Esta tese tem por objeto o estudo do direito sucessório dos companheiros na união estável, tema que, cada vez mais, tem despertado grande interesse da sociedade. O ser humano, em decorrência de sua falibilidade e suscetibilidade a doenças, ferimentos e velhice, está sujeito à morte, fim inexorável de sua existência. A pessoa fenece, enquanto seus bens remanescem, sendo transmitidos a seus herdeiros, legítimos ou testamentários, e legatários. A sucessão legítima é aquela que se dá de acordo com a ordem preferencial estabelecida na lei; a testamentária, a que ocorre de acordo com a declaração de última vontade do falecido, expressa em testamento. Os herdeiros legítimos podem ser necessários ou facultativos: estes podem ser afastados da herança pelo fato de o falecido dispor de seus bens sem contemplá-los; aqueles, entretanto, não podem ser privados de parcela mínima da herança, a que têm direito, chamada de legítima, a não ser que sejam excluídos da sucessão por ato de indignidade ou deserdados pelo testador, em decorrência de ato atentatório à sua pessoa, nas hipóteses previstas em lei. O Código Civil de 2002 modificou profundamente a sucessão decorrente dos vínculos conjugal e convivencial. O cônjuge passou a concorrer não só com os descendentes do autor da herança, dependendo do regime de bens, mas também com os ascendentes, neste caso independentemente do estatuto patrimonial adotado. Ademais, foi elevado à categoria de herdeiro necessário, à qual antes só pertenciam os descendentes e ascendentes do de cujus. O companheiro supérstite, por outro lado, não foi declarado expressamente herdeiro necessário, embora também concorra à herança com os descendentes e ascendentes do morto. A presente pesquisa examina a posição sucessória daqueles que vivem em união estável, considerada entidade familiar pela Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, em contraste com a sucessão do cônjuge, a fim de perscrutar, por meio de ampla investigação bibliográfica, legal e jurisprudencial, se o companheiro deve ou não ser considerado herdeiro necessário, do que dependerá seu direito à legítima. / The objective of this thesis is to examine succession law in connection with common law marriage (stable union), an issue that has garnered increasing public attention. Due to their intrinsic fallibility and vulnerability to disease, injury, and old age, human beings are subject to death, to the inexorable end of their existence. Yet while human beings are destined to meet their end, their property and assets remain behind, transferred to their heirs, either legitimate or testamentary, and legatees. Legitimate succession is based on the order of preference, as prescribed in law; testamentary succession is based on a statement of last wishes by the deceased, as expressed in a will. Legitimate heirs may be necessary or optional: although the latter may be left out of the inheritance by the deceased upon disposition of his or her property and assets, the former may not be deprived of a minimum share of the inheritance, to which they have a right, also known as legitime, unless they are excluded as a consequence of an act of indignity or disinherited by the testator by virtue of an offense against such person, as provided for by law. The 2002 Brazilian Civil Code significantly modified succession for cases of marriage and cohabitation. The spouse may now claim a share of the inheritance alongside the testators descendants, depending on the particular marital property system applied, and ascendants as well, in this case irrespective of the specific property division system invoked. In addition, spouses are now classified as necessary heirs, a category previously reserved for descendants and ascendants of the deceased. However, the Civil Code does not expressly include surviving partners as necessary heirs, although they are entitled to claim a share of the inheritance alongside the ascendants and descendants of the deceased. This study considers the succession rights of individuals in common law marriage, considered a family entity under the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, in contrast to spousal succession, with a view to examining, through a detailed investigation of the existing legal literature and jurisprudence, if partners should or should not be deemed necessary heirs, a determination on which their right to legitime largely depends.

Esta tese tem por objeto o estudo do direito sucessório dos companheiros na união estável, tema que, cada vez mais, tem despertado grande interesse da sociedade. O ser humano, em decorrência de sua falibilidade e suscetibilidade a doenças, ferimentos e velhice, está sujeito à morte, fim inexorável de sua existência. A pessoa fenece, enquanto seus bens remanescem, sendo transmitidos a seus herdeiros, legítimos ou testamentários, e legatários. A sucessão legítima é aquela que se dá de acordo com a ordem preferencial estabelecida na lei; a testamentária, a que ocorre de acordo com a declaração de última vontade do falecido, expressa em testamento. Os herdeiros legítimos podem ser necessários ou facultativos: estes podem ser afastados da herança pelo fato de o falecido dispor de seus bens sem contemplá-los; aqueles, entretanto, não podem ser privados de parcela mínima da herança, a que têm direito, chamada de legítima, a não ser que sejam excluídos da sucessão por ato de indignidade ou deserdados pelo testador, em decorrência de ato atentatório à sua pessoa, nas hipóteses previstas em lei. O Código Civil de 2002 modificou profundamente a sucessão decorrente dos vínculos conjugal e convivencial. O cônjuge passou a concorrer não só com os descendentes do autor da herança, dependendo do regime de bens, mas também com os ascendentes, neste caso independentemente do estatuto patrimonial adotado. Ademais, foi elevado à categoria de herdeiro necessário, à qual antes só pertenciam os descendentes e ascendentes do de cujus. O companheiro supérstite, por outro lado, não foi declarado expressamente herdeiro necessário, embora também concorra à herança com os descendentes e ascendentes do morto. A presente pesquisa examina a posição sucessória daqueles que vivem em união estável, considerada entidade familiar pela Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, em contraste com a sucessão do cônjuge, a fim de perscrutar, por meio de ampla investigação bibliográfica, legal e jurisprudencial, se o companheiro deve ou não ser considerado herdeiro necessário, do que dependerá seu direito à legítima. / The objective of this thesis is to examine succession law in connection with common law marriage (stable union), an issue that has garnered increasing public attention. Due to their intrinsic fallibility and vulnerability to disease, injury, and old age, human beings are subject to death, to the inexorable end of their existence. Yet while human beings are destined to meet their end, their property and assets remain behind, transferred to their heirs, either legitimate or testamentary, and legatees. Legitimate succession is based on the order of preference, as prescribed in law; testamentary succession is based on a statement of last wishes by the deceased, as expressed in a will. Legitimate heirs may be necessary or optional: although the latter may be left out of the inheritance by the deceased upon disposition of his or her property and assets, the former may not be deprived of a minimum share of the inheritance, to which they have a right, also known as legitime, unless they are excluded as a consequence of an act of indignity or disinherited by the testator by virtue of an offense against such person, as provided for by law. The 2002 Brazilian Civil Code significantly modified succession for cases of marriage and cohabitation. The spouse may now claim a share of the inheritance alongside the testators descendants, depending on the particular marital property system applied, and ascendants as well, in this case irrespective of the specific property division system invoked. In addition, spouses are now classified as necessary heirs, a category previously reserved for descendants and ascendants of the deceased. However, the Civil Code does not expressly include surviving partners as necessary heirs, although they are entitled to claim a share of the inheritance alongside the ascendants and descendants of the deceased. This study considers the succession rights of individuals in common law marriage, considered a family entity under the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, in contrast to spousal succession, with a view to examining, through a detailed investigation of the existing legal literature and jurisprudence, if partners should or should not be deemed necessary heirs, a determination on which their right to legitime largely depends.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:25:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Camila Moreira Barros Dutra.pdf: 801824 bytes, checksum: cc61a3182884ec66bf60e861730a166b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-08-29 / The present work boards the controversy over the straight law of habitation as a figure of right of succession in the case of the death of the one of the parties in a common-law marriage. It has been stablished a parallel among these rights conceded to the husbands or wives and those conceded to the parties of the common-law marriage at the present standing normative system. According to this, a critical analysis has been made with the familiar entities disposed by the Federal Constitution and its abordage by the infraconstitutional rules. Essencial to the proposed object, the study has been expanded to the elements of the family rights, the straight law and the rights of succession, having as an aim the examining of this law application over the surviving part in a common-law marriage / O presente trabalho aborda o questionamento acerca do direito real de habitação como figura do Direito sucessório nos casos de sucessão do convivente. Traçou-se um paralelo entre os direitos hereditários concedidos aos cônjuges e aos conviventes na atual sistemática normativa vigente. Em vista disso, foi realizada análise crítica às entidades familiares instituídas pela Constituição Federal e seu tratamento pelas normas infraconstitucionais. O estudo se estendeu, por essencial à abordagem ao objeto proposto, elementos do Direito de Família, do Direito Real e do Direito das Sucessões, tendo como objetivo a verificação de aplicação de tal direito aos conviventes supérstites

Le droit des règlements pécuniaires entre époux consécutifs au divorce a pendant longtemps été fondé sur l’idée de sanctionner le conjoint responsable de la rupture que ce soit en France, au Canada ou dans la province canadienne de Québec. Bien que de traditions juridiques différentes, les droits français et canadien reconnaissaient ainsi un rôle central à la faute dans leur droit du divorce. Face à l’évolution concomitante des sociétés française et canadienne vers un individualisme plus marqué et une volonté croissante de pacifier les conflits, ces droits ont dû tendre vers une plus grande objectivation du divorce et de ces conséquences. Parallèlement à un mouvement de quasi-disparition de la faute, de nouvelles institutions sont apparues dans les droits étudiés, institutions fondées sur des idées de compensation, d’équité mais aussi de solidarité avec la survie ou l’apparition d’obligations alimentaires. Aujourd’hui, les droits étudiés sont marqués par une diversité d’institutions avec pour certaines des fondements multiples et des intitulés qui, malgré la différence de tradition juridique, peuvent se répondre comme, par exemple, la pension alimentaire non compensatoire canadienne qui n’est pas sans rappeler la prestation compensatoire que nous qualifions d’alimentaire française. Cette diversité amène alors à s’interroger sur la nécessité de repenser et de rationaliser les institutions existantes pour les rendre tout à la fois plus compréhensibles mais aussi plus accessibles par les futurs ex-époux. Cette simplification doit en effet s’accompagner d’une plus grande liberté contractuelle permettant aux conjoints divorcés de se réapproprier leur séparation avec l’aide d’un avocat, d’un médiateur ou encore du juge. Le divorce pacifié, se pose alors la question de la pacification de la rupture des autres couples que sont les unions libres ou encore les PACS et union civile. Ces unions hors mariage se développant, il est nécessaire aujourd’hui de prendre en considération les conséquences de leur dissolution voire d’envisager un droit commun des règlements pécuniaires consécutifs à toute séparation. / Historically post-divorce laws between spouses was based in France, Canada and Quebec on penalizing the responsible party of the separation. Although from different law traditions, Canadian and French law recognized an important place to the fault in their divorce laws. However, the tendency of the French and Canadian societies to be more individual and to pacify conflicts, divorce law had to change to become more objectivized. The movement of removing the fault in divorce permitted the creation of new institutions based on compensation, equity and solidarity which is symbolized by spousal support and alimony. The studied laws are characterized by diverse institutions, are founded on different grounds. These institutions inspired by different law traditions are thus very similar such as the Canadian on compensatory spousal support and the French compensatory obligation that we call "alimony compensatory obligation". This diversity impose us to think about the possibility of a renewal and rationalization of the existent institutions in order to be simplified and comprehensible for the future divorce spouses. A greater freedom of contract should also ensure the appropriation of the divorce's consequences by the divorced spouse with help of lawyers, mediators and judges. Once the divorce humanized, the question of the pacification of the dissolution/ ruptures of other types of union such as common law marriage or civil partnership. The increasing number of those new couples, it is becoming a necessity to take in consideration the consequences of their dissolution and draw a new common law for their dissolution.

Cette thèse vise à appréhender la condition juridique des couples non mariés, à travers près de cinq siècles. Le droit canonique du mariage relégua le concubinage à un état permanent de péché, et, au XVIe siècle, le concile de Trente prescrivit des sanctions sévères à l'encontre des concubinaires. Les pères du concile édictèrent des règles encadrant la célébration du mariage. Puis, l'autorité séculière s'arrogea peu à peu la compétence en matière matrimoniale, par les lois et par la jurisprudence. La frontière entre mariage et concubinage était dorénavant strictement établie. Si l'ancien droit ne regarda pas le concubinage comme un délit, il fustigea les bâtards en les soumettant à un statut d'infériorité. Sous la Révolution, la sécularisation du mariage ne remit pas en cause la forme traditionnelle de l'union conjugale, toutefois, les législateurs accordèrent des droits aux enfants naturels reconnus. En 1804, le Code civil ignora absolument le concubinage. Le fondement de la famille était le mariage ; et, les enfants naturels furent, de nouveau, les victimes de la prééminence de l'union légitime. Dés le milieu du XIXe siècle, la rigueur du Code envers la famille naturelle fut atténuée grâce à un courant d'idées progressistes. Puis, au début du XXe siècle, la reconnaissance officielle du concubinage fut opérée par une série de mesures législatives lui conférant des effets juridiques, et la voie vers un pluralisme juridique des modèles familiaux se trouva ouverte. / The aim of this thesis is to understand the legal status of unmarried couples, over a period of time extending for nearly five centuries. The canon law of marriage relegated cohabitation to a permanent state of sin, and in the sixteenth century, the council of Trent prescribed severe penalties to punish cohabitation. The fathers of the council enacted rules governing the celebration of marriage. Secular authority then gradually arrogated jurisdiction in matrimonial matters by means of laws and jurisprudence. The line between marriage and cohabitation was now strictly drawn. Although the old law did not consider cohabitation as a crime, it castigated children born outside of wedlock by subjecting them to an inferior status. During the Revolution, the secularization of marriage did not call into question the traditional form of the marital union; however, legislators granted rights to recognized natural children. In 1804, the question of cohabitation was totally absent from the civil Code. Marriage represented the foundation of the family, and illegitimate children were once again the victims of the rule of lawful union. By the mid-nineteenth century, the rigor of the Code toward the natural family was mitigated by a current of progressive ideas. Then, in the early twentieth century, official recognition of cohabitation was brought about by a series of legally-binding legislative measures, and the path to legal pluralism in family matters found an opening.

The study sought to determine, first, what the rules of the Hananwa family law were and, second, whether those rules were compatible with the Constitution. First, it documented the rules of the official family law. The problem that the study countenanced is that customary law is "corrupted, inauthentic and lacking authority".1 Second, it established and documented the rules of the Hananwa family law. The problem that the study countenanced in respect of Hananwa law was that it was difficult to ascertain the content of the rules of the "living" Hananwa law in order to determine their compatibility with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the traditional Hananwa community is inegalitarian and patriarchal. Section 9 of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and enjoys equal and full protection and benefit of the law. The study found that the Hananwas still observe their system of customary law. However, there are visible changes. For instance, nowadays the spousal consent is a validity requirement for all customary marriages. A parent or legal guardian must consent to a customary marriage of a minor. The individual spouses, not their families, are parties to their own customary marriages. African women enjoy equal status. This development is consistent with section 9 of the Constitution read with section 6 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. According to the Constitutional Court, in MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC), the first wife must consent to her husband's customary marriage to another woman in addition to her customary marriage to him. However, some rules of the Hananwa law do not comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. For instance, according to the Hananwa law, extramarital children do not enjoy equal inheritance rights and maintenance rights yet. This discrimination is inconsistent with the constitutional right to equality and the provisions of the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009.The Constitution puts common law and customary law on a par. However, the courts have often replaced customary law dispute resolution rules with the common law rules. For instance, the Constitutional Court in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) and the High Court in Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (W) substituted the rules of common law for those of customary law in order to resolve customary law disputes. The legislature could not be outdone. A meticulous study of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 reveals that their provisions almost appropriately reflect the common law marriage and intestate succession rules respectively. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act has, furthermore, adopted the provisions of the Divorce Act of 1979. Section 28 of the Constitution read with the Children's Act 38 of 2005 has generally substituted the fundamental human rights for the unequal rights provided by the customary law of parent and child. The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 has substituted the communal form of maintenance under customary law. / Public, Constitutional, & International Law / LLD (International and Constitutional Law)

The study sought to determine, first, what the rules of the Hananwa family law were and, second, whether those rules were compatible with the Constitution. First, it documented the rules of the official family law. The problem that the study countenanced is that customary law is "corrupted, inauthentic and lacking authority".1 Second, it established and documented the rules of the Hananwa family law. The problem that the study countenanced in respect of Hananwa law was that it was difficult to ascertain the content of the rules of the "living" Hananwa law in order to determine their compatibility with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the traditional Hananwa community is inegalitarian and patriarchal. Section 9 of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and enjoys equal and full protection and benefit of the law. The study found that the Hananwas still observe their system of customary law. However, there are visible changes. For instance, nowadays the spousal consent is a validity requirement for all customary marriages. A parent or legal guardian must consent to a customary marriage of a minor. The individual spouses, not their families, are parties to their own customary marriages. African women enjoy equal status. This development is consistent with section 9 of the Constitution read with section 6 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. According to the Constitutional Court, in MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC), the first wife must consent to her husband's customary marriage to another woman in addition to her customary marriage to him. However, some rules of the Hananwa law do not comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. For instance, according to the Hananwa law, extramarital children do not enjoy equal inheritance rights and maintenance rights yet. This discrimination is inconsistent with the constitutional right to equality and the provisions of the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009.The Constitution puts common law and customary law on a par. However, the courts have often replaced customary law dispute resolution rules with the common law rules. For instance, the Constitutional Court in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) and the High Court in Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (W) substituted the rules of common law for those of customary law in order to resolve customary law disputes. The legislature could not be outdone. A meticulous study of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 reveals that their provisions almost appropriately reflect the common law marriage and intestate succession rules respectively. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act has, furthermore, adopted the provisions of the Divorce Act of 1979. Section 28 of the Constitution read with the Children's Act 38 of 2005 has generally substituted the fundamental human rights for the unequal rights provided by the customary law of parent and child. The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 has substituted the communal form of maintenance under customary law. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LLD (International and Constitutional Law)