Aquesta tesi consisteix a demostrar que l’ètica epicúria no es distancia de l’ètica platònica, com s’ha dit tant sovint, sinó que és en el fons la mateixa. O dit d’una altra manera, que l’hedonisme epicuri és una interpretació psicològica de l’ètica platònica. Les diferències entre tots dos filòsofs rauen més aviat en l’estatus ontològic de l’ètica, però no en l’ètica en ella mateixa. I s’ha de dir que aquesta idea està suggerida en molts comentaristes, fins i tot en els que insisteixen en les diferències amb Plató. Podem dir que aquesta tesi consisteix a portar fins a les últimes conseqüències les idees d’aquests tractadistes. Un resum d’aquesta tesi ja la podríem trobar a la intervenció de Torquat en el De Finibus bonorum et malorum de Ciceró. La tesi es desenvolupa al voltant de dos conceptes, l’intel•lectualisme moral i el plaer. L’intel•lectualisme moral, desenvolupat preferentment per Plató, consisteix a identificar la virtut amb el coneixement, o dit d’una altra manera, que el coneixement de la virtut és condició necessària i suficient per practicar la virtut. Aquesta teoria moral té tres implicacions indissolublement unides. La primera, que la virtut és ensenyable, ja que és objecte de coneixement; la segona, que la virtut és única, ja que ningú no podria conèixer totes les virtuts; i la tercera, que la virtut només té avantatges per al subjecte moral, de manera que ningú no fa el mal conscientment, ja que ningú no actua en contra dels seus propis interessos. Aquesta teoria és escandalosa, i provoca escàndol en els oponents de Sòcrates en els diàlegs platònics i en alguns comentaristes actuals. Fins i tot n’hi ha que la cualfiquen de paradoxal, i parteixen de la base que Plató no se la creu. Nosaltres no hi estem d’acord en absolut i més aviat creiem que es dona en tots els discursos ètics grecs, des d’Hesíode fins als estoics. Evidentment, creiem que Epicur no n’és cap excepció, perquè hi trobem les tres implicacions d’aquesta teoria. Però també hi trobem un escull important, ja que en les seves màximes capitals diu que el savi podria cometre injustícia si tingués la seguretat de no ser descobert ni sancionat, però com que això és impossible mai no la podrà cometre. Plutarc, per la seva part, comenta que, quan Epicur es pregunta a ell mateix si el savi cometria injustícia en la hipotètica seguretat de no ser descobert, no sap que contestar. Plutarc creu que en realitat la resposta del savi epicuri és afirmativa, i no ho expressa clarament perquè se n’avergonyeix. Nosaltres, d’acord amb la nostra tesi, creiem que és negativa, i no ho diu perquè entraria en contradicció amb aquestes màximes, de la mateixa manera que una resposta positiva entraria en contradicció amb la resta dels seus escrits morals. Pel que fa al plaer, partim de la base àmpliament acceptada, que Epicur contempla dos tipus de plaer tant en el cos com en l’ànima, que són el cinètic i el catastemàtic, aquest últim considerat com l’absència de dolor. Analitzant l’obra ètica d’Epicur constatem que el plaer catastemàtic és preponderant, i la major part de les vegades que Epicur fa servir la paraula plaer ho fa amb aquest significat. En Plató, en canvi, el plaer catastemàtic no existeix, i només existeix el cinètic, que és el que coincideix amb el significat vulgar de la paraula plaer. I reforcem la similitud entre tots dos pensadors considerant el plaer catastemàtic de l’ànima com una conseqüència psicològica del Bé platònic. Si aquest plaer catastemàtic o ataràxia és el màxim plaer, i és conseqüència d’haver practicat el bé, i el plaer és indefugible, també ho és practicar el bé, que és el punt essencial de l’ètica platònica. La diferència és que per Plató la virtut és una finalitat i per a Epicur un mitjà, però aquesta diferència no és de caire ètic, sinó ontològic. / THE MORAL INTELECTUALISM IN EPICURUS OF SAMOS The object of this work is to show that the ethics of Epicurus and the ethics of Plato are at bottom the same. We could say in other words that the Epicurus’ hedonism is a psychological interpretation of the platonic ethics. The difference between both moral systems is more ontological than ethic. This idea has been suggested by many authors, even by those who consider Epicurus as non-platonic. Plato identifies virtue with the knowledge of the virtue and this involves three implications. The first is that virtue can be taught, because it is object of knowledge; the second, that all virtues are reduced to one, which can be identified with justice, because, nobody could know all the virtues; and the third is that the virtue is always good for the moral subject, in such a way that virtue is unavoidable for those who know it, because no one acts against his own interest. This theory is surprising, and the opponents to Socrates were surprised. There are modern authors who are also surprised, and name this theory the Socratic paradox. We think that there is no paradox and we find it more o less explicitly in all the Greek ethics, from Democritus until the stoics. Epicurus is not an exception, and we find in his moral system the three implications exposed before. The only difficulty is that he says that the wise man will commit no injustice because he can’t be sure of not to be punished. But when he asks himself what would do if he could be sure of that, he gives no response, but his answer is not affirmative. Epicurus is hedonist because he says that human beings can’t avoid looking for pleasure, and it is commonly accepted that Epicurus speaks about two kinds of pleasures, the kinetic and the katastematic. The first is what the word pleasure means in the ordinary level of language, and the second is the absence of pain. We can find both of them in the body and in the soul. Plato says that the absence of pain is not pleasure, but for him pleasure is only the cinetic pleasure of Epicurus. The katastematic pleasure of the soul, which has nothing to do with the platonic pleasure, can be considered as a psychological consequence of practicing virtue, in such a way that virtue is also unavoidable in his ethic system.

Christianity is not anti-intellectual; however, there is a distinct quality of anti-intellectualism in the rhetoric of the Christian Right. This thesis explores the ways in which rhetors in the Christian Right encourage anti-intellectual sentiment without explicitly claiming to be against intellectualism. I argue that the Christian Right makes these anti-intellectual arguments by invoking the tropes and topoi of populism, anti-evolution, and common sense. I analyze how Pat Robertson, as a representative of the Christian Right, used the stock argument, or topos, of populism in his 1986 speech, in which he announced his intention to run for President. I argue that while Robertson used the generic argumentative framework of populism, which is "anti-elitist," he shifted the meaning of the word "elitist" from a wealthy person to an intellectual person. This formed a trope, or turn in argument. Next, I consider the Christian Right's argument against the teaching of evolution. I analyze William J. Bryan's argument in the Scopes Trial, a defining moment in the creation-evolution debate. I show that Bryan used the topos of creationism, which included the loci of quality and order, to condemn the teaching of evolution, arguing that it would be better to not have education at all than for students to be taught something that contradicts the Bible. Finally, I consider how both Ronald Reagan and Sarah Palin used the topos of common sense. Reagan used this topos to create a metaphorical narrative that was to be accepted as reality, or common sense. Sarah Palin, then, used the common sense narrative that Reagan had created to support her views. By calling her ideas "common sense" and frequently referencing Reagan, her rhetoric gives the illusion that good governing is simple, thus removing the space for an intellectual in public life.

The study on Liang Qichao¡¦s moralistic approach

Indiana University, Purdue University- Indianapolis / Current models of public intellectualism rely upon arbitrary and oftentimes elitist criteria. The work of Corey Robin, when combined with that of Antonio Gramsci, provides a reproducable, and scalable, series of tests for consideration of indivduals as public intellectuals. This work takes author Ray Bradbury as an example of public intellectuals who are often missed using current schemas . Bradbury serves as a test case of public intellectualism in the early Cold War period in the United States based upon this new formulation. It examines Bradbury’s work in light of the historical situation in which Bradbury operated, his work’s comparitive arguments in relation to contemporary intellectuals, and reviews some of the influence Bradbury exerted on future generations.

Intellectual activities seek understanding the way pirates capture booty. It is all about pulling up alongside, finding and holding the rhythm of the other vessel, fixing the grappling hooks in order to board and to appropriate. This is not the way understanding is usually depicted, even if appropriation is its intended aim. Philisophers in particular characterise understanding more gently, as a kind of welcoming of distant truth, held out to the foreign past. However, gentleness is an illusion in hermeneutic thought, philosophical or ethnological, as I wish to show in reflection on \'dialogue\' and \'story\' as two major intellectial grappling hooks.

Rousseau’s Discours sur les sciences et les arts predicts the rise of the public intellectual, and along with him, intellectual trends and scientism. It is therefore a treasure to anyone who has wondered about the cults of “authenticity” and “openness,” or slogans like “believe science.” To be more precise, his goal in the Discours is to expose the philosophes of the Enlightenment as hypocrites who laud the advancement of the sciences only to “distinguish” themselves and win power. In this way, the Discours parallels the City of God, where St. Augustine argues that self-love [amor sui] leads to the will to power [libido dominandi]. Rousseau’s Discours is unique however, since he considers the philosophes to be unconscious hypocrites. That is, he does not believe that they treat philosophy and science as “fashions” in order to directly acquire power, but rather because they are over-socialized. In this thesis, I will argue that Rousseau develops a unique method in the Discours for exposing the over-socialized hypocrite: unmasking. Although previous authors such as Molière, La Bruyère and Montaigne often invoked the rhetoric of the mask, I will show that Rousseau is the first to transform this rhetorical device into a method of social theory proper. Ultimately, when Claude Lévi-Strauss argues that Rousseau is the “founder of the sciences of man,” it is this method that he is describing. Of course, Rousseau could not have intended for this method, which sought to expose how institutions socialize people, to itself be institutionalized within the academies. / Le Discours sur les sciences et les arts de Rousseau prévoit l’émergence de personnalités intellectuelles publiques et, par conséquent, des modes intellectuelles et du scientisme. Cet ouvrage est donc un plaisir pour ceux qui ont déjà cogité sur les cultes de l’authenticité et de l’« openness », et sur des slogans tels que « croyez la science ! ». Plus précisément, Rousseau s’engage dans le Discours à dénoncer les philosophes des Lumières comme des hypocrites qui ne louent le progrès des sciences que pour « se distinguer » et gagner du pouvoir. Le Discours ressemble ainsi à La Cité de Dieu, où saint Augustin soutient que l’amour de soi-même [amor sui] donne lieu à la volonté de puissance [libido dominandi]. Le Discours est cependant original, puisqu’il considère les philosophes comme des hypocrites involontaires. Autrement dit, il ne pense pas qu’ils traitent de la philosophie et de la science comme des « modes » pour volontairement obtenir du pouvoir, mais plutôt car ils sont hyper-socialisés. Dans cette thèse, on se propose de démontrer comment Rousseau élabore une méthode unique dans le Discours afin de dévoiler l’hypocrite hyper-socialisé : le démasquage. Bien que d’autres penseurs tels que Molière, La Bruyère et Montaigne emploient souvent la rhétorique du masque, on soutient que Rousseau est le premier à transformer cette figure de style en une méthode de la théorie sociale à proprement dit. Lorsque Claude Lévi-Strauss fait valoir que Rousseau est le « fondateur des sciences de l’homme », il semblerait en fin de compte qu’il décrive cette méthode. Pourtant, Rousseau n’aurait pas pu prévoir que le démasquage, qui cherche à exposer comment les institutions socialisent des hommes, soit institutionalisé lui-même dans les universités.

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Dwight D. Eisenhower has been criticized as an anti-intellectual by scholars such as Richard Hofstadter. Eisenhower’s tenure as president of Columbia University was one segment of his career he was particularly criticized for because of his non-traditional approach to education there. This paper examines Eisenhower’s time at Columbia to explain how anti-intellectualism played into his university administration. It explains how his personality and general outlook came to clash with the intellectual environment of Columbia especially in the wake of the faculty revolt against former Columbia President Nicholas Murray Butler. It argues that Eisenhower utilized the Columbia institution to promote a Cold War educational agenda, which often belittled Columbia intellectuals and their scholarly pursuits. However, this paper also counter-argues that Eisenhower, despite accusations of anti-intellectualism, was an academically interested man who never engaged in true suppression of free thought despite pressure from McCarthyite influences in American government, media and business.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-07-04T12:50:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1466014 bytes, checksum: bfa0417a544782d7cfb24f364fc2280d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-04T12:50:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1466014 bytes, checksum: bfa0417a544782d7cfb24f364fc2280d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-07 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The Merleau-Ponty phenomenology’s, with the desire not to put the subject or the world as precedence to understand the relationship of being and living world, splits with the main philosophical currents of modernity, namely: intellectualism and empiricism. To overcome this, Merleau-Ponty resorts to notion of body lived and presents an approach about the perception always from the point of view of the perceiver. Thus, the being-in-the-world, located in their surrounding world, is constantly in relationship with this without distinguishable ever. The cogito, therefore, elevated to absolute by Descartes, reverts to “worldly” in this phenomenological philosophy, given that the thought no longer has the power to all “swallow” separate from the world. Being-in-the-world, in short, is to be in an experiential effectiveness, in which subject and world intertwined in a mutuality that form the unique experience possible. Finally, our work will focus on overcoming this phenomenology front of the egoic absolutism left by the intellectualism of Descartes. / A fenomenologia merleau-pontyana, com a preocupação de não pôr o sujeito ou o mundo como precedência para compreendermos a relação do ser e do mundo vivido, cinde com as principais correntes filosóficas da modernidade, a saber: intelectualismo e empirismo. Para esta superação, Merleau-Ponty lança mão da noção de corpo próprio e faz uma abordagem acerca da percepção sempre do ponto de vista daquele que percebe. Com isso, o ser no mundo, situado em seu mundo circundante, está em relação constante com este, sem distinguir-se nunca. O cogito, portanto, elevado a absoluto por Descartes, volta a ser “mundano” nesta filosofia fenomenológica, tendo em vista que o pensamento não detém mais o poder de tudo “deglutir” apartado do mundo. Ser no mundo, enfim, é estar situado numa efetividade vivencial, na qual sujeito e mundo entrelaçam-se numa mutualidade que forma a única experiência possível. Por fim, nosso trabalho versará sobre esta superação da fenomenologia frente ao absolutismo egoico deixado pelo intelectualismo de Descartes.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Arquivototal.pdf: 633797 bytes, checksum: 1d551e5f29abe8b204fe26a85234d19f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Empiricism and intellectualism are distinct perspectives which, taking as a starting point the modernity with the thought of Rene Descartes and the English empiricists, guide the epistemological statute of various areas of scientific knowledge. In the contemporaneity, such perspectives are observed in areas such as anatomy, physiology, medicine, biology, psychology, among others. The comprehension of the body, which is influenced by the cited perspectives, often suffers from a reductionism which one moment tends to the psychologism, and one another to physicism. An approach which proposes an integral understanding of the body needs to take into account the various and complex aspects which compose it. The thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and of Sigmund Freud allows a reading of the body as a live and pulsatory instance which resists to the pretension of an objective definition of the body. The subjectivity which permeates all the corporal parts and mechanisms, as well as the pulsional forces which act on them, subvert all and any pretension of a reductionist framework, and impose on the corporeity a living and amazing character. / Empirismo e intelectualismo são perspectivas distintas que, sobretudo a partir da modernidade com o pensamento de Rene Descartes e dos empiristas ingleses, norteiam o estatuto epistemológico de diversas áreas do conhecimento científico. Na contemporaneidade, tais perspectivas se fazem perceber em áreas como a anatomia, fisiologia, medicina, biologia, psicologia, dentre outras. Não raro a compreensão do ser humano que advém dessas perspectivas padece de um reducionismo que hora tende ao psicologismo, hora ao fisicismo. A compreensão e a abordagem do corpo, por exemplo, padecem desse reducionismo. Uma abordagem que pretenda uma compreensão integral do corpo carece levar em conta os diversos e complexos aspectos que o compõem. O pensamento de Maurice Merleau-Ponty e de Sigmund Freud possibilita uma leitura do corpo como uma instância viva e pulsional que resiste a pretensão de uma definição objetiva do corpo. A subjetividade que permeia todas as partes e mecanismos corporais, bem como as forças pulsionais que agem sobre os mesmos, subvertem toda e qualquer pretensão de enquadramento reducionista, e impõem à corporeidade um caráter vivido e surpreendente.