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Latterly, ¡§corporate governance¡¨ has become an important idea all over the world. There are many companies around the world went bankrupt. Those are often because that their directors or CEOs did not manage the company for the profit of their shareholders, but for their self. In order to make their benefits, the directors and CEOs even did many things illegally to harm the interest of the company. In order to stop this trend, the administration all over the world attempts to reform their corporate governance system. Although the corporate governance system of Taiwan has also been improved during the recent years, it is hard to say that our system is in the perfect condition. Hence, the purpose of this thesis is to try to analyze the corporate governance system of Taiwan, and to give some suggestion for the governance system in the future. There are six chapters in this thesis. Next segment is the introduction of these chapters. Chapter 1: Descript the incentive, purpose, range and structure of this thesis. Chapter 2: Discuss the agency theory, introduce the idea of ¡§corporate governance¡¨, and realize the capital structure of the company in Taiwan. Chapter 3, 4, 5: Analyze the self-governance mechanisms in Taiwan. The self-governance mechanisms include shareholder, board and supervisory board. At the end of each chapter, the thesis will give some suggestion about our corporate governance in the future. Chapter 6: Summarize all the viewpoints and suggestion in this thesis.

La littérature financière n’offre pas de vision explicite sur le rôle de l’administrateur indépendant et sa contribution à la création de valeur. C’est pourquoi nous avons cherché à mieux comprendre l’importance de ce membre externe en nous appuyant sur une nouvelle approche synthètique de la gouvernance. Dans l’objectif d’obtenir des réponses plus concluantes, nous avons élaboré un modèle explicatif qui mobilise deux courants : le courant juridico-financier et le courant cognitif. L’étude empirique a été menée sur les administrateurs indépendants des sociétés cotées françaises. La partie descriptive examine les caractéristiques des administrateurs indépendants entre 2008 et 2011. Les tests du modèle montrent que les contributions supposées importantes des administrateurs indépendants en termes cognitifs ne sont pas majoritairement favorables pour la création de valeur. Leur contribution disciplinaire s’avère plus importante, ce que démontre théoriquement le courant juridico-financier. Une typologie des administrateurs indépendants est dressée au cours de cette étude. Les tests confirment l’existence d’une vision classique d’un conseil d’administration français au niveau de la sélection et de la nomination des administrateurs indépendants, qui se rapprochent des caractéristiques des dirigeants français. / Financial literature is far away from offering convincing answers about the contribution of independent director in the value creation. This is why we sought to get a better understanding of this role using the approach of synthetic governance. In order to shed more light on the question, we develop explanatory model. The model uses two approaches: the disciplinary view and the knowledge-based view. An empirical study of the independent director of French listed companies was carried out. We first present the characteristics of profile the independents directors between 2008 and 2011. Empirical tests indicate that the cognitive contribution did not result a value creation. Moreover statistical modeling confirms the existence of disciplinary contributions of the independent director and shows mostly positive effects on value creation. The same argument also confirm by the disciplinary perspectives of governance. A typology profile of independent director shows the existence of classical vision of the board directors in French listed. The selection and the appointement of independent director reconciled of the profile’s executive.

台灣證券交易所於2002年2月22日發佈規定，於發佈日後之申請上市公司，需聘任2席獨立董事與1席獨立監察人，櫃臺買賣中心亦於2002年2月25日發佈相同規定。對台灣上市櫃公司而言，獨立董監事制度之正面效益尚未明確，且可能使公司內部資訊流入外人手中，稀釋最終控制者之決策影響力。本研究從財務特性及最終控制者特性兩觀點，探討影響台灣上市櫃公司自願性設置獨立董監事之因素。另外，本研究認為獨立董監事應可發揮功能，增進公司營運效，故接著探討設置獨立董監事後，對公司後續營運績效是否有正面效益。 在影響台灣上市櫃公司自願性設置獨立董監事因素之分析，多變量迴歸實證結果發現，資訊電子業者、營運規模較小、獨立董監事設置年度前三年之平均股東權益報酬率較高及盈餘分配權與董監席次控制權偏離程度較小之公司，傾向於自願性設置獨立董監事之比例較高。 本研究以營業收益、淨利及持續性淨利衡量樣本公司之股東權益報酬率及資產報酬率，形成六種營運績效變數，探討獨立董監事對公司績效是否有正面效益。單變量實證結果發現獨立董監事對前期績效表現不佳之公司，並無明顯幫助。多變量迴歸分析結果則顯示，獨立董監事之設置與否或比例高低對公司績效，不一定具有關連性，因績效衡量變數方式不同，而有不同結果。本研究認為其可能原因有三，第一為融資決策之影響，第二為後期績效涵蓋期間太短，第三為獨立董監事並未具有足夠之獨立性或專業性。 本研究另測試獨立董監事對員工分紅與董監酬勞佔淨利程度之影響。多變量分析結果顯示，獨立董監事設置與否與所佔比例，與員工分紅與董監酬勞佔淨利之前後期變動程度無關。此結果之可能原因為，本研究所蒐集設置獨立董監事後之期間僅涵蓋2002年及2003年，即使公司有設置獨立董監事，短期間內亦難以改變公司存在已久之董監酬勞與員工分紅制度。

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我國從2002年引進獨立董事制度，並於2007年引進審計委員會制度;且要求公開發行股票之證券投資信託事業、綜合證券商、上市（櫃）期貨商及實收資本額達新臺幣100億元以上未滿500億元之非屬金融業之上市（櫃）公司應於104至106年間完成審計委員會之設置。實收資本額達新臺幣20億元以上未滿100億元之非屬金融業上市（櫃）公司應於106至108年間完成審計委員會之設置。本研究將針對已施行近10年的審計委員會制度做一檢視。 本研究採用朱德芳（2013，2014）關於審計委員會制度之研究理念與作法。邀請五位獨立董事做訪談並將訪談內容作整理分析，初步了解臺灣審計委員會實施概況。本研究發現：宜強化審計委員會的功能，以及調整雙軌制漸漸趨向單軌制。 / The Independent Director System was imported into Taiwan in 2002 and subsequently the audit committee system started in 2007. Public companies, brokerages, listed futures firms and securities firms were then required to establish an audit committee. This new regulation also applied to non-securities firms who has capital between NTD $10Bn and NTD $50Bn. It was stipulated that the changes must be implemented between 2015 and 2017. Furthermore, listed firms whose capital exceeds NTD $2Bn but less than NTD $10Bn must establish audit committees in the period 2017-2019. This thesis intends to review and analyze the implementation of these audit committees. This study adopts concepts put forward by distinguished professor Te-Fang Chu (2013-2014) as well as uses the process she developed to verify the effectiveness of the legislation in the business world. We invited five independent directors to interview and helped us gain a surface-level understanding of the audit committee process.This analysis resulted in two specific recommendations. First, some functions within the audit committee must be strengthened. Second, the two-tier corporate governance system should be flattened to a single tier.

O objetivo principal desta pesquisa é identificar o efeito predominante da participação de conselheiros independentes nos fundos de pensão públicos do Brasil, entre solução para o problema de agência ou reforço da legitimidade organizacional. O estudo tomou como ponto de partida a dissonância entre a proposta do Senado Federal brasileiro e a posição da entidade que representa o segmento no País sobre a introdução de conselheiros independentes no conselho deliberativo dessas fundações. A pesquisa é de natureza descritiva e tem como aporte as teorias da agência e institucional. Uma amostra de 76 fundos de pensão públicos do Brasil foi estudada com o uso da análise de conteúdo de documentos e de dados compilados em tabelas de frequência e gráficos de dispersão. Os resultados sugerem que a introdução do conselheiro independente na estrutura de governança teria efeito predominante no reforço da legitimidade organizacional, abrangendo 40 fundações ou 52,5% dos casos. Para 36 fundos com alto potencial de problemas de agência, dos quais 31 estão conjugados com baixa legitimidade organizacional, a presença de um conselheiro independente especialista teria efeito predominante no reforço do monitoramento da gestão e no aconselhamento estratégico. O exame da composição dos ativos de investimentos e da presença de mecanismos mitigadores de problemas de agência na estrutura de governança evidenciaram, sob vários enfoques, limitações de escala no conjunto de fundos de pensão públicos do Brasil. Para 83% da amostra observou-se baixo isomorfismo normativo e mimético para práticas de governança corporativa voluntárias relacionadas a princípios de prestação de contas e de transparência. Como relevância para a área do conhecimento, esta pesquisa possibilitou a criação de índices para classificação do potencial de problemas de agência e de legitimidade organizacional no âmbito dos fundos de pensão públicos brasileiros / The main objective of this research is to identify the predominant effect of the participation of independent directors in public pension funds in Brazil, between solution to the agency problem or strengthening of organizational legitimacy. The study took as a starting point the dissonance between the proposal of the Brazilian Federal Senate and the position of the entity that represents these organizations in the country on the introduction of independent directors in the deliberative council of these foundations. The research is descriptive in nature and has the support of agency and institutional theories. A sample of 76 public pension funds in Brazil was studied using content analysis of documents and data compiled in frequency tables and scatter plots. The results suggest that the introduction of the independent director into the governance structure would have a predominant effect on strengthening organizational legitimacy, covering 40 foundations or 52.5% of cases. For 36 funds with high potential for agency problems, of which 31 are coupled with low organizational legitimacy, the presence of an independent director and specialist would have a predominant effect on reinforcing management monitoring and strategic advice. The analysis of the composition of investment assets and the presence of mechanisms that mitigate agency problems in the governance structure evidenced, under various approaches, scale limitations in Brazil\'s public pension system. Eighty three percent of the sample revealed low normative and mimetic isomorphism for voluntary corporate governance practices related to principles of accountability and transparency. As theoritical and academic implications, this research allowed the creation of indexes to classify the potential of agency problems and organizational legitimacy within Brazilian public pension funds

This thesis explores whether independent directors in the USA and Canada are effective in holding management accountable by: (1) analyzing how the policy of relying on independent directors developed and operates; (2) introducing the main theoretical critiques of independent directors’ monitoring effect; and (3) examining whether empirical studies in the field of management science and financial economics support the policy in both countries of relying on independent directors as corporate monitors. Empirical evidence shows that boards with a majority of independent directors, in some circumstances, were associated with better firm performance (in the post-SOX period) and fulfilled certain board tasks effectively in the United States. Canadian studies, however, have not shown a positive association with improved firm performance. Audit committees composed entirely of independent directors have been effective in ensuring the quality of financial reporting in the United States, but this effect has not been found in Canada. Compensation committees composed fully of independent directors neither constrained the level of executive compensation nor tied CEO pay to firm performance in either country. US firms with an audit committee member who had accounting expertise, rather than financial analysis or supervisory expertise, were associated with a higher quality of financial reporting, while Canadian firms with an audit committee member who has financial expertise, instead of financial literacy, were associated with a similar effect. Studies also showed that independent directors perform better in certain circumstances. Based on empirical evidence, US regulators should consider: (1) changing the current mandatory requirements for an independent board and a completely independent compensation committee to a comply-or-explain requirement; (2) narrowing the qualification of a financial expert to an individual who has accounting expertise; and (3) recruiting independent directors who have two or fewer outside directorships, hold more of the corporation’s shares, have lower cost of acquiring corporate information, and have no social connections with the CEO. In Canada, weak evidence of the monitoring effectiveness of independent directors supports the existing comply-or-explain approach. Canadian regulators may only need to require or recommend that at least one audit committee member has financial expertise, instead of only financial literacy.

This thesis explores whether independent directors in the USA and Canada are effective in holding management accountable by: (1) analyzing how the policy of relying on independent directors developed and operates; (2) introducing the main theoretical critiques of independent directors’ monitoring effect; and (3) examining whether empirical studies in the field of management science and financial economics support the policy in both countries of relying on independent directors as corporate monitors. Empirical evidence shows that boards with a majority of independent directors, in some circumstances, were associated with better firm performance (in the post-SOX period) and fulfilled certain board tasks effectively in the United States. Canadian studies, however, have not shown a positive association with improved firm performance. Audit committees composed entirely of independent directors have been effective in ensuring the quality of financial reporting in the United States, but this effect has not been found in Canada. Compensation committees composed fully of independent directors neither constrained the level of executive compensation nor tied CEO pay to firm performance in either country. US firms with an audit committee member who had accounting expertise, rather than financial analysis or supervisory expertise, were associated with a higher quality of financial reporting, while Canadian firms with an audit committee member who has financial expertise, instead of financial literacy, were associated with a similar effect. Studies also showed that independent directors perform better in certain circumstances. Based on empirical evidence, US regulators should consider: (1) changing the current mandatory requirements for an independent board and a completely independent compensation committee to a comply-or-explain requirement; (2) narrowing the qualification of a financial expert to an individual who has accounting expertise; and (3) recruiting independent directors who have two or fewer outside directorships, hold more of the corporation’s shares, have lower cost of acquiring corporate information, and have no social connections with the CEO. In Canada, weak evidence of the monitoring effectiveness of independent directors supports the existing comply-or-explain approach. Canadian regulators may only need to require or recommend that at least one audit committee member has financial expertise, instead of only financial literacy.

「獨立董事與獨立監察人制度」對我國而言，為一種因法規強制要求而產生的新現象。2002年2月時，在台灣證券交易所股份有限公司及財團法人中華民國證券櫃臺買賣中心等單位的努力下，正式引進「獨立董事與獨立監察人制度」，規定自2002年2月22日起新申請上市上櫃的公司，需設置獨立董事至少二人，及獨立監察人至少一人，期望以此制度革除積習已久的公司治理弊端。 本研究自選任獨立董事及監察人之事前與事後，從選任席次、素質差異、專業背景差異檢視聘僱事前公司是否有特殊考量，並進一步從盈餘管理的角度，檢視選任事後獨立董事與監察人之預期功能是否對企業整體發揮實際之效用。 實證結果支持本研究認為因監察人得以單獨行使職權，故獨立監察人實際選任席次超過最低法定門檻之比例確實較獨立董事實際選任席次超過最低法定門檻的比例高，且企業所選任的獨立董監素質，因企業之規模大小不同而有顯著差異，另外，亦發現企業確實會考量職能別的差異，進而聘僱不同專業背景之專家。最後，關於獨立董事與獨立監察人在監督管理當局從事盈餘管理行為時之作用部分，未獲得實證結果支持，推測原因，可能係因我國企業於設置獨立董事與監察人後，僅將其視為專業地位崇高的「名譽」董事與監察人，但並未賦予其監督的實際權力，因而造成獨立董事與監察人未能涉入企業核心，致使其無法發揮監督管理當局之預期功能所導致。 / The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors is a new phenomenon arisen from forced enactment made by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and Gretai Securities Market on February 22, 2002. It claims all new listed corporations to employ at least 2 independent directors and 1 independent supervisor in order to enhance corporate governance in Taiwan. This thesis examines if enterprises have special considerations when employ independent directors and independent supervisors from the viewpoints of actual numbers, grade level and governance expertise. Furthermore, this thesis also examines the actual contributions of them to reduce the earnings management behaviors. Consistent with our hypothesis that due to the different way to oversee the management, this thesis finds that besides achieving the minimum standard threshold, it is more likely for an enterprise to employ much more independent supervisors than independent directors. Moreover, empirical results support that the bigger size of the company, the better independent directors and independent supervisors it will employ. Additionally, this study also finds that corporation will employ different kinds of experts owing to the different functions between independent directors and independent supervisors. Finally, as for reducing earnings management behaviors, this study can’t offer proper evidences. It may result from that enterprise views independent directors and independent supervisors as “reputable” experts, so they can’t have actual power to oversee managements. In other words, independent directors and independent supervisors can’t exercise the role well because of lacking actual power.