In this work we have focused on a public employee's right to express himself both in his freetime but also at work. We have also investigated deeply the duty of loyalty that an employeehas towards their employer and investigate how the outcome can be when these have been setagainst each other. With this work, we wanted to investigate how an employee's right toexpress himself can be limited due to various factors. We have done this by presenting whatlaws, principles, doctrine and case law such as AD cases and JO decisions say in the area. Wehave picked up various cases that have shown us different factors regarding freedom ofexpression, such as an employee's criticism directed toward his employer and business, theemployee's own interests, but also in cases where an employee has been in a high positionand has spoken out, etc. We have then analyzed and compared different cases with each otherto arrive at how the duty of loyalty and freedom of expression, as well as the right to expressoneself in leisure time and at work, relate to each other. AD cases and JO decisions are about employees expressing themselves, for example, throughtheir Facebook page or on their blog. However, the weight of our work has been to highlightvarious cases that have been able to provide answers to our questions.We have highlighted cases where the employee has expressed himself during his free time,where in some cases it has been considered okay and in some cases where the employee hasreceived a warning in the service. We have also highlighted cases that show that theemployee has a duty of loyalty towards his employer. In some cases, it has been found thatthe employee's duty of loyalty has outweighed and that the employee who has been dismissedhas been dismissed on the right grounds. This has been shown after we have interpretedjudgments and decisions from JO and AD. We have also presented in our work that freedomof expression has come before the duty of loyalty in the majority of cases.However, common to most cases from both JO and AD has been that the employer has firstgiven a sanction to the employee, such as a dismissal or a warning, which has then gone tocourt and been subject to authoritative judicial review. In some cases there has been a legal assessment of JO. Whether the sanction was right or not and whether the employee had theright to express himself, we go deeper into this in our work.

No description available.

No description available.

Since long, Swedish land owners has been forced to accept that their land is claimed for mining activities. The utilization has taken place in accordance with different laws and legal rules. Also the current Minerals Act expresses a right for third parties to assimilate minerals from other people's property. The question of who owns the mineral prior the utilization is however not answered by the Minerals Act or by any other statute. In addition to being principally interesting, the ownership issue is also of practical importance, for instance regarding the right to exploit minerals covered by the Minerals Act for household use, or the right to exploit unregulated mineral as well as in future assessments regarding e.g. mineral compensation. In addition to the principal question of ownership, the Minerals Act also gives rise to a number of other issues that affect the land owner's right in relation to the extraction of minerals on the property. The main purpose of this study has thus been to identify who, if any, can be regarded as the principal owner of the elements of earth that contains minerals under Swedish law. To do this it has been necessary to define the concept of ownership in the property context. Furthermore, the study also contains an investigation regarding whether the minerals in the earth is to be considered a part of the property, and if the property ownership entails a principal right (power) for the owner to utilize minerals that may exist underground. The right with which third parties can reside on private land and there perform the preliminary studies that may be required to obtain exploration permit is also examined, as well as the conditions for – and the powers that comes with – permit and concession in accordance with the Minerals Act. The results of the study confirm that the ownership of property in Sweden is negatively determined and that all powers relating to the property therefore is due to the owner, unless law, custom, tradition or other source of law states otherwise. The results of the study also indicate that the mineral in the ground are to be considered a part of the property; the landowner is therefore in principle its owner and the function of the Minerals Act is that of a legal constraint. It is also concluded that it is possible to perform a large part of the necessary preliminary investigations with support of the Right of Common (Swe: Allemansrätten).

No description available.

This is a thesis regarding the instigator’s intent in a case where the perpetrator, due to confusion, attacks another person, other than what the instigator had intended. The doctrine of error in persona and aberratio ictus is one of criminal law's most classic problems and highlights the conflict of intent when the act causes an intended result in an object other than intended. Another aspect being analyzed is what is known as the "coverage principle" and how it should be applied regarding differences between the perpetrator’s action and the instigator’s perception of the imagined events. Should the instigator then be charged with intent for the attack that takes place, even though the course of events developed in a completely undesirable way from the instigator's point of view? And if so, what should the instigator be charged for: instigation of attempted murder of the intended victim, instigation of murder of the actual victim, or both? The overarching purpose of the thesis is to examine how intent coverage should be assessed and what the perpetrator’s mistake means for the instigator’s liability. The thesis consists of analyzing jurisprudential and theoretical aspects as well as elements of comparative law regarding this issue. When exploring the intent of the instigator, it is necessary to determine what the perpetrator's mistake means for his or her liability. Two alternative models have been presented within Swedish legal doctrine: the model of equivalence and the model of specialty. My conclusion is that the model of equivalence should be applied concerning the perpetrator’s liability for error in persona, and after analyzing cases from the Swedish courts of appeal, the model of specialty will most likely be applied in cases of aberratio ictus. The Swedish Supreme Court addresses the instigator’s criminal liability in NJA 2022 s. 675. In this thesis, I scrutinize the case to pinpoint what this implies for the instigator’s liability, despite the perpetrator's mistake. The Supreme Court rules that if two conditions are met, the instigator has intent to commit the act committed by the perpetrator. Firstly, that the act intended by the instigator is criminally equivalent to the act that is committed, and secondly, that the outcome of the instigation is a conceivable consequence of the course of events that the instigator has set in motion. My conclusion is that the assessment of the instigator's intent should be made separately from the assessment of the perpetrator's intent. For the “coverage principle” this means that all the details of the course of events can never be predicted and cannot rule out intent. Furthermore, I suggest that there are two ways to judge the instigator’s intent: a subjective assessment that aims at the instigator’s intention at the time of the act and the circumstances of the individual3incident, or an objective assessment that aims at the risk-taking relevance and "principles derived from experience." Finally, despite the perpetrator's confusion about his identity, the instigator has the intent to the act committed by the perpetrator, despite that the outcome wasn’t desired by the instigator.

This is a thesis regarding the instigator’s intent in a case where the perpetrator, due to confusion, attacks another person, other than what the instigator had intended. The doctrine of error in persona and aberratio ictus is one of criminal law's most classic problems and highlights the conflict of intent when the act causes an intended result in an object other than intended. Another aspect being analyzed is what is known as the "coverage principle" and how it should be applied regarding differences between the perpetrator’s action and the instigator’s perception of the imagined events. Should the instigator then be charged with intent for the attack that takes place, even though the course of events developed in a completely undesirable way from the instigator's point of view? And if so, what should the instigator be charged for: instigation of attempted murder of the intended victim, instigation of murder of the actual victim, or both? The overarching purpose of the thesis is to examine how intent coverage should be assessed and what the perpetrator’s mistake means for the instigator’s liability. The thesis consists of analyzing jurisprudential and theoretical aspects as well as elements of comparative law regarding this issue. When exploring the intent of the instigator, it is necessary to determine what the perpetrator's mistake means for his or her liability. Two alternative models have been presented within Swedish legal doctrine: the model of equivalence and the model of specialty. My conclusion is that the model of equivalence should be applied concerning the perpetrator’s liability for error in persona, and after analyzing cases from the Swedish courts of appeal, the model of specialty will most likely be applied in cases of aberratio ictus. The Swedish Supreme Court addresses the instigator’s criminal liability in NJA 2022 s. 675. In this thesis, I scrutinize the case to pinpoint what this implies for the instigator’s liability, despite the perpetrator's mistake. The Supreme Court rules that if two conditions are met, the instigator has intent to commit the act committed by the perpetrator. Firstly, that the act intended by the instigator is criminally equivalent to the act that is committed, and secondly, that the outcome of the instigation is a conceivable consequence of the course of events that the instigator has set in motion. My conclusion is that the assessment of the instigator's intent should be made separately from the assessment of the perpetrator's intent. For the “coverage principle” this means that all the details of the course of events can never be predicted and cannot rule out intent. Furthermore, I suggest that there are two ways to judge the instigator’s intent: a subjective assessment that aims at the instigator’s intention at the time of the act and the circumstances of the individual3incident, or an objective assessment that aims at the risk-taking relevance and "principles derived from experience." Finally, despite the perpetrator's confusion about his identity, the instigator has the intent to the act committed by the perpetrator, despite that the outcome wasn’t desired by the instigator.

No description available.

Swedish energy policy relies heavily on the promotion of renewable energy resources, in particular wind energy and in 2002 the Swedish Government adopted a national planning goal of a yearly wind power generation of 10 TWh by 2015, which implies a substantial increase from the current 0.6 TWh level. The main purpose of this study is to analyse relevant functions of the Swedish law with reference to the im-plementation of wind power; the overarching question at issue being in what respects the law impedes respectively facilitates the development of wind power, and to compare the results from the Swedish analysis with the corresponding functions in Danish law, and b) to present some implications for the choice between different legislative measures to meet the Swedish wind power planning goal. The results are based on in-depth studies of relevant legal rules and case law, and the overall indi-cations are: a) on one hand, that several of the Swedish legal rules in connection with the overarching management and use of land and water areas are vaguely formulated and provide an extensive room for discretion, which makes the outcomes unpredictable and increase the uncertainties associated with wind power investments, b) on the other hand, that certain specific rules regarding the location of the wind-mills, together with the requirement to objectively assess alternative sites for the installation have shown to seriously hamper the establishment of windmills in Sweden, c) that the strong support for the munici-pal self- governance in connection with the system for physical planning in Sweden implies that great stress is laid on the existence of territorial plans for wind power, which in turn implies that windmills are unlikely to be established without municipal consent, and finally d) that the installation of windmills on Swedish territory may require as many as five different permits, which imply time-consuming (and hence costly) processes with unpredictable outcomes. The results from the analysis of the corresponding Danish system reveal a quite different situation; the specific and precise regulations regarding the installation of windmills in Denmark imply a lot less room for discretion which reduce the uncertainty in connection with the investment decision. Moreover, that the vertically integrated planning system in Denmark greatly enhances the possibilities to implement national planning objectives on the regional, municipal and local level. / <p>Godkänd; 2006; 20070109 (haneit)</p>

No description available.