This dissertation critically reconsiders the dichotomy drawn in modern philosophy between faith and reason, especially as formalized by the German Idealists. The latter, I suggest, continue to influence how the philosophy of religion is conceived and what it is considered to be capable of accomplishing. Though originally used to reconcile religious faith with the philosophical reason that had animated forceful skepticism, this dichotomy also underscores a tension between the conceptualization of a rational public good and private religious values within pluralistic societies. I focus on the efforts of Kant, Hegel, and F.W.J. Schelling to develop a philosophy of religion that distinguished philosophical reason and religious faith as distinct sources of theory while nevertheless establishing meaningful dialogue between each. The first chapter surveys Kant's and Hegel's philosophy of religion and argues that they struggled to maintain the otherness of religious faith relative to philosophical interpretation. The subsequent chapters each focus on a period of Schelling's intellectual development — his early criticisms of Kant, his mature rejection of German Idealism's subjective metaphysics, and his late philosophy of religion — as he developed an alternative philosophical approach to religion. This provides a means of exploring the challenges that a philosophy of religion must navigate to move beyond the problematic opposition of faith and reason. I conclude by considering the university as a promising context for reformulating this problematic dichotomy central to the philosophy of religion. The professional division of faculties embodies the abstract delineation of faith and reason and indicates the social and political dimension of such academic efforts. I argue that Schelling's contributions to the philosophy of religion point to the idea of the university as a vital framework for both reconsidering the opposition of faith and reason and moving beyond this schema in order to conceptualize effectively the contemporary conflicts between rational and religious authority within pluralistic societies.

This essay examines the role of intersubjectivity in the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. For Fichte, the ultimate ground of philosophy is the infinite self-positing activity of the I. However, this self-positing activity must have as its product a determined I, and therefore it must establish a limit to the I’s original infinity. Further, such a limit is only thinkable as a relation to that which lies beyond it: the negation of the I, or the not-I. By this characterization of the nature of the I, Fichte establishes it as a paradoxical concept that is at once infinite and finite. To solve this paradox, he introduces the concept of a “check” (Anstoβ) that puts a halt to the outward-striving activity of the I. In experiencing this check, the I is not limited by something outside of itself, which would negate its position as the ultimate ground of its own being, but rather is given the task of positing its own limit. In Grundlage des Naturrechts, Fichte develops this idea through another concept: that of a “summons” (Aufforderung) given to the I by another subject. Since the I is characterized by containing the ground of its own being, the intersubjective relation to the other is conditioned by the I limiting itself, so that the self-grounding character of the other can be recognized. In experiencing the summons of the other, though, the I does not only posit a limit for itself, but also becomes conscious of its own nature as a free, self-positing subject. Intersubjectivity, therefore, must be considered a fundamental element of the I as such. In Fichte’s own words: “No I, no Thou; no Thou, no I.”

Recently, a number of scholars have sought to reveal the extent to which the concept of religion and the discipline of religious studies depend upon a distinction between humans and other animals for their conceptual and disciplinary integrity. This dissertation is an attempt to deepen this insight by (re)turning to one of the central figures in the history of thinking about religion, G.W.F. Hegel, whose Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion represent one of the first forays into the academic study of religion. By employing the non-human animal as a limit-case, this project attempts to probe Hegel’s concept of religion for a place where it might be possible to think “religion” anew. This “place” can be found in Hegel’s concept of habit or Gewohnheit, since habit unsettles the distinction between nature and spirit, leaving open a way to rethink “religion” as being rooted in the animal or quasi-natural. Chapter 1 considers Alexandre Kojève’s worry that, at the proverbial “end of history,” the human being will become “reanimalized.” We argue that the (im)possibility of such a reanimalization lies in Hegel’s concept of habit or Gewohnheit, that “mechanism,” which aids the natural or feeling-soul in its “transition” to spirit or, more specifically, consciousness. In chapter 2, we consider the relationship between nature and spirit further, exploring the relationship between thought and feeling as thematized in Hegel’s philosophy of religion. Hegel argues (in contrast to the likes of Schleiermacher) that religion cannot have its essence in feeling, because feeling is a form of thought. In chapter 3, we take a closer look at how habit aids in the “transition” or passing-over from nature to spirit, highlighting habit as skill. Habit is a means for the purification of the natural drives and for replacing these drives with those of another, spiritual nature. However, we will find that the transition from nature to spirit cannot be accomplished through habit alone; it depends upon an encounter with the infinite or death, wherein the subject realizes her own in/finitude. In chapter 4, we consider how spirit expresses itself through the human body and, most importantly, through language and (the language of) sacrifice. While the death of the animal is the becoming of spirit, spirit depends upon the death of the animal even after it makes its first appearance in language since speech or language is dependent upon the animal voice. In the final chapter, we discover that religion too is predicated on the death or sacrifice of the animal. Moreover, it is through religion that human beings raise themselves above the animals and learn how to recognize themselves as essentially spiritual beings. Religion brings about this realization, this conversion from nature to spirit, through the cultus – a form of religious practice akin to a habit as skill. In the cultus, the human subject undergoes a conversion and becomes aware of herself as a spiritual rather than a natural being. When performed continuously, this cultus becomes the basis of the ethical as well as the philosophical life.

The main aim of this thesis is to present an account of Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy and to demonstrate its relevance to contemporary issues in the methodology of the history of philosophy both insofar as Hegel still has interesting things to say to contemporary historians, and insofar as an understanding of Hegel's views helps us understand later developments in the historiography of philosophy. In the first chapter, I present the conceptual scaffolding which enables us to compare Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy with contemporary approaches to the history of philosophy. I also criticize some of the myths that have developed around Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy. In the second chapter, I present the principles that constitute Hegel's evaluative framework: coherence or non-contradiction (in relation to the concept of Aufhebung), concreteness, systematicity, autonomy, and the use of clear conceptual language in philosophical discourse. Aside from these formal principles, I also identify a substantive philosophical thesis which Hegel seems to use in order to evaluate development in the history of philosophy, namely, the identity of thought and being. In the third chapter I attempt to attenuate the tension that exists between Hegel's methodological prescriptions, especially the claim that we should be on guard against anachronistic readings and that critique should be internal, with the manner in which he seems to consistently read past philosophers through his own system. I suggest two perspectives which can help attenuate this tension. First, I emphasize that Hegel is trying to write an anti-individualistic history of philosophy, where philosophical systems are presented as public culture achievements and the individual idiosyncrasies of philosophers are suppressed. Second, I show how Hegel's semantic and epistemic holism helps us make sense of the way that he approaches the history of philosophy. In the fourth and final chapter I discuss Hegel's conception of the relationship between philosophy and its socio-cultural milieu, and based on this discussion, I show that Hegel did not think that there is continuity in the kinds of problems that philosophers have been interested in, and that he thought that the main purpose of the history of philosophy is to provide metaphilosophical reconstructions and justifications of shifts in the kinds of problems that philosophers have been interested in. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / In this thesis I attempt to fill in a gap in Anglophone scholarship on Hegel by presenting an account of a much neglected aspect of Hegel's system, namely, Hegel's account and conception of the history of philosophy. I begin by attempting to dispel some misunderstandings that have distorted the Anglophone reception of this aspect of Hegel's thought, and by emphasizing the importance of understanding Hegel's views on the history of philosophy if one wishes to understand later developments in the historiography of philosophy. I then present the principles by which Hegel evaluates development in the history of philosophy, and I attempt to attenuate some of the tension which seems to exist between Hegel's methodological prescriptions and his actual practice as a historian of philosophy. I conclude with an account of Hegel's views on continuity in the history of philosophy, and their relation to contemporary views on continuity in the history of philosophy.

This dissertation demonstrates how Samuel Taylor Coleridge provides a unique vision of reality in which his evolving self-consciousness mirrors, contributes to, and is subsumed by a single universal consciousness. Utilizing the divine power of imagination, he is able to decipher the images from the material world as characters of God's symbolic language of self-revelation; subsequently, through the divine "attribute" of reason, he is able to transform them into a corresponding symbolic language of poetry. He realizes that his creativity is a finite repetition of God's infinite act of creation in which "spirit," God's consciousness in creation, comes to an awareness of itself through the human mind. This study argues that, according to Coleridge, these processes follow a divine intention, and the human faculties and the mind's structure have been molded precisely to achieve a particular understanding of reality that conforms to God's requirements and for spirit's self-actualization. Furthermore, the process by which Coleridge creates and derives knowledge from his poetic expressions follows an archetypal blueprint according to which all natural processes operate. This project illustrates not only how the theory of organicism lies at the foundation of the complex, reciprocal relationship between Coleridge's artistic expression and developing subjectivity, but also how there is an organic interrelationship between an individual's developing self-consciousness and spirit's growing awareness of its cosmic totality. Ultimately, Coleridge's writings reveal that the macrocosmic and microcosmic processes are organically interrelated, interdependent, and symbiotic and that this "truth" is gradually discovered through his experiences of the divine elements of love and beauty in creation.

Dans le présent travail de thèse, nous nous proposons de mettre en lumière les raisons pour lesquelles Heidegger donne le coup d’envoi à un questionnement de longue haleine et de grand ampleur sur la question de la liberté à la suite de la publication, en 1927, de son chef d’oeuvre, Etre et Temps. Nous nous efforcerons de formuler et d’élaborer progressivement deux thèses à la lumière des objections heideggeriennes adressées à la conception kantienne et à la doctrine schellingienne de la liberté. Notre première thèse est que la radicalisation heideggerienne de la conception kantienne de la liberté, développée dans le cadre d’une « métaphysique du Dasein », ne permet pas de découvrir un contexte philosophique dans lequel une problématique plus originelle de la liberté pourrait être formulée puisque le questionnement heideggerien de la liberté se réduit en dernier ressort en une répétition de la démarche transcendantale de Kant et en un exemple d’application remarquable de cette démarche à une question non kantienne, à savoir la question de l’être. Notre deuxième thèse est qu’à partir de la thèse de la différence ontologique et au prix de l’oubli du concept schellingien de l’absolu, l’investigation heideggerienne de la liberté ne donne lieu qu’à une forme sécularisée de la théologie dialectique de Schelling, qui prend en garde malgré son caractère panthéiste la thèse de la bonté divine et la doctrine de la révélation de la dogmatique chrétienne. Dans la perspective ontologique proprement heideggerienne, l’être fondé dans la liberté, dans le fondement du fondement (Grund des Grundes), dans l’abîme (Abgrund) se manifeste à travers ce qu’il rend possible, c’est-à-dire l’étant / In this thesis, we tried to highlight the reason for which Heidegger initiates an investigation of large scale on the question of freedom after the publication of Being and Time. We tried to formulate and elaborate progressively two theses in the spot of objections that Heidegger addresses to the Critique of Kant and to the Schellingian theology of freedom. Our first thesis is that the Heideggerian radicalization of Kantian conception of freedom developed in the framework of metaphysics of Dasein does not allow to the discovery of a philosophical context from where a more original problematic of freedom could be formulated and the Heideggerian questioning is nothing but a repetition of it and a remarkable application example for elaborating a non Kantian question, to namely the question of Being. Our second thesis is that from the thesis of ontological difference and further to forgetting Schellingian concept of absolute, Heideggerian questioning only could develop a secularized variant of theological dialectics of Schelling, which despite its pantheistic view affirm the thesis of divine goodness and the doctrine of revelation of Christian dogmatics. In Heideggerian ontological perspective, the Being (Sein) melted in the freedom, in the ground of ground (Grund des Grundes), in abyss (Abgrund) manifests itself through what it renders possible, that is to say through being (Seiende)

The thesis focuses on the theory of tragedy in Germany around 1800, and has two primary aims: to demonstrate the importance of idealist thought for contemporary approaches to tragedy and the tragic; and to revise the intellectual historiography of the classic phase in German letters. It traces reflection on Greek tragedy from the Querelle des anciens et des modernes in France around 1700 through the aesthetic systems formulated in Germany around 1800. Two intellectual developments are emphasized: the historicist consciousness that develops throughout the eighteenth century and places Greek tragedy more radically in its cultural context than ever before; and the idealist philosophy of art, which seeks to restore a measure of universality to the ancient genre, seeing it as the manifestation of a timeless quality of ‘the tragic.’ These two impulses, historicizing and universalizing, it is argued, are fundamental to modern understanding of Greek tragedy. The genealogical method seeks to establish a greater continuity with earlier eighteenth-century thought than is generally recognized, and to refute the teleologies that dominate accounts of idealist thought. A reconstruction of the central texts of Schiller, Schelling, Hegel, and Hölderlin reveals that the theory of tragedy around 1800 is in large part a reflection on history, an effort to understand how ancient literature can be meaningful in modernity. Greek tragedy becomes the ground for an engagement with the pastness of antiquity and its possible presence. Idealist theories, far from dissolving particularity in abstraction, seek a mediation between philological historicism and philosophical universalism in considering Greek tragedy. A genealogy of the tragic suggests that such mediation remains a vital task for scholars of the Classics.

Durante o ano de 1781 Kant lança a obra Crítica da razão pura, a qual é exclusivamente voltada para o problema do conhecimento humano, mais precisamente, sua origem, seu limite, sua organização e sua validade perante a realidade empírica. Contudo, foi a questão quanto a origem do conhecimento que se tornou o foco das atenções e discussões durante todo o período do idealismo alemão, visto que tal questão trazia a luz o conceito de coisa em si. O problema deste conceito era saber qual deveria ser seu lugar em relação ao conhecimento, isto é, se a coisa em si era ou não a causa do conhecimento empírico e quais as consequências e soluções diante a escolha de alguma destas posições. Desse modo, durante o idealismo alemão surgiram vários sistemas que ora tentavam resolver ora atacar, com argumentos céticos, o problema da coisa em si kantiana. Dentre estes sistemas, como defensor da doutrina transcendental, destaca-se o de Arthur Schopenhauer, que tanto dá uma denominação metafísica-imanente para a coisa em si, Vontade, quanto soluciona o problema da origem do conhecimento empírico sem o uso de tal conceito problemático. Sendo assim, nossa dissertação tem como objetivo discutir a solução e o significado do conceito de coisa em si encontrado por Schopenhauer em seu livro O mundo como vontade e como representação. / During all the year of 1781, Kant releases his Critique of Pure Reason, which is exclusively devoted to the problem of human knowledge, more precisely his origins, his limits, his organization and his validity face off the empirical reality. Although, the question around the knowledge origins has become the focus of lectures and discussions during all the period of German idealism because it brings out the thing-in-itself concept. That concepts problem is to know which should be his role concerning knowledge, or if thin-in-itself was the cause of empirical knowledge or not, and which consequences and solutions were implicated in this positions. With that, during the period of German idealism several philosophical systems began to exist, attempting to solve or to attack, using skeptical argumentations, Kantians thing-in-itself problem. Among these systems, as a defender of transcendental philosophy doctrine, Arthur Schopenhauers system gains force, as an author of the denomination metaphysical-immanent to the thing-in-itself (the Will), and both as the proposer of a solution to the problem of the empirical knowledge without the using of this problematical concept. Therefore, our master thesis has, as her goal, to discuss solution and signification of thing-in-itself inner concept, founded by Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation.

A presente dissertação busca situar o pensamento de Hölderlin em relação à filosofia do idealismo alemão, na maneira pela qual propõe uma solução poética para algumas questões levantadas pela filosofia de seu tempo. Partindo da mesma exigência de reunir sujeito e objeto em um fundamento absoluto, o poeta procura um princípio unificador que supere as cisões deixadas pela filosofia crítica em uma reflexão que desloca de maneira original as noções e conceitos de Kant e Fichte. Ao apontar, em seu fragmento Juízo e Ser, o caráter cindido da operação do juízo e os pressupostos da consciência e da identidade, Hölderlin se move da noção de eu absoluto fichteana para um fundamento concebido enquanto ser, anterior a toda divisão entre sujeito e objeto; as consequências desse deslocamento sinalizam os limites da filosofia em suas posturas teórica e prática. Essa reflexão filosófica tem um exemplar desenvolvimento em seu romance Hipérion ou o Eremita na Grécia, o qual mobiliza todas essas questões em uma expressão estética. Acompanhando o percurso do protagonista em suas tentativas de recuperar uma Grécia harmoniosa, revelam-se as consequências e limites desse projeto de pensamento. Se o saldo do romance parece negativo, ele chama a atenção, no entanto, para uma reconsideração daquela intuição original do fragmento e para a compreensão da operação formal e poética da obra enquanto verdadeiro espaço de efetivação do projeto hölderliniano. Em um complexo processo de estratificação temporal que relaciona o tempo vivido com o tempo narrado, é a recordação que se revela cerne da atividade poética de Hölderlin, por sua capacidade de mobilizar aqueles conteúdos negativos em uma perspectiva positiva, reunindo os momentos particulares do passado em um todo infinito. Realçada na escolha do autor pela forma romanesca, tangenciando a vivacidade do romance epistolar com a distância narrativa do Bildungsroman, essa significação infinita do finito oferece uma original compreensão para os problemas da filosofia do idealismo alemão através da via estética. Desse modo, o romance Hipérion acompanha a realização poética de um projeto filosófico junto à fundamentação filosófica da poesia de Hölderlin, encontrando um vislumbre da totalidade a partir da finitude e da condição cindida da modernidade. / This thesis intends to situate Hölderlins thinking in relation to the philosophy of German Idealism, in the way which it proposes a poetic solution to some questions raised by the philosophy of his time. Starting from the same demand of reuniting subject and object in an absolute ground, the poet searches for a unifying principle capable of overcoming the divisions left by critical philosophy, in a meditation that dislocates notions and concepts from Kant and Fichte in an original way. Pointing in his fragment Judgment and Being to the divided character of judgment and the presuppositions of conscience and identity, Hölderlin moves from the Fichtean notion of an absolute I to a ground conceived as being, prior to any division between subject and object; the consequences of this dislocation indicate the boundaries of philosophy in its theoretical and practical dispositions. This philosophical meditation has an exemplary development in his novel Hyperion or The Hermit in Greece, which mobilizes all these questions in an aesthetic expression. By following the leading character in his tries to recover a harmonious Greece, he recognizes the consequences and limits of this project of thought. If the outcome of the novel seems negative, it however calls for a reconsideration of that original intuition in the fragment and of a comprehension of the formal and poetic operation of the work as the real place where Hölderlins project is put into action. In a complex process of temporal stratification that relates lived time with narrated time, it is recollection that reveals the core of Hölderlins poetic activity, in its capacity to mobilize those negative contents in a positive perspective, assembling the particular past moments in an infinite whole. Accentuated by the authors choice of the novel, tangent to the vivacity of the epistolary novel and to the narrative distance of Bildungsroman, this infinite meaning of the finite offers an original comprehension to the problems of German Idealism by means of an aesthetic path. Therefore, Hyperion follows the poetic accomplishment of a philosophical project together with the philosophical grounding of Hölderlins poetry, finding a glimpse of totality that arises from finitude and from the divided condition of modern age.

Max Stirner has historically been charged with nihilism, narcissism, and nominalism. Yet there exists another Stirner—a Stirner attentive and responsive to the intricate uncertainty of existence. I argue that we can find in his destructive an-archism a spirited celebration of creativity and experimentation; in his wild anti-humanism, a gentle sympathy for the human life; in his aggressive atheism, an unwavering clemency for the heathen. Stirner’s vagabond ontology, egoist ethics, and insurrectionary politics culminate in a singular, joyful affirmation: there are other ways of being.