Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-01T18:29:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 maria_neuma_carvalho_barros.pdf: 1957741 bytes, checksum: e836ca2c900673e0819088366e694031 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-14 / Hatred ― one of the main constituent elements in one s relationship with other people― is a kind of affection that may engender rejection. From a psychoanalytical perspective, it protagonizes the self s subjective structuring process and, at times, contributes to psychic preservation, as revealed in clinical practice. Thence, the need to start this work by posing the following question: how does hatred work in the psychic structure? This research is meant to be an extension of clinical practice and of our previously developed studies. To achieve this goal, we have resorted to some of the concepts of three major psychoanalists and authors: S. Freud, M. Klein and D. W. Winnicott. Considering their concepts on both the self and human psychism, we have detected in their theories pieces of information which are basic to the understanding of the presence of hatred in psychic dynamics; in addition to this, we have here examined some present day scholars contributions to our theme. All of these materials have helped us perceive the paradoxical plot created by the ambivalence of this affection in psychic dynamics, where it works not only to build up the self s structure and affirmation, but also as an element of resistance and destructiveness. Moving from theory to clinical practice ― and thus reinforcing the active articulation between both these poles, as recommended by psychoanalysis ― we have also resorted to clinical fragments to illustrate our major argument. The clinical examples here reported suggest, in short, that hatred can be equally used as a defense ― as evidenced, for example, in the analytical process ―, thus modifying the development of the psychic plot. Finally, we do believe that this investigation can eventually contribute to the work of those who dedicate themselves to psychoanalytical practice and the study of psychoanalysis, particularly as regards the complex and revealing expressions of hatred, which are characteristic of the human condition. / O ódio ― um dos principais elementos de nossa relação com o outro ― é um afeto que suscita rejeição. Na perspectiva psicanalítica, ele protagoniza o processo de estruturação subjetiva do sujeito e por vezes funciona como elemento de preservação psíquica, como nos revela a prática clínica. Diante disto, é oportuno indagar: de que forma o ódio atua no psiquismo? A presente pesquisa se propõe a ser prolongamento da atividade clínica e a dar prosseguimento a estudos por nós anteriormente desenvolvidos. Para tanto, recorremos às postulações de três dos principais autores e psicanalistas conhecidos: S. Freud, M. Klein e D. W. Winnicott. Considerando as concepções de sujeito e de psiquismo humano de cada um desses autores, constatamos, em suas teorizações, a existência de dados fundamentais para o entendimento da presença do ódio na dinâmica psíquica. Partindo de tais teorias ― aqui parcialmente ampliadas por reflexões de estudiosos da atualidade sobre tal afeto ―, centramos nossa investigação na trama paradoxal do ódio, dada sua ambivalente atuação na dinâmica psíquica: funciona tanto como elemento de estruturação e afirmação do sujeito, quanto de resistência e destrutividade. Transitando entre os polos teórico e clínico ―e desse modo realçando a articulação ativa entre teoria e clínica, tal como postula a psicanálise ―, recorremos também a fragmentos clínicos para ilustrar nosso argumento central. Os exemplos clínicos reportados neste texto sugerem, em suma, que o ódio ― tal como evidenciado no processo de análise ― pode ser igualmente usado como defesa, assim modificando o desenvolvimento da trama psíquica. Acreditamos, finalmente, que esta tese possa vir a se constituir em subsídio e contribuição para aqueles que se dedicam à prática psicanalítica e ao estudo da psicanálise, particularmente no que diz respeito às complexas e reveladoras manifestações do ódio, características da condição humana.

The biological energy concepts used by Freud to account for unconscious mental processes in psychoanalysis are discredited by modem biological findings. As a result, different psychoanalytic schools developed new foundational theories in order to verify unconscious mentation. The present study argues that these theories are unsuccessful for two main reasons. Firstly, replacing Freud's drive energy theory with other equally hypothetical foundational constructs does not solve the problem of finding proof for the existence of unconscious mentation. Secondly, the clinical psychoanalytic definition of unconscious mentation as imaginary, internally generated processes, autonomous from the external world is misguided. External sensory data may play a formative role in producing unconscious mentation. In particular, neurobiological findings on sensory data encoding and storage in human infants may throw light on the nature of unconscious processes. The present study therefore compares ideas derived from Lacanian psychoanalysis with neuropsychological memory and infant research findings to ascertain whether unconscious mentation is linked to the memory encoding of sensory data in infants. This analysis is in tum contrasted with a more contemporary psychoanalytic synthesis of findings on infant memory and unconscious mentation (Lichtenberg, 1989, Lichtenberg, Lachmann, and Fosshage, 1992). The latter theory identifies connections between unconscious mentation and the encoding of sensory memories in infancy, but does not connect the episodic and procedural memory constructs used in this account to specific neurolo·gical mechanisms in the brain. The present study's original contributions therefore involve firstly connecting the development of aversive episodic and procedural memories to neurological mechanisms in the brain during the period between birth and 28 months of age. Secondly, this memory model suggests that the storage of aversive memories in infancy has lasting unconscious motivational significance for subjects. Presymbolic memories may unconsciously manipulate conscious attention and memory retrieval in verbal subjects, inviting comparison with the psychoanalytic concept of dynamic unconscious mentation. Thirdly, the presymbolic memory model contributes towards a novel understanding of false memories of childhood sex abuse, and the dissociation of real traumatic memories that occur in many cases of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. / Psychology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Psychology)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T20:39:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PCL - Marta Nora Oneto de Cesarotto.pdf: 676350 bytes, checksum: 09b84a07269b439dd741271423db62b6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-11-24 / This work focuses the place of conciousness in the freudian theory. Having the unconscious as the major concept in psycho-analysis, Freud did not neglect this essential phenomenon. For example, the three instances that divide the psychism were named by appointment. In Portuguese, the word conciousness means the atribute that alouds the knowledge about things, the mental representation that an aorganism has about his existence and the out-side world, and the faculty to difference good from bad, the sense of morality and duty. In German, the aceptions are discriminated, with the psychological conciousness refered as Bewusstsein, the clear and concrete knowledge. For the moral conciousness, looked as a superegoical function, Freud chosed the term Gewissen, a more abstract sense of knowledge. This theoretical research follows the development of the notions of coniousness and moral coniousness from 1895 to 1932, and was motivated by a quotation of Freud´s own words in his last years, about re-valuating the importance of conciousness, because of the diversity of concerning problems, and the complexity of explanations and definitions. In several times, he wrote about his intention to investigate more deeply in this particular matter, but never did it / Este trabalho focaliza a consciência na teoria freudiana. Destacando o inconsciente como objeto da psicanálise, Freud nunca deixou de considerá-la como um fenômeno essencial, basta lembrar que a nomeação das três instâncias que constituem o psiquismo foi feita levando em conta, especialmente, a sua relação com a consciência. Em português a palavra consciência alude tanto ao atributo que permite o conhecimento de uma coisa, a representação mental que um organismo tem da própria existência ou do mundo externo, assim como designa a faculdade de distinguir o bem do mal, ou seja, o sentimento da moralidade e do dever. Na língua alemã, ambas acepções se apresentam discriminadas, a consciência psicológica corresponde o termo Bewusstsein que aponta para o conhecimento claro e concreto, enquanto que para a consciência moral, entendida como função da subestrutura superegoica. Freud optou por reservar o termo Gewissen que denota um saber com certeza, mas com um sentido mais abstrato. Esta pesquisa teórica acompanha o desenvolvimento da noção de consciência conjuntamente com o de consciência moral, desde 1895 até 1932, e foi norteada por uma frase presente na que Freud manifesta a necessidade de reavaliar o valor da consciência. Para o criador da teoria psicanalítica, a diversidade dos problemas da consciência, a tornavam um fenômeno refratário a qualquer explicação e definição. Por diversas vezes ao longo da obra, expressou a intenção de fazer uma investigação mais profunda a respeito da consciência, mas nunca chegou a concretizá-la

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T20:39:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Patricia Leirner Argelazi.pdf: 421110 bytes, checksum: 31d2dfe04136d3078e31f0909a158e5c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-12-09 / The objective of this work is to review the principle texts of Freud which treat the subject of religion and to propose a map with which to study his ideas striving, whenever possible, to discriminate Freud's important contributions from his radically anti-religious militancy. This work also makes a discussion if the psychoanalytical theory is compatible with religion. This study also includes the influence of two important interlocutors , the preacher Oskar Pfister and the writer Romain Rolland. And to finalize, the work briefly presents some relevant considerations of Winnicott. The study concludes that Freud s own scientific account became restricted by his prejudicial view of religion / Considerando a enorme influencia que as concepções de Freud sobre a religião teve sobre os psicanalistas e psicólogos, o objetivo deste trabalho é retomar e apresentar os principais textos de Freud que tratam do tema , e proporcionar um mapa de estudo sobre suas idéias, procurando, sempre que possível, discriminar as importantes contribuições de Freud das posições demasiadamente influenciadas por sua militância anti religião. Também discute a questão de se o arcabouço psicanalítico seria incompatível com a religião. Este estudo retoma, também, as contribuições de dois interlocutores de Freud, o pastor Oskar Pfister e o escritor Romain Rolland. Ao final, o estudo apresenta, brevemente, as importantes contribuições de Winnicott. Conclui que Freud trouxe contribuições de grande valor à psicologia da religião, mas que sua postura contra a religião fez com que visse tão somente os aspectos negativos dela

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Departamento de Psicologia Clínica, Programa de Pós-graduação em Psicologia Clínica e Cultura Departamento de Psicologia Clínica, 2015. / O presente trabalho foi produzido com o intuito de explorar a dimensão temporal na constituição do sujeito, de acordo com o pensamento de Jacques Lacan e em referência a um retorno a Sigmund Freud. Foi privilegiado o artigo de Lacan ―O tempo lógico e a asserção da certeza antecipada‖, de onde partiram algumas elaborações acerca da incidência do tempo no sujeito do inconsciente. Para explorar a concepção de tempo na psicanálise, foram utilizados também alguns artigos de Freud e outros artigos e seminários de Lacan. Dentre os principais conceitos e categorias que tratamos, articulando-os ao tempo e ao sujeito, estão: trauma; aparelho psíquico; processo primário e processo secundário; recalque; inconsciente; divisão; repetição; linguagem; alienação e separação; ato; pensamento; saber; verdade; e castração. A temporalidade abordada neste trabalho convoca noções de retroação, a posteriori (Nachträglichkeit), só-depois (après-coup), futuro anterior, origem, atraso, antecipação, intervalo, descontinuidade, escansão, suspensão, corte, urgência, pressa, isto é, noções que compõem o tempo lógico. O tempo, marcado por pausas e alternâncias, faz nascer o sujeito, modula o ato e possibilita desejar. / This dissertation aims at exploring the time dimension in the constitution of the subject, according to Jacques Lacan, in reference to Sigmund Freud. The main article to this study is ―Logical time and the assertion of anticipated certainty‖, that brings some elaborations on time and the subject of the unconscious. We also refer to some articles written by Freud and some of Lacan‘s seminars to explore the conception of time in psychoanalysis. Amongst the main concepts and categories that we deal with, articulating them with the ideas of time and subject, are trauma; psychic apparatus; primary process and secondary process; repression; unconscious; division; repetition; language; alienation and separation; act; thinking; knowledge; truth; castration. The temporality we investigate in this study brings to attention the notions of retroacting, a posteriori (Nachträglichkeit), après-coup, future perfect, origin, delay, anticipation, gap, discontinuity, scansion, suspension, cut, urgency, rush --- notions that are part of the logical time. Time, with its pauses and alternations, makes the subject possible, modulates the act and allows the desire.

Submitted by Cleide Dantas (cleidedantas@ufpa.br) on 2014-12-02T13:02:53Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_CienciaReligiaoIlusao.pdf: 662250 bytes, checksum: d06dac929672cc29c6712756d771ce3b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Rosa Silva (arosa@ufpa.br) on 2014-12-02T16:06:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_CienciaReligiaoIlusao.pdf: 662250 bytes, checksum: d06dac929672cc29c6712756d771ce3b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-02T16:06:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_CienciaReligiaoIlusao.pdf: 662250 bytes, checksum: d06dac929672cc29c6712756d771ce3b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Em sua obra de 1927, O futuro de uma Ilusão, Freud tenta de uma maneira geral fundamentar a função das crenças religiosas no psiquismo humano e desmistificá-las como capazes de apreender a realidade. Para ele, a origem psíquica das ideias religiosas é a ilusão, que está profundamente ligada com a repressão dos desejos humanos e a negação dos mesmos, que se dá na civilização. Freud não pretende examinar o valor de verdade das doutrinas religiosas, mas afirma que elas, em sua natureza psicológica, não passam de ilusões. Trata-se de ajustar-se à realidade com o objetivo da busca de felicidade. Para ele tal tarefa deve ser fruto da ciência, não da religião. Freud ressalva que a religião é apenas uma etapa do processo evolutivo humano. Nota-se que Freud foi amplamente influenciado pelo forte valor que o positivismo possuía em sua época. Assim, defendia que a única maneira de se chegar à verdade era através da racionalidade. Nosso trabalho pretende, portanto, analisar o discurso cientificista freudiano, na sua relação com a religião compreendida como ilusão, a partir de uma leitura filosófica de O Futuro de Uma Ilusão e levando sempre em consideração a influência dos ideais iluministas sobre o pensamento de Freud e sua obra. / In his book of the 1927 "The Future of an Illusion" Freud tries in a broader manner, support the function of religious beliefs in the human psyche and demystify them as capable of apprehending reality. For him, the psychic origin of religious ideas is the illusion, which is deeply connected with the repression of human desires and the negation thereof, which occurs in civilization. Freud does not intend to examine the truth value of religious doctrines, but states that they, in their psychological nature, they are illusions. It is the adjustment of reality to promote the pursuit of happiness. Freud points out that religion is only one stage of the human evolutionary process. It is noted that Freud was largely influenced by the strong value that positivism had in his time, thus, he defended that the only way to get at the truth was through rationality. Our work aims therefore to analyze the Freudian scientist discourse, in its relation to religion understood as illusion, from a philosophical reading of " The Future of an Illusion " and always taking into account the influence of Enlightenment ideals on the thought Freud and his work.

The proof set forward in this thesis is that the method of Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980), which he came in the 1970’s to describe as ‘structuralist’, ‘phenomenological’ and even ‘metaphysical’, owes a heretofore unacknowledged debt to Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). Critics have thus far neglected the influence of nineteenth and twentieth century psychology in McLuhan’s work, although a wealth of biographical material supports the argument that McLuhan’s ‘metaphysical’ method is derived as much from psychoanalysis and analytical psychology (C.G. Jung) as from any of McLuhan’s acknowledged predecessors. Returning to the texts from which McLuhan gained his knowledge of psychology, I trace the influence of Freud, Jung and their disciples upon McLuhan, establishing McLuhan’s use of Freudian concepts and terminology in his first book The Mechanical Bride (1951), and his use of the psychoanalytic concepts of the ‘unconscious’, ‘trauma’ and ‘repression’ in the books that came after it. What McLuhan calls the ‘unconscious’ is more often named by him as Logos, ‘acoustic space’ or the ‘media environment’, and I trace the debts that these concepts owe not only to Freud and Jung but to Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, gestalt theory, art theory, Henri Bergson, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Wyndham Lewis, Siegfried Giedion, Harold Innis, the French symbolist poets of the late nineteenth century and the British modernists of the early twentieth. Despite his rejection of the Freudian argument, McLuhan, like Freud, conceptualizes pain or trauma as the ‘cause’ of transformations (i.e. processes) in the unconscious; but while for McLuhan, invoking St. Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle, technologies are ‘formal causes’ simultaneous with (or ‘preceded’ by) their effects, for Freud and his modern interpreter Jacques Lacan, trauma is ‘paradoxical’ in structure, presenting as both its own ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. Situating McLuhan in relation to French structuralism, I contrast McLuhan’s concepts of ‘figure’ (as cause) and ‘ground’ (as effects), elaborated in his last book Laws of Media (1988), to the concepts of the ‘signifier’ and the ‘signified’ in Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics (1916), and critique McLuhan’s ‘tetrad’, the ideograph with which he illustrates media ‘effects’, in relation to the psychoanalytic concept of the signifier elaborated by Lacan. In reply to McLuhan’s maxim that ‘the medium is the message’, I conclude that technologies, insofar as they function as ‘formal causes’, are doubly ‘hidden’: firstly, because, as McLuhan says, they can only be grasped through their effects; and secondly because, as Lacan says, their effects can only be articulated when they manifest as ‘disturbances’ in the symbolic order, i.e., as fantasies of the Other’s jouissance (enjoyment). There are numerous stories about how McLuhan would frustrate his critics by refusing to take a ‘point-of-view’, and in fact his (psychoanalytic) technique of ‘putting on’ the audience as a mask, and his (deconstructivist) manner of changing perspectives as often as necessary, sit oddly with his championing of Logos. A comparison with Freud and Lacan finds McLuhan at a ‘paradoxical’ moment in the history of Western thought, poised between modernism and postmodernism, between structuralism and deconstructivism, and between metaphysics and psychoanalysis. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, 2008

Nous dégageons dans ce mémoire les limites de l'utilisation du concept de narcissisme au sein de la sociologie et plus particulièrement dans les livres La culture du narcissisme de Christopher Lasch et L'ère du vide de Gilles Lipovetsky. Pour ce faire, nous avons retracé l'évolution du concept de narcissisme dans la psychanalyse freudienne ainsi que la psychanalyse américaine s'inspirant de la réforme hartmannienne. Nous sommes parties du fait qu'il existe une certaine méprise concernant l'acception de ce concept au sein de thèses sociologiques et avons illustré cela par une analyse des auteurs précités. Que ce soit dans la conceptualisation freudienne du phénomène du narcissisme; l'encadrant d'abord par du sexuel, ensuite dans les avatars que le moi subit ou bien les thèses hartmanniennes, kernbergiennes et kohutiennes mettant l'accent sur le soi, le concept de narcissisme demeure un concept fortement déterminé par la psychanalyse et en conséquence exige que l'on s'y réfère adéquatement. Nous avons ainsi découvert que Lasch opère plusieurs glissements conceptuels entre l'acception freudienne et l'acception postfreudienne, rendant sa thèse confuse. Quant à Lipovetsky, nous avons montré que parce qu'il occulte le dispositif psychanalytique, il ne peut comprendre la portée même de sa thèse sur le narcissisme de l'individu postmoderne. Ce mémoire parcourt ainsi le concept de narcissisme dans le cadre du premier et du deuxième dualisme pulsionnel, de la réforme hartmannienne mettant l'accent sur le narcissisme comme investissement libidinal du soi, du narcissisme tel que Green le conçoit et finalement, ce voyage conceptuel culmine dans une analyse des thèses laschiennes et lipovetskiennes sur le narcissisme de l'individu du 20ième siècle. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Narcissisme, Premier dualisme pulsionnel, Deuxième dualisme pulsionnel, Postmodernité, Freud, Hartmann, Kernberg, Kohut, Green Lasch, Lipovetsky.

No description available.

Freiburg i. Br., Univ., Diss., 2002.