A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO NATIONAL PROTECTION LAW (1940-1956) Erdemir, &Ouml / mer M.A, Department of History Supervisor: Prof.Dr. Se&ccedil / il Karal Akg&uuml / n December 2004, 130 pages This thesis introduces a comparative history of National Protection Law of 1940 and 1956. It analyzes the two applications of the law, first, by the Republican People&rsquo / s Party governments during World War II, and second, by the Democratic Party Government during the years between 1956 and 1960 in view of the general economic policies followed during both periods. It argues, in reference to the ideological struggle over Turkish economic development during the twentieth century, that the enactments and applications of the first and second National Protection Law address the authoritarian characteristics of both the Republican People&rsquo / s Party and the Democratic Party. It further argues, the enactment and application of National Protection Law by the Democratic Party government contradicted with the party&rsquo / s economic principles whereas the Republican governments had already been on the interventionist path that they inherited from the previous decade of etatism. In addition, the thesis reveals that the first National Protection Law was more widely applied than the second. In both cases, the application of National Protection Law failed to solve economic problems and aroused a public discontent which brought about political losses for its executors.

Esta tese tem por objetivo criticar a \"Doutrina Bush\", cujos termos foram lançados na Estratégia de Segurança Nacional dos EUA de 2002 e têm orientado a política externa da atual Administração daquele país no sentido de uma maior assertividade do poder militar estadunidense contra as ameaças, atuais ou futuras, que ponham em risco a sua posição de dominância no plano internacional, em particular no seu pleito de legalidade da legítima defesa chamada preemptiva. A este respeito, esta tese faz duas afirmações centrais: 1) que, ao contrário do que os termos em que está formulada nos querem fazer crer, não se trata de uma política de ataques preemptivos, mas sim de ataques preventivos, que não podem ser subsumidos ao instituto jurídico da legítima defesa; 2) que qualquer política de ataques preventivos decididos de maneira unilateral é incompatível com a manutenção da ordem no atual sistema em que se estruturam as relações internacionais na atualidade. Para tanto, na primeira parte da tese, é analisada a justificação político-filosófica da legítima defesa, cujo reconhecimento nos sistemas jurídicos positivos se revela uma condição racional de sua legitimidade, bem como, a partir dos limites marcados pelos princípios justificantes - agressão atual e necessidade dos meios empregados na defesa -, é apresentado um conceito ideal de legítima defesa; na segunda parte, expõe-se a regulação do instituto da legítima defesa no direito internacional, especialmente na Carta da ONU, contra a qual é, em seguida, comparada a proposta de \"legítima defesa preemptiva\" feita pela \"Doutrina Bush\". Desta se conclui que, nos termos em que é formulada, não pode ser considerada como legítima defesa, porque dispensa o requisito do ataque atual, em curso ou iminente, revelando-se verdadeira ação preventiva, cuja atribuição somente deve caber a um órgão que represente a comunidade internacional, no caso, o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, sob pena de fragilizar a proibição do uso da força nas relações internacionais. Por outro lado, entendida a preempção nos estreitos limites da resposta antecipada a um ataque iminente, defende-se que seja abrangida pela permissão do uso da força em legítima defesa, desde que sujeita a alguma forma de controle posterior. / This thesis intends to refute the so-called \"Bush Doctrine\", whose terms have been laid down in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America in 2002, and have since then oriented the present Administration\'s foreign policy towards a greater assertiveness of military power against either present or future threats to its dominant position in international relations, in particular its proposition of a right to preemptive self-defense. In this respect, this thesis advance two central claims: 1) that, contrary to what the actual terms in which this doctrine is formulated might want to suggest, it is not a policy of preemptive strikes that is being proposed, but one of prevention, which is beyond the reach of the legal right of self-defense; 2) that any policy of unilateral preventive strikes is contrary to the maintenance of order in the present international system. In order to support this claims, in the first part of the thesis, the philosophical and political justification of the right to self-defense is examined, the recognition of such a right in actual normative systems emerging as a rational condition of their legitimacy, and an ideal concept of self-defense is advanced that results from the application to the claim to individual self-preservation of the requirements deriving from this justification: an actual aggression and the concrete necessity of the means employed in the defense; in the second part of the thesis, the regulation of self-defense by international law, specially through the Charter of the United Nations, is explained, in the terms of which the legality of the Bush Doctrine\'s claim of preemptive self-defense is verified. Of this claim it is concluded that, at least in the way it is described by the National Security Strategy, it cannot be regarded as self-defense, because it does away with the necessary element of an actual aggression, either in progress or imminent, being in fact a variety of preventive use of force, the recourse to which should be restricted to an organ representing the community, in this case the Security Council of the United Nations, lest the prohibition of the recourse to force in international relations is relaxed. That notwithstanding, it is advanced that, as long as one understands preemption only as an early response to an imminent attack, it can be reconciled with the authorization to use force in self-defense, if subjected to some form of ex post control.

The use of Private Military Companies (PMCs) has become an increasingly common feature of contemporary armed conflict. Because of their autonomous contractual status, PMCs have presented governments with problems of accountability on several levels, including violations of international human rights and humanitarian law (IHL) standards. This thesis argues that PMCs should be considered to be non-state actors (NSAs), subject to international law from both an International Relations Theory and a Legal Theory perspective. This conclusion is linked to the issue of whether individual PMC employees can be treated as legitimate combatants according to IHL. State practice has not led to a clear understanding of the definition of combatant, a problem which has been compounded by a lack of government policy on the use of PMCs. Using Canadian experience as a case study, the thesis concludes that IHL suggests two options for regularizing the status of PMCs which would both strengthen accountability and uphold the rule of law.

I och med Romstadgan för den internationella brottmålsdomstolen (nedan Romstadgan) finns nu, för första gången, en juridiskt bindande definition av begreppet aggression, vilken baseras på Förenta Nationernas stadga (nedan FN-stadgan) artikel 2(4). Romstadgan utgör grunden för att Internationella brottmålsdomstolen (nedan ICC), i efterhand, ska kunna utkräva ansvar av en fysisk person för aggressionsbrott. Förenta Nationerna (nedan FN) har till uppgift att bevara freden, genom att agera mot staters aggressionshandlingar, framför allt i preventivt syfte och efter beslut av säkerhetsrådet. Det är intressant att jämföra FN-stadgan och Romstadgans aggressionsbegrepp för att på så sätt förstå hur begreppet aggression behandlas i internationell rätt, både i relationer mellan stater och då fysiska personer ska hållas rättsligt ansvariga för aggressionsbrott. Det är också värdefullt att förstå hur de två definitionerna kan påverka varandra och vad det kan föra med sig för fördelar och nackdelar.                       I denna uppsats behandlas FN-stadgans och Romstadgans aggressionsbegrepp i en komparativ studie, en viktig slutsats är att det finns skillnader mellan  de båda stadgorna.                       I uppsatsen ges inledningsvis en historisk inblick i aggressionsbegreppets utveckling, som underlag för den efterföljande behandlingen, där FN-stadgans och Romstadgans begrepp aggressionshandling utreds.                       Därefter behandlas begreppet aggressionshandling enligt FN-stadgan. Utredningen följer Wienkonventionen om traktaträttens allmänna tolkningsregel. Först görs en tolkning av begreppet aggressionshandlings ordalydelse, i enlighet med FN-stadgans systematik. Sedan redogörs för hur begreppet tolkats av relevanta FN-organ och i staters praxis. Generalförsamlingens aggressionsdefinition, i resolution 3314, gås igenom och kritiseras till viss del, då den inte ger en tydlig avgränsning av vad aggressionsbegreppet innefattar. Generalförsamlingens resolution 3314 är dock central och används därmed, som grund för vidare behandling i uppsatsen där resolutionen också jämförs kritiskt med andra FN-organs praxis och med FN-stadgans lydelse. Uppsatsen visar att begreppet aggressionshandling har givits en vag formulering i FN-stadgan och att vad som anses innefattat i begreppet också skiljer sig något mellan de olika FN-organen. Hos FN-organen finns dock den gemensamma kärnan att, som aggressionshandling anses den första våldsanvändningen i en stats internationella relationer genomförd med ett specifikt aggressivt uppsåt.                        Uppsatsen utreder sedan kritiskt Romstadgans aggressionsbegrepp och dess olika delar varvid viktiga skillnader mot FN-stadgan behandlas. Ett specifikt aggressivt uppsåt saknas i Romstadgan och kan inte heller läsas in i denna, då det skulle gå emot Romstadgans ordalydelse och systematik. Romstadgan ser därmed inte heller ett specifikt aggressivt uppsåt, som en försvårande omständighet, utan Romstadgan ser enbart till det använda våldets allvar och omfattning. Vidare så innehåller Romstadgan en tröskel, i syfte att utesluta en legal gråzon från ICCs jurisdiktion, vilken saknar motsvarighet i FN-stadgan. Romstadgan utesluter därmed genom sin lydelse våldshandlingar, som inom delar av den folkrättsliga doktrinen, anses befinna sig inom en gråzon av jus ad bellum.                       I slutsatserna sammanställs sedan de huvudsakliga skillnaderna mellan aggressionsbegreppen enligt FN-stadgan, FN-organen och Romstadgan och en utredning görs av de fördelar respektive nackdelar och risker, som dessa skillnader medför samt hur skillnaderna påverkar varandra. Författaren finner att det föreligger betydande skillnader då specifikt aggressivt uppsåt saknas i Romstadgan samt då Romstadgans tröskelvärde syftar till att utesluta den legala gråzonen inom jus ad bellum. Vidare anser författaren att dessa skillnader riskerar att urholka FN-stadgans våldsförbud och således i framtiden riskera att gynna starka våldsbenägna stater på svaga staters bekostnad. / The Rome Statute for The International Criminal Court (henceforth The Rome Statute) now provides, for the first time, a legally binding definition of the concept of Aggression. The definition is based on the United Nations Charter (henceforth The UN Charter) article 2(4). The Rome Statute is the foundation on which the International Criminal Court (henceforth ICC) can prosecute individuals on crimes of aggression post the events. The United Nations (henceforth UN) has the charter to sustain the peace through acting against the acts of aggression of nations, primarily preventively and based on resolutions by the Security Council. It is interesting to compare the UN Charter and the Rome Statute definition to understand how the concept of aggression is used in international law, both in relations between nations and when individuals shall be held accountable for crimes of aggression. In addition, it’s valuable to understand how the two definitions can impact each other and what the implications might be of similarities and differences.   Hence, this thesis is a comparative study of the concept of aggression in the UN Charter and the Rome Statute. One key conclusion is that there are significant differences in how the aggression is defined in the two documents.   The use and development of the concept Aggression is first accounted for in a historic context as a foundation for the comparative study.   Then, acts of aggression in the UN Charter is thoroughly investigated in three steps. The investigation is carried out in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Firstly, through an interpretation of acts of aggression in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term in the context of the UN Charter. Secondly through an investigation of the interpretation in relevant UN bodies and in the practice of nations. Thirdly, the definition of the UN General Assembly, resolution 3314, is investigated and criticised as it does not offer a sufficiently clear delimitation of the concept of aggression.  Resolution 3314 is, however, of key importance and is used subsequently as an element of comparison. The resolution is also compared with the practice of other UN bodies and the wording of the UN Charter. The thesis proves the that aggression has a vague definition in the UN Charter and that the scope of the concept is different in different UN bodies. However, common to all UN Bodies is to define aggression as the first use of force with a specific aggressive intent in international relations.    Following on UN, the thesis provides a critical investigation of the concept of aggression in the Rome Statute where key differences relative to the UN Charter are accounted for. The Rome Statute lacks specific aggressive intent and such cannot be made part of the interpretation as it would the statutes wording and systematics. Thus, the Rome Statute does not regard a specific aggressive intent aggravating but looks solely to the gravity and scale of the force used. In addition, the Rome Statute includes a threshold with the purpose of excluding a grey zone from the jurisdiction of ICC. Such grey zone does not exist in the UN Charter. The implication of this is that the Rome Statute excludes acts of violence that, among some international lawyers, are regarded to be in a grey zone of jus ad bellum.   The conclusions include a summary of the main differences across the UN Charter, different UN Bodies and the Rome Statute. That leads into a discussion on the potential advantages and drawbacks that come out of these differences plus potential effects of the reciprocal influence. The key element of this discussion is that aggressive intent is missing in the Rome Statute and that the statute’s threshold aims to exclude the legal grey zone in jus ad bellum. The thesis concludes that these differences risk to weaken the prohibition of the use of force in the UN Charter and, as a consequence, that this may favour strong and aggressive nations at the expense of smaller and weaker nations.

No description available.

L’échec de l’impérativité du droit international pénal et la fragilité de la justice pénale internationale qui en résulte ne dépendent pas du choix normatif d’un modèle de juridiction, ad hoc ou conventionnel, mais simplement des défaillances et des réticences des États à l’égard de la norme choisie. Ce constat d’évidence trouve sa confirmation dans le processus de mise en place et de fonctionnement de la Cour pénale internationale, fâcheusement contournée à faire prévaloir sur la lutte contre l’impunité une lutte pour la « justiciabilité » des auteurs des crimes les plus graves qui heurtent la conscience de l’Humanité : crimes contre l’humanité, crime de génocide, crimes de guerre, crime d’agression. L’obstacle qu’elle doit essentiellement surmonter est en effet que sa compétence peut être délibérément mise en échec à tout moment, directement ou indirectement, par tout État avant tout soucieux de sa propre souveraineté, qu’il soit ou non partie au Statut de Rome. L’observation des stratégies étatiques montre d’une part que la faculté de renoncer à l’exercice de sa propre compétence répressive se traduit par une négation de l’impérativité des engagements souscrits auparavant, certains Etats se désolidarisent de la répression dont ils se sont désistés. D’autre part, et à l’inverse, l’exercice légitime de sa compétence répressive par un Etat peut très facilement lui permettre de glisser vers une obstruction chronique de la juridiction internationale, voire ou déni du droit impératif qui la régit. En l’absence d’une réelle reconnaissance de la juridiction internationale, les conséquences de telles attitudes sont d’une ampleur qui dépasse l’imagination. Seul un comportement coopératif et constructif, affranchi des compromis égoïstes et opportunistes des États, pourrait parer au risque actuel d’une érosion progressive de l’architecture punitive partagée mise en place par les États eux-mêmes lors de la création de la Cour pénale internationale et ainsi de garantir que soient punis à coup sûr les auteurs de crimes insupportables. / The failure to make international criminal law imperative and the resulting fragility of international criminal justice should not be understood as the consequence of a normative choice toward a jurisdictional model, be it ad hoc or conventional. Rather, it derives from the State's weaknesses and reluctance to abide by the chosen norm. This is clearly confirmed by the very way the International Criminal Court was implemented, functions and is being sadly circumvented. Instead of bolstering the fight against impunity, it focuses on the fight for the “justiciability” of the perpetrators of the most serious crimes, resulting in subsequent negative effects on Humanity’s consciousness: crimes against humanity, crime of genocide, war crimes and crime of aggression. Owing to the fact that a State's primary concern is its own sovereignty, the biggest obstacle the Court has to overcome remains that at any moment, directly or indirectly, its competence can be intentionally overruled by any State, signatory or not of the Treaty of Rome. Observing State strategies shows that relinquishing one’s repressive authority is generally seen through a negation of formerly made commitments: some States dissociate from the repression monopoly they disclaim. Conversely, the legitimate exercise of a State’s repressive authority can easily result in regular obstruction of international jurisdiction, and even the refusal of the imperative law that governs it. Without any genuine recognition of international jurisdiction, such attitudes have undeniable serious consequences that far outreach the imagination. The only solution is cooperative and constructive behavior, free of opportunistic and selfish compromises of States. This behavior could protect against the current risk of the progressive erosion regarding shared punitive organization which States themselves implemented through the creation of the International Criminal Court. The result would guarantee the punishment of perpetrators of unbearable crimes.

The paper deals with the use of unmanned aircraft of the American national security policy. It examines the history of unmanned aviation, its military use, and cost- efficiency. It then examines the main obstacles and problems with their use in national security that this technology meets and will meet in the future after a higher level of autonomy is developed. These problems involve legal issues, international and domestic American law, the issue of civilian casualties, the role of the media, and public opinion. The final chapter focuses on the problems of technical, strategic and operational issues. In this section the research paper comes to the first conclusion which claims that the introduction of more autonomous systems to war will radically change its structure and, consequently, standard procedures and strategies. Case studies are included to illustrate how successful the drone strategy is applied in the five countries where the United States leads a war on terror. The research using the theory of the revolution in military affairs concludes that these UAVs pose the greatest challenge in history and it goes well beyond military matters. UAVs in national security affect the understanding of the basic principles of war in relation to the concepts of warrior ethos and just war.