This thesis explores the historical development of personal status law, which governs a person’s marriage, divorce, and custody rights. It is significant because it is part of a framework that has defined women’s rights for centuries. I will argue that personal status law is a patriarchal framework that has been reinforced over time, leading up to the creation of nation-states in the Middle East. As such, this is the “institution” of personal status that will be traced using historical institutionalism theory. In this thesis I will argue that personal status has undergone a critical juncture, or crucial moment of potential to change, in both Jordan and Iraq’s founding, and that this has consequentially affected personal status law development and responses to the women’s movement throughout the 20th century in both countries. This thesis briefly reviews the role of women’s rights and the development of law in pre-Islam era, Islam and the Qur’an, and the Ottoman Empire in order to describe the institution of personal status law. Next, I review the history of Jordan and then Iraq and identify the critical juncture of personal status in historical context. In each chapter I will also explore the matter of de facto, or what women’s rights are like in practice, as an example of the institution at work in the patriarchal protection paradox.

The main argument of this study is that the right of Indigenous peoples in Peru to consultation has little practical force and effect, since the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal is not prepared to base it on a broader right of self-determination. I centre my investigation on the 2005-2011 decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal of Peru regarding the right to consultation. In these decisions, the application of the right to consultation is divorced from a perspective informed by the right of Indigenous self-determination. The main consequence of this divorce is that it obscures the pragmatic and symbolic dimension of the right to Indigenous self-determination, debilitating the practical and symbolic potential of the right to consultation. The lack of correspondence between the right to consultation and the right of indigenous self-determination is built into the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal and reflects the bias of its judges. This bias is actually a continuation and accommodation of old prejudices of the dominant society against Indigenous peoples in Peru; it is part of the pervasive cultural discrimination that is embedded in Peruvian society and that has been translated into jurisprudential terms and language. This bias is also a symptom of the invisibility of the cultural manifestations of Indigenous peoples and the resultant obscuring of cultural differences in general. This situation illustrates that the racism that existed in the colony, and continued during the republican era in Peru, has not died, but has merely been transformed into a more subtle form of legal and constitutional colonialism. / Graduate / 0326 / alvaro.cordova@mail.mcgill.ca

Le droit public est un élément structurant l’organisation des facultés de droit depuis la fin du XIXe siècle en France. Pourtant, la notion reste bien souvent problématique : l’objet de cette étude est d’en préciser la portée dans l’enseignement, à partir de l’exemple de la Faculté de droit de Paris. Celle-ci, par ses effectifs, sa proximité avec les institutions politiques et la concurrence directe d’autres établissements d’enseignement supérieur joue un rôle de premier plan dans l’élaboration et la mise en œuvre des réformes qui conduisent sous la IIIe République à la généralisation du droit public dans les facultés de droit. Elle permet ainsi de comprendre le processus de spécialisation des professeurs de droit, marqué notamment par le sectionnement de l’agrégation en 1896. Loin de produire des résultats simples, ces évolutions créent une série d’équilibres instables et de tensions. La volonté des publicistes de former un groupe distinct de celui des privatistes se heurte au souhait largement répandu de maintenir l’unité de la science juridique. Le droit public lui-même n’est pas homogène. Ensemble de matières (droit administratif, droit international public, droit constitutionnel, législation financière) plus que savoir cohérent, il est traversé par deux tendances : l’une en fait un savoir formalisé et autonome, capable d’imposer sa logique propre à l’écume des faits, l’autre à l’inverse le rattache aux sciences politiques et économiques. Le succès tardif de la première tendance ne doit pas dissimuler la volonté, dans la première moitié du XXe siècle, de faire du droit public un savoir lié à l’actualité et explicatif du social. / Public law has been instrumental in organizing Law Schools in France since the late 19th century. However, the notion remains problematic: based on the example of the Law School of Paris, the purpose of this study is thus to examine its specific impact on legal teaching. The Parisian School of Law, by far the biggest and closest to political institutions, played a leading role in the reforms which led to a generalization of public law in Law Schools during the Third Republic. Its framework provides a good example of how legal scholars have specialized after the separation, in 1896, of the agrégation recruitment competition into different sections, one of them being for public law and one for private law. Far from being simple, these evolutions remain unstable. Public law scholars both wish to distinguish themselves from the dominating civilists, and to maintain the unity of legal science. Public law itself is not a homogeneous field of knowledge. A collection of disciplines (administrative law, international public law, constitutional law, financial legislation) rather than a coherent science, it is characterized by two trends: the first sees public law as a formalized and autonomous body of knowledge, able to comprehend facts through its distinctive logic; on the contrary, the second trend sees it simply as a part of political and economic sciences. Before the supremacy of the first trend imposed itself – rather late – in the first half of the 20th century, public law was considered a social knowledge, used to explain contemporary political events.

Dans une actualité où l’institution matrimoniale est devenue l’expression d’une liberté individuelle, s’élevant au niveau du droit constitutionnel et du droit international, on se demande d’abord si un nouveau droit commun à cet égard est né à la base des traditions européenne et chinoise, et puis dans quelle mesure. Ces réponses dépendent étroitement d’un regard sur le passé de cette institution à la lumière du droit comparé. Fondé sur le droit romano-canonique, le ius commune europaeum avait laissé une grande liberté comme le consensualisme romain à la conclusion du mariage mais exclu le divorce, ce qui avait été suivi par les droits français, allemand et anglais jusqu’au XVIème siècle. C’est la Réforme protestante au XVIème siècle et les codifications nationales au XVIIIème et XIXème siècle qui ont fait l’éclatement de ce vieux droit commun. Toutefois, la notion de liberté individuelle et la réclamation d’égalité juridique ont jeté des bases d’un nouveau droit commun de la liberté matrimoniale qui évoque non seulement la liberté de se marier mais celle de divorcer. C’est depuis le XXème siècle que la notion européenne de liberté matrimoniale, du moins en tant qu’« état d’esprit », a pénétré dans l’ordre juridique chinois, aboutissant à la rupture chinoise avec son héritage traditionnel qui avait rendu défavorisée et inégalitaire la liberté individuelle des époux, et à la naissance d’un nouveau droit commun qui traverse les deux traditions. Néanmoins, une telle convergence, en raison de la contrainte culturelle étant le fruit d’évolutions historiques distinctes, n’est encore qu’un rapprochement conceptuel et idéologique. / In the current situation where the matrimonial institution has become the expression of an individual freedom, rising to the level of constitutional law and international law, questions may arise as to, first, whether a new ius commune in this respect has been born on the basis of Chinese and European legal traditions, and then, to what extent. The answers closely depend on a glance at the past of this institution in the light of comparative law. Based on Romano-Canon law, the ius commune europaeum had left a considerable freedom as Roman consensus to the conclusion of marriage, but excluded the divorce, which had been followed by French, German and English laws until the 16th century. It is the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century and national codifications of the 18th and 19th century that maked this old ius commune burst. Nevertheless, the notion of individual freedom and the claim of legal equality provided the basis for a new ius commune of matrimonial freedom that evokes not only the freedom to marry but also the freedom to divorce. It is since the 20th century that the European notion of matrimonial freedom, at least as a “state of spirit”, penetrated into the Chinese legal order, leading to China’s break with its traditional heritage that had made the individual freedom of the spouses disadvantaged and unequal, and to the birth of a new ius commune crossing the two traditions. However, such a convergence, due to the cultural constraint being the fruit of distinct historical evolutions, is still only a conceptual and ideological rapprochement. / In der gegenwärtigen Situation, wo die Institution der Ehe zum Ausdruck der individuellen Freiheit geworden ist, die sich auf dem Niveau des Verfassungs- und Völkerrechts erhoben hat, ist zunächst zu hinterfragen, ob ein neues gemeines Recht in dieser Hinsicht entstanden ist, das sich aus der europäischen und chinesischen Rechtstraditionen ergibt, und dann inwieweit. Die Antworten auf diese Fragen hängen in hohem Maße von einem Blick zurück in die Vergangenheit dieser Institution im Lichte der Rechtsvergleichung. Das römisch-kanonische Ius commune, das bis zum 16. Jahrhundert von der französischen, deutschen, englischen Rechte gefolgt worden war, hatte der Eheschließung eine grosse Freiheit wie römische Konsensvereinbarung gelassen, aber die Ehescheidung ausgeschlossen. Die protestantische Reformation im 16. Jahrhundert und die Nationalkodifikationen im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert zersplitterten dieses alte gemeine Recht. Allerdings schufen der Gedanke der individuellen Freiheit und die Einforderung der Rechtsgleichheit wichtige Grundlagen für einen neuen gemeinen Recht von Ehefreiheit, das sich nicht nur auf die Eheschließungsfreiheit sondern auch auf die Ehescheidungsfreiheit beruft. Seit 20. Jahrhundert ist der europäische Begriff von Ehefreiheit zumindest als eine „Geisteshaltung“ in die chinesische Rechtsordnung eingeführt worden. Dies hat dazu geführt, dass China mit dem traditionellen Erbe gebrochen hat, das die individuelle Freiheit der Ehegatten benachteiligt hatte, und dass ein neues gemeines Recht quer durch diese zwei Rechtstraditionen entstanden ist. Aufgrund der kulturellen Einschränkung, die auf unterschiedliche historische Entwicklungen zurückzuführen sind, ist dennoch eine solche Angleichung noch immer eine konzeptionelle und ideologische Annäherung. / 当前，婚姻制度已经演进成为个人自由的表达，并且上升到了宪法与国际法的层面，于是人们不禁要问，在这一方面基于中欧两大法律传统的新的“共同法”是否已经形成？如果有，在多大的范围内呢？这些答案紧紧地取决于从比较法的角度对这个制度既往史的考察。根植于中世纪罗马教会法的“欧洲共同法”对婚姻的缔结赋予了极大的自由，如罗马式意思一致，但却排除了离婚自由，并在十六世纪以前被法国法、德国法以及英格兰法所共同遵循。正是欧洲十六世纪的宗教改革以及十八和十九世纪的民族国家法典化运动打碎了旧的“共同法”秩序。尽管如此，个人自由的观念和法律平等的诉求为婚姻自由新一轮的“共同法”奠定了基础，不仅涉及结婚自由，还扩大到离婚自由。正是二十世纪以来，婚姻自由的欧洲观念，起码作为一种“精神状态”，被引入中国法律秩序，使中国与其传统遗产（夫妻个人自由的不尊重和不平等）相决裂，横跨两大法律传统的新一轮“共同法” 也相应诞生。然而，由于不同历史演进所带来的文化束缚，这样的一种趋同，目前还只是处于一种概念上和观念形态上的接近。

LL.D.

Substantive due process is one of the most cherished and elusive doctrines in American constitutional jurisprudence. The understanding that the Constitution of the United States protects not only specifically enumerated rights, but also broad concepts such as “liberty,” “property,” and “privacy,” forms the foundation for some of the Supreme Court’s most impactful—and controversial—decisions. This thesis explores the constitutional merits and politicizing history of natural rights jurisprudence from its application in Dred Scott v. Sandford to its recent evocation in Obergefell v. Hodges. Indeed, from slavery to same-same sex marriage, substantive due process has played a pivotal role in shaping our nation’s laws and destiny: But was it ever intended to? This paper first examines the legal arguments in favor of substantive due process to determine whether the judiciary was designed to be the “bulwark” of natural as well as clearly scribed law. Then, employing a novel framework to measuring judicial politicization, the thesis tracks the doctrine’s application throughout its most prominent case studies. Often arriving at nuanced conclusions, we observe that the truth is more often painted in some gradation of grey than in black or white.

[pt] O estado de sítio constitui uma figura constitucional essencial à compreensão das estruturas políticas democráticas. Se por um lado é mecanismo de proteção da sociedade, alargando os limites da autoridade estatal para rápida ação em situações excepcionais, por outro pode ser instrumento legitimador de arbitrariedades e abusos intervencionistas. As freqüentes decretações de estado de sítio durante a Primeira República brasileira servem como um indicativo das vicissitudes que permeavam os poderes estatais e das tentativas de consolidar o regime republicano federativo no país. A partir da compreensão de que o fenômeno normativo jurídico do estado de sítio pode ser visto como um fenômeno lingüístico, o presente trabalho analisa o instituto constitucional, durante o referido período histórico, com base nas teorias de linguagem de viés culturalista desenvolvidas por Mikhail Bakhtin e Pierre Bourdieu. Para tanto, foram examinados discursos sobre o sítio produzidos nas esferas dos três poderes públicos federais, registrados, principalmente, nos anais da Assembléia Constituinte, do Senado Federal e da Câmara dos Deputados, em mensagens redigidas pelos Presidentes da República e em decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal. O estudo desses materiais, que leva a concluir que as disputas pelos sentidos do estado de sítio foram marcadas por relações lingüísticas de poder simbólico e que o instituto funcionou como meio de configuração das estruturas políticas e jurídicas da Primeira República, está estruturado em três partes: a primeira dedicada aos trabalhos constituintes, a segunda ao processo de concretização dos dispositivos constitucionais e a terceira à reforma da Constituição aprovada em 1926. / [en] Understanding the constitutional precept of the state of siege is essential to understanding the democratic political structures. If, on the one hand, it is a mechanism for the society s protection, thus broadening the limits of the state authority for a quick action in exceptional situations, then on the other hand it can be a legitimizing instrument of arbitrariness and interventionist abuses. The frequent declarations of state of siege during Brazil s First Republic can indicate the vicissitudes that used to permeate the state powers and the attempts to consolidate the federative republican regime in the country. Given that the normative juridical phenomenon of the state of siege can be seen as a linguistic phenomenon, the current work analyses the constitutional institution during the aforementioned period, based on the language theories of Mikhail Bakhtin and Pierre Bourdieu and their culturalist bias. Discourses on the state of siege produced by the three branches of the federal powers - mostly registered in the annals of the Constituent Assembly, the Senate and the House of Deputies, presidential messages and Supreme Court decisions - have been examined. The study of these materials is structured in three parts - the first, dedicated to the making of a new constitution, the second, concerning the solidification process of the constitutional rules and the third, dealing with the 1926 constitutional reform - and leads to the conclusion that the disputes on the meanings of state of siege were characterized by linguistic relations of symbolic power and that this institution worked as a means to configure the political and juridical institutions of the First Republic.

Although secularization has early antecedents in Mexico's history, the generation who embodied the Constitutionalist faction of the 1910 Revolution undertook an unprecedented campaign to achieve it. Strong anticlerical provisions proclaimed in the 1917 Constitution were implemented and gradually escalated in intensity by the administrations of Presidents Álvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elias Calles. This ignited an armed uprising known as the Cristero Rebellion that arose in rural Mexico in 1926. Beyond the armed conflict, this dissertation analyzes the cultural effects caused by the implementation of such a legal and institutional agenda that reveal a substantial confrontation in the public sphere between two opposed concepts of society-religious and non-religious. As a result, society became highly polarized while the government pushed its secularization aims to the extreme as never before. New laws intervened more intensely on private rights, transforming people's everyday ideas about religion, nation, law, justice and citizenship. By looking at citizens' experiences with such law enforcement, this work elucidates how the state finally neutralized radical Catholicism by stigmatizing it as non-patriotic in the public sphere. This phenomenon that happened between 1917 and 1929 can be conceptualized as the secularization of patriotism and the transformation of people's notions of the legal system- defined as the legal popular culture- that was central to Mexico's social and cultural Revolution.

Sjötåget sommaren 1676 blev ett svenskt misslyckande. Efter regalskeppet Kronans förlisning och förlusten av sjöslaget den första juni 1676 tillsatte kungen Karl XI en kommissorialrätt med syfte att ställa de ansvariga för misslyckandet till svars. Kommissorialrättens protokoll har utgjort den här undersökningens grund. Syftet har varit att dels undersöka kommissorialrättens arbete, dess organisation, retorik och metod, men också att analysera de tankemönster och värderingar som präglade och styrde dess handlingsmönster. Det står klart att kommissorialrättens ledamöter, samt de berörda officerarna, i stor utsträckning delade ett antal föreställningar om mod och manlighet, plikt och trohet, samt heder och ära. Dessa föreställningar påverkade inte bara det sätt man valde att beskriva sjöslaget och officerarnas agerande i strid, utan också hur framför allt de anklagade kom att uppföra sig inför den sittande rätten. Rätten framstår i protokollen inte enbart som en arena för att skilja skyldiga från oskyldiga samt för att utdöma straff, utan också som en plats att bevisa och återupprätta en hotad heder.

This dissertation identifies institutional positivism and historically grounded pluralism as interpretive trends in the Canadian case law on Indigenous-state relations, and explores tensions between these trends. These are tensions between practices of judicial interpretation, not between theories of interpretation or legal concepts. They are practices developed case- by-case, with interpretive trends emerging over time through series of cases addressing similar issues in related contexts. Institutional positivist approaches insist that judicial recognition of Indigenous legal orders and accommodation of Indigenous interests must take place within established constitutional forms founded on state sovereignty. Historically grounded pluralist approaches show greater willingness to balance principles of state sovereignty against principles of popular sovereignty and of Indigenous priority in Canadian territory. While the two approaches overlap significantly, their differences sometimes lead to contrasting legal conclusions on key issues of, e.g., treaty interpretation, the relationship between Indigenous legal orders and the state legal system, and the jurisdictional dimension of Aboriginal title. This dissertation examines these positivist-pluralist tensions in the context of the current period of ideological transition and rapidly evolving imaginaries of Indigenous-state relations. Chapters 1 and 2 explore the case law to highlight concrete ways in which this ideological transition finds doctrinal expression in both positivist and pluralist modes. Chapters 3 and 4 offer broader reflections on philosophical debates relating to legal positivism and the role of popular sovereignty in constitutional interpretation by Canadian courts. The final chapter then considers the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in Canadian law, with a focus on implementing legislation recently adopted by British Columbia and on two recent judgments that split the Supreme Court of Canada on the proper role of the Canadian judiciary in coordinating Canadian state law with non-state legal orders (Indigenous in one case and international in the other). This concluding chapter explains how the ongoing interplay of positivist and pluralist concerns will inevitably shape the reception of UNDRIP in Canadian law and the ongoing elaboration of Canadian Aboriginal law more generally. / Graduate / 2022-08-26