ABSTRACT A MISCONSTRUAL OF EVIDENTIALISM: ALVIN PLANTINGA AND BELIEF IN GOD Aydin, S&uuml / leyman Ph.D., Department of Philosophy Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. David Gr&uuml / nberg August 2004, 183 pages The evidentialist objection to belief in God is the claim that theists do not have sufficient evidence for the existence of God, therefore are they irresponsible to continue holding their belief in God in the face of insufficient evidence. Alvin Plantinga assumes that evidentialism, being a dogma characterized by classical foundationalism which itself has a faulty picture of rationality, should be set aside altogether in the assessment of epistemic status of belief in God. Behind Plantinga&rsquo / s assumption is the suggestion that the epistemic status of belief in God has been misinterpreted by philosophers, since the vast majority of religious epistemologists have remained within the evidentialist tradition. In my evaluation of Plantinga&rsquo / s assumption, I undertake two tasks: First, I seek to clarify his presumption that classical foundationalism had a faulty picture of rationality: I attempt to show that the insufficiency of classical foundationalism is not as problematic as Plantinga assumes. Secondly, I analyze and evaluate evidentialism in a larger perspective to show that: (1) evidentialism is a broader category than classical foundationalism, (2) evidentialism can not be put aside completely in any epistemological enterprise. I conclude that Plantinga&rsquo / s argument for belief in God is based on a faulty assumption, and I argue that evidentialism can best be seen to be a &ldquo / demand of clarity&rdquo / with regard to knowledge claims which on no grounds can legitimately be escaped altogether.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1992. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-88).

This thesis is primarily a descriptive exploration of the related moral philosophies of Wilfrid Sellars and Richard Rorty. While Rorty is clear that his normative thinking descends from Sellars's positions, there are numerous differences between their two positions. For instance, though Rorty is a self-identified Sellarsian, he rejects the explicitly formal character of his predecessor's work. Further, Sellars's normative upshot may be seen as philanthropic whereas Rorty's is best understood as solidaristic. Chapter 1 works through Sellars's metaethical position, which gives an intentional account to experientially-imperative normative judgments. This description pays particular attention to the necessity of community and the action-motivating character of practical reasoning. Chapter 2 turns to Rorty's deployment of Sellars's insights, beginning with a brief account of the commonalities between their metaphysical and epistemological positions. The most significant extensions Rorty makes to Sellars's position are in limiting justificatory schemas to only one's own community and shifting the focus of this community from "we reasoners" to "we sufferers." The third and final chapter briefly compliments one of the benefits of Rorty's claims over Sellars's before turning to critique, arguing that unfortunately neither of their positions have much in the way of content to offer. Beyond this, it seems difficult to understand trans-traditional conversation or deliberation on their accounts, especially Rorty's. Nonetheless, by tracing the impact of Wilfrid Sellars's thought in the work of Richard Rorty, an important connection may be made and explored.

This thesis consists of the analysis of Peirce's essays Questions Concering Certain Faculties Claimed for Man and Some Consequences of Four Incapacities focused on the genesis of fallibilism and its dependence on the theory of representation. Peirce's epistemological position here is articulated as a rejection of foundationalism and its conditions (e.g. intuition and introspection) that are understood to be unfounded hypotheses due the character of our knowledge of the outside world. The aim of this thesis is to find out how Peirce's epistemology can work without the certainty of foundationalism. Keywords: Peirce, fallibilism, representation, critique of foundationalism, inference, epistemology

Magister Artium - MA / Our secular age is a period of scepticism and ubiquitous doubt. The epistemology of a paradigmatic figure like Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) is central to Islamic intellectual thought, but also speaks to our modern world. In this research dissertation we embark on a critical study of doubt (shakk) and certainty (yaqīn) in Ghazālī’s epistemology. We ask, what is the nature and function of doubt, and how do we best acquire truth and certainty according to Ghazālī? In our evaluation of scepticism in Ghazālī’s epistemology, we analyse the notion of existential doubt and his methodological doubt. In the latter, we look at his scepticism of the methods of knowing as a means to establish the foundations of knowledge. Also, we look at his scepticism as an instrument to cast doubt upon heterodox doctrines and show the limitations of philosophical logic. In this study we assess Ghazālī’s attitude to philosophical demonstration and Sufism as a means to certainty. In early scholarship surrounding Ghazālī, it was assumed that he was a vehement adversary to philosophy. On the other hand, in much of contemporary scholarship, Ghazālī has been understood to give preference to philosophy as the ultimate means to certainty, undermining the place of Sufism. In this study we evaluate these claims; we argue that he was not antagonistic to philosophy and regarded it as a legitimate approach to certainty, but recognised Sufism as a superior approach. Much of previous scholarship has either focused on Ghazālī as a Sufi or a philosopher; we attempt to embark on a parallel approach in which we acknowledge each discipline in its right place within Ghazālī’s epistemology. Thus, in analysing Ghazālī’s approach to acquiring certainty, we evaluate his foundationalism, his attitude to authoritative instruction (taʿlim), and the place of philosophical demonstration and Sufism.

No description available.

<p>In this thesis I examine the concept of certainty in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a focus on the collection of remarks entitled <em>On Certainty.</em> In the first part I examine two essays of G.E. Moore that initiated Wittgenstein’s discussion of certainty and critique of Moore’s two essays. As I show, Wittgenstein believes that Moore misunderstood the use of the expression of I know in relation to the propositions of common sense. Instead, Wittgenstein believes that the common sense propositions stand for a certainty that belongs to the language-game itself, a certainty that stands fast for everyone who participates in the language-game, like hinges on which the rest of our knowledge and doubt turn. The rest of my thesis is spent examining three different interpretations of this notion of hinge certainty. The first is hinges as presuppositions to combat skeptical arguments, offered by the philosophers Crispin Wright and H.J. Glock. The second is that hinges are Wittgenstein’s version of foundationalism, serving as the foundational framework of human language, a notion primarily advocated by the philosophers Avrum Stroll and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock. I then examine the interpretation of hinges as learned norms of judging and acting that we must display certainty in if we are to learn a language. This is the interpretation of Rush Rhees and Meredith Williams, and is the position that I support. Finally, I show that contrary to some the remarks in <em>On Certainty </em>express a unified theme, rather than a series of disjointed and contradictory ideas.</p> / Master of Philosophy (MA)

The problem of understanding political foundings is situated at the nexus between political philosophy and political science. This thesis rethinks founding by asking both the philosophical question of how political order comes into being, and the political science question of how to understand particular founding moments. These two questions stimulate and structure a dialogue between the works of Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt and Eric Voegelin. The approach of founding in all three has a common starting point: they begin from ordinary experience and outline a political science that is mindful of the phenomenality of political life. I show that Strauss’s return to ordinary experience is partial. By limiting political life to the normative claims raised in it and submitting them to philosophical judgment, Strauss moves too quickly beyond political phenomena. His account of founding, as a consequence, vacillates between understanding particular founding acts and conceiving the perfect founding moment in abstract thought. Arendt’s work decisively shifts the problem on the side of practical understanding. Yet, her ontological account of action as appearance subtly displaces her concern for understanding historical actions. I move away from approaching historical foundings as a mode of appearing in the world, by recovering an account of action as experience. On that basis, I suggest a hermeneutics of experience which approaches foundings in light of the quest for meaning. With Voegelin founding is recovered as a symbol that exists only in the quest of understanding. Founding occurs in the experience of struggle to restore a reality that has become symbolically opaque. This experience is shared by the philosopher and the political actor; therefore to understand moments of founding requires the interweaving, and not separation, of political philosophy and political science. At the end, the quest of understanding founding moments is neither derivative, nor preparatory, but encompassing the philosophical question of how order comes into being.

[pt] Esta dissertação objetiva promover uma possibilidade de reflexão filosófica pós-fundacionista em torno das reconstruções da relação entre legitimidade e legalidade na disciplina de Relações Internacionais (RIs), em interseções pontuais desta com o campo do Direito Internacional (DI). Essa investigação é motivada, em particular, por contexto e discursividade que procuraram reconstituir essa relação em termos da diferença (ex: ilegal, porém legítima) ou semelhança potencial (ex: ilegal, porém legítima, porém quase-legal) entre os dois ente-conceitos, tal como em tentativas de ordenamento epistêmico e político dos eventos relacionados ao uso da força pela Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN) na região do Kosovo em 1998-1999. Ao longo deste trabalho, tal perspectiva teórico-filosófica pós-fundacionista assumirá diferentes facetas, transitando transdisciplinarmente nos campos da Filosofia (Ludwig Wittgenstein e Jacques Derrida), das Relações Internacionais (construtivismo, pós-colonialismo e pós-estruturalismo) e, pontualmente, do Direito Internacional (estudos críticos legais) e da Sociologia do Conhecimento (etnometodologia), com vistas a deslocar as expectativas quanto à condição ontológica da legitimidade e da legalidade - isto é, ao entendimento destas como ente-conceitos plenos de sentido em si mesmos e articulados com estratégias de ordenamento epistêmico e de delimitação da imaginação política internacional - e, com isso, reconstruir (e não abandonar) o conhecimento e a política da relação legitimidade/ legalidade nas RIs. Investiga-se particularmente a possibilidade de uma reflexão sociológica politicamente engajada com essa relação, ou seja, uma forma de engajamento epistêmico-político na qual a suspensão do sentido do legal e/ou do legítimo configura momento-chave de abertura política a uma sensibilidade investigativa contínua em relação aos limites desenhados pelas tentativas de encerramento de um devido ser do mundo; este, por sua vez, limitadamente articulado enquanto uma impressão sociológica contingente através da performance contextual e discursiva do julgamento normativo vinculado à relação legitimidade/legalidade. / [en] This Master s thesis seeks to promote a possible post-foundational philosophical investigation on the reconstructions of the relation between legitimacy and legality by International Relations (IR), in specific juxtapositions with the field of International Law (IL). This research is especially motivated by those context and discourse that sought to reconstitute this relation in terms of differentiation (e.g. illegal, yet legitimate) or potential similarity (e.g. illegitimate but legitimate, albeit quasi-legal) between the two concepts/entities, such as the attempts to epistemically and politically order the events concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) s use of force in Kosovo in 1998-1999. Throughout this piece, this postfoundationalist theoretical-philosophical perspective takes on different facets, transdisciplinaryly moving around the fields of Philosophy (Ludwig Wittgenstein e Jacques Derrida), International Relations (constructivism, post-structuralism, and post-colonialism) and, occasionally, International Law (critical legal studies) and Sociology of Knowledge (ethnomethodology), while seeking to displace the expectations on the ontological character of legitimacy and legality - i.e. the understanding of them as meaningful concepts/entities in themselves which are intertwined with strategies of epistemic ordering and circumscription of political imagination - and thus to reconstruct (and not to reject) the knowledge and politics of the legitimacy/ legality in IR. This work particularly investigates a possible sociological form of reflection that is politically engaged with this relation, that is, a form of epistemic-political engagement in which the suspension of the meaning of the legitimate and/or the legal constitutes a key moment for a political opening towards a continuing investigative sensibility vis-à-vis the limits that have been designed by the attempts to delimit a right-being of the world; which is in turn limitedly mobilized as a contingent sociological impression through the contextual and discursive performance of a normative judgement attached to the legitimacy/legality relation.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Wilfrid Sellars is well known for his criticism of what he called the myth of the given , which first appeared in his Empiricism and the philosophy of mind(1956).The given that is regarded as mythical by Sellars is the epistemic given with which foundationalists in epistemology intend to solve the epistemic regress problem. Sellars s criticisms of foundationalism had a strong repercussion in epistemology and soon become a reference in this field, mainly in virtue of having targeted the most basic features of foundationalism, questioning the very idea of immediate knowledge, which is at the core of any foundationalist account of knowledge. Sellars s criticism remain a challenge for foundationalism, and its significance has been highlighted by a growing number exegetical, critical, and Sellarsian inspired works. This dissertation comprieses three papers focused on Sellars s epistemology. The first paper shows how wide the reach of Sellarsian criticism on the myth of the given is. It also shows that Sellars s criticism of foundationalism can be presented in the form of a dilemma (known as Sellars s dilemma ) and how that dilemma, which does not appear explicitly in his work, can be found in his writings. The second paper presents an attempt by Laurence BonJour s to answer the challenge put to foundationalism by Sellars s dilemma. It assesses BonJour s more recent views on the matter, and shows thatthey do not answer the criticisms which himself endorsed when he was a coherentist. The third paper shows that if Sellars s views are coherent with and representing one of the culminations of the traditional analyses knowledge as justified true belief, and if his views are inadequate, then this could be evidence that we need an alternative in which knowledge is not analyzable in term of justification and other concepts but is a basic concept. We indicate, based on the work of Timothy Williamson and on a late piece by Sellars, how that alternative might turn out. / Wilfrid Sellars é conhecido por suas críticas ao que denominou mito do dado , que apareceram pela primeira vez em Empirismo e filosofia da mente (1956). O dado considerado mítico por Sellars é o dado epistêmico com o qual a vertente fundacionista em epistemologia pretende solucionar o problema do regresso epistêmico. As críticas de Sellars ao fundacionismo tiveram grande repercussão no debate epistemológico e logo se tornaram referência nessa área, principalmente em virtude de visarem os aspectos mais basilares da concepção fundacionista, pondo em xeque a própria noção de conhecimento imediato, cara a qualquer abordagem fundacionista do conhecimento. Suas críticas representam ainda hoje um desafio de peso para concepções fundacionistas e sua importância tem sido enfatizada por um número crescente de trabalhos exegéticos, críticos e de inspiração sellarsiana. Esta dissertação compõe-se de três artigos que têm como foco a epistemologia de Sellars. No primeiro, mostra-se em que consiste e quão geral é a crítica de Sellars ao mito do dado. Mostra-se também como a crítica de Sellars pode ser apresentada na forma de um dilema ( O dilema de Sellars ) e como esse dilema, que não é formulado de forma explicita em sua obra, podem ser encontrado nos textos do autor. O segundo artigo apresenta a tentativa de Laurence BonJour de responder ao desafio posto pelo dilema de Sellars ao fundacionismo. Avalia-se a nova posição de BonJour, que no passado foi um coerentista, e mostra-se que ela não é capaz de superar as críticas que ele mesmo endossava anteriormente. No terceiro e último artigo, mostra-se que se a concepção epistemológica de Sellars é vista como sendo coerente com e representando uma das culminâncias da tradição que analisa conhecimento como crença verdadeira justificada e tal concepção resulta inadequada, então isso pode ser um indício de que deveríamos buscar uma concepção alternativa do conceito de conhecimento. Indica-se, a partir do trabalho de Timothy Williamson e de um texto tardio de Sellars, como poderíamos entender conhecimento como um conceito básico, não analisável.