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Avtalsfriheten i Sverige medför att parter själva kan bestämma hur länge ett avtal ska löpa. Avtalstiderna kan således löpa under en kort period men även för all evig framtid, så kallade evighetsavtal. Det finns även avtal där varken avtalstid eller uppsägningsrätt är reglerat och parterna är därför ovissa om de har ingått ett evighetsavtal eller om avtalet istället utgör ett tillsvidareavtal. Eftersom det råder olika regleringar gällande uppsägningsrätt beroende på vilken typ av avtal det är kan det uppstå problem när en part vill säga upp ett ingått avtal som utgör antingen ett evighetsavtal, eller ett avtal där avtalstid och uppsägningsrätt inte är reglerat. Om en part inte kan säga upp ett ingått evighetsavtal eller om en part endast vill ändra ett avtalsvillkor, exempelvis avtalstiden, finns istället möjligheten att under vissa omständigheter jämka avtalet i enlighet med 36 § lag (1915:218) om avtal och andra rättshandlingar på förmögenhetsrättens område, AvtL. I uppsatsen utreds vad skillnaden är mellan tillsvidareavtal samt evighetsavtal eftersom uppsägningsmöjligheterna skiljer sig mellan de två avtalstyperna. Vidare utreds under vilka omständigheter evighetsavtal kan bli föremål för uppsägning respektive jämkning enligt generalklausulen i 36 § AvtL. Eftersom generalklausulen inte ger någon tydlig vägledning när ett evighetsavtal kan jämkas tillämpas avtalsrättsliga principer för att undersöka om de kan ge klarhet vid bedömningen om ett evighetsavtal är oskäligt och därmed kan jämkas. Av analysen i uppsatsen framkommer det att tillsvidareavtal alltid kan bli föremål för uppsägning medan endast vissa evighetsavtal kan sägas upp beroende på avtalstypen och dennes särskilda bestämmelser. Vad som avgör om ett avtal utgör ett tillsvidareavtal eller ett evighetsavtal, när avtalstid och uppsägningsrätt saknas i avtalet, är avsikten vid avtalets ingående. Om en part istället vill ändra ett evighetsavtal är jämkning enligt 36 § AvtL enda möjligheten. Viktigt att notera är emellertid att evighetsavtal i sig inte utgör ett ensamt skäl för jämkning, utan istället måste varje evighetsavtal bedömas in casu utifrån dess specifika omständigheter. Vid bedömningen om ett evighetsavtal kan anses oskäligt och således ska jämkas kan avtalsrättsliga principer tillämpas. Ekvivalensprincipen, förutsättningsläran samt omöjlighetsläran är alla principer som med fördel kan tillämpas för att bedöma oskäligheten i ett evighetsavtal. Av analysen i uppsatsen framkommer det emellertid att de avtalsrättsliga principerna måste appliceras med försiktighet vid jämkning av evighetsavtal för att syftet med 36 § AvtL inte ska gå förlorat.

In the ongoing global biodiversity crisis, science deems a system-wide, structural, and fundamental transformation of society necessary to mitigate severe risks for planetary and human health. These risks will escalate further if a paradigm shift in normative human-nature relationships is not realised. The legal system needs to change. This study aims to investigate what might be required of the legal system in order to ensure that Swedish areas are protected in accordance with what science deems necessary for the sufficient conservation of biodiversity. It assesses the compatibility between Swedish law on area protection and biodiversity science and suggests how said law can change to ensure this compatibility. The compatibility between biodiversity science and current Swedish legal mechanisms for area-based conservation of biodiversity is lacking. The mechanisms fail to create requirements, conditions, and possibilities that sufficiently ensure that protected areas are ecologically representative, organised in a well-connected network, implemented and managed effectively, and cover a sufficiently large total area. These compatibility shortages could be mitigated through limiting the possibilities to derogate from area-protecting provisions, increasing the stringency of protective legislations and regulations, expressly requiring the fulfilment of scientific criteria in legislation or regulations, or through establishing a comprehensive framework regulating the entirety of Swedish protected areas. There are currently no such rules addressing the size and structure of the totality of Swedish protected areas. The compatibility between Swedish law on area protection and biodiversity science is also lacking on a more foundational level. Swedish law on area protection is built on a foundation of an anthropogenic right to exploitation of nature, a prioritisation of economic interests, and a view of nature as property and humans as rights-bearing superiors. These normative foundations clash with the ecocentric conclusions of foundational biodiversity science that anthropogenic exploitation of nature must be mitigated, that ecological interests are and must be treated as prerequisites for economy, society, and humanity, and that urgent biodiversity-prioritising transformation of the paradigm governing our legal system is necessary. These compatibility shortages could be mitigated through changing the default of what humans are allowed to do to biodiversity, and through shifting the perception of which living entities are entitled to bear legal rights.

The formal rule of law is the foundation of the Swedish legal system. It is con-nected to- but independent of- fundamental human rights. It demands that every institute of the state, every public or private actor and every private person isbound by the law. The highest hierarchical law in a state governed by the rule oflaw is the written constitution. The second chapter in the Instrument of Govern-ment consists of a catalog of basic human rights. The protection of human rights in Sweden is- apart from EU-law- a dualistic system with both the second chapterin the Instrument of Government, and the European Convention on humanrights. According to the Instrument of Government, no law in Sweden can be made that contradicts the European Convention. While a double protection con-cerning human rights might seem like a positive thing, it also creates conflict.This is especially clear in the matter of judicial review. The judicial review by thecourts and administrative agencies as well as the judicial preview made by theCouncil on Legislation in Sweden acts as an instrument to make sure that a lawdoes not contradict the constitution. In modern law, the constitution gets in-creasingly relevant with the global development of constitutionally codified hu-man rights. This is a new phenomenon in Swedish law from a historical perspec-tive, and the constitutionally codified human rights has not had the same practicalmeaning as the rights codified in the European convention. As a result, the na-tional human rights have lived in the shadow of the convention. What the essay has shown with a comparative analysis of the Norwegian judicial review is thatthe modern judicial review in a state governed by the rule of law is closely relatedto human rights because of international conventions created after the secondworld war. The human rights that are developed in the convention is influencedby natural law, while the Swedish system is based on the formal meaning of therule of law, which does not value the content of the law but the system itself.Consequently, international human rights have been incorporated into a systemthat is not made for natural law. The Swedish and Norwegian system shows that there are some common factors to the definition of the rule of law. But the de-velopment of judicial review in both countries have differed. The common fac-tors are in general codified in the checklist created by the Venice commission,why there are some principles in the rule of law that is considered constitutionaljus cogens. By using the margin of appreciation in fulfilling the duties constituted in the European convention, the constitution can be relevant, dynamic, and su-perior to the convention, as the constitution should be. Nationally characterized human rights that is in harmony with the national legal framework creates a legalcertainty that the current application of human rights is lacking.

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Bankruptcy trustees regularly, throughout the bankruptcy proceeding, encounter goods belonging to third parties that are in the possession of the bankruptcy estate. The question of whether or not the trustee or estate has a duty of care for this type of property is, however, virtually unregulated within Swedish law. The answer to the question could be of practical concern for both third parties and the involved bankruptcy actors (i.e., the bankruptcy trustee and bankruptcy estate). The bankruptcy trustee, for example, is mandated by the bankruptcy act to only act in the best interests of the creditors, which could possibly prohibit him from providing the necessary care for goods belonging to third parties. Furthermore, if an investigation would show that the bankruptcy actors have no responsibility to care for goods belonging to third parties, it would mean that these belongings are unprotected, up until the point the owner collects his property. The uncertainty revolving these issues warrants an investigation. This thesis aims at providing knowledge about the nature of responsibility the bankruptcy actors have to care for goods belonging to third parties that are in the possession of the bankruptcy debtor at the time of the bankruptcy order. It is also intended to critically discuss the findings of the investigation. The investigation covers several legal issues in the pursuit of this aim and is, following the introduction, divided into four chapters. Chapter 2 examines the concept of a duty of care and identifies the varieties of duties of care present in Swedish law. Chapter 3 addresses the question of whether the bankruptcy actors have a duty of care for the belongings of third parties. Chapter 4 deals with the mandate of the bankruptcy trustee and the ability for him to care for goods belonging to third parties within his mandate. Chapter 5 concludes the investigation and discusses the findings. The inquiry shows that the bankruptcy estate most likely has a duty of care regarding the belongings of third parties within the estate’s possession. The investigation also shows that it is likely the bankruptcy estate, and not the trustee, who bears this responsibility and who has an indemnity liability towards the third party in the event of his belongings suffering damages. The analysis shows that the bankruptcy trustee likely has a legal mandate, and at times even an obligation, to care for third party goods. I conclude by noting that the result of the investigation is mired in legal uncertainty and that one could make the argument for the necessity of clarification through legislation. However, the fact that the number of conflicts regarding this issue seems to be low, points towards the possibility of the conflict being handled well as is by the parties involved, which would seem to speak against the need of further legislation.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (further “CJEU”) assesses the compatibility of national tax provisions with the fundamental freedoms. The assessment normally consists of different steps. The first step is to determine if the national legislation constitutes a restriction. The second step is to determine if the restriction can be justified. Preserving a balanced allocation of taxing powers between the Member States is one of the grounds of justification that have been developed through the CJEU’s case law. The argument has been used frequently but is also debated since it has not appeared obvious how it may be relied upon. The purpose of this thesis has therefore been to analyse the case law of the CJEU when this ground of justification has been invoked in order to define a coherent concept of when the ground can be relied upon, how it can be distinguished from other grounds of justification, and how the reasoning of the Court has developed over time. The analysis was made of the case law up until this date which was divided into different categories of cases.    Conclusions that can be made after this analysis are that this justification ground can be relied upon in situations when a Member State’s taxing power over profits generated in its territory is being jeopardised, both as the residence state and the source state. The reasoning of the Court differs a bit from the different categories of cases, but a common element is that weight is put on if the taxpayer can move the tax base freely which would result in the Member State being obliged to renounce its taxing power. Moreover, in many of the cases examined different grounds of justification have been relied upon together with this one. However, a conclusion is that a balanced allocation of taxing power can be relied upon as a sole ground of justification. When invoked together with other grounds it serves as the foundation of the justification test and it seems rather clear that the other grounds are unnecessary but are nevertheless examined by the Court if invoked by the parties. This justification ground is widely accepted by the Court today as a sole ground of justification and can be considered essential today to allow the Member States to protect their tax base against base erosion and profit shifting.

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