With the starting point in UN peacekeeping operations, this essay investigates the participation of the Swedish armed forces and how the Swedish soldiers perceive their role in those operations. The aim of the study was to explore different perceptions about the Swedish soldiers in international operations. Partly from the Swedish soldiers perspective and how they perceived their own role as soldiers. Partly from the perspective of civilians, like Swedish aid workers, and how they perceive the Swedish soldiers. The third perspective was from a person with mixed experiences from both the military and the civilian work. The aim was also to investigate the discrepancy between the perceptions and its consequences. The method used was interviews with six informants, both soldiers and civilians. The interviews were based on three subjects: soldiers and civilians, men and women as soldiers, and soldiers from Sweden compared to soldiers from other countries. The result showed that there is a discrepancy between different perceptions and that a broader understanding was given from the informant who had the experience from both military and civilian work in international operations. This can lead to the assumption that it is preferable to have more experience from different roles. The abolishment of the compulsory military service may inhibit this broader perspective in the Swedish military.

<p>Inom det akademiska studieområdet som berör underrättelseverksamhet finns inte någon vedertagen teori. Teorier avseende vad underrättelsetjänst är och hur den skall bedrivas varierar. Vidare har nationella särintressen stor inverkan vid utformningen av dessa. Inom den militära kontexten är läget i vissa stycken annorlunda. Dagens multinationella operationer kräver samarbete inom en rad olika områden inklusive underrättelsetjänst. I denna uppsats genomförs en studie av tre doktriner/handböckerna avseende underrättelsetjänst. Dessa undersöks utifrån de tre perspektiven Ledning, Adaptivitet och Samarbete. Syftet med detta är att finna vad dessa dokument framhåller som viktigt för underrättelsetjänstens utövande. Dessa viktiga punkter används därefter för att konstruera ett analysverktyg som kan undersöka huruvida dessa doktriner är implementerade inom en för närvarande högaktuell doktrin, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Utifrån de doktriner och handböcker som denna undersökning har baserats på finns tydliga samband mellan hur underrättelsetjänst utövas mellan Sverige, USA och NATO. Detta trots det faktum att vissa variationer kring begrepp och upplägg förekommer mellan styrdokument. Samarbete utgör ett centralt begrepp mellan samtliga underrättelsedokument och förefaller även vara viktigt inom FM 3-24. Vikten av interoperabilitet inom underrättelsetjänsten, som samtliga underrättelsedokument betonar, tycks inte vara implementerad inom FM 3-24.</p> / <p>Within the academic field of intelligence studies, there is no established theory. Theories regardingwhat intelligence is and how it should be conducted vary, and national interests have a major impact in the design of these. Within the military context, the situation is different in certain aspects. Today's multinational operations require cooperation in a variety of areas, including intelligence. In this essay a study of three doctrine/manuals is presented. These are examined from three perspectives, Control, Adaptivity, and Cooperation. The purpose of this is to find what these documents present as important for intelligence exercise. These important points are then used to construct an analysis tool that examine whether these doctrines are implemented in a currently highly topical doctrine, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. This study shows a clear link between how intelligence services are organized in Sweden, the United States and NATO. This despite the fact that some variation around concepts and structures exists between their regulatory documents. Cooperation is a central concept among all intelligence documents and appears to be important in FM 3-24. The importance of interoperability within the Intelligence Service, as all intelligence document stresses, does not seem to be implemented in FM 3-24.</p>

Inom det akademiska studieområdet som berör underrättelseverksamhet finns inte någon vedertagen teori. Teorier avseende vad underrättelsetjänst är och hur den skall bedrivas varierar. Vidare har nationella särintressen stor inverkan vid utformningen av dessa. Inom den militära kontexten är läget i vissa stycken annorlunda. Dagens multinationella operationer kräver samarbete inom en rad olika områden inklusive underrättelsetjänst. I denna uppsats genomförs en studie av tre doktriner/handböckerna avseende underrättelsetjänst. Dessa undersöks utifrån de tre perspektiven Ledning, Adaptivitet och Samarbete. Syftet med detta är att finna vad dessa dokument framhåller som viktigt för underrättelsetjänstens utövande. Dessa viktiga punkter används därefter för att konstruera ett analysverktyg som kan undersöka huruvida dessa doktriner är implementerade inom en för närvarande högaktuell doktrin, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Utifrån de doktriner och handböcker som denna undersökning har baserats på finns tydliga samband mellan hur underrättelsetjänst utövas mellan Sverige, USA och NATO. Detta trots det faktum att vissa variationer kring begrepp och upplägg förekommer mellan styrdokument. Samarbete utgör ett centralt begrepp mellan samtliga underrättelsedokument och förefaller även vara viktigt inom FM 3-24. Vikten av interoperabilitet inom underrättelsetjänsten, som samtliga underrättelsedokument betonar, tycks inte vara implementerad inom FM 3-24. / Within the academic field of intelligence studies, there is no established theory. Theories regardingwhat intelligence is and how it should be conducted vary, and national interests have a major impact in the design of these. Within the military context, the situation is different in certain aspects. Today's multinational operations require cooperation in a variety of areas, including intelligence. In this essay a study of three doctrine/manuals is presented. These are examined from three perspectives, Control, Adaptivity, and Cooperation. The purpose of this is to find what these documents present as important for intelligence exercise. These important points are then used to construct an analysis tool that examine whether these doctrines are implemented in a currently highly topical doctrine, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. This study shows a clear link between how intelligence services are organized in Sweden, the United States and NATO. This despite the fact that some variation around concepts and structures exists between their regulatory documents. Cooperation is a central concept among all intelligence documents and appears to be important in FM 3-24. The importance of interoperability within the Intelligence Service, as all intelligence document stresses, does not seem to be implemented in FM 3-24.

Mgr. Zuzana Bílková Key mental features of the members of the armed forces for coping with conditions of high risk of losing one's life: Importance of social support among soldiers of the ISAF mission Abstract This thesis focuses on the topic of social support among soldiers in the ISAF mission. It was supposed that army environment is very specific in the area of social relationships in particular and so in the area of social support. Military mission is very demanding - soldiers face a real danger of their lives, they are limited in contact with their families, in the way of spending their free time. Therefore, some soldiers suffer from mental problems when they came back. This thesis examines a potential contribution of social support during the mission and deals with the question whether social support can help soldiers to cope with it. The theoretical part summarizes three main topics - the specificity of the army environment, stress and its impact to health and performance, and social support. Different approaches towards social support, methodological difficulties, positive and negative outcomes of social support are presented. Approach of the author Eric Sonderen was used in the empirical part (Sonderen, 1991, 2012a). The empirical part presents a combine-designed survey. Semi-structured in-depth...

Privata säkerhets- och militära företag (PSMF) har använts allt mer i counterinsurgency (COIN)-operationer under de senaste tio åren, där Afghanistan och Irak utgör två tydliga exempel. Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur PSMF påverkar säkerhetsarbetet vid genomförande av COIN i ett konfliktområde, Afghanistan. Studien visar att PSMF i Afghanistan under 2008–2011 i huvudsak påverkade säkerhetsarbetet positivt och fyllde en viktig funktion avseende COIN med två undantag. PSMF stöd till militära operationer i form av bevakning och eskortering påverkade COIN till del negativt och PSMF resistens mot korruption var direkt negativt för COIN. PSMF spelade en framträdande roll för att bygga upp och utbilda militära och civila institutioner i Afghanistan, samt påverkade även i huvudsak positivt vid skydd av humanitära projekt och utvecklingsverksamhet. Studien visar att PSMF stöd till säkerhetsarbetet genom bevakning och eskortering i Afghanistan hade positiva sidor genom att de avlastade de reguljära militära styrkorna, men även stor negativ inverkan på COIN då stor användning av främst afghanska säkerhetsföretag, tillika krigsherrar, medgav dem inflytande och möjlighet att undergräva den afghanska regeringens auktoritet. PSMF var även i hög grad inblandade i korruption och studien visar på ett samband mellan PSMF och korruption i Afghanistan, vilket varit negativt för COIN. Studien förordar att PSMF fortsatt används för uppbyggnad av militära och civila institutioner. För att förbättra säkerhetssituationen och minska korruptionen förordas bättre kontroll av PSMF samt att säkerhetspersonal från tredje land används för bevakning och eskortering, i det fall inte reguljär militär och polis kan användas. / Private Security and Military Companies (PSMC) has been used more frequently in counterinsurgency(COIN)-operations during the past ten years, where Afghanistan and Iraq are two examples. The aim of this study is to examine how PSMC affects security in a COIN-context in a certain overseas contingency operation, in Afghanistan. This study proves that PSMC filled an important part and contributed to security within the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan during 2008–2011 with two exceptions, concerning base and transport security and concerning corruption. PSMC played a prominent part in building military and civilian institutional capacity in Afghanistan, where training, mentoring, partnering and advisory are important key functions. PSMC also contributes to protection of humanitarian and development projects, since fulfilment of many projects depends on the protection from PSMC. The study shows that PSMC efforts to provide base and transport security had a positive impact in terms of relieving regular military units to conduct military operations, but also major negative impact on COIN in terms of using warlords and powerbrokers as security providers. The illicit conduct of local security providers together with widespread corruption undermined counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. The study proposes further use of PSMC as military and civilian institutional capacity-builders. In order to improve the security situation and reduce corruption this study proposes better oversight of PSMC and the use of third-country nationals for security, in case regular Coalition and Afghan units are not available.

Submitted by Elesbão Santiago Neto (neto10uepb@cche.uepb.edu.br) on 2018-04-03T18:20:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 PDF - Deisiane da Conceição Viana de Santana Valdevino.pdf: 77861906 bytes, checksum: 4701ab00d4e7bffbc9710ec1ede4684f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-03T18:20:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PDF - Deisiane da Conceição Viana de Santana Valdevino.pdf: 77861906 bytes, checksum: 4701ab00d4e7bffbc9710ec1ede4684f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-09-05 / CAPES / This study on dehumanization seeks to shed light on a subject little studied in the area of International Relations. The theoretical model on dehumanization encompasses two concepts of humanity – human nature and human uniqueness. Those two concepts represent two forms of humanity denial – the animalistic and the mechanistic forms. In the Afghan scenario of prolonged violence, over decades of war, destructive human relations become an exemplification of dehumanizing processes. The case study focuses on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a multinational mission authorized by the UN Security Council to be the first operation to support peace building under the NATO command. Elements of the military discourse and practices provide a basis for characterizing ISAF’s role in Afghanistan as a dehumanizing agent. The dehumanization paradox exposes forms of prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, delegitimization and objectification that interrelate and destructively impact the lives of the Afghan people. / Este estudo sobre desumanização busca dar luz a uma temática pouco estudada na área de Relações Internacionais. O modelo teórico sobre desumanização engloba dois conceitos de humanidade - natureza humana e singularidade humana. Os dois conceitos representam duas formas de negação da humanidade - as formas animalista e mecanicista. No cenário afegão de violência prolongada, ao longo de décadas de guerra, as relações humanas destrutivas se tornam uma exemplificação de processos desumanizantes. O estudo de caso se concentra na International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), que corresponde a uma missão multinacional autorizada pelo Conselho de Segurança da ONU, sendo a primeira operação de apoio à construção de paz sob o comando da OTAN. Elementos do discurso e da prática militar fornecem embasamento para caracterizar o papel da ISAF no Afeganistão como o de um agente desumanizador. O paradoxo da desumanização retrata formas de preconceito, estereótipos, discriminação, deslegitimação e objetificação que se inter-relacionam e afetam destrutivamente a vida de afegãos e afegãs.

The UN and NATO have implemented separate approaches to civilian-military cooperation. Central in both approaches is a need for information sharing between civilian and military actors. Without shared information, cooperative planning becomes impossible. For military actors secret information makes sharing difficult and for civilian actors, principles hinder close cooperation. Scholars in the field of intelligence study have identified that states and organizations share information if the benefits of such, outweigh costs and risks. This thesis examines institutional differences between the UN mission MINUSMA in Mali and NATO mission ISAF in Afghanistan, in order to better understand how institutional factors, affect sharing of information. With an outset in Rational Choice Institutionalism and by use of Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Development and Analysis Framework, an analytical instrument is designed. Through inductive review of interviews, first-hand accounts and reports; factors that drive, enable and hinder civilian-military sharing are indicated. The thesis indicates that the institutional framework of MINUSMA forms interdependency between civilian and military actors, while sharing in ISAF was enabled only when common goals were agreed upon. Military and civilian actors, in both MINUSMA and ISAF point to unclear mandates and vague goals as primary barriers to civilian-military sharing.

This dissertation examines the role of military officers as policy implementers by investigating the discretion of Swedish force commanders in the multinational military campaign in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2013. By developing an analytical framework that takes both an outside-in and an inside-out perspective, and that encompasses both the objective implications that structural factors project on force commanders as well as their subjective perceptions of those structural factors, and applying that framework to a range of official documents as well as unique interview data, the thesis describes the discretion that force commanders have had in interpreting, choosing and shaping their mission and concept of operations. The findings show that Swedish force commanders in the Afghanistan campaign have had considerable discretion in interpreting and framing the principal’s overarching mission, the mission of their own force, as well as their force’s concept of operations. Their discretion can be understood as a combination of structurally induced freedom to make choices, the force commanders’ perceptions of that freedom and their inclination to use it. Circumstances regarding structural factors such as duality of command, passive authority of superiors, non-specific tasks and ambiguous implications of allocated resources has created this discretion and rendered force commanders disproportionately influential in the policy implementation process. Although this influence can be regarded as a manifestation of modern management ideals such as Auftragstaktik and mission command in the military, or management by objectives in government and business, it can also be regarded as a downwards passing of the buck where strategic implementation decisions trickle down to the level of force commanders in the field, making them “strategic colonels”.

This thesis examines approaches taken towards warlords and militias during the current U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan and that of the Soviet/Najibullah period analysing their impact on key state formation dynamics and state-building efforts. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, the study finds that while the current intervention has seen its warlord and militia strategies produce generally negative results, the past Soviet intervention can arguably claim some partial successes. Though these partial successes provided an “exit strategy”, they did not aid in the state-building efforts or regime stabilization goals that had been Moscow’s initial and primary goals. The study also point to the problematic omission of actors and social groupings, such as warlords and militias, in state-building theory, and shows how security goals as typically addressed in state-building need not be synonymous or conducive to the primitive accumulation of force that spurred dependency relationships in past state formation.

This paper evaluates the differences between U.S. multilateralism within ad hoc coalitions and U.S. multilateralism within permanent institutions – specifically NATO, the only standing defense alliance with which the U.S. is involved – within the context of the war in Afghanistan's COIN operations. Specifically, this work contrasts the strategies of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the portion of the war that was undertaken by U.S. forces and a coalition of allies, and the operations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which were defined by U.S. cooperation with NATO. Along with contrasting the overarching strategies of OEF and ISAF, this thesis evaluates the tactical differences between the two operations as they presented themselves within two pairs of tactical maneuvers: OEF Operation Red Wings vs. ISAF Operation Siege of Sangin and OEF Operation Eastern Resolve II vs. ISAF Operation Panther’s Claw.