Cette thèse a pour objet l’énigme d’autrui. À cet égard, elle interroge l’opposition entre deux conceptions de l’altérité, celle de Husserl et celle de Levinas. Pour Husserl, autrui est envisagé du point de vue de la connaissance, connaissance d’autrui qui se fait à partir de moi. Autrui est pensé comme alter ego. Levinas, lui, fait éclater cette conception de l’autre : pour lui, autrui ne peut pas être pensé comme l’autre du même. Plutôt, c’est autrui qui, pensé à partir de sa vulnérabilité, oblige le soi à la responsabilité. La relation ne part plus du même mais de l’autre, de l’autre dont l’appel enjoint le soi à ne pas rester indifférent. L’énigme d’autrui semble donc se tenir dans la tension entre le lointain et le proche. Trop proche, son altérité est annihilée. Trop lointain, il devient presque inaccessible. Or, entre familiarité et étrangeté se situe le lieu propre de l’herméneutique, un lieu que tant Ricœur que Gadamer n’ont cessé d’explorer. Quelle(s) réponse(s) les herméneutiques de ces deux penseurs apportent-elles à l’énigme d’autrui ? De quel ordre relève d’abord la relation entre soi et autrui : épistémologique (Husserl) ou éthique (Levinas) ? Nous soutiendrons que c’est principalement la dimension éthique qui est en jeu. C’est par le biais d’un dialogue avec Levinas que nous chercherons à faire ressortir la dimension éthique de l’herméneutique. Ce faisant, nous nous trouverons face à une autre question, celle d’une conception commune de l’herméneutique. Nous serons par conséquent amenée à dégager les aspects sur lesquels les pensées de Ricœur et de Gadamer se rejoignent et ceux sur lesquels elles se différencient, construisant ainsi des ponts entre leurs herméneutiques et inscrivant par là même notre thèse dans la veine des travaux qui les mettent en dialogue.

Tableau d’honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2007-2008. / En tant qu'introduction à sa pensée philosophique, les Méditations Cartésiennes de Edmund Husserl constituent l'un de ses ouvrages les plus lus. Par ailleurs, la 5e Méditation Cartésienne resta pendant longtemps l'un des rares textes où Husserl nous présentait de façon systématique sa théorie de l'empathie (Einfiïhlung) et sa conception de l'intersubjectivité transcendantale, et fut à ce titre la cible de plusieurs critiques bien connues de nos jours. Toutefois, depuis la parution dans les années 1970 des volumes XIII, XIV et XV des Husserliana portant sur la question de l'intersubjectivité, notre compréhension de cet aspect de la pensée husserlienne s'est grandement améliorée. Ce mémoire de maîtrise constitue donc une relecture de la 5e Méditation Cartésienne à la lumière de ces connaissances élargies, en vue de mieux saisir son propos, et la confronter à neuf à certaines des critiques classiques (Schutz, Ricœur) formulées à son égard.

El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo principal alcanzar una aproximación al concepto de "mundo de la vida" a partir del análisis de sus principales significados, tal como ellos se exponen fundalmentamente en la. parte IIIA de la obra de Edmund Husserl, La Crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental. Una introducción a filosofía fenomenológica - (1936)

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / This study seeks to give a philosophical account of, and justification for the intuition that subjectivity is not a stable “Archimedean point” on the basis of which an intersubjective relation can be founded, but is instead profoundly affected by each different “Other” with which it enters into a relation. As a preliminary to the positive philosophical account of how this might work in Part II of the thesis, there is an attempt to critique certain of the classical accounts of intersubjectivity found in phenomenology, in order to show that these positions cannot give a satisfactory account of the type of intersubjective relation which gives rise to the abovementioned intuition. The thesis therefore starts off by examining the account of intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (especially the Fifth Meditation). Husserl is there engaged in an attempt to overcome the charge of solipsism that might be levelled at phenomenology, since phenomenology is concerned with experience as, by definition, the experience of the subject. We try to show that Husserl cannot give a satisfactory account of the Other because he tries to derive it from the Subject, and hence reduces the Other to the Same. We then turn to two other phenomenological thinkers – Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, both of whom are themselves critical of Husserl – to examine whether they provide a better account, but conclude that (although each represents a certain advance over Husserl), neither are able to provide a decisively better account, since each is still too caught up in phenomenology and its focus on consciousness. In Part II of the thesis, we then turn to a non- (or even anti-) phenomenological thinker, namely Gilles Deleuze, to try and find an alternative theory that would be able to provide the account we seek. Our contention is that Deleuze, by seeking to give an account of the constitution of the subject itself, simultaneously provides an account of the constitution of the Other as arising at the same time as the Subject. Crucial to this account is the inversion of priority between the poles of a relation and the relation itself. Deleuze argues that a relation is “external to its terms”, and precedes these terms. Hence, by returning to a level which precedes consciousness and the order of knowledge – that is, by returning to the level of the virtual multiplicities and singular events that underlie and precede the actualization of these events and multiplicities in distinct subjects and objects – we argue that Deleuze shows that, contra phenomenology, there is in fact no primordial separation between subject and Other. The contention is therefore that the problem of intersubjectivity as posed by phenomenology is a false one that can be eluded by means of Deleuze’s philosophy. This philosophy is not based on the subject, but instead shows the subject to be the product of an underlying network of relations. Finally, we turn to Deleuze’s appropriation of Nietzsche to trace out the transformation of “ethics” that result from adopting a position like that of Deleuze.

Chapter One introduces the problem that existed in music and logic-psychology at the end of the 19th century. Both music and logic-psychology were in the cul-de-sac of relativism, which had led to obscurity of method and language. Asthetics-criticism is seen to be in the same relativistic position. It is postulated that phenomenological method could aid in music criticism and aesthetic awareness. The second chapter presents a motivic, or Idea, analysis of Schoenberg's second and third string quartets, showing how the twelve-tone method was developed as a way of curing musical composition of the tonal obscurity of late Romanticism. The third chapter is a short exposition of Husserl's development of phenomenological method from his initial work in logic and mathematics to transcendental phenomenology. Chapter Four discusses some of the methodological parallels between Schoenberg and Husserl. Parallels are drawn from all creative periods of their respective work. Chapter Five focuses on similar problems raised in contemporary aesthetic-criticism and their relationship to the methods of Husserl and Schoenberg. Showing how both men solved their problems, a solution is projected for aesthetics-criticism.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luis Felipe Netto Lauer.pdf: 575327 bytes, checksum: 6022e98d212cd348ccaf658ccf21811a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-07-03 / Fundação Araucária / The conductive thread of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger s phenomenological investigations is the concept of intentionality; his analysis has for purpose to solve the fundamental methodological problem concerning the scientific disclosure of the sphere of lived experience (Erlebnis). So that it becomes clear, it is necessary to consider him formally. In Husserl, the sphere of lived experience is the one of the pure ego or pure consciousness, and the intentionality is understood as intentionality of consciousness; in Heidegger, it is treated of what denominated factical life or existence of Dasein, in that the intentionality designates the type of comportment that the human existence maintains in relation to itself and to the world. This work seeks a critical confrontation among the two positions, pointing out the heideggerian concern with the inadequacies of the theoretical attitude and her form of conceiving the field of the formal, towards an investigation concerning the nature and the formation of the concepts and philosophical statements as formal indications. / O fio condutor das investigações fenomenológicas de Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger é o conceito de intencionalidade; sua análise tem por finalidade resolver o problema metodológico fundamental acerca do modo de abrir cientificamente a esfera dos vividos (Erlebnis). Para que se torne claro, é necessário considerá-lo formalmente. Em Husserl, a esfera dos vividos é a do ego puro ou consciência pura, e a intencionalidade é compreendida como intencionalidade da consciência; em Heidegger, trata-se do que denominou vida ou existência fáctica do Dasein, em que a intencionalidade designa o tipo de comportamento que a existência humana mantém em relação a si e para com o mundo. Este trabalho visa um confronto crítico entre as duas posições, salientando a preocupação heideggeriana com as insuficiências da atitude teorética e sua forma de conceber o campo do formal, em direção a uma investigação acerca da natureza e da formação dos conceitos e enunciados filosóficos como indicações formais.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished