La difficulté éprouvée lorsqu'on considère la question de l'être est décrite par Étienne Gilson de la manière suivante : Dans « un domaine où la démonstration dialectique perd ses droits, chacun ne peut que regarder, dire ce qu'il voit et inviter les autres à tourner comme lui le regard vers la vérité. » En fait, Gilson dit, dans le même article : « De deux métaphysiciens également compétents et jouissant d'une égale habileté dans le maniement des arguments dialectiques, il se peut qu'aucun ne réussisse jamais à convaincre l'autre, parce qu'ils ne voient pas les mêmes choses. » Cela semblerait être le sort du vrai philosophe, qui est, comme il est décrit dans le Sophiste, difficile à voir, « car cette région est si brillante, et les yeux de l'âme de la plupart des gens ne peuvent pas supporter de regarder ce qui est divin. » Si le philosophe, la personne qui interroge l'Être, est difficile à voir, à cause de ce qu'il poursuit, alors ce qu'il poursuit doit être encore plus difficile à saisir. Comme Josef Pieper le dit, « La personne philosophante se trouve dans une telle situation ; ceci est, en effet, exactement ce que la distingue, c'est-à-dire, qu'elle est obligée de parler de quelque chose qui soit indéniablement rencontré, mais qui ne peut être exprimé avec des mots précis. » Cette thèse est divisée en deux grandes sections. La première pourrait être décrite comme une section interprétative. Nous essayons ici de mettre en place, aussi précisément que possible, les différentes tentatives de répondre à la question de l'être proposées par Platon, Aristote et Martin Heidegger. Nous cherchons, dans un sens, à tracer les chemins qu'ils ont pris dans leur quête vers le sommet du mont Être. Chacune de ces subdivisions contiennent nos propres contributions à ce que nous proposons comme la bonne approche interprétative de ces trois philosophes. Ces appoints prennent en compte une interprétation préliminaire de ces auteurs, suivies d'une tentative de naviguer dans un véritable marécage de textes interprétatifs qui prétendent nous dire, une fois pour toutes, comment bien comprendre les revendications ontologiques de Platon, d'Aristote et de Martin Heidegger. Nos contributions à la pensée philosophique entourant ces penseurs particuliers ne constituent pas, cependant, l'objectif principal de cette thèse. Au contraire, ils serviront à nous aider dans notre tentative d'atteindre, nous-mêmes le sommet du la montagne de l'Être. Après avoir jalonné ces parcours, nous devrions être en mesure de mieux planifier notre propre approche à la question de l'Être. La première section sous-tendra ainsi la deuxième afin d'aborder, à nouveau, la question de l'Être. Cette deuxième section doit être considérée comme une section philosophique-la poursuite active de la sagesse. Dans cette deuxième partie, nous proposons d'aborder la question de l'Être, tout d'abord par la comparaison, l'analyse et la critique des trois penseurs que nous avons examinés dans la première section ; nous proposerons ensuite nos propres tentatives de répondre à la question de l'Être. Nous allons conclure avec quelques brèves réflexions sur la façon dont nos découvertes concernant l'Être pourraient affecter d'autres domaines de la connaissance. / The difficulty of approaching the question of Being is described, by Étienne Gilson as follows, "in a domain where dialectical demonstration loses its rights, one can do no more than look, say what he sees, and invite others to turn, like himself, their eyes towards the truth." In fact, says Gilson, earlier in this same article, "Take two metaphysicians who are equally competent and in possession of equal ability in the handling of dialectical arguments, it is possible that neither of them will ever succeed in convincing the other, because they do not see the same things." This seems to be the fate of the true philosopher, as he is described in the Sophist, who is hard to see "because that area is so bright and the eyes of most people's souls cannot bear to look at that which is divine." If the philosopher, the person who questions Being, is difficult to see, because of that which he is pursuing, then that which he is pursuing must be even more difficult to grasp. As Josef Pieper puts it, "The philosophizing person finds himself in just such a situation; this is precisely what singles him out, that is, that he is obliged to speak of something undeniably encountered but that cannot be expressed exactly in words." This dissertation can be divided into two major sections. The first major section could be portrayed as an interpretative section. We here attempt to establish, as accurately as possible, the differing attempts to answer the question of Being that were proposed by Plato, Aristotle and Martin Heidegger. We are, in a sense, attempting to map out the paths they took in their quest to attain the summit of Mount Being. Each of these sections contain our own contributions to what we propose is the proper interpretation of these three philosophers. These contributions take into account a preliminary interpretation of these authors, followed by the attempt to wade through a veritable swamp of interpretative writings that purport to tell us, once and for all, how to properly understand the ontological claims of Plato, Aristotle and Martin Heidegger. Our contributions to philosophical thought surrounding these particular thinkers do not constitute, however, the primary goal of this dissertation. Rather, they will serve to help us in our attempt to climb the mountain of Being. Having mapped out their paths, we should be better able to plan out our own approach to the question of Being. Thus, in the second section, we will use what we have learned in the first section in order to approach the question of Being anew. This second section should be seen as a philosophical section-the active pursuit of wisdom. In this second section we propose to approach the question of Being, first of all, through a comparison, analysis, and critique of the three thinkers we examined in the first section. This will be followed by our own humble attempts to answer the question of Being. We will conclude with some brief thoughts about how our discoveries about Being may affect other domains of knowledge.

No description available.

Québec Université Laval, Bibliothèque 2018

S’inscrivant dans l’horizon de la phénoménologie développée par le penseur allemand Martin HEIDEGGER (1889-1976), le présent mémoire vise à offrir un diagnostic philosophique et phénoménologique portant sur l’époque qui nous est contemporaine. Soixante-six ans après la parution du texte allemand de la conférence « La question de la technique » (Die Frage nach der Technik, 1953) et compte tenu de la technicisation et de la dévastation progressive du monde habité par l’homme qui sont caractéristiques de notre époque, il apparaît nécessaire de repenser à nouveaux frais cette « question de la technique » à partir du corpus heideggérien ainsi que des divers commentaires s’y étant depuis ajoutés. Identifiant avec Heidegger la « technique moderne » comme le trait fondamental de notre époque, cette recherche vise à réinterpréter le concept de « technique », en le délestant des interprétations successives de la tradition philosophique qui en ont fait un ensemble de moyens en vue de fins. Ce faisant, le concept de technique se voit déployé dans toute son historialité et par-delà sa détermination métaphysique comme dévoilement de l’étant, c’est-à-dire comme mode de la vérité, comprise par Heidegger comme hors-retrait (Unverborgenheit, ἀλήθεια). Par ce dévoilement, l’étant apparaît sous une certaine lumière déterminant avec précision la teneur phénoménologique de l’étant à dévoiler. Suivant toujours Heidegger, nous explorons ensuite le terme de Dispositif (Gestell) qui nomme l’infrastructure métaphysique régissant le mode d’apparaître de tout phénomène à l’époque de la technique. Notre travail tente du même souffle de montrer comment l’histoire de la métaphysique occidentale, comprise comme histoire de l’être et de son oubli successif, mène à son propre achèvement dans l’avènement moderne de cette époque. Au terme de notre recherche, il apparaît que la technique moderne, en tant que trait fondamental de notre époque, détermine l’apparaître même de l’étant, c’est-à-dire le type d’étant auquel les sujets qui nous sont contemporains auront accès ; notre phénoménalité se faisant dès lors intégralement technicienne. Le présent mémoire montre en ce sens en quoi notre époque est à la fois celle de la domination de la technique, sous la figure paradigmatique du Dispositif (Gestell) planétarisé, et celle de l’accomplissement de la métaphysique occidentale, née en Grèce il y a plus de deux millénaires. En guise d’ouverture conclusive, le présent travail aborde finalement le « Danger » (die Gefahr) ainsi que la possibilité corollaire d’un « Sauver » (Retten) qui gisent selon Heidegger au sein du Dispositif.

Ce mémoire examine le rapport à autrui d’un point de vue phénoménologique, dès lors qu’autrui se présente au travail. Nous nous demandons quelle est la consistance phénoménologique des rapports sociaux et si une situation sociale particulière, comme le travail, peut modifier le rapport à autrui, tel qu’il est analysé phénoménologiquement. Dans un premier temps, nous détaillons l’ontologie de la phénoménologie heideggérienne, sa théorisation du rapport à autrui et son ouverture aux phénomènes sociaux. Le passage par l’ontologie est nécessaire pour évaluer la teneur phénoménale d’autrui, ainsi que celle des rapports sociaux et de leur interaction. Dans un deuxième temps, nous nous servons de Michel Henry et de son interprétation de Marx pour nous doter d’une analyse des rapports sociaux en tant que tels et de leur portée phénoménologique. En effet, cette interprétation place le vécu phénoménologique au centre de l’analyse, d’une part en en faisant le socle ontologique de tout rapport social possible, et d’autre part en offrant une compréhension de la manière dont ces rapports sociaux s’autonomisent pour en retour déterminer ce vécu. Cet ancrage phénoménologique offre la possibilité de croiser ces deux discours pour analyser le rapport à autrui, ce que nous montrons dans notre discussion. Nous avançons que le rapport à autrui est toujours à la fois la rencontre d’un analogon au sens de la phénoménologie, en même temps qu’un rapport social qui peut changer la signification de cette rencontre.

No description available.

The purpose of this study was to explore what keeps nurses in nursing by examining the impact of the relational experiences between the nurse and her or his patient in the context of the nursing situation. Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology grounded the study and was the method used to interpret the registered nurse participants' meaning of their everydayness. The nurses' first hand perspectives elicited implications for nursing practice. This qualitative research study examined what keeps nurses in nursing. The eight registered nurse participants provided rich descriptive data from which four relational themes emerged: Practicing from Inner Core Beliefs, Understanding the Other from Within, Making a Difference, and Nursing as an Evolving Process. The hermeneutical interpretative process guided the researcher to synthesize the themes into a constitutive pattern of meaning which the researcher named Intentional Compassion Energy. In intentional caring consciousness, the nurse intentionally knows the nursed as whole. Compassion energy is the intersubjective gift of compassion that gives nurses the opportunity to be with the nursed. Compassion energy is composed of compassionate presence, patterned nurturance and intentionally knowing the nursed and self as whole. Thus, intentional compassion energy is defined as the regeneration of nurses' capacity to foster interconnectedness when the nurse activates the intent to nurse. Intentional compassion energy was discovered in the meaning of the nurse participants being in their everydayness of practice. The participants described the intention to care compassionately as the grounding of their practice, striving to understand the other, to make a difference while living their nursing as an evolving process. Hermeneutic phenomenology provided the opening to discover what keeps nurses in nursing. / by Dorothy J. Dunn. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2009. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2009. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Paulo Eduardo Rodrigues Alves Evangelista.pdf: 781323 bytes, checksum: 7ad511b312139c0c2e42d4ac44e9ff8a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-12-11 / The publication of Martin Heidegger´s Complete Works has been offering new elements for students to consider his intelectual trajectory. In the early 1920´s, he shares Husserl´s perception that philosophy is [CONFUSÃO MIXED UP] and can only be phenomenology. He disagrees that phenomenology must be limited to the description of the consciousness. It is the explicitation of factical life experience (faktische Lebenserfahrung). In his theological studies, Heidegger discovered the questionability of each one´s concrete life. Theoretical knowledge, which drives contemporary philosophy and, according to him, has its beginning in greek philosophy, is unable to describe it. Factical life experience is not objective, thus a new method is necessary to describe it. Phenomenology is such method. This study focuses on the lecture course called Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion, taught in the 1920-21 winter semester. The lessons show contemporary philosophy´s inability to access the factical life experience of primal christianity found on Saint Paul´s Epistles. Phenomenology allows such proto-christian religious experience to show itself. It is a way of living one´s life in which one figts against the tendency to seek ilusionary security in daily experiences. For the christian, the end of time is already present since conversion. And conversion is always actualized. Heidegger discovers a temporality that is different and inaccessible to theory, which only know chronological time. It is factical life experience´s kairological time. Metaphysics is thus a way of seeking security. In this study, the lesson course is contextualized within Heidegger´s historical moment. Philosophy and life are implicated. Next, Heidegger´s way of demonstrating factical life experience´s originality and philosophy´s need of returning to such origin are shown. To do so, are presented 1) a brief description of factical life experience , 2) the formal indication as the phenomenological concept able to describe it, and 3) philosophy and the sciences as its possibilities. At last, Heidegger´s interpretation of Saint Paul´s Epistles is followed in order to understand the apostle´s factical life according to how it shows itself, instead of taking as point of departure previously conceived theories. In doing so, it is human life which unveals itself. That is the task of phenomenology / A publicação das Obras Completas de Martin Heidegger tem oferecido aos estudiosos novos elementos para que se considere sua trajetória intelectual. Esta começa na teologia e desemboca na filosofia. No começo da década de 1920, ele compartilha com Husserl que a filosofia, que se encontra enredada em confusão com as ciências objetivas, só pode ser fenomenologia. Diverge de seu mestre, entretanto, em que a fenomenologia não se limita à descrição da consciência. Ela é explicitação da experiência de vida fáctica (faktische Lebenserfahrung). Nos estudos de cunho teológico, Heidegger descobrira a questionabilidade da vida concreta de cada qual. O conhecimento teórico, que anima a filosofia de sua contemporaneidade e cuja origem ele encontra na filosofia grega, mostra-se incapaz de tematizá-la. A experiência de vida fáctica não é objetiva, de modo que necessita de um novo método para ser tematizada. A fenomenologia é esse método. No presente estudo, destaca-se o curso ministrado no semestre de inverno de 1920-21, intitulado Introdução à Fenomenologia da Religião , no qual Heidegger demonstra a incapacidade da filosofia contemporânea de acessar a experiência de vida fáctica do cristão primitivo contida nas Epístolas Paulinas. Com a fenomenologia, a experiência religiosa protocristã pode mostrar-se. Trata-se de um modo de viver pelo qual se luta contra a tendência a encontrar ilusório asseguramento nas experiências quotidianas. O cristão é aquele para quem o fim dos tempos já se faz presente desde a conversão; esta sendo sempre atualizada. Heidegger encontra nisso uma temporalidade diferente e inacessível à teoria, que só conhece o tempo cronológico. É a temporalidade kairológica, própria da experiência de vida fáctica. A metafísica revela-se, assim, um modo de buscar asseguramento. Neste estudo, contextualiza-se o curso no momento histórico de vida de Heidegger, pois filosofia e vida imbricam-se. Em seguida, apresenta-se o exercício que ele realiza para demonstrar a originalidade da experiência de vida fáctica e a necessidade de a filosofia ser capaz de retornar a essa sua origem. Para isso, mostra-se 1) uma breve descrição da experiência de vida fáctica , 2) a indicação formal como conceito fenomenológico capaz de tematizá-la e 3) a filosofia e as ciências como possibilidades dela. Por fim, realiza-se com Heidegger a interpretação das Epístolas Paulinas, a fim de compreender a vida fáctica do apóstolo tal como se apresenta a partir dele, e não de teorias previamente concebidas. Com isso, é a vida humana que se desvela. Essa é a tarefa da fenomenologia

牟宗三的哲學系統建基於康德哲學，可謂眾所周知。不論批評抑或支持，論者均以牟宗三與康德表面上的親和關係而立論。本文嘗試擴闊相關課題的論域，論證牟宗三反覆申述的康德哲學，其實源於海德格的康德詮釋。他閱讀的康德，他建立的系統，均以「有限」與「超越」概念為焦點，這都是海德格影響下的結果。因此，本文的目標是雙重的：其一，重新評估牟宗三的哲學系統，我們應該重視他與海德格之間的對話，不應該只側重他與康德的關係；其二，顯示「有限」與「超越」概念如何有助我們重構中國哲學。 / 本文共分五章。第一章檢討學界現況，說明牟宗三與海德格之間關係的研究素被忽略，本文將論證海德格在牟宗三的哲學中扮演了關鍵的角色。第二、三章探討兩者哲學歷程上的相似性，點出兩人如何從生命哲學轉到存在論的研究。接下來的兩章，本文重點剖析牟宗三與海德格的兩個基本概念，一個是「有限」，另一個是「超越」。本文會研究牟宗三如何繼承海德格的概念，又如何使用這些概念來闡述他的存在論。牟宗三強調「智的直覺」並非出於誤解，那是他回應海德格基礎存在論的策略。 / It is well-known that Mou’s system of philosophy is constructed through a transformation of Kant’s philosophy. Both critics and followers of Mou make their stance based on the apparently intimate relation of his thought to Kant’s philosophy. My own inquiry will broaden this scope by trying to demonstrate how Mou’s much-discussed Kantianism is rooted in his close reading of Heidegger’s Kant interpretation. Under Heidegger’s influence, Mou’s own reading of Kant and his system of philosophy focus on the concepts of “finitude and “transcendence. Now the purpose of my thesis is twofold: first, the system of Mou’s philosophy should be reassessed through a dialogue with Heidegger, not merely with Kant; second, it will be shown how the reconstruction of the Chinese philosophy through concepts like “finitude and “transcendence is possible. / This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter reviews the state of current scholarship on Mou’s relation to Heidegger. This issue is largely neglected. I will argue that it is Heidegger who plays a crucial role in Mou’s philosophical development. The second and the third chapters are concerned with the similarity of their approaches to philosophy, i.e. the transformation from a philosophy of life to ontology. The following two chapters focus on the two fundamental concepts of both Mou and Heidegger -- finitude and transcendence. I will investigate how Mou inherits Heideggerian concepts and uses them to articulate his own ontology. Taking this backdrop into consideration, the purpose of Mou’s emphasis on intellectual intuition comes to the foreground, which I understand not as the result of a misunderstanding of Kant’s, but as his strategy in response to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 劉保禧. / Thesis submitted in 2012. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 265-272). / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Liu Baoxi. / 摘要 --- p.i / 鳴謝 --- p.iii / 目錄 --- p.iv / 引用與縮寫 --- p.viii / Chapter 第一章 --- 導論：隱匿的對話 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- 前言：海德格籠罩下的陰影 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- 文本根據：牟宗三筆下的海德格 --- p.5 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- 主題式的理解：牟宗三論西方哲人 --- p.6 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- 理論勁敵：牟宗三論海德格 --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.2.1 --- 起點：上帝隱退與神聖之感 --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.2.2 --- 誤讀：海德格與主體性 --- p.12 / Chapter 1.2.2.3 --- 轉折：海德格的康德詮釋 --- p.16 / Chapter 1.3 --- 理論根據：有限與超越 --- p.23 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- 柏拉圖的兩個世界 --- p.24 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- 牟宗三：兩個世界的圓融無礙 --- p.25 / Chapter 1.3.3 --- 海德格：時間、有限與超越 --- p.27 / Chapter 1.3.4 --- 有限與無限之爭 --- p.31 / Chapter 1.4 --- 本文定位 --- p.33 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- 學界現況：牟宗三與漢語哲學 --- p.33 / Chapter 1.4.1.1 --- 牟宗三與康德 --- p.36 / Chapter 1.4.1.2 --- 牟宗三與黑格爾 --- p.37 / Chapter 1.4.1.3 --- 牟宗三與海德格 --- p.40 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- 隱匿的對話 --- p.44 / Chapter 1.4.2.1 --- 「隱匿」 --- p.46 / Chapter 1.4.2.2 --- 「對話」 --- p.48 / Chapter 1.4.3 --- 研究範圍 --- p.50 / Chapter 1.4.4 --- 論文佈局 --- p.53 / Chapter 第二章 --- 生命：實況性與氣質 --- p.55 / Chapter 2.1 --- 前言：同一的思想軌跡 --- p.55 / Chapter 2.2 --- 海德格：生命、實況性與詮釋 --- p.56 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 實況性的詮釋 --- p.59 / Chapter 2.2.1.1 --- 生命與實況性 --- p.60 / Chapter 2.2.1.2 --- 詮釋 --- p.65 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 小結 --- p.72 / Chapter 2.3 --- 牟宗三：生命的學問 --- p.74 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- 建構理論的純學院式人物？ --- p.74 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- 生命的學問 --- p.76 / Chapter 2.3.2.1 --- 「生命」 --- p.77 / Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- 「學問」 --- p.80 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- 小結 --- p.84 / Chapter 2.4 --- 生命哲學的交鋒 --- p.85 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- 「英雄式的勇敢哲學」：牟宗三論海德格的生命哲學 --- p.85 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- 海德格的可能辯護 --- p.89 / Chapter 2.5 --- 結語：真正的分歧 --- p.94 / Chapter 第三章 --- 存在論：一個世界抑或兩個世界？ --- p.97 / Chapter 3.1 --- 康德的遺稿 --- p.97 / Chapter 3.2 --- 牟宗三：兩層存有論 --- p.99 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- 存在論的轉向 --- p.100 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- 現象與物自身 --- p.105 / Chapter 3.2.2.1 --- 「現象」所以可能的根據 --- p.108 / Chapter 3.2.2.2 --- 「物自身」所以可能的根據 --- p.111 / Chapter 3.2.2.3 --- 「現象與物自身」所以可能的根據 --- p.114 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- 基本存有論 --- p.116 / Chapter 3.3 --- 海德格：基礎存在論 --- p.122 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- 「兩個觀點」的閱讀方式 --- p.122 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- 存在論的差異 --- p.126 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- 哥白尼式革命 --- p.128 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- 範疇論與存活論 --- p.131 / Chapter 3.3.5 --- 存在論的「基礎」 --- p.136 / Chapter 3.4 --- 結語：無本之論 --- p.138 / Chapter 第四章 --- 有限：智的直覺與想像力 --- p.139 / Chapter 4.1 --- 前言：有限抑或無限？--牟宗三與海德格的正面衝突 --- p.139 / Chapter 4.2 --- 「有限性」的哲學意涵 --- p.141 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 康德：人是甚麼？ --- p.142 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 海德格：人的有限性 --- p.143 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- 牟宗三：人雖有限而可無限 --- p.144 / Chapter 4.3 --- 「有限」的界線 --- p.145 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- 康德 --- p.145 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- 海德格 --- p.149 / Chapter 4.4 --- 越界：牟宗三論「智的直覺」 --- p.152 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- 「智的直覺」為何可能？ --- p.154 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- 「無限」為何可能？ --- p.160 / Chapter 4.4.2.1 --- 「命」之限制 --- p.163 / Chapter 4.4.2.2 --- 無限的歷程？. --- p.168 / Chapter 4.5 --- 化無限為有限：海德格論「想像力」 --- p.173 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- 質疑：想像力不是「共根」 --- p.174 / Chapter 4.5.2 --- 回應：想像力、圖式論與共根 --- p.175 / Chapter 4.5.2.1 --- 想像力 --- p.177 / Chapter 4.5.2.2 --- 圖式論 --- p.179 / Chapter 4.5.2.3 --- 共根？ --- p.185 / Chapter 4.6 --- 處境與可能性：海德格對牟宗三的可能批判 --- p.190 / Chapter 4.6.1 --- 處境 --- p.191 / Chapter 4.6.2 --- 可能性 --- p.194 / Chapter 4.7 --- 結語：哲學家之間的思想對話 --- p.197 / Chapter 第五章 --- 超越：天道與界域 --- p.199 / Chapter 5.1 --- 前言：關於「超越」的爭議 --- p.199 / Chapter 5.2 --- 牟宗三：超越而內在 --- p.200 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- 上帝隱退與神聖之感 --- p.201 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- 作為宗教的儒學 --- p.202 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- 爭議：「無本之論」--牟宗三論海德格的超越 --- p.205 / Chapter 5.2.3.1 --- 超越論的對象 = x --- p.207 / Chapter 5.2.3.2 --- 真正的「超越」 --- p.211 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- 正名：transcendent 與transcendental --- p.212 / Chapter 5.2.4.1 --- 康德 --- p.213 / Chapter 5.2.4.2 --- 牟宗三 --- p.214 / Chapter 5.2.5 --- 質疑：「超越而內在」是否可能？ --- p.216 / Chapter 5.3 --- 海德格：此在的超越 --- p.224 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- 為形而上學奠基 --- p.225 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- 此在、世界與超越 --- p.228 / Chapter 5.3.2.1 --- 此在 --- p.230 / Chapter 5.3.2.2 --- 世界 --- p.232 / Chapter 5.3.2.3 --- 超越 --- p.234 / Chapter 5.3.2.4 --- 小結 --- p.235 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- 根據的本質 --- p.237 / Chapter 5.3.3.1 --- 界域 --- p.237 / Chapter 5.3.3.2 --- 無 --- p.239 / Chapter 5.3.3.3 --- 根據 --- p.240 / Chapter 5.3.3.4 --- 小結 --- p.243 / Chapter 5.4 --- 道德與歷史：兩條取代宗教的道路 --- p.244 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- 牟宗三：以道德代宗教 --- p.244 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- 海德格：以歷史代宗教 --- p.246 / Chapter 5.5 --- 結語：同一與差異 --- p.248 / Chapter 第六章 --- 結論：有限者的超越 --- p.251 / Chapter 附錄一： --- 詞彙表 --- p.257 / Chapter 附錄二： --- 外文著作學者姓名對照表 --- p.263 / 參考書目 --- p.265

The aim of this study is to attempt a re-conceptualisation of ethics and politics away from the well-rehearsed structure of singularity versus community, particularity or individuality versus universality, as well as from the inadequate dyadic positioning of these sets of terms. Dominant scholarship on Lévinas's and Derrida's work has generally been divided into those who see Derrida's work as continuing the Lévinasian legacy, and thus having little to offer to the political, and those who would like to divorce the trajectory of deconstruction from the Lévinasian heritage, and thus reveal it as being inherently political. The above split in opinion is largely based on a divergence in the interpretation of Lévinas's own writings as essentially about ethics, and therefore as either having little to offer to our thinking of the political, or as undergoing something like a ‘split', with the focus coming to rest more clearly on politics through the figure of the third, in later writings. My contribution to this impasse is to foreground a recent, though much overlooked notion within Jacques Derrida's work as an alternative to thinking being-with: that of community of singularities. I also suggest the notions of alteronomy and fiendship as alternatives to thinking being-with, which take into account the way in which the other-within-the-self restructures the concepts of freedom and autonomy and takes them beyond a humanist context. I will be arguing from two overarching points: a) that Lévinas's own work can convincingly be interpreted as not only concerned with the political from his earliest writings, but as setting up the political as the interruptive force within the ethical, thus providing a shift in perspective for what is essentially a mutually-interruptive relation between ethics and politics, and b) that Derrida's own writing need not be ‘divorced' from Lévinas's trajectory of thought, in order to be considered as having something to offer to our re-thinking of the relation between ethics and politics.