Diss. Uppsala : Uppsala universitet, 2008.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The unwillingness to correct deficiencies in current COIN Doctrine or to follow the correct methods within current doctrine will lead to continued instability and possible failure of counterinsurgency operations and governments in states with large Islamic populations. The conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq is insurgent in nature, therefore requires a Counterinsurgent strategy. Current US Army Doctrine focuses entirely on the Counterguerilla aspect of an insurgency, rather than viewing the insurgency in its entirety. Therefore, not only is the COIN doctrine is inadequate, it also requires an overall governing strategy which must include the engagements of both the populace, and the infrastructure of the insurgency, as well as counterforce operations against the guerillas. The entire hierarchy of COIN Doctrine is skewed in favor of the conventional units who write it. Currently all COIN operations fall under Support and Stability Operations, as do Counterguerrilla Operations in doctrinal hierarchy that is written by the US Army Infantry Branch. However, US Army Special Forces Branch writes Insurgency and Foreign Internal Defense Doctrine (COIN falls under FID for all Internal Defense and Development [IDAD] Programs). The unique qualifications of Special Forces units make them ideal for creating, developing, instituting, and commanding these operations. Special Forces soldiers are language and culturally trained to operate within these nations, and normally have habitual associations previously developed with the people and militaries of these nations. / Major, United States Army

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / A "Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare" argues for the establishment of a new branch of service, with the sole responsibility of conducting Unconventional Warfare. The thesis statement is: Unconventional Warfare is a viable tool for achieving national security objectives under certain circumstances. Hypothesis One states that in order for UW to be effective it must be managed in accordance with specific principles. Hypothesis Two states that to optimize UW a new branch of service under the Department of Defense is required. Chapter II establishes the strategic requirement, laying the foundation by explaining the differences between UW and conventional warfare. Chapter III explains the requirements for dealing with substate conflicts. Chapter IV articulates the operational construct for UW revolving around an indigenous-based force in order for the US to gain influence in a targeted population. The second half of this thesis, Chapters V - VI, analyzes policy, doctrine, and schooling, as well as case studies of USSF efforts in the Vietnam War and El Salvador in order to reveal a conventional military aversion to the use of UW. The conceptual discussion of Chapters I thru IV supported by the research of Chapters V and VI together make "A Bold Case for UW." / Captain, United States Army / Major, United States Army

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Following the cold war a new kind of threat emerged; terrorism became the most important threat used by individuals, organizations and countries to reach their goals. Turkey has suffered from terrorism for years. In Turkey, the main logistic resource for the terrorist is the villages located in remote areas. A search operation is one of the techniques used to capture the terrorists. Five village search operations scenarios are developed based on a previous study done for the New Zealand Army and the author's personal experiences. For this study, the agent-based model MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform Automata) is used. To investigate the effects of 16 variables state-of-the-art Near Orthogonal Latin Hypercube Designs are used. With a personal computer and the computational capabilities of supercomputers run by Mitre for the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) approximately 15000 runs are completed. In comparing the five scenarios, the significant effects on the outcome of a possible skirmish in search operations are the proficiency level of the soldiers, the employment of village guards and the support of the local people to the terrorists. The results of the analysis suggest that the most important factor affecting the Blue casualties is the initial speed and synchronization of the Blue search unit entering the village and the most important factor affecting the Red casualties is the Red Stealth. / First Lieutenant, Turkish Army

This thesis aims to develop a better understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare through a thorough analysis of the nature and strategies of insurgency and a comparative examination of the current strategic approaches to counterinsurgency warfare. Toward this end, a systems model approach, which views insurgent organizations as open systems, is adapted to the insurgent environment. Popular support, external support, and insurgent organization are determined as the major variables of the insurgency system. The evolution of French counterrevolutionary doctrine and its implementation in the Algerian rebellion is examined under the light of the major variables of the system and strategies of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. After an analysis of the F.L.N. tactics and French countermeasures, three important propositions are offered: First, popular support is the primary condition for the success of the insurgent organization; second, political, social, economic, and administrative factors have a primacy over military factors; and, third, domestic factors have a primacy over external factors in the outcome of a rebellion.

This thesis argues that a shift in the doctrine, organization, equipment and training of armies is required due to a shift in the nature of war. This thesis refers to the "new way of war" as Fourth Generation War (4GW) and this analysis is restricted to the army component of the defense forces. Armies at present are geared to fight the earlier generation of attrition and maneuver wars. In 4GW, an army structured for earlier generations of warfare is militarily dysfunctional. The thesis statement is: Infantry based armies practicing unconventional warfare (UW) are essential for the 4GW battlefield. The thesis argues for the conventionalization of UW. Hypothesis One states that heavy armor/artillery based armies should give way to infantry based armies. Hypothesis Two states that the military doctrine of these infantry based armies should be based on UW. The thesis explains 4GW and examines the relationship between terrorism and 4GW. It studies the impact of 4GW on the Principles of War. It examines whether Special Forces (SF) are the panacea for 4GW and whether increasing the size of SF is the solution. Lastly, the thesis discusses the changes required in the army to fight in a 4GW environment and provides recommendations.

In this thesis, we examine the current levels of cultural understanding and irregular warfare being taught in U.S. Army conventional military schools. Given engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our view that the military needs a deeper understanding of the indigenous people due to the extremely close and on-going interaction between American Soldiers and the local populations. Current analysis of the difficulties being reported suggests U.S. Army Soldiers are having trouble combating irregular warfare due to cultural misunderstandings and a lack of counterinsurgency training, thereby reflecting a likely educational gap in the U.S. Army's formal military educational training system. This thesis analyzes the current problems and difficulties Soldiers are reported to be having while attempting to combat irregular forces in non-western environments. We analyze the amount of training U.S. Army Soldiers receive in cultural understanding and irregular warfare in the military schools pipeline and conclude that there is a connection between problems Soldiers currently face and a lack of training for the conduct of operations in foreign countries. We propose a number of solutions to overcome these suspected gaps in education and suggested changes to the Army's professional education curriculum.

Doctor of Philosophy (Economics) / This dissertation asks how foreign assistance to one or both sides in a civil war affects the dynamics of the conflict. This overarching question is subsequently divided into two further questions: 1) how does foreign intervention affect the capabilities of the recipient, and 2) how does this affect the nature of the warfare. The puzzle for the first is that the impact of foreign intervention on combat effectiveness frequently varies significantly between recipients. This variation is explained by recipients’ different abilities to convert the inputs of foreign intervention into the outputs of fighting capability. The nature of the warfare in civil war will change in line with the balance of military capabilities between the belligerents. The balance of capabilities will be responsible for the form of warfare at a particular place and time whether it be conventional, irregular or guerrilla/counter-guerrilla. The argument is then illustrated with two extensive case studies, of civil wars in Angola and Afghanistan, where temporal and spatial variation in the type of warfare is shown to correlate with the type, degree, and direction of foreign intervention.

<p>Kriget i Afghanistan som startade 2001 har bidragit till att många civila skadats och fått sätta livet till. En av anledningarna till detta är det ökade användandet av flygstridskrafter för att skydda egen marktrupp. Flygattacker är på många sätt en bra metod för att snabbt kunna bekämpa fientliga individer samt med stor eldkraft kunna verka över stora ytor. Baksidan av att använda flygbombningar är att det i flera fall drabbar dem som inte är det utpekade målet. Kan detta vara en bidragande faktor till ett ökat missnöje mot koalitionen i Afghanistan och en direkt ökning för stödet till rebellerna? Syftet med arbetet är att undersöka om det finns ett samband mellan koalitionens flygbombningar i Afghanistan och ett ökat stöd till talibanerna från civilbefolkningen. Den hypotes som jag utgår ifrån i mitt arbete är att flygbombningar som leder till civila förluster ökar stödet tilltalibanerna i Afghanistan. För att få ett svar på min hypotes använder jag mig av statistik över antalet civila dödsfall i flygattacker mellan åren 2006-2008. Statistiken kopplas ihop med statistik över det ökade antalet rebellattacker under samma period för att se om det finns en korrelation mellan dem. Därefter presenteras ett urval av intervjuer med människor som drabbats av flygbombningar gjorda av olika nyhetsbolag samt uttalanden från utomstående personer för att styrka indikationerna från statistiken om att fler civila dödsoffer leder till ökat stöd för talibanerna. Resultatet av undersökningen verifierar min hypotes. En slutsats av undersökningen är att koalitionens användningav flygbombningar måste ändras för att minska de civila dödsoffren och på så sätt inte vända befolkningen emot dem.</p> / <p>The war in Afghanistan that started in 2001 has contributed to numerous civilians that have been injured and killed. One reason for this is the increased use of air power to protect ground troops. Airstrikes can be a good way to quickly strike against individuals and to operate across vast areas with great firepower. But the drawback of aerial bombing is that it in many cases affects those who are not the designated target. Could this be a contributing factor to increased dissatisfaction with the Coalition forces in Afghanistan and a direct increase in support to the rebels? The purpose of this study is to investigate whether there is a connection between the coalition air campaign in Afghanistan and the increased support for the Taliban from civilians. The hypothesis which I test in my work is that air campaign, leading to civilian casualties increases support for the Taliban in Afghanistan. To get an answer to my hypothesis, I use statistics on the number of civilian deaths in air strikes between the years 2006 to 2008. As well as on the increasing number of insurgent attacks during the same period to see if there is a correlation between them. I also present support from secondary sources, including interviews with people affected by air bombardments and expert comments that indicate that the number of civilian casualties results in increased support for the rebels. The results validate my hypothesis. One conclusion of the study is that the coalition's use of the air campaigns must be modified to reduce the civilian deaths in order not to turn the population against them.</p>

Kriget i Afghanistan som startade 2001 har bidragit till att många civila skadats och fått sätta livet till. En av anledningarna till detta är det ökade användandet av flygstridskrafter för att skydda egen marktrupp. Flygattacker är på många sätt en bra metod för att snabbt kunna bekämpa fientliga individer samt med stor eldkraft kunna verka över stora ytor. Baksidan av att använda flygbombningar är att det i flera fall drabbar dem som inte är det utpekade målet. Kan detta vara en bidragande faktor till ett ökat missnöje mot koalitionen i Afghanistan och en direkt ökning för stödet till rebellerna? Syftet med arbetet är att undersöka om det finns ett samband mellan koalitionens flygbombningar i Afghanistan och ett ökat stöd till talibanerna från civilbefolkningen. Den hypotes som jag utgår ifrån i mitt arbete är att flygbombningar som leder till civila förluster ökar stödet tilltalibanerna i Afghanistan. För att få ett svar på min hypotes använder jag mig av statistik över antalet civila dödsfall i flygattacker mellan åren 2006-2008. Statistiken kopplas ihop med statistik över det ökade antalet rebellattacker under samma period för att se om det finns en korrelation mellan dem. Därefter presenteras ett urval av intervjuer med människor som drabbats av flygbombningar gjorda av olika nyhetsbolag samt uttalanden från utomstående personer för att styrka indikationerna från statistiken om att fler civila dödsoffer leder till ökat stöd för talibanerna. Resultatet av undersökningen verifierar min hypotes. En slutsats av undersökningen är att koalitionens användningav flygbombningar måste ändras för att minska de civila dödsoffren och på så sätt inte vända befolkningen emot dem. / The war in Afghanistan that started in 2001 has contributed to numerous civilians that have been injured and killed. One reason for this is the increased use of air power to protect ground troops. Airstrikes can be a good way to quickly strike against individuals and to operate across vast areas with great firepower. But the drawback of aerial bombing is that it in many cases affects those who are not the designated target. Could this be a contributing factor to increased dissatisfaction with the Coalition forces in Afghanistan and a direct increase in support to the rebels? The purpose of this study is to investigate whether there is a connection between the coalition air campaign in Afghanistan and the increased support for the Taliban from civilians. The hypothesis which I test in my work is that air campaign, leading to civilian casualties increases support for the Taliban in Afghanistan. To get an answer to my hypothesis, I use statistics on the number of civilian deaths in air strikes between the years 2006 to 2008. As well as on the increasing number of insurgent attacks during the same period to see if there is a correlation between them. I also present support from secondary sources, including interviews with people affected by air bombardments and expert comments that indicate that the number of civilian casualties results in increased support for the rebels. The results validate my hypothesis. One conclusion of the study is that the coalition's use of the air campaigns must be modified to reduce the civilian deaths in order not to turn the population against them.