This thesis provides a detailed analysis of the feasibility of voluntary moral bioenhancement through an ethico-legal exploration of three motivators: money (and financial incentives in general), health, and duty. These motivators are explored in turn over the course of three papers and it is concluded that while none offer a motivator that could encourage broad participation in voluntary programmes of moral bioenhancement, they do provide insight into things that will be important to note in advance of the advent of such an intervention and (especially) of attempts to promote it. In addition, this thesis identifies and explores areas of discussion not previously addressed in the literature, including issues such as: taboo trade-offs in the use of financial incentives to promote participation in programmes of moral bioenhancement, the use of medical definitions in order to classify moral bioenhancement interventions as medically indicated, and the question as to whether there could be a duty to undergo moral bioenhancement interventions. Moral bioenhancement, though currently a hypothetical notion, is considered by many to be a desirable endeavour due to its potential to bring about good consequences and to avoid instances of significant and even ultimate harm. However, unlike other enhancements, moral bioenhancement is something that does not seem to directly benefit the enhanced individual and so there are concerns that people would be disinclined to undergo the intervention. Some writers have proposed that this therefore demonstrates a need for compulsory approaches to the endeavour, but in the introductory chapters of this thesis I demonstrate that such an approach would be ethically and legally problematic and, therefore, a voluntary approach would be required. If moral bioenhancement is considered as something that is good to have (and it seems that such a case can be made, certainly on a societal level), then a method of encouraging participation in programmes of the endeavour will be required. This thesis aims to identify that method by exploring the three possible motivators already mentioned and, in doing so, to analyse the feasibility of voluntary moral bioenhancement in a broader sense.

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My dissertation explores the promise of kindness as a response to the problem of luck which confronts both ancient and modern visions of the moral life. A rich articulation of kindness in the light of historical moral theory reveals that, far from being a trifling, merely and purely sentimental phenomenon, kindness involves many of the key ethical commitments that distinguish both Aristotelian ethics and Kantian morality. More importantly, at the level of individuals kindness has the power to mitigate the toll of bad luck on agents and to yield the types of judgments that dissolve the problem of moral luck. Where it finds expression at the institutional level kindness has tremendous ameliorative potential. I therefore contend that kindness is to be esteemed above all other modes of comportment; in a world that is not up to us, our greatest hope for flourishing lies in being kind and in remaining graciously open to the kindness of others.

SIQUEIRA, Rogério Moreira de. Risco bancário e disciplina de mercado. 2009. 71f. Dissertação (mestrado) - Programa de Pós Graduação em Economia,Caen, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Faortaleza, 2009. / Submitted by Mônica Correia Aquino (monicacorreiaaquino@gmail.com) on 2013-07-19T18:23:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2009_dissert_rmsiqueira.pdf: 4571477 bytes, checksum: 36bb92a1e52a3f583e30215a9fa6b19e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Mônica Correia Aquino(monicacorreiaaquino@gmail.com) on 2013-07-19T18:23:49Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2009_dissert_rmsiqueira.pdf: 4571477 bytes, checksum: 36bb92a1e52a3f583e30215a9fa6b19e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-07-19T18:23:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2009_dissert_rmsiqueira.pdf: 4571477 bytes, checksum: 36bb92a1e52a3f583e30215a9fa6b19e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / This work search to study as the agency costs and the moral hazard affect the decisions of the Brazilian banks as for the risk level that it are willing to assume, once determining the behavior of these banks is easier to formulate preventive politics to the occurrence of crises. As contribution in relation to the existent literature can stand out the attempt to model the variance taking into account the problem of the conditional heteroscedasticity and to verify as the banks have if held durant during the crises observed in the last decade. The results of this work point that the systemic risk was less expressive than the specific risk in the composition of the total risk and that, given the characteristics of the Brazilian banks, the property structure and the franchise value tend to affect the total and specific risks in an inverse way, however in what concerns the systematic risk no there is a very defined relationship. / Este trabalho busca estudar como os custos de agência e o risco moral afetam as decisões dos bancos brasileiros quanto ao nível de risco que estão dispostos a assumir, uma vez que determinando o comportamento destes bancos fica mais fácil formular políticas preventivas à ocorrência de crises. Como contribuição em relação à literatura existente pode-se destacar a tentativa de modelar a variância levando em conta o problema da heterocedasticidade condicional e verificar como os bancos têm se comportado durante as crises observadas na última década. Os resultados deste trabalho apontam que o risco sistêmico foi menos expressivo do que o risco específico na composição do risco total e que, dadas as características dos bancos brasileiros, a estrutura de propriedade e o franchise value tendem a afetar os riscos totais e específicos de forma inversa, no entanto no que diz respeito ao risco sistemático não há uma relação bem definida. Palavras-

AZEVEDO, Alana Katielli Nogueira. Risco moral em seguro saúde: uma análise para os estados do Nordeste utilizando estimadores de Matching por Propensity Score. 2008. 44f. Dissertação (mestrado profissional em economia do setor público) - Programa de Pós Graduação em Economia, CAEN, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, 2008. / Submitted by Mônica Correia Aquino (monicacorreiaaquino@gmail.com) on 2013-10-07T17:08:48Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2008_dissert_aknazevedo.pdf: 317894 bytes, checksum: e79eba8af676e76440dd56bc8c0f9476 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Mônica Correia Aquino(monicacorreiaaquino@gmail.com) on 2013-10-07T17:09:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2008_dissert_aknazevedo.pdf: 317894 bytes, checksum: e79eba8af676e76440dd56bc8c0f9476 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-10-07T17:09:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2008_dissert_aknazevedo.pdf: 317894 bytes, checksum: e79eba8af676e76440dd56bc8c0f9476 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / This dissertation analised the existence of moral hazard in the brazilian health system using anestimation of two propensity score matching models, one by stratification and the other one usinga kernel function. The variable of healthcare utilization selected was the medical visits and theanalysis was made considering the nine states of Northeast of Brazil. The results indicatedexistence of moral hazard for both stratification and kernel function estimation. For thestratification model the stimated value of the diference in medical visits stayed between 1,014 e 2,262 times, the state of Rio Grande do Norte had the greater diference. For the kernel functionmodel the stimated value of the diference in medical visits stayed between 0,866 e 2,242 times,the state of Maranhão had the smallest diference. So, individuals with health insurance use morethe healthcare than if they only have access to public services. / Esta dissertação analisa a existência de risco moral no sistema de saúde brasileiro a partir de uma análise de estimação de dois modelos de matching baseado no propensityscore, um a partir de estratificação e outro a partir de uma função kernel. A variável de utilização do serviço médicoselecionada foi a de consultas médicas e a análise compreendeu os nove estados do Nordeste doBrasil. Osresultados indicam presença de risco moral tanto pela estimação a partir de estratoscomo a partir de uma função kernel. Para o modelo de estratificação o valor estimado da diferença de procura por consultas médicas ficou entre 1,014 e 2,262 vezes, com o estado do RioGrande do Norte apresentando a maior diferença. Já para o modelo a partir de uma função kernel,o valor estimado da diferença de procura por consultas médicas ficou entre 0,866 e 2,242 vezes,com o estado do Maranhão apresentando a menor diferença. Ouseja, indivíduos que possuemplanos de saúde geralmente buscam maior atendimento médico do que caso não estivessem cobertos por nenhum plano.

The main aim of this PhD research was to explore the cultural differences in moral judgment, moral behaviour, moral identity, and cultural values between Saudi Arabia and United Kingdom. Furthermore, I was interested in the psychological factors affecting morality in those two cultures. The first study aimed to achieve the following objectives: to understand people’s moral judgment in Saudi Arabia and the UK, to investigate whether and how personality traits and cultural values affect moral judgment in five moral foundations (harm avoidance, justice, ingroup, authority, purity), and to investigate whether personality traits and cultural values are related differently or similarly across Saudi and UK cultures. The findings of the study revealed that Saudi and British participants differed with regard to their foundation-specific moral judgments. Saudi participants were more likely to endorse moral foundations in the domains of intergroup relations, authority, and purity. However, there were no cross-cultural differences in the domains of harm avoidance and justice. Moreover, the results showed that the effect of personality traits and cultural values on morality varied. Harm and fairness foundations were predicted by personality traits while ingroup, authority, purity foundations were predicted by values. The second study investigated whether foundation-related moral behaviour was affected by moral judgment and people’s moral identity in a cross-cultural context comparing adults from the UK and Saudi Arabia. Findings of this study resulted in no cross-cultural differences between the two samples concerning moral judgment in the care and justice foundations. Furthermore, no cultural differences were found between the two samples concerning moral behaviour in the five foundations. In addition, moral identity mediated the relationship between moral judgment and allocations in the dictator game. The third study investigated the relationship between (dis-) honest behaviour, moral judgment and moral identity in two different cultures, namely Saudi Arabia and the UK. It has been found that there are no statistically significant differences in honest behaviour between Saudi Arabia and the UK. Furthermore, deception was not predicted or correlated significantly with any of the five foundation-specific moral judgments across both cultural samples. However, culture moderated the relationship between deception and moral judgment in harm and authority moral foundations. Additionally, moral sensitivity did not mediate the relationship between moral judgments and dishonesty. The forth study explored the link between moral foundation violations (harm, justice, ingroup, authority, and purity) and anger, disgust, sadness, apathy, guilt, contempt, shame, resentment, and embarrassment emotions. Findings showed that the violations of harm, and justice foundations triggered anger and Violations of purity foundation triggered disgust. The results show no cultural differences in the assignments of the violations made by both samples. Saudi and UK participants’ classifications were in agreement with the original classifications of the 40 violations by Graham et al. (2009). However, we found cross-cultural differences in the relationship between emotions and moral foundation violations.

Tese (Doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Ciências Jurídicas. / Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-18T16:43:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0Bitstream added on 2016-01-09T01:25:04Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 161578.pdf: 5371203 bytes, checksum: 54aac3e7149076fef85ccf9e36590f8f (MD5)

Esta pesquisa refere-se a um estudo experimental conduzido com o objetivo de diminuir o comportamento agressivo de adolescentes na escola, combinando dois paradigmas: o modelo cognitivo desenvolvimental de Kohlberg e a teoria da aprendizagem social de Bandura. Isto foi operacionalizado na técnica de intervenção que combinam elementos das discussões de dilemas desenvolvidos por Blatt e Kohlberg com o modelo de papéis, enfatizando a discussão do líder e personagens dos dilemas. Foi hipotetizado que uma combinação entre os dilemas morais tradicionais com outros novos, que propõem soluções pacíficas versus soluções agressivas (e que foram especialmente criados para este estudo), poderiam levar a um alto decréscimo no comportamento agressivo e aumento na maturidade de julgamento moral nestes adolescentes. Os participantes eram 44 adolescentes, com idades entre 12 e 18 anos, que foram pré e pós testados através do Moral Judgment Interview, de Kohlberg, e pelo Teachers Report Form, de Achenbach (com a adaptação Brasileira ainda em andamento, realizada por Silvares e cols.). Os resultados apontam para poucos resultados estatísticos significantes, mas uma análise qualitativa de conteúdo mais acurada foi realizada na discussão, revelando ganhos interessantes tanto na maturidade de julgamento moral quanto nas reflexões sobre paz e violência.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília,Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2016. / Submitted by Fernanda Percia França (fernandafranca@bce.unb.br) on 2017-02-07T15:30:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_RogerValériodeVargasRex_Parcial.pdf: 331004 bytes, checksum: e09745aa1d8836779211a54797eb264e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ruthléa Nascimento(ruthleanascimento@bce.unb.br) on 2017-03-16T14:43:14Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_RogerValériodeVargasRex_Parcial.pdf: 331004 bytes, checksum: e09745aa1d8836779211a54797eb264e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-16T14:43:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_RogerValériodeVargasRex_Parcial.pdf: 331004 bytes, checksum: e09745aa1d8836779211a54797eb264e (MD5) / A fim de identificar o papel de estruturas psicológicas ‘inatas’ na moralidade, investigo como os seres humanos desenvolvem a capacidade de julgar comportamentos a partir de normas. Preliminarmente, procuro demonstrar que a abordagem adotada nesta dissertação não incorre na chamada falácia naturalista e, para afastar certas confusões, examino os conceitos de inato e de moralidade. Em seguida, exploro o problema sob a perspectiva de três programas de pesquisa nativistas. O primeiro deles defende a existência de uma gramática moral universal a partir de uma analogia com o modelo de princípios e parâmetros desenvolvido na Linguística. O segundo programa defende a existência de domínios morais relacionados a módulos mentais específicos, que favoreceriam o surgimento de normas com determinados conteúdos. Por fim, o terceiro programa consiste de modelos epidemiológicos, de acordo com os quais estruturas cognitivas resultantes do processo de evolução da nossa espécie provocariam vieses na origem e na transmissão das normas. Em especial, analiso como os argumentos utilizados para sustentar esses programas se saem quando confrontados com os resultados obtidos em estudos empíricos de diferentes áreas das ciências cognitivas e com argumentos de construtivistas. Quanto à teoria da gramática moral universal, argumentos como o da pobreza de estímulos e da projeção não se mostram convincentes quando aplicados ao domínio da moralidade. Estudos empíricos sobre dilemas envolvendo bondes, mencionados com frequência pelos proponentes dessa teoria, são também insuficientes para sustentar a tese de que a moralidade funciona segundo um conjunto de princípios e parâmetros. Quanto à teoria dos domínios morais, ela tem o mérito de incluir características psicológicas típicas da espécie humana, como as nossas disposições emocionais, na explicação sobre os julgamentos morais. No entanto, está comprometida com uma visão modular a respeito da mente humana que não é consiliente com os resultados de pesquisas neurocientíficas; e, além disso, não oferece uma explicação para as etapas mentais prévias ao desencadeamento das intuições morais. Com relação aos modelos epidemiológicos, o apelo a fatores de atração no processamento cognitivo oferece a hipótese mais promissora para explicar a recorrência, em diversas culturas, de normas similares. Contudo, as explicações propostas até agora são insuficientes, pois se restringem às influências de fatores psicológicos, sem explorar a sua interação com fatores de atração ecológicos. Nesse sentido, esses modelos poderiam ser complementados pela teoria da construção de nichos. Em suma, defendo que os principais programas de pesquisa nativistas não apresentam boas justificativas para sustentar a existência de estruturas cognitivas dedicadas especificamente à produção de julgamentos morais. No entanto, tendo em vista que fatores de atração psicológicos parecem canalizar o desenvolvimento da moralidade, poderíamos dizer que ela é em alguma medida inata, ao menos em um sentido ‘desenvolvimental.’ / In order to identify the role of 'innate' psychological structures in morality, I investigate how human beings develop the capacity to judge behaviors based on norms. Preliminarily, I show that the approach adopted in this dissertation does not imply the so-called naturalistic fallacy, and, to dispel confusion, I examine the concepts of innate and morality. Then, I explore the problem from the perspective of three nativist research programs. The first of them defends the existence of a universal moral grammar, by analogy with the Chomskyan model of principles and parameters in linguistics. The second program supports the existence of moral domains related to specific mental modules, which would favor the emergence of norms with certain contents. Finally, the third program consists of epidemiological models according to which cognitive structures produced by an evolutionary process would be responsible for biases in the origin and transmission of norms. In particular, I analyze how the arguments used to support these programs fare at relevant contemporary research in Cognitive Science and how well they meet arguments proposed by constructivists. With respect to the universal moral grammar theory, arguments such as the poverty of the stimulus and the projection problem are not convincing when applied to the realm of morality. Empirical studies about trolley problems, often mentioned by proponents of this theory, are also insufficient to ground the claim that morality operates according to a set of principles and parameters. Concerning the moral domains theory, it has the merit of including psychological characteristics typical of the human species, such as our emotional dispositions, in the explanation about moral judgments. Nevertheless, it is committed to a modular view of human mind that is not consilient with the results of neuroscientific research. Moreover, it does not explain the mental stages prior to the unleashing of moral intuitions. With regard to epidemiological models, the appeal to factors of attraction involved in cognitive processing offers the most promising hypothesis to explain the recurrence, in several cultures, of similar norms. However, the explanations proposed so far are still insufficient, as they are restricted to the influences of psychological factors, without exploring their interaction with ecological factors of attraction. In this sense, these models could be complemented by the niche construction theory. In short, the main nativist research programs have not presented good reasons to postulate the existence of cognitive structures specifically dedicated to the production of moral judgments. Notwithstanding, given that psychological factors of attraction seem to channel the development of morality, it is plausible to sustain that the capacity to make moral judgments is innate in some measure, at least in a developmental sense.

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