This thesis examines the applicability of culminations theory in a guerrilla context. In battle, a crucial factor is to assess who has superior strength. Culmination theory is a central concept in conventional warfare, could the same theory support the analysis of guerrilla warfare?Previous research tends to focus on the results of guerrilla wars. By using the concept of culmination this research attempts to determine, by assessing the battle, whether the guerrilla reached the point of culmination and by that evaluate the applicability of culmination theory in guerrilla warfare.The research design consists of a two-case study to analyse the LTTE and Daesh and thereby highlight culmination theory’s applicability on guerrillas. Written documents are used as sources of empirical data for the two-case study. The result of the survey shows that LTTE and Daesh reached their defensive point of culmination and that culmination theory is generalizable in a similar guerrilla context.

<p>In studying the art of Counterinsurgency Warfare we are usually inclined to the reading of several books regarding this matter. Because of this some writers have the power to influence the minds of the reader. This can be of great benefit since it enables information sharing and for the reader a chance to learn from the triumphs, but also mistakes of others. However each writer is the creation of the time and context under which he existed. Because of the wheel of time certain things change, and because of the context a myriad of factors came into play affecting the outcome and product of the doings and thoughts of that specific occurrence. Because of this, books need to be read and viewed from a certain perspective to be used to the full. Out of the large number of factors I have chosen one in particular which is to be revealed in the pages you are about to read; The strategic culture. This work deals with the task of examining the COIN-based books of John A Nagl, Frank Kitson and David Galula in order to see the influence of the strategic culture from the countries from which they were spawned. The result will be an evaluation of the similarities of the writers to that of the strategic culture of their country of origin and a set of guidelines to regard in the advent of reading the three writers.</p>

In studying the art of Counterinsurgency Warfare we are usually inclined to the reading of several books regarding this matter. Because of this some writers have the power to influence the minds of the reader. This can be of great benefit since it enables information sharing and for the reader a chance to learn from the triumphs, but also mistakes of others. However each writer is the creation of the time and context under which he existed. Because of the wheel of time certain things change, and because of the context a myriad of factors came into play affecting the outcome and product of the doings and thoughts of that specific occurrence. Because of this, books need to be read and viewed from a certain perspective to be used to the full. Out of the large number of factors I have chosen one in particular which is to be revealed in the pages you are about to read; The strategic culture. This work deals with the task of examining the COIN-based books of John A Nagl, Frank Kitson and David Galula in order to see the influence of the strategic culture from the countries from which they were spawned. The result will be an evaluation of the similarities of the writers to that of the strategic culture of their country of origin and a set of guidelines to regard in the advent of reading the three writers.

Begreppet counterinsurgency har fått stor uppmärksamhet efter 2001 och USA:s militäraengagemang i Afghanistan och Irak. USA har bedrivit ett gediget utvecklingsarbete sedan dess och en ny doktrin för just counterinsurgency presenterades 2006. Redan 1964 utkom fransmannen David Galula med en bok i ämnet. Det har alltså funnits teorier om counterinsurgency sedan dess. Sovjetunionens engagemang i Afghanistan under 1980-talet slutade med att den afghanska kommunistregimen kollapsade. Viljan att vinna konflikten borde ha funnits där och precis som USA har dragit erfarenheter, borde något ha gjorts för att försöka vinna konflikten även på 1980-talet. Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka om de parter som försökte besegra den afghanska motståndsrörelsen gjorde det på ett sätt som kom att likna Galulas teorier om counterinsurgency. Konflikten har analyserats utifrån Galulas teori om upprorsbekämpning med både politiska och militära medel. Analysen har visat att Sovjetunionen och den afghanska kommunistregimen inte utvecklade sitt sättatt hantera konflikten i en riktning som motsvarade Galulas teorier. Den primära politiska orsaken var att regimen förlitade sig på förtryck för att försöka avskräcka motståndssympatier. Detta tillvägagångssätt ledde istället till ökat stöd för motståndsrörelsen. Militärt saknades medlen att befästa närvaro i nya områden där regimen kunde ha börjat utöva inflytande. I förlängningen innebardet att regimen saknade förmåga att bredda sin inflytandesfär. / The term counterinsurgency has received a lot of attention since 2001 and the U.S commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S has conducted thorough developmental work since then and a new doctrine on counterinsurgency was presented in 2006. As early as 1964, the Frenchman David Galula issued a book on the subject, and there have existed theories on counterinsurgency ever since. The Soviet Union’s commitment in Afghanistan during the 1980s ended with the collapse of the Afghan communist regime. The will to win the conflict should have been present there, and in the same way that the U.S have capitalized on their experiences something ought to have been done to try to win the conflict during the 1980s. The purpose of this study is to examine whether the parties involved in the fight against the Afghan resistance acted in a way that resembles Galula’s theories on counterinsurgency. The conflict has been analyzed with Galulas theories on how to defeat an insurgency by both political and military means. The analysis has shown that the Soviet Union and the Afghan communist regime did not develop their way of handling the conflict in a way which is consistent with Galula’s theories. The primary political cause was that the regime put its trust in oppression in their attempts to discourage resistance sympathies. This approach resulted in an increase in support for the Afghan resistance rather than the support of the regime. Militarily, the lack of means to secure the regime’s political presence in new areas meant that the regime was unable to broaden its sphere of influence.

Counterinsurgency is still believed to be of relevance in modern time and affect military organizations. Kilcullen and Galula, two theorists who have been of high relevance for the development of strategies for population-centric counterinsurgency used in the modern era. In 2010, Operation Moshtarak was conducted with Field Manual 3-24, which is based on these theorists. Despite this, there is a discrepancy if the operation was conducted with a population-centric counterinsurgency and if Kilcullen and Galula theories can be applied in a modern era. The purpose of this study is to examine why operation Moshtarak, which was supposed to implement the aspects of population centric counterinsurgency resulted in failure. The study uses a qualitative case study and even though the theories didn’t reach the expected elucidatory level, the results of the study indicate that the initial steps of the operation demonstrate that population-centric counterinsurgency were used, but after the initial successes in the expulsion of insurgents, problems arised for the coalition. The study also indicates that more research is necessary to understand the outcome of the case and the relevance of these theories.

After the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and the war in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed, the debate about counterinsurgency (COIN) has once again been stirred up. Some researchers claim that the old proven theories and methods of successful COIN are still relevant. Other researchers, however, consider that today's opponents have developed and differ compared to the earlier, claiming that yesterday's theories are out dated and inadequate in a modern context. Today's view of successful counterinsurgency is heavily influenced by David Galula, whose theories were developed in the 1950s and 1960s. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether past theories are useful in contemporary insurgency. To investigate the question, the study examines whether the United States followed Galula's strategies in practice during the counterinsurgency in the Al-Anbar province (2003–2008). The study's findings indicate that there are similarities between U.S. action in Al-Anbar and Galula's models for successful COIN. Galula implies that the local population's support needs to be gained in order to achieve success in counterinsurgency. The focus on the population is clearly reflected in the U.S. approach and can be interpreted as the cause of success. In addition to similarities regarding the central parts of the theory, differences can also be found. In the two cases studied, the importance of cooperation with local armed forces and the media's role in the conflict is clearly highlighted, which is not mentioned in Galula's theory. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that other aspects not declared in Galula's theory might have influenced the outcome of the conflict as well. To be able to determine the usefulness of Galula's theory in modern time with greater certainty, further research is proposed to investigate more recent cases, using the results of this study as a starting point.

In modern times, NATO-countries had difficulties defeating insurgency around the globe. Russia on the other hand, succeeded in winning the second Chechen war against insurgents. How could this be? The purpose of this study is to investigate whether Russia’s victory in the second Chechen war can be explained by population-centric theories of counterinsurgency, thus understanding the outcome of the conflict. The result of this study show that Russia followed much of both Galula’s and Trinquier’s theories, but none of the theories could explain the victory. Russia did not share the theories view of the civilians being the key to victory. The conclusion is that if counterinsurgency is carried out without any regards to the civilians, operations can be carried out in a way that makes the situation unsustainable to the insurgents. If artillery and air-bombings are made against the insurgents without caring for the consequences for civilians, victory can be achieved. This could explain why NATO-countries have had difficulties with counterinsurgency due to their population-centric doctrines.

David Galula var en fransk officer som 1964 skrev ner sina teorier om upprorsbekämpning.Dessa teorier har därefter fått ett enormt stort utrymme i både utbildningar och itillämpningar på konflikter världen över. Uppsatsen avhandlar skillnader och likhetermellan Galulas åtta operationella steg och NATO:s nya doktrin för COIN-operationer från2011.Syftet med uppsatsen är att studera de två verken för att utröna hur mycket Galulas teorieranvänds i en modern handbok gällande upprorsbekämpning. Kopplat till användet avGalula i doktrinen vill uppsatsen bedöma hur mycket plats Galulas teorier bör få i denmoderna svenska officersutbildningen.Uppsatsen har nyttjat sig av en kvalitativ textanalys samt en komparativ del där de tvåverken jämförs. NATO:s doktrin för COIN-operationer har analyserats med hjälp avGalulas åtta steg. Resultatet visar att Galulas teorier till viss del går att finna i doktrinen,men det är även mycket som ej går att koppla mellan verken.

Kulmination är ett väletablerat teoretiskt begrepp inom högintensiv krigföring som förklarar hur relativ styrka förändras mellan motståndare. Kulmination är dock relativt oprövat i lågintensiva konflikter och särskilt inom gerillakrigföring. Forskningsläget kring kulmination identifierar att betydelsen av omslag i relativ styrka för en gerillaaktör behöver ytterligare förklaras. Utifrån ett grundläggande antagande att en gerillaaktörs kan nå kulmination i sin krigföring öppnar undersökningen upp den kausala processen mellan upprorsbekämpning och en motgång i gerillaaktörens krigföring genom att pröva en deduktivt framtagen kulminationsmodell. Undersökningen processpårar en kulminationsmekanism vid två typiska fall av gerillakrigföring: al-Qaeda i Irak (AQI) 2003-2009 och Islamiska staten (IS) 2010-2016. Resultatet visar att denformulerade kulminationsmodellen får i huvudsak stöd och kulminationsmekanismen existerar i undersökningens fall. Viss generalisering kan göras till andra liknande fall men slutsatserna är inledningsvis preliminära. Undersökningens resultat vidgar kulminationsbegreppets teoretiska generaliserbarhet och praktiska användbarhet och kompletterar även Galulas teoribildning om upprorsbekämpning.

Counterinsurgency warfare has had an ambiguous position in the American military tradition. After the Vietnam experience, the population-control-oriented doctrine of David Galula was almost forgotten. Current war of the United States of America in Afghanistan turned out to be a conflict where application of the doctrine comes in question. It is codified in the 2006 FM 3-24 counterinsurgency manual. The author of the thesis Spojené státy americké a protipovstalecký boj: Afghánistán asks a question whether the behavior of American armed forces in Afghanistan was in compliance with the COIN doctrine of David Galula. The author looks at the conflict through lens of Galula's eight counterinsurgency steps, as defined in his book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. The author of the thesis looks for factors that could influence fulfilment of the steps and he gives the factors in perspective with American strategic culture, as defined in the thesis. The analysis shows that the fulfilment of Galula's eight steps has never occurred. Traditional military thinking partially locked successful adaptation of American armed forces to the environment of Afghanistan. However, the author comes to the discovery that in terms of strategic culture, there were some shifts in Afghanistan.