The implementation of deregulation in the financial industry has shown both positive and negative effects on the average investor’s ability to save for retirement. The increase in financial investment products and supplements to saving has provided the average investor with many more opportunities to manage his/her wealth in order to save for retirement. This paper will examine the evolution of basic savings accounts offered by commercial banks in the early 1900s to the broadening of investment opportunities in the 1990s. The paper discusses the effects of three deregulatory acts on the average investor’s ability to accumulate wealth for retirement. These acts include: The Depository Institutions Deregulatory Monetary Control Act of 1980, Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, and the repeal of Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. Each of these deregulatory measures played a significant role in the changing of investment and savings behavior of the average investor and the definition of retirement in general.

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The late 1990's was a time of great wealth and prosperity in the United States. With this economic fervor came a new era of deregulation of the financial services industry. During this time, Congress passed the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, otherwise referred to as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GBLA). This law removed the final barrier (contained in Depression-era Glass-Steagall legislation) between mixing investment banking and commercial banking in the United States. The purpose of this report is to explain the intentions of the law's supporters and detractors, to discuss why this period was a particularly ripe time for such a policy, to examine the leadership decisions that contributed to the passage of GLBA, and to understand the motives behind a "new Glass-Steagall" bill today. This paper focuses only on the deregulatory parts of GLBA relevant to Glass-Steagall's repeal. It does not examine the privacy protections, et al. of GLBA at any length. Also contained in the analysis is a brief discussion of whether GLBA's stated intentions have been violated through the mixing of banking and commerce that has emerged in the present day. Finally, this report ends with a discussion on the fidelity of our national debate on banking regulation, and what it means for the federal government to manage risk in American financial markets in support of the public interest. / text

abstract: The economic crisis in 2008 triggered a global financial shockwave that left many wondering about the origins of the crisis. Similarly, in the early twentieth century, Wall Street faced catastrophic losses that set the stage for the Great Depression, which resulted in a decade of economic depression, leaving millions of people out of work. Using discourse analysis to understand how economic crisis is framed through the mainstream press, this research project analyzed the stock market crash of 1929-1932 and the mortgage-backed financial crisis of 2007-2009 through the lens of two mainstream publications, The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. Comparative analysis focused on explanations for the causes of the crises, attributions of blame, culprits, and proposed solutions emerging in news coverage of the 1929 panic and the 2007-2009 financial crises. Mainstream media accounts of the 2007-2009 crisis are then compared with `alternative media' accounts of crisis causes, culprits, and solutions. These comparative analyses are contextualized historically within economic paradigms of thought, beginning with the classical economists led by Adam Smith and transitioning to the Chicago School. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. Communication Studies 2013

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No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - Humberto Gallucci Netto.pdf: 1119149 bytes, checksum: 8b79fe7fd5ee44160a2d7b7b97075abc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-23 / This thesis analyzes the differences between venture capital (VC) funds managed by banks and funds managed by independent institutions. Banks as VC fund managers (or bank affiliates funds) contact companies that commonly require banking services such as loans, underwriting and M & A advisory. Fang et al. (2013) and Hellman et al. (2008) explore the possibility that bank affiliates seek to invest in companies that may in the future be clients of the bank to which they are associated. In this case, banks sponsor VC funds to strengthen their commercial area. In addition, bank affiliates have access to the same flow of opportunities as independent funds. This thesis explores another possibility: independent funds seek co-investment with bank affiliates to facilitate the access of their investees to advantages such as greater capital volume and obtaining credit. In this case, the flow of opportunities of bank affiliates is differentiated because they are easier to participate in co-investments. Thus, the first objective of this thesis is to seek evidence that bank affiliates have a different flow of opportunities and that they are easier to co-invest. The second objective is to investigate whether the reinterpretation of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (or GSA) that occurred in 1989 affected the structuring of the investments of affiliated funds of banks. The GSA has in many ways limited the performance of commercial banks. Section 20 prohibited commercial banks and their subsidiaries from being the underwriters in corporate bond issues. Over the years, there have been some attempts by Congress to soften or remove the GSA, but with little success. Regulators and banks were able to effectively soften the GSA through successive reinterpretations of their content. In 1989, the Federal Reserve (Fed) allowed some financial institutions to underwrite corporate assets (including IPOs). This permission created, exogenously, two groups of financial institutions: those that could and could not do underwriting (we call the commercial banks that obtained this authorization as subsidiaries Section 20 or SS20). This constituted an exogenous shock that affected only a portion of commercial banks and thus allows us to identify whether underwriting activity affects the behavior of banks as VC fund managers. A change in the investment style after 1989 that occurs only for the SS20 would be indicative that bank affiliates adjust their investment style in function of the activities and interests of the holding company. This also suggests the conflict of interest between these two activities. Regarding the first objective, we find that the model of VC investment of affiliates of commercial banks is dependent on the round of entry into the company. When they invest in the first round, commercial bank affiliates enter rounds up to four times larger in investments with fewer co-investors and investment rounds than independent funds. Investments of bank affiliates in companies in the first round of financing are made in sectors other than the investments of independent funds and 35% of the companies invested by banks acquire a bank loan. Co-investment in companies that have passed the first round of investment represents most of investments for VC funds. Bank affiliates make 63% of the investments in this modality (55% for independents) and invest companies 400 miles away. Bank affiliates coincide with a larger number of funds, even with lower ratio numbers. Despite some differences, the sectors invested between affiliated funds and banks are similar. Investment in VC increases the likelihood of selling other banking products such as loans, underwriting and M & A advisory. Finally, companies invested in the first round by bank affiliates seeking loans from the VC bank have a spread of 90 basis points higher than companies seeking loans from other banks. In relation to our second objective, we identified a change in the investment model of funds affiliated with banks that have SS20 as compared to the VC funds of banks without such subsidiaries. There was a drop in the percentage of investments made in the first round of the company's VC by approximately 15%, and the main reason for this decline is the 19% decrease in first-round investments made alone. Early-stage investments fell by approximately 10%, while the co-investment percentage increased by 19%. There was a decrease, both in the percentage of rounds that the bank invested and, in the total, invested in the company by 20%. The distance between bank and company has decreased by 400 miles. These changes in the investment style impacted the percentage of companies that went through IPO by more than 10%. The results suggest a change in the investment model of commercial banks SS20 after 1989. The subsidiaries invested in more mature and closer companies, co-investing in more investments. One possible explanation is the search for more mature companies that can issue debentures, shares or use the new services that SS20 have been authorized. / Esta tese analisa diferenças entre fundos de venture capital (VC) geridos por bancos e os geridos por instituições independentes. Bancos enquanto gestores de fundos de VC (denominamos por afiliados de bancos os fundos geridos por bancos) entram em contato com empresas que comumente necessitam de serviços bancários tais como empréstimos, underwriting e assessoramento em M&A. Fang et al. (2013) e Hellman et al. (2008) exploram a possibilidade que afiliadas de bancos procurem investir em empresas que possam no futuro ser clientes do banco ao qual estão associadas. Nesse caso, os bancos patrocinam fundos de VC para fortalecer sua área comercial. Além do mais, as afiliadas de bancos têm acesso ao mesmo fluxo de oportunidades que os fundos independentes. Essa tese explora outra possibilidade: que fundos independentes busquem o coinvestimento com afiliadas de banco para facilitar o acesso de suas investidas a vantagens tais como maior volume de capital e obtenção de crédito. Nesse caso, o fluxo de oportunidades das afiliadas de bancos é diferenciado porque estas possuem maior facilidade para participar de coinvestimentos. Assim, o primeiro objetivo dessa tese é buscar evidências de que afiliadas de bancos têm um fluxo de oportunidades diferenciado e que têm maior facilidade para coinvestir. O segundo objetivo é investigar se a reinterpretação da Seção 20 do Glass-Steagall Act de 1933 (ou GSA) que ocorreu em 1989 afetou a estruturação dos investimentos de fundos afiliados de bancos. O GSA limitou de vários modos a atuação dos bancos comerciais. Em particular, a Seção 20 proibiu que bancos comerciais e suas subsidiárias e depositárias fossem os underwriters em emissões de títulos corporativos. Ao longo dos anos, houve algumas tentativas do Congresso para amenizar ou remover o GSA, mas com pouco sucesso. Os reguladores e bancos conseguiram amenizar efetivamente o GSA por meio de sucessivas reinterpretações de seu conteúdo. De especial interesse para o nosso tópico, em 1989 o Federal Reserve (FED) permitiu que algumas instituições financeiras fizessem o underwriting de ativos corporativos (inclusive IPOs). Essa permissão criou, de maneira exógena, dois grupos de instituições financeiras: as que podiam e as que não podiam fazer underwriting (denominamos os bancos comerciais que conseguiram esta autorização como subsidiárias Seção 20 ou SS20). Isso constituiu um choque exógeno que afetou apenas uma parcela dos bancos comerciais e, portanto, permite identificar se a atividade de underwrinting afeta o comportamento dos bancos enquanto gestores de fundos de VC. Uma mudança no estilo de investimento após 1989 que ocorra somente para as SS20 seria indicativa de que afiliadas de bancos ajustam seu estilo de investimento em função das atividades e interesses da holding. Isso também sugere o conflito de interesse entre essas duas atividades. Com relação ao primeiro objetivo, encontramos que o modelo de investimento em VC das afiliadas de bancos comerciais é dependente do round de entrada na empresa. Quando investem no primeiro round as afiliadas de bancos comerciais entram em rounds até quatro vezes maiores, em investimentos com menor número de coinvestidores e rounds de investimento do que os fundos independentes. Os investimentos de afiliadas de bancos em empresas no primeiro round de financiamento são feitos em setores distintos aos investimentos de fundos independentes e 35% das empresas investidas por bancos adquirem um empréstimo bancário. O coinvestimento em empresas que passaram do primeiro round de investimento representa a maioria dos investimentos para os fundos de VC. Afiliadas de bancos fazem 63% dos investimentos nesta modalidade (55% para independentes) e investem empresas 400 milhas mais distantes. As afiliadas de bancos coinvestem com um maior número de fundos, mesmo com índices de número de relacionamento mais baixos. Apesar de algumas diferenças, os setores investidos entre fundos afiliados e bancos são similares. O investimento em VC aumenta a probabilidade da venda de outros produtos bancários como: empréstimos, underwriting e assessoramento em M&A. Por fim, empresas investidas no primeiro round por afiliadas de bancos que buscam empréstimo junto ao banco investidor de VC tem um spread de 90 pontos base maior do que as empresas que buscam empréstimo em outros bancos. Com relação ao nosso segundo objetivo, identificamos uma mudança no modelo de investimento dos fundos afiliados a bancos que possuem SS20, quando comparado com os fundos de VC de bancos sem tais subsidiárias. Houve uma queda na porcentagem de investimentos feitos no primeiro round de VC da empresa em aproximadamente 15%, e o principal motivo desta queda é a diminuição em 19% dos investimentos em primeiro round realizados sozinhos. Os investimentos em early-stage caíram aproximadamente 10%, enquanto a porcentagem de coinvestimento aumentou 19%. Houve uma queda, tanto na porcentagem de rounds que o banco investiu quanto no total investido na empresa em 20%. A distância entre a sede do banco e da empresa diminuiu em 400 milhas. Estas mudanças no estilo de investimento impactaram na porcentagem de empresas que saíram por IPO em mais de 10%. Os resultados sugerem uma mudança no modelo de investimento dos bancos comerciais SS20 após 1989. As subsidiárias investiram em empresas mais maduras e mais próximas, coinvestindo em mais investimentos. Uma possível explicação é a busca por empresas mais maduras que podem emitir debêntures, ações ou utilizar os novos serviços que as SS20 foram autorizadas.

由於國內金融自由化的起步較歐美、等先進國家晚，因此，金融創新的活動在國內金融市場一直落後其他先進國家。在瞭解近三十年來金融創新的發展過程，透過學習歐、美等先進國家在金融創新產品上的發展經驗，將可以縮短我國金融業者在金融創新活動上的摸索時間，進而加速提升其金融創新的開發能力。 美林證券在1977年首先推出「現金管理帳戶」（Cash Management Account；簡稱CMA），該帳戶主要提供的服務包括：買賣貨幣市場共同基金、證券交易管理帳戶、簽發支票、信用卡服務、融資權益、與自動提款機提款等功能。國內之華信銀行於民國89年也率先推出類似「現金管理帳戶」的金融創新產品，稱為「投資管理帳戶」（Money Management Account；簡稱MMA）。美林證券在成功開發「現金管理帳戶」之後，更將該產品結合美林證券本身在財務專業上的優勢，提供全面性的財務金融規劃，根據每個投資人其生命週期中的潛在資金需求及收入，例如：退休基金、結婚基金、子女教育基金等，設計出最適合該投資人的投資理財計畫。 由於美林證券「現金管理帳戶」的推出，打破了美國Glass-Steagall Act長久以來商業銀行與投資銀行業務分離的限制，因此，本論文也將從美國G-S法案的立法精神與基本原理出發，探討美國商業銀行跨足證券業務的發展過程以及G-S法案存在的必要性。並且透過美林證券成功開發「現金管理帳戶」的經驗，來探討我國證券商目前若開發該創新產品，可能會面臨到的障礙並且提供相關建議。 最後，透過寄發問卷的研究方式，從我國證券商的角度分析未來「現金管理帳戶」在我國金融市場上發展的可行性，得出實證結論如下： 1.我國證券商對於承作現金管理帳戶的意願受限於國內金融相關法規的限制。 2.多數證券商看好未來現金管理帳戶之發展，並同意承作現金管理帳戶能實際發揮證券商的投資理財專業。 3.未來主管機關應朝向建立公平競爭的金融環境、強化我國自律組織功能發展。 4.國內多數券商皆非常注重專業人才之培訓，因此，未來在開發現金管理帳戶之專業領域上，必會有更大的發揮空間。

【第一篇論文中文摘要】 本文檢測公司負債合約中的利差是否可被最終的違約後償還率所解釋。透過1962年至2007年間在美國金融市場上發行但最後卻違約的負債合約資料來進行實證，發現違約後償還率的確有反映在發行時的利差上，且此關聯性會隨著美國開放商業銀行進行證券承銷業務後隨之更加顯著。我們並且進一步發現此償還率的資訊能更加有效反映原因與發行公司的資訊不對稱程度降低有關。此外，我們同時又發現此負債合約中的利差與違約後償還率的關聯性對於公司治理較差、以及非投資等級的發行公司會更為顯著。最後，我們的實證結果在考量內生問題、潛在可能遺漏解釋變數、以及其他模型設定後，仍同樣具有堅實性。 【第二篇論文中文摘要】 本文使用臺指選擇權的日內資料來探討選擇權提前交易期間是否具有資訊內涵與價格發現的功能。就作者所知，我們是第一篇透過選擇權資料探討提前交易期間資訊內涵的研究。首先，我們分別透過價、量、與高階動差三類資訊變數指標來衡量提前交易期間的資訊內涵。實證結果顯示：選擇權提前交易期間不只能有效反映隔夜資訊 (公開資訊)，且具有預測當日現貨指數開盤後5分鐘內股價指數移動的能力 (反應私有資訊)，說明提前交易期間的確具有資訊內涵與價格發現的功能。此外，我們進一步發現價平選擇權包含最強的資訊內涵，此應與投資人尋求交易流動性最高的價平選擇權來迅速實現其利潤以反映其資訊有關。最後，本研究亦發現前一日海外市場 (美國) 投資人情緒傳染效果的強度會影響提前交易期間選擇權的資訊內涵，而前一日是否交易 (週末效果與假日效果)則不會影響此資訊內涵。 / 【第一篇論文英文摘要】 We investigate whether the spread of corporate debt contacts can be explained by their ultimate recovery rates. Using the actual realized recovery rates of defaulted debt instruments issued in the U.S. from 1962 to 2007, we find that recovery rate is reflected in the spread at issuance, and that this relationship has become more significant since commercial banks were allowed to underwrite corporate securities. Our further investigation indicates that the enhanced informativeness of recovery rate can be attributed to the lowering of information asymmetry of individual firms. Besides, the relation between the spread at issuance and the recovery rate is stronger for weak corporate governance and non-investment grade issuers. Our conclusions are found to be robust to endogeneity issues, potentially omitted variables and alternative model specifications. 【第二篇論文英文摘要】 This study uses tick-by-tick data to examine the information content and price discovery of TAIEX option trading during the pre-opening period. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that focuses on the options market. We construct three groups of information variables to measure the information content of the pre-opening period, including the price, volume, and high moment information variables. We find that option trading during the pre-opening period not only can reflect the overnight information (public information) but also predict the 5-minute intraday returns after the opening of spot market (private information), showing the information content and price discovery of option trading during the pre-opening period. We also find that at-the-money options contain the strongest richness of information content, which may result from its highest liquidity. Finally, we also find that the empirical results would be stronger depending on the intensity of investor sentiment from overseas (U.S. market) of last day but not the length of hours without trading (weekend and holiday effect).