Submitted by Gustavo Moreira de Souza (gustavo.souza@fgvmail.br) on 2014-09-30T10:57:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tese2.pdf: 627931 bytes, checksum: 6803828198abb7c93382d2d995199ba2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2014-10-02T19:02:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese2.pdf: 627931 bytes, checksum: 6803828198abb7c93382d2d995199ba2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2014-10-14T12:19:11Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese2.pdf: 627931 bytes, checksum: 6803828198abb7c93382d2d995199ba2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-14T12:24:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese2.pdf: 627931 bytes, checksum: 6803828198abb7c93382d2d995199ba2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-05-29 / This paper introduces simultaneous choices of the political, taxation and expenditure government systems in a dynamics macroeconomic model of political economy with incomplete markets where the size of government must be decided in each period. The paper also evaluates the effect of each one of these institutions on the political equilibrium. The inclusion of these variables makes the model more realistic and makes possible the study of how government policy is chosen by society. The more general specification of the model calibrated to the EUA reproduced the effective tax rate and capital-labor tax rate observed in data. / Esse paper introduz escolha simultânea do sistema político, sistema tributário e composição do gasto governamental em um modelo macroeconômico dinâmico de economia política com mercados incompletos onde o tamanho das arrecadações governamentais deve ser decidido a cada período. Além disso avalia o efeito de cada uma dessas instituições sobre a política fiscal de equilíbrio político. A inclusão dessas variáveis torna o modelo mais realista e possibilita o estudo de como a política econômica do governo é escolhida pela sociedade. A especificação mais geral do modelo calibrada para os EUA foi capaz de aproximar de maneira satisfatória a taxa efetiva e a relação tributária capital-trabalho observada nos dados.

La tesi studia l'interazione tra potere di mercato, disuguaglianza e benessere in un modello dinamico di equilibrio generale. A tal fine è necessario abbandonare due capisaldi della teoria Neoclassica: l'agente rappresentativo e la competizione perfetta. L'obiettivo del primo capitolo è capire come il potere di mercato influenza la distribuzine di ricchezza e reddito tra le famiglie. I risultati suggeriscono che una semplice estenzione del modello di Aiyagari, in particolare competizione oligopolistica con dinamica delle imprese endogena, riesce a replicare le distribuzioni osservate nei dati USA. Inoltre, un incremento del grado di concentrazione nel mercato dovuto a un aumento dei costi di entrata, implica una più bassa Labor Share e una più alta Profit Share. A loro volta queste dinamiche causano un incremento della disuguaglianza. Anche questi trend sono in linea con ciò che si può osservare dai dati USA. Il secondo capitolo estende il modello sviluppato nel primo per studiare il ruolo della tassazione dei dividendi nel redistribuire risorse. L'analisi considera due regimi alternativi. Una riduzione dell'aliquota sui dividendi, dallo Status Quo statunitense, comporta una perdita di benessere per la società. Una più bassa tassazione riduce i trasferimenti monetari alle famiglie, implicando alti costi per quelle più povere. Inoltre, una riduzione dei trasferimenti causa un incremento dei risparmi. Per poter risparmiare di più gli agenti meno abbienti devono sacrificare consumo. Dato che la ricchezza è molto concentrata, la maggior parte della popolazione soffre una perdita di benessere. / This work studies the interactions between market power, inequality, and welfare in a dynamic, general equilibrium framework. Doing so requires departing from two building blocks of the neoclassical general equilibrium model: the representative agent paradigm and perfect competition. The aim of the first chapter is to understand whether market power affects the distributions of wealth and income among households. Results suggest that a relatively simple extension of the Aiyagari model, namely oligopolistic competition with endogenous firms’ dynamics, is successful at reproducing the wealth and income distributions observed in the U.S. Additionally, an increase in concentration in the markets for final goods, due to an increase in entry costs, leads to a lower labor share and a higher profit share of income. These dynamics, in turn, imply higher income inequality. Importantly, these trends are broadly in line with those observed in the U.S. in the last thirty years. The second chapter extends the framework developed in chapter one to study the role of the dividend income tax as a redistributive tool. The analysis considers alternative redistribution regimes. The main finding is that a reduction of the dividend income tax rate, from the US Status Quo, is associated with a social welfare loss. A lower dividend income tax rate implies lower transfers to households. From a welfare point of view, this is particularly costly for poor households. Furthermore, a reduction in transfers forces households to save more for precautionary reasons. To do so, wealth poor households must sacrifice consumption. Given the high concentration of wealth, this implies that the majority of the population suffers a welfare loss.

[pt] Esta tese é composta por três artigos independentes relacionados a macroeconomia. No primeiro artigo, nós aumentamos um modelo dinâmico de equilíbrio geral relativamente padrão com fricções financeiras, a fim de quantificar os efeitos macroeconômicos da expansão de credito observado no Brasil. No modelo, um estilizado setor bancário intermedia credito das famílias pacientes para as famílias impacientes e empresas. A novidade fundamental deste artigo é que nós modelamos a restrição de crédito enfrentada por (impacientes) famílias em função do rendimento do trabalho futuro. No modelo calibrado, expansão de crédito gera apenas modestos resultados sobre o crescimento acima do potencial do consumo, investimento e PIB. No segundo artigo, documentamos que a associação entre o crescimento do consumo médio per capita e a expansão do crédito é mais forte em países com maior desigualdade de renda. Nós usamos um modelo de mercados incompletos com famílias heterogêneas, risco idiossincrático e restrições ao crédito para verificar em que medida este arcabouço teórico pode racionalizar a evidencia empírica. Mostramos que, quando a fonte de desigualdade de renda vem do menor nível de capital humano fixo das famílias, o nosso modelo pode racionalizar a evidência empírica encontrada. Uma vez que as outras fontes de desigualdade de renda consideradas, o resultado oposto corre. Finalmente, no terceiro artigo, nós usamos um modelo de vetor auto-regressivo com fator aumentado (FAVAR) para estimar o impacto de um choque na taxa de juros internacional e de choque de preços de commodities na economia peruana. Nossos resultados sugerem que um choque positivo de taxa de juros internacional tem efeitos contracionistas, reduzindo o PIB, a taxa de inflação e gerando uma depreciação cambial, aumentando a taxa de juros interna e uma redução das reservas internacionais. No caso de choque de precos de commodities, encontramos que os nossos resultados são consistentes com a literatura, em que um choque positivo expande o PIB, as exportações líquidas e taxa de inflação. / [en] This thesis is comprised of three articles independent related to macroeconomics. In the first article, we augment a relatively standard dynamic, general equilibrium model with financial frictions, in order to quantify the macroeconomic effects of the credit deepening process observed in Brazil. In the model, a stylized banking sector intermediates credit from patient households to impatient households and firms. The key novelty of the paper is to model the credit constraint faced by (impatient) households as a function of future labor income. In the calibrated model, credit deepening generates only modest above-trend growth in consumption, investment, and GDP. In the second article, we documented that the association between consumption growth and credit expansion is stronger in countries with higher income inequality. We use an incomplete markets model with heterogeneous households, idiosyncratic risk and borrowing constraints to check in which extent this theoretical framework can rationalize the empirical finding. We show that when the source of income inequality comes from households lowest fixed level of human capital, our model can rationalize the empirical evidence. Once other sources of income inequality are considered, the opposite occurs. Finally, in the third article, we use a Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) model to estimate the impact of an international interest rate shock and a commodities price shock on the Peruvian economy. Our results suggest that a positive international interest rate shock has contractive effects, it reduces GDP and inflation rate and generates an exchange rate depreciation, an increase of the domestic interest rate and a reduction of international reserves. In the case of commodity price shock, we find that its effects are consistent with the previous literature in which a positive shock expands GDP, net exports and inflation rate.

Cette thèse comporte trois essais en macroéconomie en économie ouverte et commerce international. Je considère tour à tour les questions suivantes: sous quelles conditions est-il optimal pour un pays de former une union économique? (essai 1); l'augmentation de la dispersion transversale des avoirs extérieurs nets des pays est-elle compatible avec une dispersion relativement stable des taux d'investissement? (essai 2); le risque de perte de marché à l'exportation du fait de l'existence des zones de commerce préférentiel joue t-il un rôle dans la décision des pays exclus de négocier des accords commerciaux à leur tour? (essai 3). Le premier essai examine les conditions d'optimalité d'une union économique. Il s'intéresse à une motivation particulière: le partage du risque lié aux fluctuations du revenu. Dans la situation initiale, les pays ont très peu d'opportunités pour partager le risque à cause des frictions: les marchés financiers internationaux sont incomplets et il n'y pas de mécanisme pour faire respecter les contrats de crédit entre pays. Dans ce contexte, une union économique apparait comme un arrangement qui pallie à ces frictions entre les pays membres seulement. Cependant, l'union dans son ensemble continue de faire face à ces frictions lorsqu'elle échange avec le reste du monde. L'arbitrage clé dans le modèle est le suivant. D'un coté, l'intégration économique permet un meilleur partage du risque entre pays membres et la possibilité pour le partenaire pauvre d'utiliser la ligne de crédit du partenaire riche en cas de besoin. De l'autre coté, l'union peut faire face à une limite de crédit plus restrictive parce que résilier la dette extérieure est moins coûteux pour les membres l'union. De plus, le fait que le partenaire pauvre peut utiliser la limite de crédit du partenaire riche génère une externalité négative pour ce dernier qui se retrouve plus fréquemment contraint au niveau des marchés internationaux des capitaux. En conformité avec les faits observés sur l'intégration économique, le modèle prédit que les unions économiques sont relativement peu fréquentes, sont plus susceptibles d'être créées parmi des pays homogènes, et généralement riches. Le deuxième essai porte sur la dispersion des avoirs extérieurs nets et la relation avec la dispersion des taux d'investissement. Au cours des récentes décennies, la dispersion croissante des déséquilibres extérieurs et les niveaux record atteints par certaines grandes économies ont reçu une attention considérable. On pourrait attribuer ce phénomène à une réduction des barrières aux mouvements internationaux des capitaux. Mais dans ce cas, il est légitime de s'attendre à une augmentation de la dispersion au niveau des taux d'investissement; ceci, parce que le financement des besoins en investissements constitue une raison fondamentale pour laquelle les pays échangent les capitaux. Les données indiquent cependant que la dispersion des taux d'investissement est restée relativement stable au cours des récentes décennies. Pour réconcilier ces faits, je construis un modèle d'équilibre général dynamique et stochastique où les pays sont hétérogènes en raison des chocs idiosyncratiques à leurs niveaux de productivité totale des facteurs. Au niveau des marchés internationaux des capitaux, le menu des actifs disponibles est restreint à une obligation sans risque et il n'y a pas de mécanisme pour faire respecter les contrats de crédit entre pays. A tout moment, un pays peut choisir de résilier sa dette extérieure sous peine d'exclusion financière et d'un coût direct. Ce coût direct reflète les canaux autres que l'exclusion financière à travers lesquels les pays en défaut sont pénalisés. Lorsque le modèle est calibré pour reproduire l'évolution de la dispersion transversale des avoirs extérieurs nets, il produit une dispersion relativement stable des taux d'investissement. La raison principale est que les incitations que les pays ont à investir sont liées à la productivité. Avec l'intégration financière, même si les opportunités d'emprunt se sont multipliées, les incitations à investir n'ont pas beaucoup changé. Ce qui permet de générer une dispersion accrue de la position des avoirs extérieurs nets des pays avec une dispersion relativement stable des taux d'investissement. Le troisième essai analyse un aspect de l'interdépendance dans la formation des accords commerciaux préférentiels: j'examine empiriquement si le risque de diversion des exportations en faveur des pays membres des zones de commerce préférentiel est un facteur déterminant dans la décision des pays exclus de ces accords de négocier un accord à leur tour. Je construis un indicateur qui mesure le potentiel de diversion des exportations auquel font face les pays et estime un modèle probit de formation des zones de commerce préférentiel créées entre 1961 et 2005. Les résultats confirment que les pays confrontés à un plus grand potentiel de détournement des échanges sont plus susceptibles de former une zone de commerce préférentiel à leur tour. / This thesis consists of three essays in open economic macroeconomics and international trade. I consider the following questions: Which countries find it individually optimal to form an economic union? (essay 1); is the rising cross-sectional dispersion in net foreign asset positions consistent with a relatively stable dispersion in investment rates? (essay 2); is the risk of trade diversion due to existing preferential trade areas an important factor in excluded countries decision to seek one? (essay 3). The first essay studies the individual optimality of economic integration. It emphasizes the risk-sharing benefits of economic integration. In an initial situation, countries have very limited possibilities to share idiosyncratic endowment risk because of financial frictions: international financial markets are incomplete and contracts not enforceable. A union is an arrangement that solves both the market incompleteness and the lack of enforcement problems among member countries. The union as a whole still faces these frictions when trading in the world economy. The model emphasizes the following key trade-off. There are two benefits from economic integration: better risk-sharing among member countries and the possibility for poor partners to use the rich partners' credit lines. The costs are the following: borrowing limits become tighter because defaulting on international debt becomes less costly for union partners. Since poor partners may benefit from the rich partner's credit limit, this generates a negative externality: rich partners will find themselves more often borrowing-constrained in a union compared to standing alone in the world economy. Consistently with evidence on economic integration, the model predicts that economic unions occur relatively infrequently and are more likely to emerge among homogeneous and rich countries. The rising dispersion of external imbalances over the recent decades and the record-high levels reached by some major economies has received considerable attention during the recent years. The second essay focuses on one of such imbalances: the net foreign asset positions (NFA). One can view this rising dispersion as a consequence of the reduction in barriers to capital flows. But in such case, one would expect the dispersion in investment rates to go up as well because one fundamental reason countries borrow and lend internationally is to finance their investments needs. Instead, the dispersion in investment rates was relatively stable. To explain this puzzling fact, I undertake a quantitative analysis of the global dispersion of net foreign asset positions and investment rates. The framework is an integrated model of world economy where countries differences arise from idiosyncratic shocks to their total factor productivity levels. International capital flows is restricted: the menu of assets traded is exogenously restricted to a risk-free bond, and international lending contracts are not legally enforceable. At any time, a country may choose to repudiate its foreign debt subject to financial exclusion and an output cost. The output cost captures margins other than financial exclusion through which defaulting countries can be punished. When calibrated to match the evolution of the cross-sectional dispersion in net foreign asset positions, the model produces a relatively stable dispersion in investment rates. The reason is because the incentives to invest are related to the productivity, not to the borrowing and lending opportunities. Although the opportunities to borrow and lend internationally have increased, the incentives to invest have not changed much, thereby generating a large cross-sectional dispersion in NFA positions with a relatively stable dispersion in investment rates. The third essay investigates empirically whether the risk of trade diversion faced by countries excluded from preferential trade areas (PTA) is determinant in their decision to seek a preferential trade agreement. Using the trade complementarity index, I derive a measure of the potential of trade diversion and estimate a probit model of the formation of PTAs between 1961 and 2005. The results show that country-pairs facing a larger potential of trade diversion are more likely to form a PTA in the future.

[pt] Esta tese é composta por três artigos relacionados à macroeconomia. O primeiro artigo analisa os efeitos macroeconômicos dos processos de aprofundamento de crédito observados no Peru e no México através de um modelo padrão Novo Keynesiano dinâmico de equilíbrio geral com fricções financeiras. Do ponto de vista do modelo, os efeitos sobre o consumo, o PIB e o investimento são pequenos. Assim, nossos resultados sugerem apenas uma contribuição modesta da expansão do crédito para o crescimento acima do potencial das economias peruana e mexicana durante o período considerado. No segundo artigo, documentamos que a associação entre o crescimento do consumo e expansão do crédito é maior para países com maior desigualdade de renda. Nós usamos um modelo de mercados incompletos com agentes heterogêneos, risco idiossincrático e restrições ao crédito para verificar em que medida este arcabouço teórico é capaz de racionalizar a evidencia empírica. Em nosso modelo, consideramos duas fontes de desigualdade de renda: a variância do risco idiossincrático e o nível fixo de capital humano dos agentes. Mostramos que, quando a fonte de desigualdade de renda vem da menor nível fixo das famílias do capital humano, o nosso modelo pode racionalizar a evidência empírica. Nos outros casos, o resultado oposto ocorre. O terceiro artigo testa os efeitos de um grande programa de intervenções no mercado cambial anunciado pelo Banco Central do Brasil afim de combater o excesso de volatilidade e overshooting da taxa de câmbio. Nós usamos uma abordagem de controle sintético para determinar se o programa de intervenção foi bem sucedido ou não. Nossos resultados sugerem que o primeiro programa de intervenção cambial mitigou a depreciação do real frente ao dólar. Todavia, um segundo anúncio feito no final do ano que o programa ia continuar com uma intensidade menor teve um efeito menor e não significativo. Esse resultado é corroborado por uma metodologia de estudo de evento padrão. Nós também documentamos que o programa e a continuação do mesmo não tiveram impacto sobre a volatilidade da taxa de câmbio. / [en] This dissertation is composed of three articles in macroeconomics. The first article explores the macroeconomics effects of the credit deepening processes observed in Peru and Mexico using a standard New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions. From the perspective of the model, the effects on consumption, GDP and investment are small. Hence, our results suggest only a modest contribution of credit expansion to the abovetrend growth experienced by Peruvian and Mexican economies during our sample period. In the second article, we documented that the association between consumption growth and credit expansion is stronger in countries with higher income inequality. We use an incomplete-markets model with heterogeneous households, idiosyncratic risk and borrowing constraints to corroborate this empirical finding. A loosening of credit constraints mitigates precautionary motives, inducing households to reduce savings along the transition path to the new steady-state. Therefore, consumption grows more rapidly in the shortrun. This consumption boom is amplified in economies with more constrained households. We consider two sources of income inequality in our model: the variance of the idiosyncratic risk and the households fixed level of human capital. They have different implications for the extent to which households are credit constrained in equilibrium. We show that when the source of income inequality comes from households lowest fixed level of human capital, our model can rationalize the empirical evidence. In the other cases, the opposite occurs. The third article tests the effects of a major program of interventions in foreign exchange markets announced by the Central Bank of Brazil to fight excess volatility and exchange rate overshooting. We use a synthetic control approach to determine whether or not the intervention program was successful. Our results suggest that the first foreign exchange intervention program mitigated the depreciation of the real against the dollar. A second announcement made later in the year that the program was going to continue on a smaller basis had a smaller effect, which was not significant. This result is corroborated by a standard event study methodology. We also document that both program did not have an impact on the volatility of the exchange rate.

Cette thèse comporte trois essais en macroéconomie en économie ouverte et commerce international. Je considère tour à tour les questions suivantes: sous quelles conditions est-il optimal pour un pays de former une union économique? (essai 1); l'augmentation de la dispersion transversale des avoirs extérieurs nets des pays est-elle compatible avec une dispersion relativement stable des taux d'investissement? (essai 2); le risque de perte de marché à l'exportation du fait de l'existence des zones de commerce préférentiel joue t-il un rôle dans la décision des pays exclus de négocier des accords commerciaux à leur tour? (essai 3). Le premier essai examine les conditions d'optimalité d'une union économique. Il s'intéresse à une motivation particulière: le partage du risque lié aux fluctuations du revenu. Dans la situation initiale, les pays ont très peu d'opportunités pour partager le risque à cause des frictions: les marchés financiers internationaux sont incomplets et il n'y pas de mécanisme pour faire respecter les contrats de crédit entre pays. Dans ce contexte, une union économique apparait comme un arrangement qui pallie à ces frictions entre les pays membres seulement. Cependant, l'union dans son ensemble continue de faire face à ces frictions lorsqu'elle échange avec le reste du monde. L'arbitrage clé dans le modèle est le suivant. D'un coté, l'intégration économique permet un meilleur partage du risque entre pays membres et la possibilité pour le partenaire pauvre d'utiliser la ligne de crédit du partenaire riche en cas de besoin. De l'autre coté, l'union peut faire face à une limite de crédit plus restrictive parce que résilier la dette extérieure est moins coûteux pour les membres l'union. De plus, le fait que le partenaire pauvre peut utiliser la limite de crédit du partenaire riche génère une externalité négative pour ce dernier qui se retrouve plus fréquemment contraint au niveau des marchés internationaux des capitaux. En conformité avec les faits observés sur l'intégration économique, le modèle prédit que les unions économiques sont relativement peu fréquentes, sont plus susceptibles d'être créées parmi des pays homogènes, et généralement riches. Le deuxième essai porte sur la dispersion des avoirs extérieurs nets et la relation avec la dispersion des taux d'investissement. Au cours des récentes décennies, la dispersion croissante des déséquilibres extérieurs et les niveaux record atteints par certaines grandes économies ont reçu une attention considérable. On pourrait attribuer ce phénomène à une réduction des barrières aux mouvements internationaux des capitaux. Mais dans ce cas, il est légitime de s'attendre à une augmentation de la dispersion au niveau des taux d'investissement; ceci, parce que le financement des besoins en investissements constitue une raison fondamentale pour laquelle les pays échangent les capitaux. Les données indiquent cependant que la dispersion des taux d'investissement est restée relativement stable au cours des récentes décennies. Pour réconcilier ces faits, je construis un modèle d'équilibre général dynamique et stochastique où les pays sont hétérogènes en raison des chocs idiosyncratiques à leurs niveaux de productivité totale des facteurs. Au niveau des marchés internationaux des capitaux, le menu des actifs disponibles est restreint à une obligation sans risque et il n'y a pas de mécanisme pour faire respecter les contrats de crédit entre pays. A tout moment, un pays peut choisir de résilier sa dette extérieure sous peine d'exclusion financière et d'un coût direct. Ce coût direct reflète les canaux autres que l'exclusion financière à travers lesquels les pays en défaut sont pénalisés. Lorsque le modèle est calibré pour reproduire l'évolution de la dispersion transversale des avoirs extérieurs nets, il produit une dispersion relativement stable des taux d'investissement. La raison principale est que les incitations que les pays ont à investir sont liées à la productivité. Avec l'intégration financière, même si les opportunités d'emprunt se sont multipliées, les incitations à investir n'ont pas beaucoup changé. Ce qui permet de générer une dispersion accrue de la position des avoirs extérieurs nets des pays avec une dispersion relativement stable des taux d'investissement. Le troisième essai analyse un aspect de l'interdépendance dans la formation des accords commerciaux préférentiels: j'examine empiriquement si le risque de diversion des exportations en faveur des pays membres des zones de commerce préférentiel est un facteur déterminant dans la décision des pays exclus de ces accords de négocier un accord à leur tour. Je construis un indicateur qui mesure le potentiel de diversion des exportations auquel font face les pays et estime un modèle probit de formation des zones de commerce préférentiel créées entre 1961 et 2005. Les résultats confirment que les pays confrontés à un plus grand potentiel de détournement des échanges sont plus susceptibles de former une zone de commerce préférentiel à leur tour. / This thesis consists of three essays in open economic macroeconomics and international trade. I consider the following questions: Which countries find it individually optimal to form an economic union? (essay 1); is the rising cross-sectional dispersion in net foreign asset positions consistent with a relatively stable dispersion in investment rates? (essay 2); is the risk of trade diversion due to existing preferential trade areas an important factor in excluded countries decision to seek one? (essay 3). The first essay studies the individual optimality of economic integration. It emphasizes the risk-sharing benefits of economic integration. In an initial situation, countries have very limited possibilities to share idiosyncratic endowment risk because of financial frictions: international financial markets are incomplete and contracts not enforceable. A union is an arrangement that solves both the market incompleteness and the lack of enforcement problems among member countries. The union as a whole still faces these frictions when trading in the world economy. The model emphasizes the following key trade-off. There are two benefits from economic integration: better risk-sharing among member countries and the possibility for poor partners to use the rich partners' credit lines. The costs are the following: borrowing limits become tighter because defaulting on international debt becomes less costly for union partners. Since poor partners may benefit from the rich partner's credit limit, this generates a negative externality: rich partners will find themselves more often borrowing-constrained in a union compared to standing alone in the world economy. Consistently with evidence on economic integration, the model predicts that economic unions occur relatively infrequently and are more likely to emerge among homogeneous and rich countries. The rising dispersion of external imbalances over the recent decades and the record-high levels reached by some major economies has received considerable attention during the recent years. The second essay focuses on one of such imbalances: the net foreign asset positions (NFA). One can view this rising dispersion as a consequence of the reduction in barriers to capital flows. But in such case, one would expect the dispersion in investment rates to go up as well because one fundamental reason countries borrow and lend internationally is to finance their investments needs. Instead, the dispersion in investment rates was relatively stable. To explain this puzzling fact, I undertake a quantitative analysis of the global dispersion of net foreign asset positions and investment rates. The framework is an integrated model of world economy where countries differences arise from idiosyncratic shocks to their total factor productivity levels. International capital flows is restricted: the menu of assets traded is exogenously restricted to a risk-free bond, and international lending contracts are not legally enforceable. At any time, a country may choose to repudiate its foreign debt subject to financial exclusion and an output cost. The output cost captures margins other than financial exclusion through which defaulting countries can be punished. When calibrated to match the evolution of the cross-sectional dispersion in net foreign asset positions, the model produces a relatively stable dispersion in investment rates. The reason is because the incentives to invest are related to the productivity, not to the borrowing and lending opportunities. Although the opportunities to borrow and lend internationally have increased, the incentives to invest have not changed much, thereby generating a large cross-sectional dispersion in NFA positions with a relatively stable dispersion in investment rates. The third essay investigates empirically whether the risk of trade diversion faced by countries excluded from preferential trade areas (PTA) is determinant in their decision to seek a preferential trade agreement. Using the trade complementarity index, I derive a measure of the potential of trade diversion and estimate a probit model of the formation of PTAs between 1961 and 2005. The results show that country-pairs facing a larger potential of trade diversion are more likely to form a PTA in the future.