavoidable. In order to clarify and deepen the issue, the tradition of reformational philosophy, which is represented by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd and Van Til is first examined; and it is shown that all three scholars struggle with the tension between antithesis and common ground; and they attempt their own solution. Secondly, the contemporary anti-foundationalist epistemology is examined; and it is shown that the same tension exists between “radical” and “moderate” postmodern (anti-foundationalist) epistemologies; and their debate is on-going – without any satisfactory conclusion. As a solution, it is suggested that the notion of common ground should be distinguished by the ontological and epistemological dimensions. From the epistemological standpoint, all knowledge is prejudiced; and no objective conclusion (on the issue of e.g., theism) can be arrived at by so-called “neutral” rational arguments. However, from the ontological standpoint, it is undeniable that all kinds of knowledge are made possible by certain universal (transcendental) conditions, which constitute the ontic common ground. In this distinction, the confusion is caused by the false assumption that the ontic common ground is meant to function as an epistemic neutral criterion. In contrast, this study argues that the ontic common ground functions only as the condition for the possibility of legitimate knowledge (including apologetic arguments). As a result, this study claims that traditional apologetics, based on objective theistic proofs should be abandoned, and that (radical) presuppositional apologetics needs to be modified. Therefore, as an alternative approach, a new “integral apologetics” is proposed – on the basis of Dooyeweerd’s modal theory of reality. This approach emphasizes the need to utilize different types of knowledge, which together could strengthen the apologetic persuasion towards Christian theism, and take into consideration of the whole context of apologetic dialogue. / PhD (International Trade), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The key issue in recent debates of Christian apologetics is whether there is any common ground of data and criteria between believers and unbelievers. Two main schools are divided on this issue, namely: evidential and presuppositional apologetics. The evidential apologists claim that a common ground exists, and that objective proofs of theism are possible from this common ground. In contrast, the presuppositional apologists argue that there is no common ground; and they maintain that theoretical arguments (including apologetic ones) are unavoidably prejudiced by religious presuppositions. In this study, both sides are claimed to have their own flaws. The former apologetics has the flaw that its epistemic foundation (i.e., “classical foundationalism”) is fatally defective; and it is criticised by the reformational philosophical tradition, as well as secular contemporary (postmodern) epistemology. In contrast, the latter apologetics has the flaw that when the existence of common ground is entirely denied, the problems of circular reasoning (hence, relativism) and total communication breakdown are unavoidable. In order to clarify and deepen the issue, the tradition of reformational philosophy, which is represented by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd and Van Til is first examined; and it is shown that all three scholars struggle with the tension between antithesis and common ground; and they attempt their own solution. Secondly, the contemporary anti-foundationalist epistemology is examined; and it is shown that the same tension exists between “radical” and “moderate” postmodern (anti-foundationalist) epistemologies; and their debate is on-going – without any satisfactory conclusion. As a solution, it is suggested that the notion of common ground should be distinguished by the ontological and epistemological dimensions. From the epistemological standpoint, all knowledge is prejudiced; and no objective conclusion (on the issue of e.g., theism) can be arrived at by so-called “neutral” rational arguments. However, from the ontological standpoint, it is undeniable that all kinds of knowledge are made possible by certain universal (transcendental) conditions, which constitute the ontic common ground. In this distinction, the confusion is caused by the false assumption that the ontic common ground is meant to function as an epistemic neutral criterion. In contrast, this study argues that the ontic common ground functions only as the condition for the possibility of legitimate knowledge (including apologetic arguments). As a result, this study claims that traditional apologetics, based on objective theistic proofs should be abandoned, and that (radical) presuppositional apologetics needs to be modified. Therefore, as an alternative approach, a new “integral apologetics” is proposed – on the basis of Dooyeweerd’s modal theory of reality. This approach emphasizes the need to utilize different types of knowledge, which together could strengthen the apologetic persuasion towards Christian theism, and take into consideration of the whole context of apologetic dialogue. / PhD (International Trade), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

Thesis (DTh)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation has sought to examine how a post-foundationalist approach to Practical Theology might look. This was done through a critical appraisal of the paradigms of foundationalism and non-foundationalism. These paradigms were explored in their historical context and development to illustrate the defining differences and features of both. The researcher then explored Practical Theology in its historical development to examine whether it has moved beyond foundationalism. This was further done by examining the last three decades of Practical Theology by a comparison of methodologies currently proposed. It emerged that, in many ways, Practical Theology has moved beyond the paradigm of foundationalism. This was seen in its affirmation of the local context, its use of a correlational hermeneutic and the pastoral cycle. These areas were then fleshed out in further detail in an attempt to delineate a truly non-foundationalist Practical Theology. A missional perspective on Practical Theology became an entry point into detailed discussions with regard to context, as well as to how the various sources of the correlational hermeneutic can best be understood in a post-foundationalist world, in light of the post-modern critique. These unique features are indeed central to a post-foundational approach to doing Practical Theology. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie proefskrif het gepoog om na te vors hoe ʼn post-foundationalistic benadering tot Praktiese Teologie daar sou uitsien. Dit behels ʼn kritiese beoordeling van die foundationalism en nie-foundationalism paradigmas. Hierdie paradigmas is in hul historiese konteks en ontwikkeling ondersoek om die bepalende verskille en kenmerke van albei te illustreer. Daarna het die navorser Praktiese Teologie in sy historiese ontwikkeling ondersoek om vas te stel of dit verby foundationalism beweeg het. Dit is gedoen deur na die laaste drie dekades van Praktiese Teologie se ontwikkeling te kyk en ʼn vergelyking te tref tussen die verskillende benaderings tot die vak. Dit het geblyk dat Praktiese Teologie in vele opsigte buite die paradigma van foundationalism beweeg het. Dit word duidelik as daar gekyk word na sy bevestiging van die plaaslike konteks, sy gebruik van ʼn korrelasie (correlational) hermeneutiek en die pastorale siklus. Hierdie areas is toe aangevul met verdere detail in ʼn poging om ʼn ware nie-foundationalistic Praktiese Teologie uit te beeld. ʼn Missionale perspektief op Praktiese Teologie het ʼn aansluitingspunt vir uitvoerige besprekings met betrekking tot konteks geword, asook tot hoe die verskeie bronne van die korrelasie hermeneutiek die beste verstaan kan word in ʼn post-foundationalistic wêreld, veral in die lig van die post-moderne kritiek. ʼn Missionale perspektief staan sentraal tot ʼn post-foundational benadering in Praktiese Teologie.

L'ambition qui préside à l'élaboration de ce travail est double : d'abord confronter une lecture précise de Kropotkine (1842-1921) à ce qu'en dit le post-anarchisme, lequel se fait fort de renouveler la compréhension de l'anarchisme à l'aide des outils légués par les auteurs post-modernes français ; ensuite reprendre le dossier de l'antinaturalisme dans la critique sociale. Nous soutenons dans cette thèse que loin de manifester une impasse pour tout discours qui voudrait dessiner les voies d'un changement radical de société, la notion de «  nature humaine  » telle que l'emploie Kropotkine offre de nombreux outils pour œuvrer dans cette direction. À la fois géographe et évolutionniste, Kropotkine ouvre la nature humaine en direction de la nature globale, et plus précisément du legs coopératif de l'évolution des espèces, à l'inverse de toute crispation essentialiste. C'est sur ce legs sans cesse retravaillé en fonction des contextes dans lesquels l'humain est conduit à vivre qu'il convient de s'appuyer pour contrer les effets de réductionnismes ruineux tels que le darwinisme social ou la sociobiologie. Conformément à la dimension fondationnaliste de la pensée de Kropotkine, la thèse s'organise de manière systématique autour de la notion de «  nature humaine  ». Après avoir posé les bases scientifiques de l'anarchie (I) nous travaillons les thèmes darwiniens de l'œuvre kropotkinienne (II). Le socle théorique est alors consistant afin d'établir des conséquences pratiques, du côté de la politique, de l'économie et de l'urbanisme (III). À l'intérieur du contexte ainsi défini, c'est aux réalisations supérieures de la morale et de l'art que nous finissons par nous intéresser (IV). / This work deals with two main issues  : first, it focuses on the way post-anarchism, which claims renewing the understanding of anarchism through the use of french post-modernists' concepts, depicts P. Kropotkin's thought  ; second, it addresses the anti-naturalistic trend within the frame of social criticism. We argue that far from standing as a hindrance to supporting radical social change, Kropotkin's view of human nature yields many tools in order to fuel such a change. Both a geographer and an evolutionist, Kropotkin includes human nature within the overall frame of nature itself, specifically within the evolution of species' cooperative legacy. This legacy has been continuously shaped within the different living contexts built by human being throughout his history. So there's nothing static about human nature, and the ever-evolving cooperative legacy provides tools to criticize reductionist ways of thinking such as social darwinism or sociobiology. According to Kropotkin's foundationalist bias, the thesis is systematically organized around the notion of «  human nature  ». First, we lay the scientific basis of anarchy (Part I), then we focus on darwinian themes (Part II). Once firmly grounded, Kropotkin's thought unfolds more accurately its practical consequences, addressing politics, economy and city planning (Part III). These three domains give shape to the contexts within which ethics and art should bring out the best in human nature (Part IV).

Au 20ème siècle, la position traditionnelle de l’épistémologie cartésienne a reçu de nombreuses critiques. La transparence de l’esprit et notre accès authentique à nos propres états mentaux sont couramment attaqués par les arguments selon lesquels nos jugements prétendument fondamentaux ne sont point infaillibles. Le problème de la « poule tachetée » proposé par Chisholm est ici un bon exemple. D’autres épistémologues ont proposé des scénarios où les cognitions fondamentales sont les victimes, soit des processus cognitifs étranges, soit des environnements défavorables. On a aussi constaté qu’il y a de cognitions fondamentales qui sont obscures ou fausses. Ces trois groupes d’objections faillibilistes ne sont pas irréfragables, mais il n’y a pas non plus de réponse systématique et suffisamment solide de la part de ceux qui défendent la thèse de l’infaillibilité fondamentale. Dans le présent travail, nous reconstruirons un modèle de l’intuition à l’inspiration des Regulae ad directionem ingenii. Nous réfuterons avec ce modèle la plupart des objections contemporaines, et proposerons en même temps une nouvelle interprétation des textes principaux de Descartes. / During the 20th century, the position of Cartesian epistemology has been much criticized. The transparency of the mind, as well as our authentic access to our own mental states, have been continuously attacked by arguments that attempt to reveal the fallibility of our putatively foundational cognitions. The famous problem of the speckled hen is representative; some epistemologists have also configured fictional scenarios where our foundational cognitions suffer from strange cognitive process or unfavorable epistemic environment, so that the relevant cognitions are no longer reliable, a fortiori infallible; others directly state that there are fundamental cognitions that are actually mistaken. These three groups of fallibilist objections are not flawless, but there are no systematic and sufficiently solid responses that defend the infallibility thesis either. In this dissertation, we shall reconstruct a model of intuition on the basis of Descartes’ Regulae ad directionem ingenii. The model will be used to refute most of the contemporary anti-Cartesian objections. It also provides a new interpretation of Descartes’ Meditations and other related texts.

This essay purports to be a “negative” defense of acquaintance foundationalism. It is “negative” in that I do not do much in the way of advancing novel argument for the position, nor do I extend the position very much. Rather, I focus on demonstrating that the position has the resources to overcome objections that have been proposed to it. In particular, I argue that it can overcome the dilemma proposed by Wilfrid Sellars and developed by Laurence BonJour against foundationalism, as well as dilemmas proposed by Jack Lyons and Michael Bergmann targeting internalism. Acquaintance foundationalism is what I will call any theory of justification that is internalist in what may justify us, foundationalist in the structure of justification, and relies on the concept of acquaintance in justifying our basic beliefs. Internalism requires that what justifies us improves the belief from the perspective of the believing subject. Foundationalism states that the justification for all beliefs depends ultimately on basic beliefs. Finally, acquaintance is a relation between a person and other things such that these other things are before the “mind’s eye” of the subject. The general idea behind each of these dilemmas, so I will argue, is to claim that acquaintance foundationalism cannot provide epistemic reasons for basic beliefs, where epistemic reason means something that contributes to justification from the subject’s perspective. Each dilemma will ask whether the alleged justifier has some feature x. However, each dilemma contends that, whether the alleged has the feature x or not, it cannot serve as an epistemic reason. For example, BonJour will ask whether our allegedly basic beliefs are cognitive or not. He argues that if they are cognitive, they need justification (and so cannot be basic), but if they are not cognitive, they cannot provide justification. Thus, no allegedly basic belief can serve as an epistemic reason. I argue that the notion of acquaintance allows us to escape such dilemmas because our states of acquaintance allow us to justify our basic beliefs without requiring justification themselves. I do so by borrowing, in part, Richard Fumerton’s theory of non-inferential justification, plus adding on a few epicycles to allow us to base our basic beliefs on our acquaintances. The first chapter sets up the issues of the dissertation: it gives context to the project, defines acquaintance foundationalism and epistemic reason, and discusses our dilemmas in broad outline. It also summarizes the rest of the essay. I use epistemic reasons in a specialized sense in the dissertation, which necessitates an extended discussion. This is the focus of chapter two. I argue that an epistemic reason is a mental complex that consists of Fumertonian acquaintances. When we have an epistemic reason, we have a mental complex that is related in the appropriate way to a belief. This is just what provides justification for the belief. This chapter explicates this notion. It includes an extended discussion of Richard Fumerton’s theory of non-inferential justification, which I follow in outline but diverge from in detail. This discussion focuses on his notion of acquaintance, and the items with which we may be acquainted. I then move to a discussion of the metaphysics of epistemic reasons, explaining how they consist of these acquaintances. I also discuss the relationship between epistemic reasons and epistemic justification. The third chapter is historical in focus. I examine Sellars’s famous dilemma for foundationalism, and contend that it can be best understood as an attempt to deny the foundationalist epistemic reasons for his beliefs. I also examine Laurence BonJour’s later formulation of the Sellarsian dilemma, and again argue that it is best understood as denying epistemic reasons to foundationalists. I then review the options that an acquaintance foundationalist has to respond to these dilemmas, as these responses will allow us to see where our more recent dilemmas go wrong. Chapter four address Jack Lyons’s dilemma. I consider what Lyons says about his dilemma at some length. I then argue that it is structurally similar to the Sellarsian dilemma, and tries to undermine the internalist’s (including the acquaintance foundationalist’s) ability to offer epistemic reasons for his beliefs. I then argue that Lyons’s dilemma only seems persuasive because he misunderstands what is required for experience to provide us with an epistemic reason. When properly understood, his dilemma fails to tell against the acquaintance foundationalism. I also argue that Lyons’s version of externalism is much more radical than it might initially appear, helping to motivate acquaintance foundationalism. The fifth chapter focuses on Michael Bergmann. I give his dilemma an extended discussion, which I follow up by reframing it in terms of epistemic reasons. I argue that his dilemma, while seemingly persuasive, fails to trouble the acquaintance foundationalism. I argue that we may be strongly aware (a Bergmannian technical notion) of our epistemic reasons without starting a regress, which vitiates his dilemma. I conclude with some short remarks on possibility of skepticism.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / Title from title screen. Andrea Scarantino, Tim O'Keefe, George Rainbolt, committee members. Electronic text (38 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Apr. 18, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 38).

Lawrence Bonjour supported coherentism in the early period, but turns to foundationalism in the later period. In this paper I shall focus on two sides in relation to his epistemology. To understand his early and later positions, first, I shall explain his coherentism and foundationalism. Second, I shall consider what objections have been raised to each position. Thus we can evaluate why Bonjour abandoned his coherentism and why his foundationalism succeeds as a plausible theory for empirical justification.