Much has been written in the literature of higher education on the history and current role of presidents, provosts, and deans. However, higher education scholars have, for the most part ignored the role of institutional in-house attorneys on college and university campuses. Those who have written on the subject of institutional counsel have proffered the idea that in-house general counsel offices were established as a result of the increased regulation of higher education by state and federal governments, and litigation resulting from the faculty and student rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s. This project seeks to provide a detailed justification for the rationale for the proliferation of counsel offices, and to provide a base-line qualitative, interview-based approach to the current role of college and university attorneys. Using a historical, document based approach this dissertation provides a comprehensive exploration of the argument that the establishment and growth of offices of the general counsel on college and university campuses was rooted in litigation. This dissertation further builds on the notion that as colleges and universities became larger and more complex, federal and state governments increased regulatory and reporting demands and accountability on institutions. A second issue that this dissertation covers is the way in which modern day institutional counsel view their roles within a college or university. Using Oral History Methodology, three attorneys were interviewed about their perceptions of their roles. Based on those interviews, this dissertation proffers the idea that an institutional counsel’s view of his or her role is linked to the nature of the individual campus and its leadership, and the structure of the office in which the attorney works. This dissertation also puts the role of the institutional counsel into the context of institutional actors by comparing it with the role of the academic dean. In addition to showing that the role of the institutional counsel is institution dependent, the results of this project indicate that the role of the institutional general counsel is an area ripe for additional study.

This dissertation is concerned with the ways in which Māori legal traditions have changed in response to the process of negotiated settlement of historical claims against the state. The settlements agreed between Māori groups and the state provide significant opportunities and challenges for Māori communities and, inevitably, force those communities to confront questions relating to the application of their own legal traditions to these changed, and still changing, circumstances. This dissertation focuses specifically on Māori legal traditions and post-settlement governance entities. However, the intention is not to simply record changes to Māori legal traditions, but to offer some assessment as to whether these changes and adaptations support, or alternatively detract from, the two key goals of the settlement process - reconciliation and Māori self-determination. I argue that where the settlement process is compelling Māori legal traditions to develop in a way that is contrary to reconciliation and Māori self-determination, then the settlement process itself ought to be adjusted. This dissertation studies the nature of changes to Māori legal traditions in the context of the Treaty settlement process, using a framework that can be applied to Māori legal traditions in other contexts. There are many more stories of Māori legal traditions that remain to be told, including stories that drill into the detail of specific legal traditions and create pathways between an appropriate philosophical framework and the practical operation of vibrant Māori legal systems. Those stories will be vital if we in Aotearoa/New Zealand are to move towards reconciliation and Māori self-determination. The story that runs through this dissertation is one of a settlement process that undermines those objectives because of the pressures it places on Māori legal traditions. But it need not be this way. If parties to the Treaty settlement process take the objectives of self-determination and reconciliation seriously, and pay careful attention to changes to Māori legal traditions that take place in the context of that process, a different story can be told – a story in which Treaty settlements signify, not the end of a Treaty relationship, but a new beginning. / Graduate / 0398 / 0332 / 0326 / carwyn@uvic.ca

Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is a prelude to the Anatomy Act of 1832, which indulged the anatomists’ scientific ambition, granting a legitimate and sufficient source of cadavers to dissect legally. When read in concert with the history of anatomy and the historical record of body snatching, including case law and anatomy legislation, Frankenstein exemplifies the issues in medico-legal history at the turn of the nineteenth century, for Victor Frankenstein and the Creature’s stories are set amid the context of anatomical study, grave-robbery, crime, punishment and the illicit relationship between medicine and murder. This thesis accordingly addresses the medico-legal history of anatomy, the anatomist’s ambition and complex inhumanity, and the mingled identity of the anatomical subject as illegitimate and criminal. This analysis demonstrates that Frankenstein sheds light upon the anatomist’s ambition, the identity of the human cadaver, and the bioethical consequences of meddling with nature.

This dissertation is concerned with the ways in which Māori legal traditions have changed in response to the process of negotiated settlement of historical claims against the state. The settlements agreed between Māori groups and the state provide significant opportunities and challenges for Māori communities and, inevitably, force those communities to confront questions relating to the application of their own legal traditions to these changed, and still changing, circumstances. This dissertation focuses specifically on Māori legal traditions and post-settlement governance entities. However, the intention is not to simply record changes to Māori legal traditions, but to offer some assessment as to whether these changes and adaptations support, or alternatively detract from, the two key goals of the settlement process - reconciliation and Māori self-determination. I argue that where the settlement process is compelling Māori legal traditions to develop in a way that is contrary to reconciliation and Māori self-determination, then the settlement process itself ought to be adjusted. This dissertation studies the nature of changes to Māori legal traditions in the context of the Treaty settlement process, using a framework that can be applied to Māori legal traditions in other contexts. There are many more stories of Māori legal traditions that remain to be told, including stories that drill into the detail of specific legal traditions and create pathways between an appropriate philosophical framework and the practical operation of vibrant Māori legal systems. Those stories will be vital if we in Aotearoa/New Zealand are to move towards reconciliation and Māori self-determination. The story that runs through this dissertation is one of a settlement process that undermines those objectives because of the pressures it places on Māori legal traditions. But it need not be this way. If parties to the Treaty settlement process take the objectives of self-determination and reconciliation seriously, and pay careful attention to changes to Māori legal traditions that take place in the context of that process, a different story can be told – a story in which Treaty settlements signify, not the end of a Treaty relationship, but a new beginning. / Graduate / 0398 / 0332 / 0326 / carwyn@uvic.ca

No description available.

No description available.

A presente dissertação trata das relações entre os momentos críticos da economia e os usos e adaptações do direito econômico no contexto de crise. Como recorte específico, estudou-se a influência da crise econômica brasileira da década de 1980 sobre a cultura jurídica, em especial sobre o pensamento jurídico que se ocupou do direito econômico. No primeiro capítulo, o direito econômico é apresentado em sua dimensão histórica, ressaltando como fases de crise contribuíram para sua formação doutrinária e legislativa. Adiante, são mostradas manifestações do direito econômico no Brasil entre as décadas de 1930 e 1960, antes da consolidação científica da área, de forma a evidenciar as respostas dos juristas às transformações e adversidades da economia nacional em um período marcado pelo crescimento da atuação do Estado no domínio econômico. Já no capítulo derradeiro, em conjunto com uma análise panorâmica da economia brasileira durante as décadas de 1970 e 1990, são apresentadas manifestações de juristas acerca de temas vinculados à crise econômica nacional, utilizando-se como divisões do texto as formas institucionais sugeridas pela escola regulacionista. / This dissertation links the critical moments of the economy and the uses and adaptations of the economic law in the context of crisis. As specific focus, we studied the influence of the Brazilian economic crisis of the 1980s on the legal culture, particularly on the legal thinking concerning the economic law. In the first chapter, the economic law is presented in its historical dimension, emphasizing how periods of crisis contributed to its doctrinal and legislative development. Following this line, we demonstrate manifestations of economic law in Brazil between the 1930s and 1960s, before the scientific consolidation of the area, in order to show the answers of lawyers and legal scholars to the changes and adversitys of the national economy in a period marked by the growth of state action in the economic domain. In the last chapter, together with an overview of the Brazilian economy during the 1970s and 1990s, we present legal topics related to the national economic crisis, using as text divisions the institutional forms suggested by the regulation school.

O objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é analisar a assimilação antropofágica (Utilizarei, nesta dissertação a metáfora da expressão Antropofagia realizada pelo Movimento Modernista brasileiro. Assim como os índios canibais devoravam seus inimigos, acreditando que assim assimilavam as suas qualidades, os artistas Modernistas propunham uma devoração simbólica da cultura estrangeira, aproveitando suas inovações artísticas sem perder a identidade cultural brasileira.) do debate jurídico norte-americano produzido em torno da questão social durante a Era Roosevelt por parte do pensamento jurídico brasileiro da Era Vargas. Desse modo, estudar-se-á a forma como os autores norte-americanos da Sociological Jurisprudence e do Realismo Jurídico foram utilizados pela doutrina jurídica brasileira do período entre guerras na formação de um pensamento jurídico antiliberal e anticonceitualista. No centro da crise do capitalismo mundial, as universidades (Roscoe Pound, 1870-1964, e Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, 1893-1962), a Suprema Corte (Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 1870-1938, e Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1856-1941) e o corpo burocrático do governo (1933-1945) Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) (James MacCauley Landis, 1899-1964) produziam alternativas ao mecanicismo judicial e ao modelo liberal. Na periferia do capitalismo mundial, o corpo burocrático de Vargas (Oliveira Vianna, Francisco Campos e Francisco Sá Filho) e as revistas e debates jurídicos (João Mangabeira e Alípio Silveira) questionavam o liberalismo da República Velha (1889-1930) e buscavam, no mercado global de idéias, modelos institucionais que pudessem ser antropofagizados, substituindo as idéias fora do lugar implantadas pelo bacharelismo utópico da República Velha. Era o momento de explicar o Brasil, encontrar o desenho institucional mais adequado à realidade nacional, construir uma opinião pública e descobrir as soluções para converter o atraso em modernização. Assim, nos principais palcos do debate jurídico dos dois países e, em especial, na Suprema Corte norte-americana e na doutrina jurídica brasileira, percebia-se essa tentativa de revisão do método jurídico, como uma forma de se adequar o direito a um novo quadro de relações do capitalismo industrial. Desse modo, não só se via a necessidade de implantação de um aparato jurídico apto a tratar a questão social (como a regulação das relações do trabalho), como também se observava a necessidade de se reconstruir a forma como se aplicava o direito. O modelo formalista e conceitualista que havia se consolidado sob uma perspectiva privatista e liberal durante o século XIX, mostrava-se ineficiente para atender as novas demandas da sociedade. Esse aspecto de integração entre a questão social e o antiformalismo é essencial para compreender o paralelo entre o pensamento jurídico norte-americano e brasileiro durante o período entre guerras, uma vez que é por meio desse eixo comum que se estabeleceram os principais canais de leitura antropofágica do pensamento jurídico norte-americano pelo pensamento jurídico brasileiro. / The objective of this Master\'s Degree dissertation is to analyze the \"anthropophagical\" (I will use, in this dissertation, the metaphor of the word Anthropophagy made by the Brazilian Modernist Movement. Like the cannibal Indians used to devour their enemies, with the belief that, as such, they would assimilate their qualities, the Modernist artists used to propose a symbolic devouring of the foreign culture, taking advantage of their artistic innovations without losing the Brazilian cultural identity) assimilation of the North-American legal debate, arising from the social issue during the Age of Roosevelt, by the Brazilian legal thought of the Age of Vargas. Therefore, one will study the way how the North-American authors of the Sociological Jurisprudence and of the Legal Realism have been used by the Brazilian legal doctrine of the interwar period, in the formation of an anti-liberal and anti-conceptualist legal thought. In the core crisis of the worldwide capitalism, Universities (Roscoe Pound, 1870-1964, and Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, 1893-1962), Supreme Court (Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 1870-1938, and Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1856-1941) and bureaucratic body of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) government (1933-1945) (James MacCauley Landis, 1899-1964) produced alternatives to the legal mechanicism and to the liberal model. At the periphery of the world capitalism, the bureaucratic body of Vargas (Oliveira Vianna, Francisco Campos and Francisco Sá Filho) and the legal magazines and debates (João Mangabeira e Alípio Silveira) questioned the liberalism of the Old Republic (1889-1930) and searched, in the global market of ideas, for institutional models that could be anthropophagized, replacing the out-of-place ideas implemented by the utopic bachelorism of the Old Republic. That was the time of explaining Brazil, finding the institutional drawing that is the most proper to the national reality, building a public opinion and discovering the solutions to convert the delay into modernization. Thus, in the main background legal debate of the two countries legal debate, and especially in the United States Supreme Court and in the Brazilian legal doctrine could be perceive such attempt of review of the legal method, as a way of fitting the law to a new picture of relations of the industrial capitalism. Therefore, it would be seen not only the need of implementation of a legal apparatus proper to treat the social issue (such as the regulation of the work relations), as well as one would observe the need of rebuilding the way how the law was applied. The formalist and conceptualist model that would be consolidated under a privativistic and liberal perspective during the 19th Century showed to be ineffective to deal with the new demands of the society. This aspect of integration between the social issue and the anti-formalism is essential to understand the parallel between the North-American and Brazilian legal thought during the interwar period, since the main channels of anthropophagic reading of the North-American legal thought by the Brazilian one have been established by means of this common axis.

Mock jurors (N = 200) read descriptions of a mock civil case involving an adult survivor of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy who is suing his/her abuser for monetary/psychological damages. Jurors individually decided perceived percent of responsibility of defendant, award to plaintiff pre- and post-group deliberations, and as a mock jury, in groups of 5 to 10. Jurors and juries assigned greater percent of culpability to female defendants than male defendants. Individual jurors awarded more n1oney to plaintiffs abused by female defendants than male defendants. Low Modem Sexism Scale (MSS) scorers attributed greater percentage of responsibility to defendants and awarded plaintiff more money than high scorers. There was no significant difference in award to male or female plaintiffs; however, greater percent of culpability was assigned to defendants who abused plaintiff longer (i.e., 19 years vs. 10 years). Low Belief in Just World (BJW) scorers individually attributed greater percent of responsibility to defendant and awarded more money to plaintiff than high scorers. Gender of defendant, just world, and sexist attitudes appeared to play important roles in jurors' decisions in cases involving adults who were child victims.

L'« expérience originelle » de l'État de droit moderne avec un état d'exception prolongé fut la Première Guerre mondiale. L'étude ici proposée porte sur cette « expérience originelle » et sa gestion en France et en Allemagne pendant l'état d'exception de 1914/18, ainsi que sur son règlement envisagé en 1918/19. Le but de l'étude est d'identifier, dans un premier temps, les origines des différents projets d'ordre international pour l'après-guerre conçus en 1918 (traités de paix à l'Est) et 1919/20 (traités issus de la conférence de paix de Paris). Ces origines sont recherchées non pas dans le droit international d'avant-guerre, mais dans le droit interne des belligérants pendant la guerre ; la partie majeure de l'étude y est consacrée. Dans un deuxième temps, seront à discerner les catégories du juste et de l’injuste, du comportement étatique légitime ou illégitime, qui sont à la base du règlement de la responsabilité de l'État dans les traités de paix. L'« expérience originelle » de nos sociétés contemporaines lié à ce problème fut la Première Guerre mondiale. L'étude ici proposée porte sur cette « expérience originelle » et sa gestion en France et en Allemagne pendant l'état d'exception de 1914/18, ainsi que sur son règlement envisagé en 1918/19. Le but de l'étude est d'identifier, dans un premier temps, les origines des différents projets d'ordre international pour l'après-guerre conçus en 1918 (traités de paix à l'Est) et 1919/20 (traités issus de la conférence de paix de Paris). Ces origines sont recherchées non pas dans le droit international d'avant-guerre, mais dans le droit interne des belligérants pendant la guerre ; la partie majeure de l'étude y est consacrée. Dans un deuxième temps, seront à discerner les catégories du juste et de l’injuste, du comportement étatique légitime ou illégitime, qui sont à la base du règlement de la responsabilité de l'État dans les traités de paix. En dépit des deux autres ruptures du 20ème siècle (1945 et 1989), un grand nombre d'éléments-clés sur lesquels notre ordre international actuel est fondé date de 1919 – notamment celles concernant la responsabilité de l'État envers les individus et vice versa (responsabilisation du citoyen pour le comportement de son gouvernement). Cela constitue l'intérêt historico-politique de cette étude qui porte sur un objet relevant de l'histoire du droit : dans le corpus de règles établi pour mettre fin à l'état d'exception généralisé après quatre ans, peuvent être identifiés des conceptions de l'État et de l'ordre international qui ont eu un impact perceptible sur la longue durée, en partie jusqu'à nos jours. / This work explores the state's legal responsibility for the expropriation or destruction of property in wartime. This responsibility is analysed in a two-fold manner: First, regarding its evolution at the national level (government liability, "Staatshaftung"), and second regarding its evolution within internaional law (state responsibility, "Staatenverantwortlichkeit"). With respect to the first aspect, wartime laws and judgements are taken into account (1914-1918), while with respect to the second, the elaboration of the treaties of Bucarest, Berlin and Brest-Litovsk (1918) and Versailles (1919) is analysed. By considering these aspects, the work aims to establish whether there was a provable link between the evolution of national and international law, and to what extent there has been a “spill-over” from the national into the international legal sphere. The primary research question is thus: To what extent did German and French government liability before 1918 shape these states' concept of state responsibility after 1918? This dissertation aims to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between state and the individual in modern society, as it was conceived in domestic and international law. Legal norms in these two realms existed before, throughout and after the war; however, there is a “before” and an “after” in the sense that the war brought about some major shifts in the legal convictions held by the authorities. The war has led to both securitisation and juridification, depending on the issue, and certain decisions – especially in juridification – from the years of 1914-1919 still shape our (international) legal order today. This is particularly true regarding sanctions directed against non-state entities. / Die „Urerfahrung“ des modernen Rechtsstaats mit dem Ausnahmezustand war der Erste Weltkrieg. Geleitet von der Frage nach der rechtlichen Verantwortung des Staates während des Ausnahmezustandes (1914-1918) und bei der Abwicklung desselben (1918/19) soll dieser „Urerfahrung“ und ihrer Handhabung in Deutschland und Frankreich nachgegangen werden. Ziel der Untersuchung ist zunächst die Identifikation der Wurzeln der verschiedenen internationalen Rechtsordnungsentwürfe von 1918 (Ostfriedensverträge) und 1919/20 (Pariser Vorortverträge). Diese Wurzeln werden weniger im Völkerrecht der Vorkriegszeit als vielmehr in der Entwicklung des Staatsrechts während des Krieges vermutet, welcher der Hauptteil der Arbeit gewidmet ist. Darauf aufbauend soll dargelegt werden, welche Kategorien von Recht und Unrecht, von legitimem und illegitimem Staatshandeln den einzelnen Leitsätzen zur rechtlichen Verantwortung des Staates zugrunde lagen, die in den Friedensverträgen festgehalten worden sind. Trotz der zwei weiteren großen Zensuren des 20. Jahrhunderts – 1945 und 1989 – lassen sich mehrere Grundelemente unserer gegenwärtigen internationalen Ordnung gerade auf diejenigen Entscheidungen zurückführen, die schon um 1919 gefällt worden sind – und hier besonders auf die Entscheidungen zur Verantwortung des Staates vor dem Individuum. Darin liegt die politikhistorische Relevanz des hier bearbeiteten rechtshistorischen Gegenstands: In den Regelwerken, die dem vierjährigen Ausnahmezustand ein Ende setzen sollten, kamen Staats- und Ordnungsvorstellungen zum Tragen, die eine langfristige Wirkung entfaltet haben, zum Teil bis in unsere Gegenwart.