國家的強制權力創造了龐大的租利(rent)。個人或團體往往投入時間、金 錢或其他努力以獲取這些租利；這些追逐爭利的過程，稱為「競租活動 」。研究這些租利的形成、尋求、防禦、規避及它對社會產生的成本、效 益的一些理論及實證分析，統稱為「競租理論」(theory of rent-seek- ing)。本文將運用「利益團體模型」及「競租理論模型」將利益團體－管 制政策－社會福利成本三者之間的關係串聯起來。最後以Mohammad與 Walley對印度競租成本估計模式為架構，以台灣現有資料做一估計，探究 台灣因管制活動造成社會福利成本究竟有多大。本文共分五章。第一章緒 論；第二章為政治決策與競租活動；第三章為競租理論與福利成本之估計 （一）；第四章為競租成本的衡量（二）；第五章為結論及建議。

Agricultural policy in the transition states of Central Eastern Europe is a very complex issue – ranging from privatisation of farm land, the establishment of agricultural markets to detailed questions of veterinary care, plant health and animal nutrition. Its main elements are the introduction of market liberalization, farm restructuring, privatisation, the reform of the sector and the creation of supporting market institutions and services.1 In this process central state agriculture administration plays a decisive role.<br><br> This paper is summing up the research of the author on Slovak agricultural administration between 2002 and 2004. This work was part of a DFG-funded research project on “Genesis, Organization and Efficiency of the central-state Ministerial Administration in Central and Eastern Europe”. The project was analysing the processes, results and efficiency of administrative structures at central-state level in Estonia, Poland and Slovakia with reference to public administration in the policy fields of agriculture and telecommunications. The paper is reflecting the situation in the sector and its administration at the beginning of 2004.<br><br> At first, an overview of the role of the agricultural sector in Slovak economy in the past and presence is provided (section I). Against this background, the development of the agricultural policy in the different periods since 1989 will be analysed, mainly what privatisation, accession to the EU and subsidy policy are concerned (section II). A detailed study of the developments in agricultural administration forms the next part of the paper (section III), i.e. the changes taking place in the ministry of agriculture and in the other institutions responsible for the implementation of agricultural policy. The role of interest groups in agriculture is briefly analysed (section IV). In the conclusions two different scenarios on the further development of Slovak agricultural administration will be deployed.

Summary Taiwan¡¦s petroleum market has been deregulated in the wake of the passing of the Petroleum Administration Law. The market structure should have been shifted to monopolistic competition from the monopoly and the price backed to the so-called equilibrium one. Observing its historical data, we can find the effect of the price decrease is not obvious. In this article, we try to explore the reasons for that using the interest group theory in the public choice school. Every interest group demanding regulation decides how much political resource they would provide in light of their own cost benefit analysis. On the other hand, the administration department supplying regulation will be influenced by some variables such as ideology, institutional constraint, and political variance. Finally the political equilibrium price, i.e. output of regulation, will be reached through adjusting both sides each other.

This paper examines the impact of a new Central Bank mandate on agricultural competitiveness and on the ability of the agricultural sector to articulate its policy interests within Argentina’s policymaking process. Reforms to Argentina’s Central Bank charter, passed into law in April 2012, loosened restrictions on Central Bank lending to Argentina’s Treasury and authorized the Central Bank to act to reduce unemployment and spur economic development. The Central Bank carries out its new mandate within a policymaking process characterized by strong presidential authority, weak political institutions, powerful provincial governments, and a budget system that politicizes the transfer of fiscal resources from the federal government to the provinces. Within these policymaking dynamics, this paper analyzes the actions of the Mesa de Enlace, an interest group coalition comprised of Argentina’s four largest agricultural producer associations, and its response to changes in Central Bank governance. My argument is twofold. First, I argue that the new mandate in the long run will exert inflationary pressure on Argentina’s real exchange rate, a key determinant of competitiveness for primary commodity exports, particularly soy. Public statements made by various representatives of the Mesa de Enlace indicate strong opposition to the nominal overvaluation (atraso cambiario) of the peso. Second, I argue that the new mandate politicizes an already-politicized Central Bank. Given the agricultural sector’s waning influence in institutionalized policymaking channels, executive intrusion in Central Bank operations is economically harmful. Such government interference serves to diminish agricultural considerations in monetary policymaking and to encourage the Mesa de Enlace’s exploitation of informal channels for interest articulation, creating disincentives for robust investment and causing undesired work stoppages, hoarding, and social protest. / text

My dissertation consists of three essays on lobbying activities by special interest groups. The first paper, "Ex Post Lobbying," systematically documents ex post lobbying, the process by which firms allocate resources during the implementation stage after congressional authorization. Previous theories assume all lobbying is done ex ante, where lobbying activities occur before Congress votes. However, my analysis of over 633,731 lobbying reports demonstrates that almost half of lobbying activity from 1998 to 2012, that targeted specific bills, occurred ex post. I argue that the goal of ex post lobbying is to allow firms to bargain over private benefits that will arise from legislation by targeting regulatory rule-making processes that clarify non-specific parts of bills. Ex post lobbying provides a chance for non-participants in the ex ante lobbying stage to claim their share from government policy.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the causal relationship between the intensive farmers-government interaction in agricultural policy and the perverse and suboptimal outcomes in the view of taxpayers and consumers. This analysis focused on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. Created with the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 by the six founding countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany), the CAP represented for many years the only common policy fully administered at the European level and the largest item in the EU budget. It is strongly rooted in the European integration project and it represents the cornerstone of EU agriculture. Although a model of policy integration at the supranational level, it has also been the source of much criticism about its cost and its perverse effects. Nevertheless, the latest reform of the CAP, approved in 2013, demonstrates that agricultural policy remains of utmost importance at the EU level. This research is based on two major assumptions: First, it was possible to maintain political support for the Common Agricultural Policy because it fulfilled social and economic purposes that justified its existence. Second, interest group activity is often perceived negatively and there is not much information on its positive role in the policy process. This thesis draws from the literature on European governance in order to analyze the role of interest groups in the policy process and their impact on policy outcomes. / Graduate / 0615 / 0503 / 0335 / elodie_texier@hotmail.com

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the causal relationship between the intensive farmers-government interaction in agricultural policy and the perverse and suboptimal outcomes in the view of taxpayers and consumers. This analysis focused on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. Created with the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 by the six founding countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany), the CAP represented for many years the only common policy fully administered at the European level and the largest item in the EU budget. It is strongly rooted in the European integration project and it represents the cornerstone of EU agriculture. Although a model of policy integration at the supranational level, it has also been the source of much criticism about its cost and its perverse effects. Nevertheless, the latest reform of the CAP, approved in 2013, demonstrates that agricultural policy remains of utmost importance at the EU level. This research is based on two major assumptions: First, it was possible to maintain political support for the Common Agricultural Policy because it fulfilled social and economic purposes that justified its existence. Second, interest group activity is often perceived negatively and there is not much information on its positive role in the policy process. This thesis draws from the literature on European governance in order to analyze the role of interest groups in the policy process and their impact on policy outcomes. / Graduate / 0615 / 0503 / 0335 / elodie_texier@hotmail.com

The diploma thesis deals with the theme of women's organizations lobbying family policy. The theoretical approaches used in the work discribe the subject of research and the tools for its exploration. These are manily theories of interest groups, theories of third sector-state interactions and theories of lobbying. Theories raised following research questions: Are women's organizations insiders or outsiders of family policy? Are their relations with state mainly cooperative or confrontational, do they join institucionalized or non-formal negotiations? Do they use radical or moderate forms of lobbying? Is their lobbying direct or indirect? The thesis explores also the costs of lobbying and their influence on the forms of lobbying chosen by women's organizations. It is also focused on evaluation of the succes of the women's organizations and on the potential and barriers of coalition and networks building. The diploma thesis comes with following results. The women's organizations are mainly insiders in the family policy negotiations. They join the institucionalized forms of advocacy, relations with the state are mainly cooperative. Nevertheless they recognize the potential of noninstitucionalized forms of lobbying both direct and indirect. There are also outsider organizations by neccessity but they are...

The first chapter presents a theoretical model of electoral competition where two parties can increase campaign contributions by choosing policies benefiting a significant interest group. However, such decision will shrink their hardcore vote base where voters are well informed about the policy. The parties can then allocate the funds between campaigning and personal wealth. Different from the core voters, independent voters can be attracted by advertisements funded by campaign spending. Using a multi-stage extensive form game, I investigate how electoral competition interacts with diversions and policy distortions. My result shows that a higher level of electoral competition helps mitigate policy distortions but prompts the parties to divert more funds. Perfectly informed signal senders need to communicate their true type (productivity or ability) which is often private information to potential receivers. While tests are commonly used as measures of applicants' productivity, the accuracy of them has been questioned. Beginning with the framework of a two-type labor market signaling game, the second chapter investigates how tests of limited reliability affect the nature of equilibria in signaling games with asymmetric information. Our results show that, if a test is inaccurate and costly, only pooling PBE exists given certain conditions. Different forms of test inaccuracy may allow a separating PBE to exist. We also study the case of three types and find different PBEs. The central issue of siting noxious facilities is that the host community absorbs potential costs, while all others can share the benefits without paying as much. The third chapter presents a modified Clarke mechanism to facilitate the siting decision, taking into account all residents' strategies. Suppose that the social planner is able to reasonably estimate the possible costs, depending on the host location, to each resident created by the facility. Our proposed Clarke mechanism is characterized by strategy-proofness and yields an efficient siting outcome. The issue of budget imbalance is mitigated when the compensation scheme is fully funded with the tax revenue based on the benefits. We then use a simple example to show that a weighted version of the Clarke mechanism may yield a different outcome. / Ph. D.

This dissertation consists of three projects related to reputational effects in legislative elections. Building on the candidate emergence, repeat candidates and congressional donor literatures, these articles use novel datasets to further our understanding of repeat candidacy and the impact of interest group endorsements on candidate contributions. The first project examines the conditions under which losing state legislative candidates will appear on the successive general election ballot. Broadly speaking, I find a good deal of support for the notion that candidates respond rationally to changes in their political environment when determining whether to run again. The second project aims to measure the impact of repeat candidacy on state legislative election outcomes. Ultimately I find a reward/penalty structure through which losing candidates for lower chamber seats that perform well in their first election have a slight advantage over first-time candidates in their repeat elections. The final chapter of this dissertation examines the relationship between interest group endorsements and individual contributions for 2010 U.S. Senate candidates. The results of this chapter suggest that some interest group endorsements lead to increased campaign contributions, as compared to unendorsed candidates, but that others do not. This research points to a number of opportunities for future research as the relationship between endorsements and campaign resources is vastly understudied. / Political Science