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1	顧客互動導向對於組織績效之影響-以設計產業為例林盈汝 Unknown Date (has links) 近年來，在市場導向的發展下，廠商對於顧客的重視程度越來越高，Ramani and Kumar（2008）提出的互動導向則更精確地將分析顧客時的單位降至「個別顧客」之層級。互動導向之所以受到注目，在於當前環境下，廠商所面對的顧客比起以往更加聰明與挑剔，顧客希望廠商提供的產品與服務能充分滿足其需求，因此，廠商需要不斷地製造出更好的商品、以更聰明的手法行銷並且更了解消費者，此時各廠商對於個別顧客需求的掌握程度，將決定彼此在未來的不同發展命運。本研究將以國內設計服務產業廠商為研究對象，採用Ramani and Kumar（2008）提出的互動導向架構，並加入中介變數組織學習與組織創新，以及調節變數顧客主動接觸的比例進行討論。本研究結果發現： 1.互動導向將能直接影響組織績效，且進一步比較「互動導向直接對於組織績效所產生之效果」與「互動導向透過組織學習對組織績效所產生之效果」時，前者所能產生的效果明顯優於後者，且「學習導向」將僅變成部分中介變數。 2.組織學習與組織創新確實為存在於互動導向與組織績效間的重要中介變數，研究發現「互動導向」對於「組織學習」確實存在正向影響，且「組織學習」亦將對「組織創新」有正向影響，而「組織創新」又會對於「顧客基礎之關係績效（CBRP）」與「顧客基礎之獲利績效（CBPP）」兩者皆有正向影響，並於最終影響總體組織績效。 3.「顧客主動接觸的比例」為存在於「互動導向」與「組織學習」關係中之調節變數，將產生負向的調節效果。互動導向組織學習組織創新組織績效 Interaction Orientation
2	Constitutional negotiations in federal reforms Lorenz, Astrid 19 December 2014 (has links) (PDF) Constitutional amendments in federal political systems have to be negotiated between national and sub-national actors. While theories of negotiation usually explain the outcome by looking at these actors, their preferences and bargaining powers, the theoretical model developed in this article also includes their interaction orientation. The article determines a typical sequence of bargaining and arguing and identifies favourable conditions for cooperation based on different interaction orientations. The article states that actors can reconcile the conflicting logics of intergovernmental or party competition and joint decision-making in constitutional politics through a sequence of bargaining and arguing. However, constitutional amendments negotiated in this way run the risk of undermining the legitimacy and functionality of constitutions. Verfassung Verfassungsänderung Wechselbeziehung Verhandlung Föderalismus politische Reform constitutional negotiations federalism interaction orientation political reforms ddc:320 ddc:328
3	Constitutional negotiations in federal reforms: interests, interaction orientation, and the prospect of agreement Lorenz, Astrid January 2011 (has links) Constitutional amendments in federal political systems have to be negotiated between national and sub-national actors. While theories of negotiation usually explain the outcome by looking at these actors, their preferences and bargaining powers, the theoretical model developed in this article also includes their interaction orientation. The article determines a typical sequence of bargaining and arguing and identifies favourable conditions for cooperation based on different interaction orientations. The article states that actors can reconcile the conflicting logics of intergovernmental or party competition and joint decision-making in constitutional politics through a sequence of bargaining and arguing. However, constitutional amendments negotiated in this way run the risk of undermining the legitimacy and functionality of constitutions. info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/320 ddc:320 info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/328 ddc:328

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