Following Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler posed the central problems of the cyclical history of civilization in the twentieth century. Subsequent world historical theorists have attempted to answer Spengler's nihilistic perspective on the destined rise and fall of all cultures by rescuing a progressive movement which transcended the downfall of civilizations. World history since Spengler has been written in pursuit of an answer to the crises of modernism: to the 'Death of God,' the problem of progress, the emergent technological order with its bureaucratic management of society, and the need sensed by the metahistorians for a new 'mythical' grounding to avert the fall of the West. The "Crisis of the West" dominates the perspectives of the world historians. Their goals for the solution of 'modernism,' through the religious transformation of society or political and cultural world unity, are central to their motivation as writers and to the formulation of their paradigms.

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Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study is to determine how the role and identity of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) changed during and after the Cold War. The demise of the Movement in the post-Cold War era, predicted by some scholars, is discussed. This study examines whether the Movement merely offered an alternative grouping during the Cold War. The issue that becomes evident with respect to the Cold War is to show the terror it brought about and how the Third World became the battleground of the Superpowers. The question as to what extent the role played by the Movement defused the Cold War is investigated. It is shown that the Movement sent emissaries to Washington and Moscow to resolve the German Crisis in 1961 and to reduce the arms race. A historical overview of the Movement is offered, which determines the role of Afro- Asianism in the birth of the Nonaligned Movement. It is explained that the 1955 Bandung conference gathered leaders from independent African and Asian states - with different foreign policies - which created energies that in the following years greatly affected Third World politics and the shaping of nonalignment. This study traces also the role of different gatherings of the Movement up to the Durban Summit of 1998. At issue are also participating countries in the 1961 Belgrade Summit, which are described, as well as the growth of the Movement's membership. Different goals of the Movement are examined. Some, like nuclear disarmament, the right to self-determination, peaceful coexistence, and the right for the Palestinians to a homeland, were adopted during the Cold War and still remain valid. Others, like protection of the environment, and the struggle for human rights, were implemented during the post-Cold War era. The détente allowed the Movement to launch a New International Economic Order. An attempt is made to show the failure and success of the Movement in this respect. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie studie is om te bepaal hoe die rol en identiteit van die Onverbonde Beweging (NAM) tydens en na die Koue Oorlog verander het. Die ondergang van die Beweging in die na-Koue Oorlogse era soos deur sommige kenners voorspel is, word ook ondersoek. Die studie het probeer vasstelof die Beweging 'n alternatiewe groepering tydens die Koue Oorlog teweeg gebring het. Die kwessie met betrekking tot respect tot die Koue Oorlog bewys dat terreur meegebring word en hoe die Derde Wêreld die slagveld van die Supermoondhede gemaak het. Daar word ook gepoog om vas te stel tot watter mate die Beweging 'n rol gespeel het in die ontlonting van die Koue Oorlog. In die verband word onder andere verwys na die Beweging se pogings om die Duitse Krisis (1961) te ontlont en die wapenwedloop te beëindig deur die stuur van afgevaardigdes na Washington en Moskou. In 'n historiese oorsig van die Beweging word die rol wat 'n Afro-Asiatiese gevoel/gees in die stigting van die Onverbonde Beweging gespeel het, ondersoek. Die studie toon aan hoe die Bandung Konferensie van 1955 leiers van onafhanklike state van Afrika en Asië, wat uiteenlopende buitelandse beleidsrigtings gehad het, bymekaar gebring het. Hierdie uiteenlopendheid het 'n dinamika geskep wat Derde Wêreldse politiek en die aard van onverbondenheid wesenlik beinvloed het in die jare na die Konferensie. Verskeie byeenkomste van die Onverbonde Beweging tot en met die Durbanse spitsberaad (1998) word ontleed. Die samestelling en verloop van die spitsberaad in Belgrado in 1961 en die groei in die lidmaatskap van die Beweging kom onder andere onder die loep. Verskeie van die Beweging se doelwitte wat tydens die Koue Oorlog beslag gekry het en steeds geldig is, word onder die soeklig geplaas. Kernkrag ontwapening, die reg op selfbeskikking, vreedsame naasbestaan en die Palestyne se reg op 'n eie staat/tuisland is voorbeelde in die verband. Ander doelwitte van die beweging wat veral in die na-Koue Oorlogse era geimplementeer is, soos die bewaring en beskerming van die omgewing en die stryd om menseregte, word ook ondersoek. Die loodsing van 'n Nuwe Internasionale Ekonomiese Orde deur die Beweging wat deur die détente van die na-Koue Oorlogse era moontlik gemaak is, word ook bespreek en die sukses en mislukking daarvan geëvalueer.

Thesis (MMil (Military Strategy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Military intervention remains controversial when it happens, as well as when it fails to. Since the end of the Cold War, military intervention has attracted much scholarly interest, and it was demonstrated that several instances of the use of force or the threat to use force without Security Council endorsement were acceptable and necessary. Matters of national sovereignty are the fundamental principle on which the international order was founded since the Treaty of Westphalia. Territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their domestic affairs, remain the foundation of international law, codified by the United Nations Charter, and one of the international community’s decisive factors in choosing between action and non-intervention. Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War matters of sovereignty and non-interference have been challenged by the emergent human rights discourse amidst genocide and war crimes. The aim of this study is to explain the extent to which military intervention in Africa has evolved since the end of the Cold War, in terms of theory, practice and how it unfolded upon the African continent. This will be achieved, by focusing on both successful and unsuccessful cases of military intervention in Africa. The unsuccessful cases being Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994, and Darfur in 2003; and the successful cases being Sierra Leone in 2000 and the Comoros in 2008. The objective of this study is fourfold: firstly it seeks to examine the theoretical developments underpinning military intervention after the end of the Cold War; secondly, to describe the evolution of military intervention from a unilateral realist to a more multilateral idealist profile; thirdly, to demarcate the involvement in military intervention in Africa by states as well as organisations such as the AU and the UN and finally, discerning the contributions and the dilemmas presented by interventions in African conflicts and how Africa can emerge and benefit from military interventions. The intervention in Somalia produced a litmus test for post-Cold War interventions and the departure point for their ensuing evolution. Rwanda ensued after Somalia, illustrating the disinclination to intervene that featured during this episode. Darfur marked the keenness of the AU to intervene in contrast with the ensuing debates at the Security Council over naming the crime whether or not “genocide” was unfolding in Darfur. Positively though, the intervention by Britain in Sierra Leone and the AU intervention in the Comoros are clear illustrations of how those intervening, were articulate in what they intend to do and their subsequent success. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Militêre intervensie, of die afwesigheid daarvan wanneer nodig, bly ‘n twispunt binne internasionale verhoudinge. Namate die impak van die Koue Oorlog begin vervaag het, het militêre intervensie besonder prominent in die literatuur begin figureer en is soms so dringend geag dat dit soms sonder die goedkeuring van die Veiligheidsraad van die Verenigde Nasies (VN) kon plaasvind. Aspekte van nasionale soewereiniteit bly nietemin ‘n grondbeginsel van die internasionale orde soos dit sedert die Verdrag van Wesfale beslag gevind het. Territoriale integriteit van state en die beginsel van geen-inmenging in die binnelandse aangeleenthede van ‘n staat nie bly ook ‘n grondslag van die Internasionale Reg soos deur die VN erken word en dit rig steeds standpunte van die internasionale gemeenskap vir of teen intervensie. Sedert die einde van die Koue Oorlog het soewereiniteit en beginsel van geen-intervensie egter toenemende druk ervaar met groeiende klem op menseregte midde in ‘n opkomende diskoers oor volksmoord en oorlogsmisdade. Die klem van hierdie studie val op militêre intervensie en veral hoe dit na die Koue Oorlog ontvou het in terme van teorie en praktyk, in die besonder op die Afrikakontinent. Die bespreking wentel om suksesvolle en onsuksesvolle gevalle van militêre intervensie in Afrika. Die onsuksesvolle gevalle wat bespreek word is Somalië (1992), Rwanda (1994), en Darfur (2003). Die meer suksesvolle gevalle wat bespreek word is Sierra Leone (2000) en die Komoro Eilande in (2008). Die studie omvat vier aspekte van bespreking: eerstens, die teoretiese ontwikkelinge wat militêre intervensie na die Koue Oorlog onderlê, tweedens, die ewolusie van militêre intervensie vanaf ‘n eensydige realisme tot ‘n meer multilaterale idealistiese verskynsel, derdens, die betrokkenheid in militêre intervensie in Afrika deur state en organisasies soos die VN en Afrika-Unie (AU) en laastens, die bydraes en dilemmas van intervensies in Afrika. Die betrokkenheid in Somalië was ‘n kritieke toets vir intervensies na die Koue Oorlog en het baie stukrag verleen aan die daaropvolgende debat. Rwanda het die huiwerigheid ontbloot om in te gryp waar dit werklik nodig was. Darfur vertoon weer die gewilligheid van die AU om in te gryp in weerwil van lang debatte in die VN oor volksmoord en die gebeure in Darfur. Aan die positiewe kant figureer die Britse optredes in Sierra Leone en optredes deur ‘n AU-mag in die Komoro Eilande as gevalle wat toon hoe die vasberadenheid van partye om in te gryp en bedreigings in die kiem te smoor, suksesvolle militêre intervensies kan bevorder.

Text in Afrikaans / Die twee boeke waarin J.J. Collyer die kampanjes in Duits Suidwes-Afrika (Namibie) en Duits Oos-Afrika (Tanzanie) beskryf, bevat enkele kennis stellings wat vandag nog bruikbaar is. Collyer verduidelik dat militere foute van die verlede histories deur die staf ontleed moet word om sodanige foute in die toekoms te vermy. Hy gaan egter verder en verduidelik dat die moontlikheid om toekomsti.ge optrede te verbeter nodig is om onnodige bloedvergieting te verhoed. Hierdie verhandeling het ten doel gehad om die laaste stelling van Collyer te ondersoek en te bepaal of dit wel in Suid-Afrika toegepas is. Die navorsingsprobleem van die verhandeling was om te bepaal ofKrygsgeskiedenis aangewend is om die militere doktrine in Suid-Afrika mee te verbeter. Die bevinding van die verhandeling was dat daar slegs in enkele gevalle deur die SuidAfrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (en sy voorgangers) wel van Krygsgeskiedenis gebruik gemaak was om doktrine mee te ontwikkel en dat baie meer gedoen behoort te word. / The two books of 1.1. Collyer which discuss the campaigns in German South West Africa (Namibia) and German East Africa (Tanzania) contain knowledge propositions that are still valid today. Collyer explains that the military mistakes that were made in the past should be analysed especially by the staff today to prevent making the same mistakes in the future. He goes on to explain that future conduct should be improved in order to prevent unnecessary bloodshed. This dissertation's aim was to investigate Collyer's proposition and to determine whether this was applied in South Africa. The research problem of the dissertation was to determine whether Military History was utilised to improve South Africa's military doctrine. The finding of the dissertation was that the South African National Defence Force (and its predecessors) utilised Military History only in very few cases to develop doctrine and that much remains to be done. / Political Sciences

Text in Afrikaans / Die twee boeke waarin J.J. Collyer die kampanjes in Duits Suidwes-Afrika (Namibie) en Duits Oos-Afrika (Tanzanie) beskryf, bevat enkele kennis stellings wat vandag nog bruikbaar is. Collyer verduidelik dat militere foute van die verlede histories deur die staf ontleed moet word om sodanige foute in die toekoms te vermy. Hy gaan egter verder en verduidelik dat die moontlikheid om toekomsti.ge optrede te verbeter nodig is om onnodige bloedvergieting te verhoed. Hierdie verhandeling het ten doel gehad om die laaste stelling van Collyer te ondersoek en te bepaal of dit wel in Suid-Afrika toegepas is. Die navorsingsprobleem van die verhandeling was om te bepaal ofKrygsgeskiedenis aangewend is om die militere doktrine in Suid-Afrika mee te verbeter. Die bevinding van die verhandeling was dat daar slegs in enkele gevalle deur die SuidAfrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (en sy voorgangers) wel van Krygsgeskiedenis gebruik gemaak was om doktrine mee te ontwikkel en dat baie meer gedoen behoort te word. / The two books of 1.1. Collyer which discuss the campaigns in German South West Africa (Namibia) and German East Africa (Tanzania) contain knowledge propositions that are still valid today. Collyer explains that the military mistakes that were made in the past should be analysed especially by the staff today to prevent making the same mistakes in the future. He goes on to explain that future conduct should be improved in order to prevent unnecessary bloodshed. This dissertation's aim was to investigate Collyer's proposition and to determine whether this was applied in South Africa. The research problem of the dissertation was to determine whether Military History was utilised to improve South Africa's military doctrine. The finding of the dissertation was that the South African National Defence Force (and its predecessors) utilised Military History only in very few cases to develop doctrine and that much remains to be done. / Political Sciences