Dissertation presented in the fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of master of arts In the faculty of Arts, Department of History at the University of Zululand. / Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi the leader of KwAZulu government and Inkatha, was amongst other South African homeland leaders. In early 1970s he became the leader of Kwa-Zulu Self-Governing homeland. In 1975 he formed the pseudo-political party that became known as Inkatha Cultural Movement that worked congenially with KwaZulu Government for almost three decades. After the formation of Inkatha, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was soon possessed by a strong desire of insatiable power hunger that forced him to part ways with his old comrades of the African National Congress in 1979 after the aborted London Meeting between him and the Oliver Reginald Tambo the leader of the exiled African National Congress. This became a true political turning point that led to a political watershed that was marked by the untold hostility between Inkath/KwaZulu Government and the African National Congress. Buthelezi being well aware of this hostility, then tried all possible means to convince all those that were close to him including the apartheid government that the African National Congress was baying for his blood. This then led to establishment of the covert relationship between him and some of the senior members of both Defence and the Police Force.. He then embarked on making a watertight defence around him that would protect him against any possible attack from the African National Congress. In 1981 he established the KwaZulu Police (KZP) as part of his defence. The KwaZulu Police was said to be a police force that would do the maintenance of law and order but its main aim was to be a para-military force that would defend Inkatha members against its political opponents. As the eighties unfolded he consolidated his relationship with the apartheid government by accepting an offer of having some of 200 members of Inkatha to be taken for training in Namibia in a place known as Caprivi Strip. These people were trained under the guise of becoming the protectors of KwaZulu VIPs but in mere fact they had been trained to kill all anti-Inkatha. They were the referred to as the Caprivi Trainees since they were trained in Caprivi Strip in Namibia. These people had been trained in different ways of killing those who were anti-Inkatha in huge numbers. The likes of Romeo Mbambo, Israel Hlongwane, Gcina Mkhize and many more became Chief Buthelezi’s private army that killed hundreds of the African Nation Congress ad COSATU members. These people made a harrowing admission in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In the TRC it was where all the violation of civil liberties were heard coming from these people and others. The Caprivi Trainees, KwaZulu Police, Vigilantes and the Warlords were the ones who turned KwaZulu into a political slaughter house in terms of violation of civil liberties of all non-Inkatha people while Inkatha and KwaZulu Government were cheering them up.

This thesis provides an analysis of changes apparent in the ideology and style of the Inkatha Freedom Party'si politics since April 1994. The IFP's first three years in power under the new dispensation, as a member of the Government of National Unity and the majority party in KwaZulu-Natal, have witnessed a significant shift away from the militant Zulu nationalism and confrontational tactics that characterised the party from the mid-1980s. Zulu nationalism has been abandoned in favour of a broader appeal, while the brinkmanship employed during negotiations in the early 1990s, the walkouts and threats of violent resistance, have been largely absent in the post-election period. Confrontation since 1994, and especially since 1996, has gradually given way to more accommodatory and cooperative relations with the political opposition, on both the national and provincial levels of government. To understand why this shift has occurred, it is necessary to examine the nature of Zulu nationalism as espoused by Inkatha. It is my assertion that Inkatha employed Zulu nationalism in an attempt to preserve its institutionalised power base in the KwaZulu-Natal region and exercise a voice on the national level. Nationalist rhetoric became increasingly prevalent as violence escalated in the late 1980s, and peaked in the uncertainty of the political transition as the IFP faced marginalisation on South Africa's emerging politicalstage. Zulu nationalism acted as the rallying call for party faithful to resist the challenge of the United Democratic Front!African National Congress in the 1980s, and provided justification for Inkatha's confrontational approach and demands for Zulu self-determination in the early 1990s. Indeed, Inkatha's brand of Zulu nationalism has always been about 1 advancing the party interest, rather than defending the integrity of the divided and warring ,J Zulu people. It is in this light that the post-1994 shift in ideological emphasis must be understood. The April 1994 general election ushered in a new era in South African politics, in which the IFP found its role radically altered. From playing the part of spoiler on the outskirts of formal political structures it now had to adjust to its status as the majority party in the provincial legislature, with Buthelezi in a prominent role in the national cabinet. Under these conditions, the party's interests were advanced by the establishment of a smootWy run provincial administration, under which its regional power could be consolidated. Thus, the new political order created a space for the IFP within the democratic system in which its credibility rested on its ability to govern the province effectively. Further, under these conditions, confrontation was not only less attractive as a means of achieving party objectives, it was also less effective and feasible. This the IFP learnt the hard way, in terms of its disastrous constitution-making experience. Its boycott of negotiations at the national level merely served to deprive the IFP of a role in drawing up the country's final constitution, while a belligerent approach at the provincial level prevented the realisation of a compromise agreement. The IFP was forced to accept that its majority in the provincial legislature was insufficient to allow it to rule unilaterally in the province. The loss of therKing's political allegiance, coupled with election results which revealed strong support for the ANC among urban Zulus while the IFP's support was largely confined to traditionalist rural communities, undermined the party's claims to represent the Zulu nation. Furthermore, the gradual return of law and order in the province diminished the IFP's capacity to resort to militarism, thus taking some of the bite out of a confrontational strategy. In brief, the IFP was both pulled and pushed into the new order, and hence to some extent, a new ideology and political style. By 1996 the Zulu nationalism and belligerence that had characterised the party since the mid-1980s had been replaced with a liberal-conservative platform that sought resonance with the urban electorate, coupled with efforts to improve cooperative relations with the political opposition in the interests of provincial stability. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1998.

M.A. (Development Studies) / Resolving conflict in South Africa is one of the greatest challenges facing the country, in addition to being a basic prerequisite to creating a political and economic climate conducive to development. The continued violence between the ANC and the IFP, has been one of the main components of conflict in this country. It can be argued that the resolution of this particular conflict would be synonymous to having brought relative peace to South Africa I while simultaneously serving as a model for dealing with future conflict. It is the objective of this study to investigate the origins, characteristics and magnitude of the ANC/IFP conflict, thereby serving to create a basis for understanding and managing the conflict. Once clarity is achieved in this regard, the study will focus on the impact which conflict can have on development, with special reference to the KwaZulu/Natal region...

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Arts in fulfillment of the requirements for degree Master of Arts in the Department of History at the University of Zululand, 1991. / It is imperative to take cognizance of the fact that no study of this nature has ever been undertaken in the field of history in South Africa. This justifies the necessity of undertaking a comparative study of the aims, structure and strategies of the NP and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the crucial decade 1975-1985. It was during that decade that these two political groupings moved closer to the political centre of gravity of South Africa. By this time the NP, in spite of preserving hegemonic principles on behalf of the White electorate and amid increased international isolation, had proved itself the invincible doyen in the body politic of South Africa. Inkatha cadres argued that their movement was born from the turbulent first half of the 1970's, spawned by Black resistance to apartheid and had authentic roots in the core of the liberation struggle. The principles and aims of the NP and Inkatha were devoid of discernible dissimilarities. One may assert, however, that it was enigmatic that such principles and aims could not compel the two groupings to solve the socio-economic and political problems facing South Africa in that decade. Such a dismal failure to seek solutions that would benefit all the people of South Africa reflected negatively on both the NP and Inkatha. In 1985 this emerged as a harbinger for the state of morass in South Africa's political scenario. The organisational structures of the NP and Inkatha remained by far the best organized in South Africa, capable of overwhelming any challenge mounted by other groups. In 1975 the NP as a party was organisationally functioning by means of the Congress, Head Council, Ward Councils, District Councils, Constituency Councils, Branches and Provincial leaders, while Inkatha had a bureaucratic structure from Branches, Regions, individual members to different conferences and decision-making bodies. The National Council (NC) was the policy-making body and represented all national leadership formations of Inkatha. It was not possible to stipulate how many members of Inkatha at any one time belonged to the NC. This was due to the fact that organizations were constantly affiliating to - the movement. The Congress was the supreme authority of the NP in each province. It discussed the draft resolutions submitted by the District Councils, the proposals submitted by the Head Council and the Federal Council, and motions submitted by members of the Congress. The organisational policies of the NP and Inkatha had vestiges of commonality. Both groupings accepted and respected the poly-ethnic nature of South Africa's population. They both endorsed the notion of a multi-party democracy, although the NP comprehended this in the context of separate development. Inkatha noted this as taking into account the fact that no single organisation, from whatever quarter, would be the sole determinant of the future of South Africa. Disinvestment, sanctions and violence were abhorred by both groupings as a strategy to dismantle apartheid. They favoured negotiation politics and non-violence both as objectives and strategies. Both groupings conveyed assurance to achievements of a political apparatus that could satisfy the political aspirations of all the country's communities through negotiations. The key to both the NP and Inkatha's organisational successes was their commitment to the traditions of constituency politics. They both believed that the ideal of constituency politics was best served by having a multiplicity of cross-cutting constituencies, each of which had its own specific objectives, but all of which had a basic common goal. It could be mentioned, however, that the different situations and platforms from which they operated, polarised them against each other. The NP and Inkatha's relations with both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groupings created a hiatus in terms of their aims and strategies. This crippled the evolvement of consensus politics in South Africa. In the decade 1975-1985 the Parliamentary political groupings were the United Party (UP), the Progressive Reform Party (PRP), the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) , the New Republic Party (NRP) , the South African Party (SAP), the Conservative Party (CP), and the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) . In principle, they agreed with the NP and Inkatha in standing for the just and equal treatment of all parts of South Africa and for the impartial maintenance of the rights and privileges of every section of the population, with due regard to the multi-ethnic reality and that of the existence of minorities in South Africa. The NP and Inkatha had unfavourable relations with the extra-parliamentary political formations. These were the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the Black People's Convention (BPC), the South African Students' Organisation (SASO), the Afrikaner weerstandsbeweging (AWB) or Afrikaner Resistance Movement, the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), the National Forum (NF), and the United Democratic Front (UDF). Their relations with both the NP and Inkatha in terms of their aims and strategies were marked by what one may convoke "timorous digressions." Most of them referred to the NP Government as illegitimate while viewing Inkatha as perpetrating political tribalism which to them was the greatest enemy of African freedom. By 1985 this intricate structure of political groupings and different aims and strategies, characterized a divided South Africa. / University of Zululand and Standard Bank

ABSTRACT This thesis investigates political violence between the United Democratic Front and Inkatha in Mpumalanga township, Natal. In the early 1980s and early 1990s Mpumalanga was one of Natal’s townships most gravely affected by political violence. I ask and answer four questions: 1. Why and how did the conflict between political organisations in Natal become violent? 2. What forms did the violence take? 3. Why, as a result of the violence did ordinary people with little prior history of political activity come to identify with either the UDF or Inkatha? 4. How were these political identities produced? In order to answer these questions the thesis explores three primary arguments. The first argument is that 1987 represents a severe rupture in the politics of Natal. This rupture is captured in the violent form of political conflict that gripped the province. To understand this rupture the thesis looks back at a complex set of processes that interlocked over space and time. A second major argument of the thesis is that an aspect of the distinctiveness of the violence was its profoundly spatialised form in combination with gendered and generational forms. There were two major shifts in the spatialised form of the violence. The first shift occurred when instead of only attacking individuals, the household and its members also became targets. And then the second shift was when the purpose of the violence was about the pursuit of territory. Boundaries between territories identified who was ‘in’ and who was ‘out’ and all aspects of everyday life became politicised. The third major argument of the thesis is that there was a strong relationship between space/place and political identity. The re-territorialisation of space - iv - during the violence was central to the production of these new identities. Political violence created new spatialities, with space itself acquiring political meaning and identity. The political meanings of these spaces were intense markers of their identity and overrode all other meanings and identities. As the spatial form of the violence shifted it forced people to question their political identities. The lived experience of the politicisation of everyday life by the violence shaped the production of political identities.

The political violence and vigilante activities that characterised Natal and Zululand between 1985 and 1996 had numerous causes. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 contributed to the rise of vigilantism and political violence. The formation of the Congress of the South African Trade Union (COSATU) in 1985 compounded this situation. Both these movements were known to be sympathetic to the African National Congress (ANC), which was still banned at the time of their formation; hence they had similar objectives to the ANC. During this time, Inkatha was the only strong Black political movement in the country, and particularly in Natal and Zululand. The Inkatha movement and its leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi regarded the formation of the UDF and COSATU in 1985 as a challenge to the hegemony of Inkatha in the region, following his fall-out with the ANC leadership in exile. Local leadership of political movements, namely, UDF and COSATU on one hand and Inkatha on the other, mobilised their support-base and took arms against each other. The lifting of the State of Emergency in 1986 intensified political violence and vigilante activities in the region. The Natal Midlands’ violence saw a high number of deaths and causalities. Local communities as well such as Vulindlela suffered a great deal. Clan faction fights were characteristic of KwaShange in the period 1940s-1970s, but from the late 1980s onwards (especially 1987) political unrest and struggle against the Nationalist apartheid regime changed into conflict between Inkatha and the UDF, which gradually worsened into civil war. In the course of my previous studies in KwaShange I discovered that the violence had impacted upon families and inter-generational relationships. According to some senior residents’ thinking, a number of youths were ill disciplined. Issues of disciplining of youths had obscured the political struggle and violence, making it hard to disentangle them. When researching memories of the violence, I found that persons spoke of different incidents within this struggle period and described their violent nature and how it had impacted on families’ survival, both psychologically and physically. The interviewees kept saying that it was hard to forget the memories engendered by their horrific experiences. The South African Government was accused of secretly provoking acts of violence in Natal and Zululand and was furthermore accused of having sent IFP troops to the Caprivi in Namibia for training in guerrilla combat. The Government later acknowledged this, explaining that the Natal Legislature needed specially trained forces for its officials. The unbanning of political parties and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 saw KwaZulu- Natal entering a new phase of random vigilante activities and violence. The security forces (the South African Police and the South African Defence Force) were accused of supporting IFP vigilantes. All this led to the “Seven Days War” in 1990 in the Midlands, particularly in KwaVulindlela. In KwaShange this violence, from 1986 until 1996, created divisions in families and the community. Many people lost their lives. All efforts to put an end to the violence and vigilantism failed. The announcement that the first democratic election in South Africa was to be held in 1994 triggered more violence in Vulindlela. Exhaustion in the area, and a national climate which promoted peace were elements which eventually brought the conflict to an end. Socially and economically, the area is still experiencing problems. Survivors and generations born during and after the turmoil talk about endless psychological and emotional suffering born during this turmoil. My contention is that trauma experienced as a result of this violence and its consequences influenced the lives of all persons affected by it, and that this was transmitted across generations, through whole families and communities. It must be realized that these people and their families were affected for a long time, and many are still traumatised. The social structure of the community has been affected by it and by implication that of successive generations will also be affected. This study describes and analyses political violence in KwaShange and investigates how it is remembered by the survivors. It also attempts to answer the question of how communities, families and individuals survived these traumatic experiences, how they coped (or failed to cope) with their experiences, both then and fifteen years after the end of violence. By focusing on KwaShange as a case study of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, I hope to determine what was in play in the province, and find a common pattern underlying the dynamics of the conflicts. Pre-civil war divisions have not, up to the present, been confronted, and these fuelled the political affiliations that were a response to the struggle against the apartheid regime. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

M.A. (Historical Studies) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

No abstract available. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1985.

The field of political violence is introduced with an overview of anti-State political violence in South Africa between 1 January 1977 and 21 July 1985. Incidents of political violence in that period were classified into one of three categories, each of which reflects different sources of political violence. Subsequently, the research analysed what is referred to 'spontaneous' collective violence in two of Durban's townships Lamont and KwaMashu. The theoretical framework for the analysis of this type of behaviour is provided by T.R. Gurr using the formula: MPV = RD + (RD x JUST x BALANCE) where MPV is the magnitude of political violence; RD is discontent; JUST is the justifications for engaging in violence; and BALANCE is the ratio of support for, and coercive capacity of, dissidents vis-a-vis the State. The weight of each variable (RD, JUST and BALANCE) was assessed in Lamont and KwaMashu through interviews with 25 group leaders from both townships and by various inferential techniques. While discontent was found to be universal in both townships, the justifications for engaging in violence as a strategy to alleviate that discontent and alter existing power relations were found to be a function of ideology. For the purposes of this research two ideological classifications were employed: 'reactionaries' (those organisations operating within government created institutions, including bantustans, e.g. Inkatha); and 'progressives' (those organisations operating outside government created institutions and which are popularly labelled the Left e.g. the United Democratic Front). In Durban there is a specific spatial distribution of ideology which has resulted in support for, and the coercive capacity of, reactionaries' being greatest in bantustan townships ' (e.g. KwaMashu), while among 'progressives' support and coercive capacity are highest in townships in 'white' South Africa (e.g. Lamont). The distribution of ideology has its origins in historical forces which are discussed in detail. The question to be answered thus remains at what point does political violence reach a crescendo? This question was answered by identifying the issues precipitating political violence in Lamont and KwaMashu and then analysing specific incidents. Frequently, the most intense collective violence erupted when resistance to State hegemony was interpreted by the State, or its proxies, as challenging the existing status quo. In Lamont the State has directly intervened to crush resistance through the use of its security forces while in KwaMashu Inkatha vigilantes have acted as proxies for the State. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sci.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1987.

his dissertation examines representations of the Zulu in a variety of discourses. It also examines the role of black nationalisms in the construction of Zuluist discourse. The production of images of the Zulu began with the first Anglo-Zulu encounter in the nineteenth century. In 1879, the Anglo-Zulu War set a trend for image-making which was developed further in the twentieth century. The appearance of The Washing of the Spears and Zulu, initiated a chapter in the study of the Zulu which gave rise to publications that created startling mages of the Zulu. Despite the publication of the James Stuart Archive, as well as serious studies of the Zulu, authors continued to use the same popular interpretations of the Zulu. During the early twentieth century, the 'native question' dominated South African politics, while in the 1990s, political protest, conceptualised as aggressive marches by 'warriors' and tourism have been the major representations. / History / M.A. (History)