<p>This essay aims to analyse if the Russian military operation carried out against Georgia between the 7^th and 12^th of august 2008 were executed with adherence to the Russian principles for military deception, <em>maskirovka</em>.</p><p>   A superior purpose is to assess the situation according to the Swedish Armed Forces task of identifying possible needs for new or changed needs for abilities and competence.</p><p>   The method used is two-alternative hypotheses which are tried by comparing actual events before and during the Russian-Georgian war with the ten methods of <em>maskirovka</em>, compiled from military analytical literature. Such traces of resemblance are further examined, both individually and as a part of a larger indication.</p><p>   Further the essay describes the Russian art of war, the prerequisites for military surprise, information warfare in Russian doctrine, the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the principles for <em>maskirovka</em>.</p><p>   The conclusion is that the Russian operation was executed with some adherence to maskirovka, though unspecified of to what degree.</p><p>   Author of this essay is Cadet Martin Svensson of the Swedish Army, currently a student at the Armed Forces Technical School in Halmstad.</p>

This essay aims to analyse if the Russian military operation carried out against Georgia between the 7th and 12th of august 2008 were executed with adherence to the Russian principles for military deception, maskirovka.    A superior purpose is to assess the situation according to the Swedish Armed Forces task of identifying possible needs for new or changed needs for abilities and competence.    The method used is two-alternative hypotheses which are tried by comparing actual events before and during the Russian-Georgian war with the ten methods of maskirovka, compiled from military analytical literature. Such traces of resemblance are further examined, both individually and as a part of a larger indication.    Further the essay describes the Russian art of war, the prerequisites for military surprise, information warfare in Russian doctrine, the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the principles for maskirovka.    The conclusion is that the Russian operation was executed with some adherence to maskirovka, though unspecified of to what degree.    Author of this essay is Cadet Martin Svensson of the Swedish Army, currently a student at the Armed Forces Technical School in Halmstad.

The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 drastically changed Europe´s and Sweden´s political climate.Russiashowed that it is capable of successfully completing complex campaigns including ground, naval and air assets. However, not much has been said about the theoretical framework and doctrine of the Russian military of today. Even less has been researched about Russian use of air power and applied air theory. Are air power assets still considered primarily as support of ground offensives or has the theoretical framework changed? John A. Warden III´s theory presented in The Air Campaign and The Enemy as a System have had a big impact on western air power use. HasRussia also changed its approach on the use of air power to include the theory of Warden? This thesis researches Russian use of air power in the war with Georgia 2008. The empirics are then compared to Warden´s theory of air power use to answer the question if Russia´s air power use in the war with Georgia 2008 was done in cohesion with what Warden suggests. / Kriget i Georgien ändrade under några få dagar i augusti 2008 Sveriges och större delen av Europas säkerhetspolitiska klimat. Efter kriget står det klart att Ryssland genomförde en lyckad operation och nådde sitt mål att slå Georgien militärt. Väldigt lite har dock skrivits om Ryssland och dess militära teorigrund. Än mindre har skrivits om Rysslands flygstridskraftsanvändande teorigrund varför det kan vara intressant att vidare undersöka kriget i Georgien. Det råder ingen tvekan om att västvärldens militärer har tagit starkt intryck av John A. Warden IIIs teori om fienden som ett system och hans bok The Air Campaign. Har även rysk militär inspirerats av Wardens tankar och försökte ryska flygstridskrafter i så fall praktisera dessa under kriget i Georgien 2008? Denna uppsats undersöker om ryskt luftmaktsanvändande under kriget i Georgien kan sägas vara inspirerat av John A. Warden IIIs teori som presenterades i hans The Air Campaign och The Enemy as a System.

This thesis examines the discursive construction of Russian national identity through the 2008 war in Georgia with a focus on how this process was influenced by the Russian leadership’s desire to gain the support of both the domestic and international audiences for its actions outside its borders. These actions involved forceful military intervention, the recognition of the independence of the two Georgian break-away republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the decision to place Russian military troops in the two republics during the aftermath of war. The study critically examines the official Russian discourse, with a focus on particular visions of national identity that this discourse utilized. The study demonstrates how the official discourse in the context of the 2008 war contributed to the construction of Russian national identity and thereby seeks to highlight the performative power of language. By placing considerable focus on the internal dimension of the Russian leadership’s conduct in the international arena, i.e. the consolidation of the national community in the event of war, the thesis contributes to an oft overlooked element of Russian foreign policy initiatives. Consequently, it seeks to challenge the tendency to explain Russian actions with regard to the war as a natural result of a neo-imperialistic identity – a tendency that fails to take into account how national identity can be constructed in its more immediate context. By making use of Rogers Brubaker's concept of nationalism as an event, the study discusses the increased force of nationalism during war and demonstrates how this was clearly the case during the 2008 war in Georgia. The analysis concentrates on three main identity visions within the official Russian discourse. Firstly, it examines how contemporary Russia was constructed as a great power, partly as a response to the claims that it was an imperialist state. Secondly, it discusses the role of certain historical concepts, i.e. the Cold War and the Soviet Union, within the discourse and elaborates upon the act of politicising history. Thirdly, the study analyses the Russian leadership’s protection narrative that emphasised the responsibility to protect Russian citizens and compatriots in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is demonstrated how these different identity visions were intertwined, resulting in a rather contradictory official discourse that speaks to many different audiences simultaneously, while foregrounding the first of the above-mentioned identity visions, namely of Russia as a great power.

Pavla Ksiazkiewiczová Německo-ruské vztahy na pozadí ukrajinské krize a rusko- gruzínské války Abstract The thesis examines the German response to the Ukrainian Crisis in 2008 and the Russo- Georgian War in 2014. On the background of these two conflicts, I would like to demonstrate the German-Russian relations and their deterioration in the past years. My main research question was why did Germany decide to support and advocate the EU sanctions against Russia during the Ukrainian Crisis in 2014, when they did not promote such a solution in the 2008 during the Russo-Georgian War. My hypothesis is that German foreign policy shifted from the economic interests-oriented approach towards norm-oriented one. I am working with the theory Foreign policy analysis, which studies the management of international relations and state's activities. This theory can be understood as a critique towards dominant structural approach in international relations because it says that foreign policy is determined by the domestic policy. I constructed the German response to the Ukrainian Crisis and the Russo- Georgian War using qualitative discourse analysis. With this method I am analyzing the statements of those actors, who influence German foreign policy.

Russian government justified the war with Georgia by a set of normatively-legislative arguments. Intervention in Georgia was in accordance to those arguments legitimate. This rationalization proved to be invalid. Main goal of this diploma thesis was therefore to find Russian motives for the war with Georgia. Our hypothesis was that the reaction to Georgian military operation in South Ossetia was a result of a certain dilemma in Russian government. We used two methodological concepts introduced in the book of Graham T. Allison "Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis" for the analysis. The first model, "rational actor", presumes that countries act in the international relations always rationally. "Rational actor" showed that Russian reaction was a result of the rational choice - Russia evaluated military confrontation with Georgia as the most advantageous alternative. The governments' behavior is in accordance to the second model, "organizational process", always limited by behavior of their parts - organizations. The second model revealed that the Russian reaction was result of activated programs, whose character led to massive military action. Our analysis showed that the model which fits better in the case of finding motives of Russian government for the intervention in Georgia...

2008年的俄喬戰爭是俄羅斯自解體以來第一次境外用兵，本文試圖透過守勢現實主義 ( defensive realism ) 的角度來解釋這一場俄羅斯的對外衝突。守勢現實主義國家的行為模式包括維持守勢現狀、對外尋求合作，因此得以處理安全困境難題，而在威脅等級過高時可能採取預防性戰爭來消除威脅。本文藉由守勢現實主義的觀點與行為模式來解釋俄羅斯的外交行為，透過檢視俄羅斯自解體以來的國家行為模式確立俄羅斯為守勢現實主義國家。再者藉由探討俄喬衝突中分離主義問題與俄喬關係中的矛盾以說明衝突的遠因與近因。最後探討俄羅斯在外高加索地區的利益與衝突以解釋俄羅斯在俄喬戰爭中的出兵動機。俄羅斯在解體之後的外交政策大多採取不衝突與合作的策略，隨著喬治亞的政權更替，俄羅斯對喬治亞的關係從合作走向以政策制衡，最後基於俄羅斯南部的地緣安全與北約東擴等等來自西方的威脅之下，俄羅斯採取了協助喬治亞分離地區的軍事行動來解決自身威脅。本論文認為俄羅斯不僅在2008年前屬於守勢現實主義國家，以守勢現實主義的觀點來看，俄喬戰爭更是一場為了應對歐美威脅的防禦性戰爭。 / The 2008 Russo – Georgian war was the first military action outside borders since the collapse of USSR. In this thesis, I describe the conflict using the perspective of Defensive Realism. The behavior of a state using a defensive realism perspective includes remain status-quo of defensive, seeking cooperation, therefore are able to manage the security dilemma. When the threat level is too high, a state using a defensive realism perspective may launch a preventive war to eliminate the threat. First, by examining Russia’s state behavior between 1992 to 2008. We are able to determine that Russia follows defensive realism behavior. Secondly, by studying the separatism of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and the change of relationship between Russia and Georgia, we are able to elucidate the factors that caused the Russo-Georgian war. Finally, we explore Russia’s interests and threats in South Caucasus area that reveal the motivation for Russia the launch the counter strike against Georgia. Russia has tended to take the non-conflict route and cooperative strategy in diplomacy after Soviet-era ended. Due to the regime change in Georgia, Russia changed its policy toward Georgia from cooperative to containment. Finally, as the threat from the West rose and another round of NATO enlargement occurred, while it’s threating the geopolitical security of the southern border, Russia decided to launch a preventive war to assist the separatist states within Georgia. In conclusion, not only Russia is a defensive realism state, from the perspective of defensive realism, the 2008 Russo-Georgia war is a preventive war against the threat of the West.

本論文旨在探討俄羅斯外交政策之動機與推動因素，文中以新古典現實主義做為研究架構，並結合了體系層次因素（自變項）及個體層次的中介變項（如：領導人形象和戰略文化）。本論文所探討之時間軸橫跨1991至2014年，重點著重於以下兩研究案例：2008年南奧塞提亞戰爭及2014年克里米亞危機。針對此兩研究案例，作者使用「過程追蹤」和「歷史敘事」的研究方法，以驗證體系與個體層次因素對於俄羅斯外交政策的影響。 分析結果印證了新古典現實主義的主要假設：俄羅斯在相對物質權力提升的情況下，會同樣地擴大外交政策行動上的野心與版圖。雖然由第一個研究案例可得知，所謂的體系修正因素（如：地理位置、限制/允許因素、和體系明確性）對於俄羅斯介入喬治亞的決策有著重要的影響。而第二個假設提到，「總統普丁選擇設計、校正、調整策略上的選擇，反映文化上可接受的偏好，以維持國內的政治支持度」這個說法也已經被印證。本研究分析顯示，體系因素和個體層次中介變項對於2008年介入喬治亞及2014年併吞克里米亞的決策皆有影響。整體而言，當分析一個國家的外交政策時，新古典現實主義確實是個強而有力的架構，但作者也深知仍有進一步研究的必要。 / This thesis aims at contributing to the debate on the motives and drivers of Russian foreign policy. It uses neoclassical realism as an enhanced research framework which combines systemic stimuli (independent variable) and unit-level intervening variables such as leader images and strategic culture. The work investigates the period from 1991 to 2014 with focus on two case studies, namely the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. This two case studies use process-tracing method and historiography to test the effect of systemic and unit level factors on the Russian foreign policy. The analysis has confirmed the main neoclassical realist expectation that an increase in the relative material power of the Russian Federation will lead to a corresponding expansion in the ambition and scope of Russian foreign policy activity. Although, especially the first case study showed, that the so called systemic modifiers, such as geography, restrictiveness/permissiveness and systemic clarity had significant effect on the decision to intervene in Georgia. The second hypothesis stating that, “President Putin chooses to frame, adjust, and modify strategic choices to reflect culturally acceptable preferences to maintain domestic political support” was also confirmed. The analysis has shown that both systemic stimuli and unit level intervening variables influenced the final decision to intervene in Georgia in 2008, and to annex Crimea in 2014. Overall, neoclassical realism proved to be enhanced and a useful framework for analyzing foreign policy of a state. But the author is fully aware that a further research is needed.