This dissertation argues that the Williams Harvey's novel conceptualization of the circulation developed from a set of concerns and sensitivities that Harvey shared with merchants and courtiers, and that it emerged at the courts of King James and King Charles, alongside a new conceptualizations of commercial circulation. As a brother to merchants and a physician to kings during the commercial crises of the 1620s, Harvey was exposed to ways of thinking about circulation that he used to make sense of the disparate observations he made about the motion of the heart and blood. Harvey's famous quantitative argument, the thought experiment at the center of his conceptualization of the blood, was an exercise in accounting. Through a process of "reckoning," and "by laying of account," Harvey balanced blood like a merchant balances books, conceptualizing arterial and venous blood as fungible. Harvey showed that there was a recirculation of blood through the heart. Over time, these aspects of Harvey's circulation became easier to overlook; the Great Fire of 1666 destroyed the most tangible artifacts of Harvey's mercantile sociability, such as his fine Persian rugs or the collection of marvels contained in the library and museum that Harvey established at the College of Physicians of London. By situating Harvey among courtiers and royal patrons who were concerned with the circulation of cloths, dyestuffs, coin, and bullion, this dissertation aims to add to the burgeoning literature on the scientific revolution that posits a multitude of different scientific practitioners with diverse philosophical commitments and varied connections to other facets of early modern life, while stressing key conceptual changes in Harvey's thought.

The aim of this thesis is to show in what way the mechanistic philosophy of René Descartes allowed him to accept William Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, while at the same time prevented him from accepting his explanation of the movement of the heart. In the introductory section we mention some of the basic notions concerning the state of natural philosophy in the second half of the 16th century which are closely related to the themes of the thesis. Both authors we are concerned with are also presented. The second, historicaly oriented section focuses on Aristotle's, Galen's and Harvey's opinions on the role and motion of the heart and blood in the human body. The aim is to describe how Harvey's 1628 treatise De motu cordis allowed to resolve the proliferating problems faced by the Galenist tradition in the 16th and the early 17th century. The third section presents the exposition of the introductory chapters of Descartes' 1633 treatise Le Monde in which he introduces the basic notions of his new mechanistic philosophy. Among these are the three types of particles, the plenist conception of the world, the omnipresence of circular motions and the relationship between God, natural laws and motion in the world. The fourth section is dedicated to Descartes' a Harvey's point of...

It is widely accepted that description was used by eighteenth-century writers for the purposes of documentary or ornamentalization. That it was also used to manage the emotions of readers is less often discussed. “Dispassionate Descriptions” corrects this imbalance by attending to the ways in which descriptions in certain scientific and poetic works from the late seventeenth to the late eighteenth centuries were used to dampen the intense emotions that scenes of violence and death tend to inspire, be they sympathy, anger, or love. Writers ranging from William Harvey to James Thomson to John Gabriel Stedman, I argue, taught their readers how to remain dispassionate in the face of suffering and injustice by describing moving bodies and scenes in terms of their physical features alone. By presenting the blood spurting from the wounds of vivisected animals in relation to the regular beat of the heart, a drowning cat in terms of the movements of its head and paws, and the dance of enslaved persons in terms of its irregular beat, the writers I study demonstrated how the disorderly movements of pain or rebellion could be read as expressive of overarching classificatory schemes. Through cultivating dispassion for movements commonly thought to incite passionate responses, these writers worked to maintain the ethical and political status quo. By examining the emotional work descriptions of motion do, “Dispassionate Descriptions” traces an alternative history of how motion from the 1660s to the 1790s was understood outside of the predominant frameworks of mechanism and vitalism. While motion was regarded as inextricable from the literary and scientific discourses of this period, scenes of motion, as I demonstrate, were paradoxically also thought to facilitate emotional retreat. They were thus used by writers to advance a mode of ethics that prized non-interference and the disavowal of moral responsibility.

Thomas Hobbes est sans doute mieux connu comme philosophe politique que comme homme de science et ses longues querelles avec John Wallis en mathématiques et Robert Boyle en physique n’ont guère encouragé les historiens des sciences à prêter attention à son œuvre scientifique. Pourtant, Hobbes conçut la philosophie comme une science et se considérait comme le fondateur non seulement d’une science nouvelle : la philosophie civile, mais aussi de la science de l’optique - récemment renouvelée à la faveur de la découverte du télescope - et même des mathématiques. Mais à quoi Hobbes pense-t-il quand il parle de science ? Aux mathématiques qu’il admire tant ? A la philosophie naturelle de Galilée ? Ou à la médecine de Harvey ? En quel sens la philosophie civile est-elle une science et quel est le statut des mathématiques ? Telles sont les questions que nous abordons à partir d’une analyse du De Corpore et des dix premiers chapitres du De Homine traduits du latin. L’interprétation proposée ici consiste à réaffirmer l’unité du système des Éléments de la philosophie et à souligner la dimension matérialiste et réaliste de la science hobbesienne. Bien que Noel Malcolm ait définitivement établi que Hobbes n’est pas l’auteur du Short Tract on first principles, nous montrons que le tournant scientifique de Hobbes est profondément marqué par son intérêt pour l’optique qu’il renouvela sur la base d’une ontologie matérialiste et des principes du mécanisme hérités de Galilée. / Thomas Hobbes is perhaps best known as a political philosopher than as a scientist and his too long quarrels with John Wallis in mathematics and Robert Boyle in physics did little to encourage historians of science to pay attention to his scientific work. Yet Hobbes conceived of philosophy as a science and considered himself the founder not only of a new science: civil philosophy, but also the science of optics - recently renewed thanks to the discovery of the telescope - even mathematics. But what Hobbes has in mind when he talks about science? Mathematics he so admires? Galileo’s natural philosophy? Or Harvey’s medicine? In what sense civil philosophy is a science and what is the status of mathematics? These are the issues we discuss from an analysis of De Corpore and the first ten chapters of De Homine translated from Latin. The interpretation proposed here is to underline the unity of the system of the Elements of philosophy and emphasize the materialistic and realistic nature of Hobbesian science. Although Noel Malcolm has definitively established that Hobbes is not the author of Short Tract on First Principles, we show that Hobbes’s shift to science was deeply marked by his interest in the science of optics he renewed on the basis of a materialist ontology and principles inherited from Galilee mechanism.