No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

<p>The notion of artistic creativity has become so commonplace in our thought that the only question remaining, it seems, is whether anyone (or everyone) other than the artist is capable of being creative. Even noting that this notion, used in the sense that we tend so readily to accept, is no more than two hundred years old, is unlikely to prevent the raising of at least one eyebrow at the suggestion that the idea is not as unproblematic as it might at first appear. The purpose of this thesis is to revitalize the belief in human creativity by returning to its primary philosophical source: Immanuel Kant.</p> <p>By doing this, I hope to revive at least the possibility of serious philosophical debate on an issue that is now either accepted as a closed case (as it typically is by aestheticians), or dismissed as an insufficiently philosophical topic (as is often done by non-aestheticians). In fact, the belief of human creativity as we now know it is ultimately the result of an enormous metaphysical and epistemological effort by Kant to preserve the possibility of moral freedom. Losing this historical context has caused 'creativity' to lose its philosophical bite. Regaining this context -- the essence of the current project -- should force us to think seriously again about a problem that opens out, not merely on major issues in aesthetics, but on the major philosophical tide of the past two hundred years.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

The problem of how one can reconcile the omnipotence and omniscience of God with human freedom has penetrated a good deal of philosophical and theological thought. On occasion it has even been reduced to a unsolvable problem unworthy of consideration. Saint Augustine, however, clearly did not think this was the case. Augustine defends human freedom as a good which must be preserved even if it does allow for the possibility of evil. David R. Griffin, on the other hand, maintains that men cannot exert their own will, when they are considered to be subject to the will of an omnipotent.God and that the occurence of evil in the world must ultimately be allowed by God. William L. Rowe also maintains that there is a problem in claiming that human beings are free, but this time, because of God's omniscience rather than His omnipotence. Rowe argues that since whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen and He knows that evil will happen, man's decision to sin is not one of freedom but of necessity. These are generally considered the two main arguments for opposing Augustine's Free Will Defense, and although Rowe eventually shows the inadequacies of the 'omniscience argument', his presentation of the traditional view is most valuable. It is the contention of this paper that neither divine omnipotence nor omniscience, when considered independently, present sufficient evidence to seriously jeopardize Augustine's position, and this, can only partially be achieved by combining these divine attributes and pitting them against the possibility of human freedom. This thesis is defended by a demonstration of the weaknesses of the independent arguments which are overcome, or at least strengthened, when combined. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

No description available.

No / This volume contributes to the growing literature on women, conflict and peacebuilding by focusing on the moments after a peace accord, or some other official ending of a conflict, often denoted as `post-conflict¿ or `post-war¿. Such moments often herald great hope for holding to account those who committed grave wrongs during the conflict, and for a better life in the future. For many women, both of these hopes are often very quickly shattered in starkly different ways to the hopes of men. Such periods are often characterized by violence and insecurities, and the official ending of a war often fails to bring freedom from sexual violence for many women. Within such a context, efforts on the part of women, and those made on their behalf, to hold to account those who commit crimes against them, and to access their rights are difficult to make, are often dangerous, and are also often deployed with little effect. Gendered Peace explores international contexts, and a variety of local ones, in which such struggles take place, and evaluates their progress. The volume highlights the surprising success in the development of international legal advances for women, but contrasts this with the actual experience of women in cases from Sierra Leone, Rwanda, South Africa, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, East Timor, Peru, Central America and the Balkans.'

The narratives of abolitionist thinkers Frederick Douglass - My Bondage and My Freedom - and Harriet Jacobs - Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl - both include instances of the authors engaging in resistance against their slaveholders that do not free them from slavery. I begin with these narratives of resistance and make the interpretive claim that both Douglass and Jacobs took themselves to be free in their acts of resistance even though they were still in conditions we would not associate with freedom. In doing so, I determine that Douglass takes himself to be free because he is able to regain an internal sense of self-respect. Differently, I argue that Jacobs takes herself to be free because she is able to exert control over her material circumstances by identifying and pursuing her goal of sexual and reproductive autonomy to the best of her ability. This difference in understanding of freedom is surprising since Douglass and Jacobs find themselves in similar situations. I proceed by addressing this surprise and making the claim that the form of freedom Jacobs found in resistance is preferable to the form of freedom found by Douglass. In order to make this claim, I draw on Isaiah Berlin's discussion of freedom in "Two Concepts of Liberty" and find that Douglass achieves a form of freedom that isolates himself from his external desires whereas Jacobs does not. Jacobs' act of resistance is tightly connected to her desires. I demonstrate that connection to desires in resistance is important because it allows an agent to develop a sense of practical agency which allows them to adapt to future circumstances. Jacobs' understanding of freedom is ultimately preferable because it tells us what it is like to find freedom in our immediate circumstances through persistence. / Master of Arts / It might seem unusual to think of ourselves as being free when we are in circumstances where we are clearly dominated, interfered with, and unable to act according to our will. However, in this paper I argue that this occurs in the narratives of abolitionist thinkers Frederick Douglass - My Bondage and My Freedom - and Harriet Jacobs - Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl. This paper is - in part - an attempt to understand what Douglass and Jacobs could possibly mean when they say they are free even though they are not in conditions we would typically associate with freedom. I proceed by demonstrating that Douglass finds freedom because he is able to regain his sense of internal self-respect while isolating himself from the consequences of his act of resistance. Jacobs finds freedom in a different way. To Jacobs, freedom means exerting control over her conditions in a way that brings her material circumstances closer to what she desires - even if the result is imperfect. This difference in the meanings of freedom is surprising because it highlights just how rich and complicated freedom found in resistance is. After establishing this, I then transition to addressing if one form of freedom is preferable to another. I argue that the form of freedom Jacobs found in resistance is preferable to the form of freedom found by Douglass. I draw on the literature to demonstrate that the form of freedom found by Douglass is internal, individual, and achieved by Douglass giving up the things he desires. Differently, Jacobs' act of resistance is tightly connected to the things she desires. I demonstrate that connection to desires in resistance is important because it allows an agent to develop a sense of practical agency which is a quality that allows them to adapt their actions to future circumstances by taking both their desires and conditions into account. Jacobs' understanding of freedom is ultimately preferable because it tells us what it is like to find freedom in our immediate circumstances through persistence.