Third-Party funding refers to a financing arrangement in which a non-party entityprovides financial resources to a disputing party in return for some benefits whichis usually dependent on the outcome of the dispute before the court or tribunal.These benefits could be for pecuniary profits or for the achievement of somepolicy objectives.Whilst this funding model has been commended for promoting access to justice, ithas also been criticized for the possibility of it leading to the filing ofunmeritorious claims, its inherent conflict with the common law tort of champertyand maintenance, the disclosure of privileged information and its impact on theimplied or express duty of confidentiality owed by the parties in arbitration.This research seeks to examine the effect of the disclosure of privilegedinformation by the party seeking funding to the potential funder before or duringArbitration with a view to determining whether the said disclosure constitutes awaiver of litigation privileges or can the third-party funder be deemed to share acommon interest with the funded party? This research will be viewed from thelens of the domestic law operational in England and Wales and Nigeria in acomparative analytical fashion with a view to determining what lessons could belearnt by the developing jurisdiction.This study also makes a brief review of extant legal regime on Third-Partyfunding in both jurisdictions on the adequacy of the provisions on disclosure witha view to providing some safeguards towards promoting the third-party fundingpractice, balance competing interests amongst the parties, promote investorconfidence as well as enhance the growth of foreign direct investment in spite ofthe various existing criticisms against the third-party litigation financing model.

This paper investigates the effect of arbitral proceedings on bilateral portfolio equity investments in emerging markets. Investment disputes may deter foreign investors as they reveal a government’s poor behavior towards foreign investors. The analysis investigates the effects of the first initiation of arbitral proceedings, the first outcome in favor of the investor, and the first outcome in favor of the respondent state of arbitration proceedings. The database is an unbalanced panel of 55 home and 36 host countries from 2001 to 2018. Estimations do not reveal an unconditionally significant effect of arbitral proceedings on bilateral portfolio equity holdings. The impact becomes significant considering the interplay with bilateral investment treaties and political risk.

The relationship between state sovereignty and investor right is well discussed in academic circles. However, when these concepts are nested with major issues such as investment screening and narrowed in the natural resource sector, the outcome points to the fact that academic conversatiosn on the issues are still embryonic. Indeed, investment treaty arbitration has increasingly come under attack because it has the propensity to elevate investors ahead of host states and afford foreign investors broad investment rights they can invoke and pursue upon minimum regulatory changes. The threat of substantial arbitral award can result in host states not enacting policies, regulations, laws or reaching decisions despite them being needed. This thesis analyses investor-state dispute settlement in Africa with a narrow focus on the natural resource sector and questions the legitimacy of these mechanisms and whether they can strike an appropriate balance between investment screening and state sovereignty and investment protection. secondly the thesis assesses whether investment screening can be deployed the potential conflict between investment screening and and state sovereignty and to ehat extent this conflict resulst in the phenomenon of "regulatory chill". the study concludes on the extent to which investor state arbitration can resiolve the seemingly conflict and offers recommendations.

La prolifération des traités bilatéraux d'investissement a contribué, ces dernières années, à l'augmentation des litiges portés devant les tribunaux d'arbitrage du Centre International pour le Règlement des Différends relatifs aux Investissements (CIRDI). En effet, les clauses de règlement des différends contenus dans ces traités ont permis aux investisseurs étrangers de saisir directement les tribunaux CIRDI en cas de violation par l'État d'accueil de l'investissement des dispositions protectrices ou de traitement prévues dans ces traités. La présence de l'État au contentieux CIRDI fait que les litiges soumis aux tribunaux arbitraux portent par nature sur des questions de responsabilité. Dès lors, l'invocation par les arbitres des règles coutumières du droit de la responsabilité de l'État, telles que codifiées par la Commission du droit international, est quasi systématique. Au regard de la pratique arbitrale, cette thèse se veut un essai sur les interactions entre le droit de la responsabilité de l'État et l'arbitrage CIRDI sur le fondement des traités de protection, l'objectif final étant de parvenir à une conclusion sur l'existence ou non d'un sous-système de responsabilité de l' État sur le fondement des traités de protection des investissements. Pour ce faire, suivant la démarche de codification de la Commission du droit International, elle met l'accent sur l'influence des règles coutumières d'engagement de la responsabilité de l'État sur la pratique des tribunaux d'arbitrage du CIRDI fondée sur les traités de protection ; et, sous l'angle de la mise en œuvre et du contenu de la responsabilité étatique, elle aborde, à la lumière du droit international général, les aspects de compétence des tribunaux d'arbitrage du CIRDI, les éléments de recevabilité des réclamations des investisseurs étrangers, et les questions liées à la réparation du préjudice causé par l'État. / With the proliferation of Bilateral Investment Treaties, many disputes have in the recent years been brought before arbitral tribunals under the auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). By virtue of dispute settlement clauses of such treaties, foreign investors are able to directly call upon the jurisdiction of ICSID in case of breach by the host State of its treaty-based protection and treatment obligations. Because of the State's involvement, ICSID disputes raise, by nature, issues of Sate Responsibility. Therefore, it is not surprising that ICSID arbitrators systematically rely on customary rules on State Responsibility as codified by the International Law Commission to form and motivate their opinions. The current thesis aims at assessing, in light of the arbitral practice, the interactions between the Law of State Responsibility and ICSID's treaty-based arbitration, with the objective to determine whether State responsibility under treaties is a self-contained regime. We have adopted the International Law Commission's codification approach to highlight, on one side, the influence of customary rules on engagement of State Responsibility on the practice of ICSID arbitral tribunals; and, on the other side, with regards to invocation and content of the State's responsibility, the relationships between general international law and salient aspects of the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals, the admissibility of claims and the reparation of injury caused to the investor by the State.

Values matter in both legal decision (lawmaking and lawapplying) and discourse (lawshaping and lawinfluencing). Yet, their purported subjectivity means that gaining or improving knowledge about values (whether they be epistemic, legal, moral, ethical, economic, political, cultural, social, or religious) in the context of analytic legal thought and understanding is often said to be at odds with its goal of objectivity. This phenomenon is amplified at the international level where the infusion of seemingly subjective political values by sovereigns, and the decisionmakers to whom they delegate, can, and does, interfere with an idealized and objective rule of law. The discourse on value subjectivity, and its relation to the purpose and function of the law, is particularly apparent in evolving international legal orders such as investment treaty arbitration. The primary aim of this work is to provide a new method for gaining empirical knowledge about value subjectivity that can help close a weak link in all nonpositivist (value-laden) legal theory: a weakness that has manifest itself as skepticism about the possibility of measuring value objectively enough to permit its incorporation as a necessary component of analytic jurisprudence. This work proposes a theory of configurative fairness for addressing the problem related to the development or evolution of legal regimes, and how legal regimes perceived as subjectively unfair can be remedied. Such a theory accepts the premise that perceptions of fairness matter in directing the way that legal orders develop, and that perceptions of fairness relate to the manner in which values are distributed and maximized in particular legal orders. It is posited that legal orders perceived as fair by their participants are more likely to be endorsed or accepted as legally binding (and are therefore more likely to comply with the processes and outcomes that such laws mandate). The purpose of a theory of configurative fairness is an attempt to provide a methodological bridge for improving knowledge about value in the context of legal inquiry through the employment of a technique called Q methodology: an epistemological and empirical means for the measurement and mapping of human subjectivity. It is a method that was developed in the early twentieth century by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson: the last research student of the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman. What Stephenson did was to create a way for systematically measuring subjective perspectives, and although not previously used in jurisprudential thought, Q methodology will facilitate a means for the description and evaluation of shared subjectivities. In the context of law generally, and in investment treaty arbitration specifically, these are the subjectivities that manifest themselves as the conflicting perspectives about value that are omnipresent in both communicative lawshaping discourse and authoritative and controlling lawmaking and lawapplying decision. Knowledge about these shared value subjectivities among participants in investment treaty arbitration will allow the legal analyst to delineate and clarify points of overlapping consensus about the desired distribution of value as they relate to the regime-building issues of evolving legal orders. The focus for a theory of configurative fairness pertains to the identification of the various value positions that participants hold about a particular legal order and to configure those values, through its rules and principles, in a manner that is acceptable (and perceived as fair) by all of its participants. If such a value consensus can be identified, then particular rules in the legal order can be configured by decisionmakers in a way so as to satisfy participants’ shared value understandings. To engage such a theory, a means for identifying shared value subjectivities must be delineated. This work conducts a Q method study on the issues under debate relating to regime-building questions in investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study asked participants knowledgeable about investment treaty arbitration to rank-order a set of statements about the way that the values embraced by this legal order ought to be configured. The results of the study demonstrate that there is significant overlap about how participants in investment treaty arbitration perceive the desired distribution of values across the regime. The Q method study identified six distinct perspectives that represent shared subjectivities about value in the context of the development of investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study was also able to identify where there is an overlapping consensus about value distribution across the distinct perspectives. It is these areas of overlapping consensus that are most likely to reflect shared value understandings, and it is proposed that it is upon these shared value understandings that the future development of investment treaty arbitration ought to aim.

O presente trabalho trata do sistema internacional de proteção ao investimento estrangeiro direto e do atual papel desempenhado pelos países emergentes em sua sistematização. Para tanto, faz uma abordagem histórica do tema da proteção ao investimento estrangeiro desde a década de quarenta até os dias atuais. Ressaltam-se as divergências históricas de entendimento mantidas entre países desenvolvidos (usualmente exportadores de capital) e países em desenvolvimento (historicamente importadores de capital) no que pertine ao nível de proteção que deve ser garantido ao investidor estrangeiro. Após, faz uma análise dos instrumentos internacionais de proteção ao investimento estrangeiro construídos especialmente durante as décadas de setenta e noventa e demonstra que o conteúdo desses instrumentos baseou-se na supremacia do entendimento dos países desenvolvidos. Em momento posterior, analisa o surgimento dos países emergentes como nações exportadoras de capital a partir da década de noventa e como esses países estão conciliando, por meio da assinatura de tratados bilaterais de investimento, a intenção de manter a soberania sobre seus assuntos internos e o interesse de proteger seus investidores no exterior. Por fim, retrata a tradicional posição brasileira com relação ao investimento estrangeiro direto e apresenta alguns contributos para futuras reflexões, baseados especialmente na atual postura adotada por outros países emergentes no que diz respeito à assinatura de tratados bilaterais de investimento. / This paper deals with the international law on foreign direct investment and the current role played by emerging market countries on this matter. In this sense, it presents a historical approach on the protection of foreign investment from the 1940’s onwards. It focuses on the historical disagreements between developed countries (usually capital-exporting countries) and developing countries (historically capitalimporting countries) in what regards the level of protection that must be accorded to a foreign investor. Moreover, it discusses the international instruments for the protection of foreign investment designed between the 1970s and the 1990s and demonstrates that the content of such instruments is based primarily on the developed countries’ understanding of the issue. Furthermore, it analyses the rise of emerging market countries as capital exporting countries since the 1990s and how they are reconciling the will to keep their sovereignty over internal affairs and the willingness to protect their investors abroad through bilateral investment treaties. Finally, it discusses the traditional view held by Brazil on the protection of foreign direct investment and presents some contributions for further research on this issue, with an emphasis on other emerging market countries current attitude towards the signing of bilateral investment treaties.

O presente trabalho trata do sistema internacional de proteção ao investimento estrangeiro direto e do atual papel desempenhado pelos países emergentes em sua sistematização. Para tanto, faz uma abordagem histórica do tema da proteção ao investimento estrangeiro desde a década de quarenta até os dias atuais. Ressaltam-se as divergências históricas de entendimento mantidas entre países desenvolvidos (usualmente exportadores de capital) e países em desenvolvimento (historicamente importadores de capital) no que pertine ao nível de proteção que deve ser garantido ao investidor estrangeiro. Após, faz uma análise dos instrumentos internacionais de proteção ao investimento estrangeiro construídos especialmente durante as décadas de setenta e noventa e demonstra que o conteúdo desses instrumentos baseou-se na supremacia do entendimento dos países desenvolvidos. Em momento posterior, analisa o surgimento dos países emergentes como nações exportadoras de capital a partir da década de noventa e como esses países estão conciliando, por meio da assinatura de tratados bilaterais de investimento, a intenção de manter a soberania sobre seus assuntos internos e o interesse de proteger seus investidores no exterior. Por fim, retrata a tradicional posição brasileira com relação ao investimento estrangeiro direto e apresenta alguns contributos para futuras reflexões, baseados especialmente na atual postura adotada por outros países emergentes no que diz respeito à assinatura de tratados bilaterais de investimento. / This paper deals with the international law on foreign direct investment and the current role played by emerging market countries on this matter. In this sense, it presents a historical approach on the protection of foreign investment from the 1940’s onwards. It focuses on the historical disagreements between developed countries (usually capital-exporting countries) and developing countries (historically capitalimporting countries) in what regards the level of protection that must be accorded to a foreign investor. Moreover, it discusses the international instruments for the protection of foreign investment designed between the 1970s and the 1990s and demonstrates that the content of such instruments is based primarily on the developed countries’ understanding of the issue. Furthermore, it analyses the rise of emerging market countries as capital exporting countries since the 1990s and how they are reconciling the will to keep their sovereignty over internal affairs and the willingness to protect their investors abroad through bilateral investment treaties. Finally, it discusses the traditional view held by Brazil on the protection of foreign direct investment and presents some contributions for further research on this issue, with an emphasis on other emerging market countries current attitude towards the signing of bilateral investment treaties.

In the framework of international treaties, with special emphasis on theBilateral investment treaty (Bit), various responsibilities for states that comprise arise. However , what happens when the courts of a country interfere contrary to international standards in full force and effect of an award, the impact caused in that state and that leading to be internationally liable to a Bit or FtA are studied in this essay. the author further analyze jurisprudence of investment arbitration tribunals in cases Saipem v. Bangladesh, ATA v. Jordan Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic and White Industries v. India, also focuses on the case of Peru; and urges members of a treaty respect the rules of the game. / En el marco de los tratados internacionales, con especial énfasis en el tratado Bilateral de inversión (Bit), surgen diversas responsabilidades para los estados que lo conforman. sin embargo, el qué ocurre cuando los órganos jurisdiccionales de un país interfieren contrariamente a los estándares internacionales en plena validez y eficacia de un laudo y la repercusión que ocasionan en tal estado y que lo conllevan a ser responsable internacionalmente frente a un Bit o un tLC, son tratados en este artículo. el autor, además de analizar jurisprudencia de los tribunales arbitrales de inversiones en los casos Saipem v. Bangladesh, ATA v. Jordania, Frontier Petroleum v. República Checa y White Industries v. India, se centra también en el caso peruano; e insta a quelos países miembros de un tratado respeten las reglas del juego.

L’encadrement, par le droit international, du comportement de l’État hôte d’un investissement étranger n’est concevable que dans la mesure où sa souveraineté est limitée, l’enjeu étant la sanction de l’inobservation, par cet État, de ses obligations. Ces dernières sont issues de la pratique conventionnelle, surtout bilatérale, regroupant des traités qui disposent au fond. L’« internationalisation » du régime juridique de l’investissement n’est pas exclue comme mode de formation d’obligations mais ne se produit qu’à la faveur de dispositions dotées d’un tel effet. La pratique conventionnelle, assez uniforme, a comme principale caractéristique l’articulation de règles limitant le besoin d’interprétation autour de standards qui l’amplifient. Ceci, de même que les interprétations arbitrales, autorise à soupçonner une volonté de « remembrement » du standard minimum international. Si l’attribution d’un comportement à l’État d’accueil ne pose pas de difficulté inédite, l’établissement d’une violation, par cet État, de « ce qui est requis de lui » révèle des singularités de ce domaine. La qualification des circonstances excluant l’illicéité en situation d’urgence peut s’avérer problématique, le risque étant omniprésent d’une méconnaissance, de la part des arbitres, de la logique du droit de la responsabilité. En dehors de ces situations, on peut imaginer des hypothèses dans lesquelles l’illicéité est exclue suite au consentement de l’État d’origine ou de l’investisseur. Le préjudice subi par ce dernier, objet de la réparation intégrale due par l’État responsable, constitue le « préjudice causé par le fait internationalement illicite ». Il est immédiat et direct. L’investisseur, titulaire du droit d’invocation de la responsabilité de l’État hôte, a accès à une réclamation internationale qui éclipse celle de son État de nationalité. La perspective d’un endossement, par ce dernier, de la réclamation de son national accroît l’efficacité des traités d’investissement. / For the conduct of a foreign investment’s host State to be governed by international law is only conceivable insofar as its sovereignty is limited, since the issue is the sanction of the failure of that State to fulfill its obligations. The latter results from a mostly bilateral treaty practice embodying treaties which contain material provisions. The “internationalization” of the legal regime of an investment is not excluded as a means to create obligations, but only occurs through provisions with such an effect. The main characteristic to this fairly uniform treaty practice is the development of rules limiting the need for interpretation around a core set of standards amplifying it. This, as well as the arbitral interpretations, may reflect a desire to “consolidate” the international minimum standard. If the attribution of conduct to the host State does not raise any unprecedented issue, the establishment of a violation by that State of “what is required of it” reveals singularities in this field. The characterization of circumstances precluding wrongfulness in an emergency situation may prove problematic, as the risk that arbitrators may ignore the logic of the law of responsibility is omnipresent. Apart from these situations, it is possible to imagine hypotheses in which wrongfulness is precluded due to the consent of the State of origin or the investor. The injury sustained by the latter, which is the subject of full reparation due by the responsible State, constitutes “injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.” It is immediate and direct. The investor, entitled to invoke the responsibility of the host State, has access to an international claim which eclipses that of his State of nationality. The prospect of an espousal by the latter of its national’s claim increases the effectiveness of the investment treaties.

L'arbitrage d'investissement fondé sur des traités s'est fondamentalement construit autour de la protection de l'investisseur et de son investissement. En effet, les accords de protection de l'investissement n'imposent quasiment aucune obligation à la charge de l 'investisseur. De façon générale, ils contiennent des dispositions substantielles exigeant des États d'accueil d'accorder un certain traitement à l'investissement étranger. Du reste, l'arbitrage fondé sur des traités d'investissement constitue en lui-même une procédure unilatérale à la seule disposition de l'investisseur. La procédure est donc fondamentalement déséquilibrée. L'action des arbitres consistant à prendre en compte le comportement de l'investisseur a cependant contribué au rééquilibrage ce type d'arbitrage. Ils ont, en dépit des difficultés tant théoriques que pratiques suscitées par ce type de procédure, accompli leur mission en ayant recours à différents moyens tant procéduraux que matériels. Ce faisant, l'arbitre s'est rapproché de la figure du juge lié par un formalise certain lors de la conduite de sa procédure juridictionnelle. Par ailleurs, a pu être observée une certaine fonction normative indirecte de l'arbitre. Enfin, s'opère un processus de transition d'un contentieux exclusivement focalisé sur la responsabilité de l'État vers un contentieux de la responsabilisation de l'investisseur. / Investment treaty arbitration is fundamentally built around the protection of the investor and his/its investment. Indeed, investment protection agreements hardly impose any obligation on investors. Such agreements generally contain substantial provisions requiring that host States grant a certain treatment to foreign investments. Moreover, investment treaty arbitration is in itself a unilateral procedure available only to the investor. The procedure is thus fundamentally unbalanced. However, the taking into account by arbitrators of the behavior of investors, has helped to rebalance this investor-state arbitration. Despite theoretical as well as practical difficulties stemming from this type of procedure, arbitrators have been able to accomplish their mission by resorting to different methods, both procedural and material. In doing so, arbitrators have moved closer to the figure of judges, who are bound by some formalism when conducting judicial proceedings. Moreover, arbitral practice has shed the light on a certain indirect normative function of arbitrators. Lastly, a transition process is underway, from disputes exclusively focused on State responsibility towards an investor-accountability approach.