The European natural gas market is characterised by higher demand than available supply from own resources. Therefore Europe is a gas net-importing region. The costs of potential problems or disruptions establish the need for an environment which stimulates sufficient investments in transmission line capacities. We examine the effects of the introduction of the recently developed Hogan, Rosellón and Vogelsang (HRV) incentive mechanism into the European natural gas market. In the simulations with GAMS we can confirm all results expected from theory. The validity of these simulation results is confirmed in a structural analysis, which comprised the variation of different exogenous input parameters. Therefore we conclude that the HRV incentive mechanism as a regulatory regime for the European natural gas market would be an advisable alternative, which should be considered in future discussions. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

Deux situations de comportement égoïste des agents dans les réseaux de communication sont considérées dans le cadre de la théorie des jeux.La première situation concerne les réseaux de communication utilisant un routage décentralisé basé sur des agents autonomes. Nous étudions les propriétés de convergence des dynamiques de meilleures réponses dans un jeu de routage sur des liens parallèles. Le jeu implique un nombre fini d'agents, chacun décidant comment son trafic est routé sur les liens de manière à minimiser son propre coût. Nous proposons l'utilisation du rayon spectral généralisé des matrices Jacobiennes de l'opérateur de meilleure réponse pour démontrer la convergence.La seconde situation apparaît dans les réseaux tolérants aux délais dont l'objectif est de permettre la communication dans des environnements où la connectivité n'est qu'intermittente et où les délais de communication peuvent être très longs. Nous proposons tout d'abord un mécanisme d'incitation basé sur une récompense pour convaincre les noeuds mobiles de relayer les messages, et analysons l'influence de l'information donnée par la source (nombre de copies du message, âge de ces copies) aux relais sur le prix à payer pour transmettre le message. Nous considérons ensuite un modèle dans lequel la source propose une récompense fixe. Les noeuds mobiles peuvent alors décider d'accepter ou non le message, et s'ils l'acceptent, peuvent ensuite à tout moment décider de l'abandonner. Nous modélisons l'interaction entre les noeuds mobiles sous la forme d'un jeu stochastique partiellement observable et analysons les politiques optimales pour les relais. / This thesis focuses on the issues related to the selfish behavior of the agents in the communication networks. We are particularly interested in two situations in which these issues arise and we address game-theoretical framework to study them.The first situation relates to communication networks using a distributed routing based on autonomous agents. Compared to a centralized routing, this type of routing offers significant advantages in terms of scalability, ease of deployment or robustness to failures and environmental disturbances. We investigate the convergence properties of the sequential best-response dynamics in a routing game over parallel links. The game involves a finite number of routing agents each of which decides how much flow to route on each of the links with the objective of minimizing its own costs. For some particular cases (e.g., two players), the convergence of the best-response dynamics can be proved by showing that this game has a potential function. For other cases, a potential function has remained elusive. We propose the use of non-linear spectral radius of the Jacobian of the best-response dynamics as an alternative approach to proving its convergence.The second situation occurs in Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) that have been the subject of intensive research over the past decade. DTN has an idea to support communication in environments where connectivity is intermittent and where communication delays can be very long. We focus on game-theoretic models for DTNs. First, we propose an incentive mechanism to persuade selfish mobile nodes to participate in relaying messages, and investigate the influence of the information given by the source (number of existing copies of the message, age of these copies) to the relays on the rewards proposed. For static information polices, that is the same type of information given to all the relays, it is shown that the expected reward paid by the source is independent of the policy. However, the source can reduce the reward by dynamically adapting the type of information based on the meeting times with the relays. For the particular cases, we give some structural results of the optimal adaptive policy. Next, we consider the model where the source proposes a fixed reward. The mobile relays can decide to accept or not the packet and then to drop the packet in the future. This game can be modelled as a partially-observable stochastic game. For two relays, we have shown that the optimal policies for the relays relates to the threshold type.

區段徵收為目前政府大規模進行土地整體開發，促進都市發展，以及無償取得公共設施用地的重要舉措之一，為一種具有高度自償性之土地開發事業。由於區段徵收需要投入大量的資金與人力，在政府財政困窘及國內不動產市場自民國81 年以來，長期處於不景氣之故，其非但無法達成原先設定之有效減低公共支出之目的，反而需要額外編列預算以支應財務缺口。爰此，造成縣市政府往往視區段徵收為畏途，但礙於相關政策規範及都市發展須盡速取得必要之公共設施用地，而不得不予執行，從而導致惡性循環，因此，如何解決區段徵收財務問題，乃成為政府必須面對的最大困境與挑戰。 在政府財政狀態日益惡化，短期內又無法籌措區段徵收開發過程中龐大的資金需求，再加上地方專業人力不足之困境下，使得區段徵收之辦理型態有所演變，部分地方縣（市）政府遂逐步引進民間資源與活力（即BT模式），朝向由民間機構自行籌措資金並由該機構專業人員負責規劃與執行開發工作，政府從旁提供必要之行政協助。此外，開發所需總費用均先由民間機構墊付，而政府再以剩餘可建築土地來償付費用，藉此創新開發模式，以有效解決區段徵收有關資金籌措及開發後土地去化等至為關鍵之癥結問題。 然而BT模式在實務執行過程時，仍存在著法令、政策制定及實施方式等相關爭議，以致於無法有效大量推廣實施，本文藉由研究相關法令、文獻記載、分析目前實施案例、並透過訪談專家學者及整理相關問題等，說明區段徵收業務在走向政府委託民間機構、引進民間資源辦理區段徵收BT開發模式時，所需面對與管理之委託-代理關係，藉由代理理論，探討區段徵收實務執行層面中，可行的解決措施（包括誘因與監督機制），並建議區段徵收應與時俱進地檢討與修正相關配套措施，以利此項善用民間資源與活力，並具有突破性的土地開發委外機制能夠更臻完備，並可作為後續土地整體開發學術研究之重要參考。 綜合本研究之結論與建議，謹分述如次： 一、結論 （一）區段徵收機制基於政策、民意與制度之可行性，可以作階段性創新改革。 （二）現行區段徵收委外機制相關法制，尚欠完備。 （三）區段徵收委外辦理機制，應同時配套建構監控制度。 （四）區段徵收委外過程，應運用誘因機制，以避免代理問題產生。 （五）區段徵收BT開發模式，應可進一步強化學術研究與應用探討。 二、建議 （一）限期檢討修正區段徵收BT開發模式法制化工作。 （二）由中央與地方成立專案小組，全力協助BT得標廠商。 （三）加強BT開發模式之宣導，建構良好的溝通協調機制。 （四）根據現有兩案例開發結果，審慎評估策訂推廣實施計畫。 / Zone expropriation is presently the large-scale integrated land development carried out by the government to promote urban development. Acquiring land for public facilities without compensation is also an important measure to have high self-liquidation of land development enterprise. Because zone expropriation needs to invest in a great deal of funds and manpower, the government finance and the domestic real estate market were in a long-term depression from 1981 until 1992. Not only unable to reach the targeted profit margin to reduce the public expenses, additional budget is needed to deal with financial gap. Therefore, it makes the county and city government often look at zone expropriation as a dangerous choice to take. But hindrance related to policy standardization and urban development must acquire the necessary land for public facilities as soon as possible because there's no choice but to implement it. As a result, it leads to a vicious circle. Therefore, the government needs to face the greatest dilemma and challenge on how to settle the zone expropriation financial problems. The financial status of the government is worsening day by day. Within a short time the government was unable to raise funds for the huge financial requirement of the zone expropriation. In addition, professional manpower is also a dilemma, causing the handling pattern of zone expropriation to evolve to some extent. Partially the local county and city government gradually brings in non-government resources and vitality (private participation-BT mode). Non-government organizations voluntarily raise funds and professionals in private sectors manage the plans and implementation, while the government provides necessary administrative assistance. In addition, the development necessary for the total costs is paid first by the non-government organization, and the government excess land will be liquidated, thereby creating modes in effect of settling the zone expropriation's fund raising and developed land key problems. However in the implementation of the BT mode process, the decrees, policymaking and implementation methodology related to disputes are still kept. Because of the incapability to take effect the large number of widespread implementation, this writing discuss about the laws, research about decrees, document records, analysis of present case studies, and interviews of professional scholars and arrangements related to the problems. Zone expropriation business is illustrated in moving towards the government's entrusting of non-government organizations. The introduction of non-government resources to handle the zone expropriation BT development method is necessary for facing with the management of principal-agent relationship. By means of principal-agent theory, probing into the implementation dimension, feasible resolutions (including incentive and monitoring mechanism), and recommending the steady advancement of zone expropriation to review and amend about the formation of a complete set of measures, these are all for making good use of non-government resources and vitality, as well as to have a break through in the land development outsourcing mechanism to make them more perfect, and may make a follow-up for the land integrated development academic study of important references. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation: 1. Conclusions: (1)Gradual improvements can be made on the zone expropriation mechanism based on policy, public opinion and system feasibility. (2)The legal system regarding the current zone expropriation mechanism is still incomplete. The external committee handling zone expropriation should simultaneously form a complete construction monitoring system. (3)The external committee handling zone expropriation should utilize a financial incentive mechanism to avoid any problems. (4)A zone expropriation based on the BT model should go further in strengthening academic research and application 2. Recommendations: (1)Establish a deadline for reviewing the legal work for zone expropriation in the BT development model. (2)Allow the national and local relevant groups to fully assist the winning bidder for the BT project. (3)Strengthen guidance for the BT development model; construct a good communication mechanism. (4)Based on the development results of the above case studies, carefully appraise the presented implementation plan . Keywords: Zone Expropriation、Private Participation(BT Mode)、Principal-Agent Theory、Incentive Mechanism

本文主要應用代理理論來評估建議目前全權委任契約的規劃草案。為深入瞭解全權委託契約的法律及經濟特性，本研究參考日本全權委託業務規範、及研究我國目前全權委託法令內容。藉實地訪談投顧業者以窺視業界對全權委託法令的真正看法，最後乃利用代理理論做為草案規範體系之基礎及進行評估。 在研究日本全權委託業務規範時，本研究發現日本的做法與目前我國草案的內容與精神大致上相同，因此難以日本作法來給我國全權委託規劃一些建議；至於規範台灣全權委託業務主要法規為「證券投資顧問事業管理規則」修正草案（重點內容請看第三章第二節），至本研究結束時還未經立法院三讀通過，為了要充分了解草案內容及業界意見，本研究在慎選二家投顧業者訪談後，發現相關法條中有許多不太合理的地方，例如為什麼在受託投資金額超過二十億元後，業者只要提存五千萬元的保證金就可以了，這樣是不是有圖利大型業者？以及對委託人而，開放業者投資國內開放型受益憑證似乎多此一舉了！（請看第三章第三節） 至於在應用 Holmstrom (1979) 代理理論方面，本研究認為此規範體系應具備以下特徵：1.在全權委託契約中不得採用固定佣金結構，否則主理人（投資者）將承擔所有全權委託契約的風險，如此代理人的道德危險會益加嚴重；2.應適當允許以績效為基礎的變動佣金結構，惟這種代客操作契約設計中的 F(x;a) 必具備一階強勢優勢的條件；3.要令 F(x;a) 的一階強勢優勢的條件在績效基礎的代客操作契約中能有效存在，則提出六個方法乃是必要條件（非充分條件）。（請看第四章第三節） 最後本文乃以先前所做的研究做為基礎，針對相關法條提出問題及建議方案，惟這部分的建議純粹是以本研究出發，完整的建議內容有賴各方面專家的共同參與才行。本文也希望對於此方面有興趣的研究者能參考本研究對後續研究者之建議部分，例如公會自律制度研究及歐美國家全權委託制度的研究均是十分值得繼續採所的領域。 / This study applies agency theory to assess the appropriateness of the regulatory framework of discretion account proposed by the Taiwan SFC (Securities and Futures Commission) which mainly imitates from Japan. This study considers investor as the principal and delegated investment company as the agent. Since the effort level of agent is unobservable, plus the interest conflict existing between the principal and agent, a rational agent would have moral hazard. If we plan to have an effective regulation of discretion account, it is necessary to design an efficient contract for eliminating or reducing agent's moral hazard. This study hypothesizes that Holmstrom's second-best agency contract could be the one for establishing an efficient regulatory framework of discretion account. Therefore, this study uses the propositions developed by Holmstrom (1979) to establish a proposed efficient regulatory framework for the business of discretion accout, including disclosure system and an incentive mechanism.

O uso de Internet para a distribuição de fluxos de vídeo tem se mostrado uma tendência atual e traz consigo grandes desafios. O alicerce sobre qual a Internet está fundamentada, comutação por pacotes e arquitetura cliente-servidor, não proporciona as melhores condições para este tipo de serviço. A arquitetura P2P (peer-to-peer) vem sendo considerada como infraestrutura para a distribuição de fluxos de vídeo na Internet. A idéia básica da distribuição de vídeo com o suporte de P2P é a de que os vários nós integrantes da rede sobreposta distribuem e encaminham pedaços de vídeo de forma cooperativa, dividindo as tarefas, e colocando à disposição da rede seus recursos locais. Dentro deste contexto, é importante investigar o que ocorre com a qualidade do serviço de distribuição de vídeo quando a infraestrutura provida pelas redes P2P é contaminada por nós que não estejam dispostos a cooperar, já que a base desta arquitetura é a cooperação. Neste trabalho, inicialmente é feito um estudo para verificar o quanto a presença de nós não-cooperativos pode afetar a qualidade da aplicação de distribuição de fluxo de vídeo em uma rede P2P. Com base nos resultados obtidos, é proposto um mecanismo de incentivo à cooperação para que seja garantida uma boa qualidade de vídeo aos nós cooperativos e alguma punição aos nós não-cooperativos. Os testes e avaliações foram realizados utilizando-se o simulador PeerSim. / Using the Internet for video stream is becoming a trend, but it brings many challenges. The foundation upon which the Internet is based, packet switching and client-server architecture, is not suitable for this type of service. P2P (peer to peer) architecture is being considered as an infrastructure for video streams on the Internet. The basic idea is that the several members of the overlay network cooperate in the task of distributing and fowarding video chunks, making available their local resources to the network. Within this context, it is important to investigate what happens to the quality of service of the video distribution when the infrastructure provided by the P2P network is contaminated with free-riding nodes, which are not willing to cooperate, since the basis of this architecture is cooperation. In this work, study is initially carried out to check how the presence of uncooperative nodes can affect the quality of the distribution application of video streaming on a P2P network. Based on these results, a mechanism is proposed to encourage cooperation in order to be guaranteed a video with good quality to the cooperative nodes and some punishment for those uncooperative. The tests and evaluations were performed using the PeerSim simulator.

O uso de Internet para a distribuição de fluxos de vídeo tem se mostrado uma tendência atual e traz consigo grandes desafios. O alicerce sobre qual a Internet está fundamentada, comutação por pacotes e arquitetura cliente-servidor, não proporciona as melhores condições para este tipo de serviço. A arquitetura P2P (peer-to-peer) vem sendo considerada como infraestrutura para a distribuição de fluxos de vídeo na Internet. A idéia básica da distribuição de vídeo com o suporte de P2P é a de que os vários nós integrantes da rede sobreposta distribuem e encaminham pedaços de vídeo de forma cooperativa, dividindo as tarefas, e colocando à disposição da rede seus recursos locais. Dentro deste contexto, é importante investigar o que ocorre com a qualidade do serviço de distribuição de vídeo quando a infraestrutura provida pelas redes P2P é contaminada por nós que não estejam dispostos a cooperar, já que a base desta arquitetura é a cooperação. Neste trabalho, inicialmente é feito um estudo para verificar o quanto a presença de nós não-cooperativos pode afetar a qualidade da aplicação de distribuição de fluxo de vídeo em uma rede P2P. Com base nos resultados obtidos, é proposto um mecanismo de incentivo à cooperação para que seja garantida uma boa qualidade de vídeo aos nós cooperativos e alguma punição aos nós não-cooperativos. Os testes e avaliações foram realizados utilizando-se o simulador PeerSim. / Using the Internet for video stream is becoming a trend, but it brings many challenges. The foundation upon which the Internet is based, packet switching and client-server architecture, is not suitable for this type of service. P2P (peer to peer) architecture is being considered as an infrastructure for video streams on the Internet. The basic idea is that the several members of the overlay network cooperate in the task of distributing and fowarding video chunks, making available their local resources to the network. Within this context, it is important to investigate what happens to the quality of service of the video distribution when the infrastructure provided by the P2P network is contaminated with free-riding nodes, which are not willing to cooperate, since the basis of this architecture is cooperation. In this work, study is initially carried out to check how the presence of uncooperative nodes can affect the quality of the distribution application of video streaming on a P2P network. Based on these results, a mechanism is proposed to encourage cooperation in order to be guaranteed a video with good quality to the cooperative nodes and some punishment for those uncooperative. The tests and evaluations were performed using the PeerSim simulator.

Abstract The aim of this thesis is to propose an array of novel cooperative content delivery (CCD) methods and related incentive mechanisms for future fifth-generation (5G) and beyond networks. CCD using multiple air interfaces is a powerful solution to mitigate the problem of congestion in wireless networks, in which the available multiple air interfaces on smart devices are utilized intelligently to distribute data content among a group of users that are in the vicinity of one another. The requirements for higher capacity, reliability, and energy efficiency in the 5G networks have warranted the development of methods focusing on CCD. Moreover, critical to the efficiency of a CCD process are incentive mechanisms to induce cooperation among the mobile users engaged in CCD. The first part of the thesis studies an ideal condition of reliable and error-free distribution of content using cellular and short-range links. The main contribution is to introduce different device selection CCD methods that take into account only the link quality of the devices’ primary (cellular) interfaces. The proposed methods provide frequency carrier savings for the operator while allowing users to enjoy higher downlink rates. The second part of the thesis studies a more realistic CCD situation where users with low data rate wireless links can be a bottleneck in terms of CCD performance. The main contribution is to propose a novel device selection CCD method that considers the link quality of both primary (cellular) and secondary (short-range) interfaces of the devices. Additionally, a carrier aggregation-based incentive mechanism for the proposed method is introduced to address the challenge of selfish deviating users. The proposed mechanism maximizes individual and network payoffs, and is an equilibrium against unilateral selfish deviations. The third part of the thesis addresses the adverse selection problem in CCD scenarios. The operator is assumed to have incomplete information about the willingness of the users to participate in CCD. The main contribution is to introduce contract-based methods through which the operator could motivate users to reveal their true willingness towards participation. The proposed methods incentivize users according to their willingness and improve system performance in terms of the utility of the operator and the users. / Tiivistelmä Tämän väitöskirjan tavoitteena on kehittää menetelmiä yhteistyössä tapahtuvaan sisällön jakamiseen (cooperative content delivery, CCD) sekä siihen liittyviä kannustinmekanismeja viidennen sukupolven (5G) ja sen jälkeisille matkaviestinverkoille. CCD:n käyttö hyödyntämällä älylaitteessa olevia useita ilmarajapintoja on tehokas ratkaisu välttää langattomien verkkojen ruuhkautumista. CCD-menetelmissä laiteen ilmarajapintoja käytetään älykkäästi datan jakamiseen käyttäjäryhmälle, kun käyttäjät ovat lähellä toisiaan. 5G-verkkojen vaatimukset korkeammalle kapasiteetille, luotettavuudelle ja energiatehokkuudelle ovat motivoineet CCD-menetelmien kehitystyötä. Erityisen tärkeää CCD-menetelmien tehokkuudelle on kannustinmekanismien kehittäminen mahdollistamaan yhteistyö mobiilikäyttäjien välillä. Väitöskirjatyön ensimmäinen osuus käsittelee ideaalista tilannetta luotettavalle ja virheettömälle sisällön jakamiselle hyödyntämällä solukkoverkkoa ja lyhyen kantaman linkkejä. Tässä osuudessa päätuloksena on kehitetty käyttäjien valinnalle menetelmiä, jotka huomioivat linkin laadun solukkoverkon ilmarajapinnassa. Ehdotetut menetelmät tuovat operaattorille säästöjä taajuusresurssien käytön osalta ja käyttäjät saavuttavat korkeampia laskevan siirtotien datanopeuksia. Työn toinen osuus tutkii todenmukaisempaa CCD-tilannetta, jossa alhaisen datanopeuden linkkien käyttäjät voivat olla pullonkaula CCD:n suorituskyvylle. Päätulos tässä on uusi käyttäjien valintamenetelmä, joka ottaa huomioon linkkien laadun sekä solukkoverkossa että lyhyen kantaman linkeissä. Lisäksi esitellään eri taajuuksien yhdistämistä hyödyntävä kannustinmenetelmä, joka ottaa huomioon itsekkäiden käyttäjien aiheuttamat ongelmat. Ehdotettu mekanismi maksimoi yksittäisen käyttäjän ja verkon hyödyt ja saavuttaa tasapainotilan käyttäjien yksipuolista itsekkyyttä vastaan. Väitöskirjan kolmannessa osuudessa tutkitaan haitallisen valikoitumisen mahdollisuutta CCD:ssä. Operaattorilla oletetaan olevan epätäydellistä tietoa käyttäjien halukkuudesta osallistua yhteistyöhön CCD:ssä. Tämän osuuden päätulos on esitellä sopimuksiin perustuvia kannustinmenetelmiä, joiden avulla operaattori voi motivoida käyttäjiä paljastamaan heidän todellinen tahtotilansa osallistua yhteistyöhön. Ehdotetut menetelmä kannustavat käyttäjiä heidän todellisen tahtotilan perusteella ja parantavat järjestelmän suorituskykyä operaattorin ja käyttäjien saavuttamien hyötyjen osalta.