Dans l’ordre juridique international, les organes de protection des droits de la personne sont de nature différente, indépendants et non hiérarchisés. Le phénomène du dialogue juridictionnel est une pratique spontanée qui consiste pour un organe de protection à intégrer dans le processus d’interprétation d’une disposition donnée, des éléments étrangers à son système, qu’il s’agisse de décisions ou d’instruments de protection émanant d’autres organes. Le dialogue est illustré avec la jurisprudence interprétée à l’aide de ces éléments extrasystémiques en matière de prohibition de la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants. Il est envisagé comme une technique interprétative permettant d’aboutir à des interprétations communes du contenu, du sens et de la portée de cette interdiction, bien que ces interprétations partagées puissent être extensives ou restrictives. L’étude interroge l’étendue et la teneur du pouvoir juridictionnel dans l’ordre juridique international ainsi que sa capacité à aboutir à une convergence normative en matière de protection des droits de la personne, qui découlerait d’une convergence interprétative. Implicitement, le dialogue joue le rôle d’un outil de régulation et de coordination qui s’impose spontanément dans la pratique interprétative des organes internationaux, contribuant à l’émergence d’un objectivisme jurisprudentiel. Ce dernier tend à s’opposer au volontarisme étatique dans un but de protection de l’ordre public international et de garantie des droits de la personne. / In the international legal order, international bodies protecting human rights are both of a different nature and independent. Judicial dialogue consists in referring to decisions or international instruments that are external sources to the system in which the international body has to exercise its power of interpretation. The example of the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments will be used to illustrate this spontaneous practice. Judicial dialogue is seen as an interpretive technique, allowing to reach common interpretations of the substance, the meaning and the scope of this prohibition, by reaching a normative convergence through the use of external sources that shows an interpretive convergence in the first place. Nevertheless, the use of external sources does not always lead to extensive interpretations since it can also highlight disagreements in which case restrictive interpretations are inevitable. Finally, it appears that the international jurisprudential dialogue can both contribute to coordinate and harmonize the application and interpretation of international human rights law in order to protect the international public order.

La présente étude porte sur l’analyse de l’aspect normatif de l’interdiction de traite en droit international ainsi que sur la mise en oeuvre du principe de cette interdiction. Les recherches effectuées montrent que l’aspect normatif de la notion conditionne une protection renforcée, et que sa mise en oeuvre nécessite une approche axée sur les droits de l’homme. La notion juridique de « traite des personnes » fait son entrée littérale dans le droit international des droits de l’homme par l’adoption du Protocole additionnel à la Convention des Nations Unies contre la criminalité transnationale organisée visant à prévenir, réprimer et punir la traite des personnes, et en particulier des femmes et des enfants (2000). La première définition conventionnelle de traite, qui a un caractère composite, englobant aussi plusieurs autres notions, pose, en même temps, les premières difficultés dans l’appréhension juridique de la notion. Une protection renforcée et une mise en oeuvre axée sur les droits de l’homme, faisant également l’objet de cette étude, permettent, en fait, de voir que le droit positif donne, pour l’essentiel, une définition de la traite aggravée, tandis que la notion de « traite » tout court continue à évoluer à la lumière des exigences des droits de l’homme. La multiplication des instruments internationaux et celle des mécanismes de contrôle dans la lutte contre la traite s’avèrent, pour le moment, incapables de lutter efficacement contre l’augmentation constante du nombre des victimes de traite, ce qui ne cesse de susciter des interrogations. En réalité, une lutte efficace contre la traite ne peut passer que par la reconnaissance des spécificités du crime de traite dans son ensemble ainsi que par une mise en œuvre effective des droits des victimes de traite conformément aux exigences des droits de l’homme, les approches actuelles privilégiant plutôt la punition des bourreaux à la protection de leurs victimes. / This study focuses on the analysis of the normative aspect of the prohibition of trafficking in international law and on the implementation of the principle of the prohibition. Research shows that the normative notion of conditional strengthened protection and its implementation require an approach based on human rights. The legal concept of "trafficking in persons"entered in the international human rights law literature with the adoption of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000). The first conventional definition of trafficking, which has a composite characterencompassing several other concepts, poses simultaneously the first difficulties in addressing the legal concept. Reinforced protection and an implementation based on human rights, which have also been evaluated in this study, allow one to see that the positive law, in principal, gives a definition of aggravated trafficking while the term "trafficking" in short continues to evolve in light of the requirements of human rights. The proliferation of international instruments and control mechanisms in the fight against trafficking, for the moment, prove to be unable to effectively fight against the ever increasing number of victims of trafficking, which continues to raise questions. An effective fight against trafficking can only be achievedthrough the recognition of the specific crime of trafficking as a whole as well as an effective implementation of human trafficking victims’ rights in accordance with the requirements of human rights, while the current approaches favor instead the punishment of perpetrators to protect their victims.

Originally presented as the author's dissertation (doctoral)--Freiburg/Schweiz, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 224-258).

So-called obligations erga omnes, owed to the international community as a whole, including all States, now form part of positive international law. These obligations protect some of the most basic values of present-day international relations. Examples include the obligations not to commit genocide or torture, to uphold the most basic human rights, to respect the self-determination of peoples, and so on. However, there is little agreement as to what these obligations imply, how they have come about, and how to identify them. In the literature, at least, there is widespread agreement that obligations erga omnes are different in essence and in nature from obligations owed by one State to another State, so-called obligations inter partes. In turn, this —alleged— radical conceptual break severs obligations erga omnes from a wealth of norms that exist in present-day, general international law, but whose origins lie farther back in time. This thesis attempts to reconcile obligations erga omnes with obligations arising in classic, general international law. It explores what it means to be owed an obligation and how it came to pass that most obligations were owed inter partes. The particular way in which sovereignty came to be conceived and the furtherance of sovereignty, at the expense of other values, forms the pattern that gave rise to obligations inter partes. But even at that time, exceptions to this pattern existed which brought about obligations analogous to those owed erga omnes today. Relevant state practice will be analysed. If obligations erga omnes could have been created in classic international law, it is unjustified to maintain that obligations erga omnes represent so radical a break with the past. Obligations erga omnes are aggregates of bilateral, primary obligations. From this perspective, it is possible to identify these obligations, their consequences, and to discern their origins.

Paprotys - vienas reikšmingiausių ir seniausių teisės šaltinių. Kartu, nepaisant egzistuojančių priešingų nuomonių, tai vienas reikšmingiausių tarptautinės teisės šaltinių. Tarptautinį paprotį sudaro du elementai: 1. objektyvus - valstybių praktika, kuri turi atitikti bendrumo, vieningumo, nuoseklumo, trukmės reikalavimus; 2. subjektyvus - atitinkamos praktikos pripažinimas teisiškai privaloma. Abu minėti elementai yra reikšmingi ir būtini paprotinės normos susiformavimui. Kartu tarptautinis paprotys yra glaudžiai susijęs su "pastovaus prieštarautojo", "greito" papročio bei jus cogens normų doktrinomis. Pažymėtina, jog, nepaisant egzistuojančių kodifikavimo tendencijų, tarptautinis paprotys išlieka reikšmingu tarptautinės teisės šaltiniu. / Custom is one of the oldest and widely recognized legal sources. In addition, despite existing different approaches, custom is considered to be one of the most significant legal sources of international law. International custom consists of two elements: 1. objective - state practice, which must also fulfill the requirements of consistency, repetition, duration and generality; 2. subjective - the recognition of certain practice as legally binding. Both above mentioned elements are of significant importance in the formation of customary rule. International custom is also closely related to the doctrines of "persistent objector", "instant" custom and jus cogens norms. Finally, it must be noticed that, despite the existing codification tendencies, international custom still remains a very important source of international law.

This study deals with two aspects of international law. The first is ‘immunity of state officials’ and the second is ‘prosecution of international crimes.’ Immunity is discussed in the context of international crimes. The study focuses on Africa because African state officials have become subjects of international criminal justice before international courts and various national courts both in Europe and Africa. It presents a new contribution to international criminal justice in Africa by examining the practice on prosecution of international crimes in eleven African states: South Africa; Kenya; Senegal; Ethiopia; Burundi; Rwanda; DRC; Congo; Niger; Burkina Faso and Uganda. The study concludes that immunity of state officials has been outlawed in these states thereby rendering state officials amenable to criminal prosecution for international crimes. The thesis argues that although immunity is founded under customary international law, it does not prevail over international law jus cogens on the prosecution of international crimes because such jus cogens trumps immunity. It is argued that, committing international crimes cannot qualify as acts performed in official capacity for the purpose of upholding immunity of state officials. In principle, customary international law outlaws functional immunity in respect of international crimes. Hence, in relation to international crimes, state officials cannot benefit from immunity from prosecution or subpoenas. Further, the study criticises the African Union’s opposition to the prosecutions before the International Criminal Court (ICC). It argues that however strong it may be, such opposition is unfounded in international law and is motivated by African solidarity to weaken the role of the ICC in Africa. It concludes that the decisions taken by the African Union not to cooperate with the ICC are geared towards breaching international obligations on cooperation with the ICC. The study calls upon African states to respect their obligations under the Rome Statute and customary international law. It recommends that African states should cooperate with the ICC in the investigations and prosecution of persons responsible for international crimes in Africa. At international level, the study reveals the conflicting jurisprudence of international courts on subpoenas against state officials. It argues that, state officials are not immune from being subpoenaed to testify or adduce evidence before international courts. It contends that issuing subpoenas to state officials ensures fairness and equality of arms in the prosecution of international crimes. It recommends that international courts should treat state officials equally regarding prosecution and subpoenas. It further recommends that African states should respect their obligations arising from the Rome Statute and that, immunity should not be used to develop a culture of impunity for international crimes committed in Africa. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

A Rome, les délégations des Etats présents ont convenu que la CPI n’exercera sa compétence à l’égard des crimes relevant du Statut que s’ils ont été commis sur le territoire, à bord d’un navire ou aéronef ou encore par le ressortissant d’un Etat partie et l’ont expressément codifié dans l’article 12, § 2 du Statut. Rédigé dans les dernières heures de la Conférence, le mécanisme a laissé en suspens beaucoup de questions brûlantes. Depuis, la portée de la disposition en ce qui concerne son champ d’application et son contenu est très discutée. Toutes ces lacunes et inquiétudes ont jusqu’à ce jour entretenu le malentendu persistant observé à l’égard de la Cour pénale internationale et semblent nuire à la clarté de sa mission. La présente étude vient aider à fixer l’état du droit sur les problèmes d’ordre pénal qui surgissent encore. Il s’agira, à partir d’un examen approfondi de la jurisprudence et de la pratique, de clarifier, dans une première partie, les concepts de rattachements territorial et personnel définis dans le Statut de Rome, c'est-à-dire d’en délimiter les contours et d’en déterminer sa consistance. Dans une seconde partie, l’on mettra en lumière la manière dont les deux titres de compétence énoncés alternativement dans le Statut de Rome permettent à la CPI d’étendre sa compétence, en toute légalité, à la fois à l’égard des Etats parties et des Etats non parties / In Rome, the delegations of the participating States agreed that the International Criminal Court (ICC) would only exercise jurisdiction regarding crimes set out in the Statute provided that these crimes were committed on the territory, on board a vessel or aircraft or by a national of a State Party, as stressed in article 12, § 2 of the Statute. This mechanism, which was drafted in the very last hours of the Conference, left open many critical issues. Since then, the scope and content of this provision is the subject of heated debate. These gaps, and the concern they raised until now, have perpetuated the persisting misunderstanding about the ICC and seem to undermine the clarity of the Court’s mission. The study helps to assess the state of the law on the criminal issues that remain so far. As a first step, it aims at clarifying, on the basis of an extensive review of the case-law and practice, the concepts of territorial and personal links defined in the Rome Statute, by marking out their contours and determining their substance. Secondly, it will be demonstrated how these two grounds of jurisdiction set out in the Rome Statute allow the ICC to lawfully expand its jurisdiction, both vis-à-vis State Parties as well as non-Party States.

The present study describes the nature, scope and application of universal jurisdiction as an important tool against impunity in international criminal law, in a straight forward manner, where inquiry into the recent developments of universal jurisdiction is undertaken. Forthwith, the formation of the principle of universal jurisdiction - especially its practical application - must be guided by international consensus, not through advocacy action of states with short term and narrow objectives. The thesis seeks to identify and observe how far the law of universal jurisdiction has actually evolved and how far we should expect it to evolve in the near future, considering its restrains and challenges. It is argued that the concept of state sovereignty, which constitutes the greatest impediment on the exercise of universal jurisdiction, has seen various changes to its fundamentals elements in the 21st Century. The aim is to look at the universality principle, not as an isolated part, but as part of a broader framework in modern international law and thus special attention is given to the relationship between universal jurisdiction and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. These principles are interrelated, yet distinct, parallels in deterring commission of the most heinous offences of international...

Thèse en cotutelle : Université Laval, Québec, Canada et Université de Bordeaux, Talence, France / Dans l'ordre juridique international, les organes de protection des droits de la personne sont de nature différente, indépendants et non hiérarchisés. Le phénomène du dialogue juridictionnel est une pratique spontanée qui consiste pour un organe de protection à intégrer dans le processus d'interprétation d'une disposition donnée, des éléments étrangers à son système, qu'il s'agisse de décisions ou d'instruments de protection émanant d'autres organes. Dans cette étude, le dialogue est illustré avec la jurisprudence interprétée à l'aide de ces éléments extrasystémiques en matière de prohibition de la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels inhumains ou dégradants. Cette interdiction est à la croisée du droit international des droits de l'Homme, du droit international humanitaire et du droit international pénal. Ainsi, les éventuelles violations peuvent engager, de manière complémentaire, la responsabilité internationale de l'État et la responsabilité pénale individuelle. Le dialogue jurisprudentiel est envisagé comme une technique interprétative permettant d'aboutir à des interprétations communes du contenu, du sens et de la portée de cette interdiction bien que ces interprétations partagées puissent être extensives ou restrictives. En effet, le dialogue permettra de mettre parfois en lumière des positions internationales communes justifiant des interprétations extensives en faveur de la personne humaine. L'interprétation unanime des rapports complémentaires entre droit international des droits de l'homme et droit international humanitaire ou à l'égard de l'application extraterritoriale des traités de protection des droits de l'homme a un impact sur les rapports entre systèmes juridiques et entre ordres juridiques. L'extraterritorialité élargit les espaces protégés par des instruments conventionnels, en contribuant ainsi à un renforcement de la perméabilité entre les normes internationales de protection des droits de la personne et une concrétisation de leur intérdépendance matérielle. Toutefois, le dialogue sera parfois un instrument d'éclairage des positions divergentes découlant de l'absence de consensus dans l'ordre juridique international. C'est le cas lorsqu'il sera question de déterminer précisément les effets d'une norme impérative qui se heurte à la règle des immunités en droit international. L'étude interroge l'étendue et la teneur du pouvoir juridictionnel dans l'ordre juridique international ainsi que sa capacité à aboutir à une convergence normative en matière de protection des droits de la personne, qui découle d'une convergence interprétative. La notion d'interprétation globale par contextualisation normative et systémique renvoie à la confrontation d'une disposition donnée aux autres normes internationales qui lui sont analogues et aux autres systèmes juridiques qui sont semblables au système d'origine de l'interprète, dans laquelle la disposition s'inscrit. Ainsi, il s'agit de montrer que les organes internationaux de protection des droits de la personne, malgré leur diversité, font usage de méthodes d'interprétation communes contribuant à définir le sens, la portée et le contenu des normes. Grâce au dialogue juridictionnel, ils s'inscrivent dans un processus d'autorégulation, entre autoélargissement de leur pouvoir d'interprétation et autolimitation de leur marge d'appréciation, par la confrontation aux éléments extrasystémiques. Implicitement, le dialogue joue le rôle d'un outil de régulation et de coordination qui s'impose spontanément dans la pratique interprétative des organes internationaux, contribuant à l'émergence d'un objectivisme jurisprudentiel. Ce dernier tend à s'opposer au volontarisme étatique dans un but de protection de l'ordre public international et de garantie des droits de la personne. / In the international legal order, international bodies protecting human rights are both of a different nature and independent. Indeed, a hierarchical principle of organization still remains unknown and multiple legal systems protect human rights. Judicial dialogue consists in referring to decisions or international instruments that are external sources to the system in which the international body has to exercise its power of interpretation. In this study, the example of the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments will be used to illustrate this spontaneous practice. This prohibition is at the crossroads of international human rights law, of international humanitarian law and of international criminal law. Therefore, its violations can both engage the international responsibility of State and the individual criminal responsibility. Judicial dialogue is seen as an interpretive technique, allowing to reach common interpretations of the substance, the meaning and the scope of this prohibition. Nevertheless, the use of external sources does not always lead to extensive interpretations since it can also highlight disagreements in which case restrictive interpretations are inevitable. Sometimes, this spontaneous practice will show the existence of international common positions regarding certains aspects of human rights. It is the case regarding the entrenched consensus of the complementarity between international human rights law and international humanitarian law and concerning the extraterritoriality of human rights treaties. This acknowledgement expands States jurisdiction and strengthens the protection offered to the individuals, while increasing interactions between international legal systems protecting human rights and therefore showing a state of substantive interdependence. The lack of consensus in the international legal order will be the ultimate limit to constructive judicial dialogue. Indeed, the latter will emphasize divergent positions in matters of interpretation. One of the most significant examples is the trouble to determine precisely the effect of peremptory norms such as the prohibition of torture when it encounters immunities in international law. This study also questions the content of the international judiciary and its capacity to reach a normative convergence through the use of external sources that shows an interpretive convergence in the first place. The notion of global interpretation through normative and systemic interactions means confronting international legal norms which are similar, even though they were adopted separate and independent systems, in order to reach a better interpretation. This study attempts to show that even though international bodies rotecting human rights are quite different and formally independent, they tend to self-regulation by using external sources. Indeed, the spontaneous practice of judicial dialogue will allow both a process of self-limitation by referring to other sources in order to interpret a given legal provision, since it means including optional limits to the margin of appreciation. At the same time, the use of external sources will also lead to a self-expansion of the possibilities in matters of interpretation by taking into account solutions that were found by other legal interpreters in comparable legal disputes. Therefore, it appears that the international jurisprudential dialogue can both contribute to coordinate and harmonize the application and interpretation of international human rights law.

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