Le relatif échec que fut le Human Rights Act 1998 et les condamnations régulières du Royaume-Uni par la CEDH peuvent être considérés comme les symptômes, parmi d’autres, d’un problème de la liberté dans le constitutionnalisme britannique. Comment expliquer que cet Etat, membre fondateur du Conseil de l’Europe, résiste si fortement à l’application de cette déclaration de droits qu’est la Convention Européenne de Sauvegarde des droits de l’Homme et des libertés fondamentales ? Nous proposons dans ce travail une solution appuyée sur une étude de la culture classique de la common law, c'est-à-dire, essentiellement mais pas seulement, de la grande doctrine parlementaire anglaise du dix-septième siècle. Il nous semble en effet que cette doctrine a fixé la conception anglaise de la liberté et l’a définitivement envisagée comme devant relever de la common law. Nous suggérons que c’est par une redéfinition permanente de la common law que la liberté a été pensée en droit public anglais et que ce travail de redéfinition est encore à l’oeuvre aujourd’hui. Tout d’abord le problème de la liberté – qui s’est aussi posé en France et en Amérique par exemple – a pris une forme particulière en Angleterre : plutôt que de penser la source de légitimité du pouvoir, les juristes anglais ont réfléchi à ce que pouvait être les « marques » d’un droit acceptable pour tous. Cette réflexion a engendré des vagues de politisation du droit mais elle a rendu l’apparition d’un peuple sujet de droit beaucoup plus difficile. La première vague de politisation fait de la common law, le droit de la communauté, c'est-à-dire le droit commun à tous (Partie 1). La seconde vague de politisation de la common law correspond à un approfondissement de la première et fait de la common law un droit de la liberté en articulant le langage de la common law à l’individu par le biais d’une morale constitutionnelle (Partie 2). / Many are the signs revealing a certain difficulty with liberty or freedom in british constitutionalism. The relative failure of the Human Rights Act 1998 in terms of efficiency , the never-ending debate about the enactment of a british declaration of rights and the numerous sanctions taken by the ECHR against the UK, can be considered as symptoms of this problem. How, then, is it possible to explain the overwhelming role of the UK in the adoption of the ECHR in the 1950’s and this resistance of the UK towards the European Convention ? Our aim, in this work, is to provide an explanation which would be based on the study of the early modern common law tradition that is mainly (but not exclusively) the parliamentary Doctrine of the Seventeenth Century. We think that this doctrine or discourse established the english conception of liberty and considered this latter as originating in the common law. We suggest that liberty was and is thought as a permanent redefinition of the law itself (the common law) and that this idea gave birth to Public Law exactly at the same time. First of all, the above-mentioned problem of liberty – which appeared in America and France as well – arose in a particular way in England. Rather than focusing on power and its legitimacy, english state lawyers concentrated their work on the marks of a law which could be acceptable for all. This reflexion led to successive waves of politisation of the law itself but did not enable the apparition of a people which would be the source of both law and power. The first wave of politisation established that common law was the law common to all (Part 1). The second wave deepened the first one and enabled the common law to be « the law of liberty » by linking the language of the common law with the individual, through constitutional morality (Part 2).

A l’arrivée des premiers colons eurocanadiens à Assiniboia en 1811, le territoire n’est encore qu’un terrain de chasse pour les grandes compagnies de commerce des fourrures, qui obéissent aux codes d’une lex non scripta propre au milieu et à l’économie des Territoires Indiens. La colonie dépend ensuite de la tutelle juridique de la Compagnie de la Baie d’Hudson, qui gère ses institutions gouvernementales, législatives et judiciaires à l’abri d’interventions canadiennes ou britanniques. Jusqu’à son annexion au Canada en tant que province du Manitoba en 1869, Assiniboia est le seul district de l’Ouest continental canadien doté de telles institutions. Cette thèse analyse l’évolution de la culture juridique de la société métissée de la Rivière Rouge (Assiniboia). A travers les sources des fonds législatifs et judiciaires de la colonie, les récits, correspondances et journaux de dirigeants, de missionnaires et d’habitants d’Assiniboia, ce travail observe les usages de l’outil juridique et ses effets normatifs sur les colons. Cette étude postule qu’un demi-siècle après sa création, la Rivière Rouge est un espace juridique hybride, où les lois coutumières coexistent avec celles du code civil de la colonie. Cette recherche démontre l’importante participation de la population à sa propre gouvernance et l’établissement progressif d’un pluralisme juridique, qui savait reconnaître et respecter les altérités sociales de la Rivière Rouge, où se rassemblaient des Eurocanadiens, des Autochtones et une majorité d’individus métissés et semi-nomades. Enfin, cette étude met en évidence le rôle fondamental des Métis et du métissage dans tous les processus de changements juridiques du territoire.

L'étranger a toujours eu un statut particulier en France. Déjà, sous l'Ancien Régime, celui-ci est soumis à une réglementation différente jusqu'à la Révolution française qui, malgré un vent nouveau ayant entraîné l'application d'un grand nombre d'idées novatrices et la création de droits importants, ne permet pourtant pas à ce dernier d'être considéré comme un citoyen. Il ne cesse alors de faire l'objet d'exclusion, tant au niveau social que politique. Cette situation se perpétuera jusque sous la III° République avant de s'accentuer sous le régime de Vichy. Après la guerre, le Préambule de la constitution du 27 octobre 1946 consacre de nouveaux droits constitutionnels économiques et sociaux. Pourtant, en dehors de l'alinéa 4 du Préambule sur le droit d'asile, aucun article ne vise spécifiquement l'étranger. Il en est, par exemple, ainsi du droit à la protection sociale qui n'est devenu effectif que bien après son affirmation, ce qui n'a pas manqué de poser quelques difficultés. Il faut, de plus, attendre l'adoption du Traité de Maastricht en 1992 pour voir émerger un statut supplémentaire de l'étranger, avec l'apparition de la notion de citoyenneté européenne. Ce nouveau statut confère aux ressortissants communautaires un droit de vote et d'éligibilité à certaines élections. Ainsi, une problématique principale se dégage du sujet. La question qui se pose est donc de savoir comment un droit historiquement contesté a finalement pu être progressivement affirmé. Cela soulève dès lors la question de savoir si, de la même manière, des droits actuellement contestés, comme le droit de vote local des étrangers, pourront un jour être affirmés. / The foreigner has always had a special status in France. Under the Old Regime, he is subject to different regulations, until the French Revolution which, despite having a wind driven implementation of many innovative ideas and the creation of important rights does not allow him to be considered as a citizen yet. He doesn't cease to be the subject of exclusion, at both social and political levels. This situation has been perpetuated under the Third Republic before being widened under the Vichy regime. After the World War, the Preamble of the 27 October 1946's Constitution dedicates new economic and social constitutional rights. Yet, except paragraph 4 of the Preamble on the political asylum, no article specifically targets the foreigner. If political rights are actually denied to him, it is the same for social rights, because of the economic and financial consequences. It is, for example, the right to social protection that has become effective after its statement, which caused some difficulties. Moreover, it is the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that gives other status to the foreigner, with the emergence of the concept of European citizenship. This new status gives EU citizens the right to vote and stand in some elections. Thus, a main problem emerges from the subject. The question is how a historically disputed right was finally declared. This therefore raises the question of whether, in the same way, human rights now denied, as the foreigners' local voting rights, may one day be affirmed.

This dissertation creates a background for studying white women in the Transvaal between 1877 and 1899. Legal documents are used as primary sources, as they are invaluable for researching women’s history, in that they provide a new perspective. When writing women’s history, it must be grounded in theory, as, especially when it comes to history in court cases, concepts like ‘history as performance’ and ‘occasionalism’ are significant. Of course, an eye must also firmly be held on concepts such as ‘gender’ and ‘deconstruction’, since it dictates how one should approach one’s sources. A history of the Transvaal is necessary, for when studying the court cases one must be able to position the women within a framework of their lives, and what type of living they made. Therefore, part of the dissertation is a political, but also social and economic, history of the Transvaal, written with specifically white women in mind. Sources for the socio-economic historical framework include literary accounts and secondary works on the period. The framework for the court cases further includes creating a legal stage on which to position women, which is accomplished by using legal sources like law reports, but also laws and resolutions. It is only once a detailed framework has been created that one can scrutinise court cases for issues surrounding white Transvaal women’s legal position, and agency. AFRIKAANS : Hierdie verhandeling skep die agtergrond vir ‘n studie van wit vroue in Transvaal tussen 1877 en 1899. Regsdokumente word as primêre bronne gebruik, aangesien dit van onskatbare waarde is in die ondersoek van vrouegeskiedenis, deurdat dit ‘n nuwe perspektief bied. Die skryf van vrouegeskiedenis moet in teorie gegrond wees, aangesien konsepte soos ‘history as a performance’ en ‘occasionalism’ belangrik is, veral wanneer dit kom by geskiedenis in hofsake. ‘n Ferm blik moet natuurlik ook gehou word op konsepte soos ‘gender’ en ‘dekonstruksie’ aangesien dit bepaal hoe die bronne benader moet word. ‘n Geskiedenis van Transvaal is nodig, want dit moet moontlik wees om vroue te posisioneeer binne die raamwerk van hulle lewens en die tipe bestaan wat hulle gevoer het. ‘n Gedeelte van die verhandeling behels derhalwe ‘n politieke, maar ook ‘n sosiale en ekonomiese geskiedenis van Transvaal, geskryf spesifiek met wit vroue in gedagte. Bronne vir die sosio-ekonomiese historiese raamwerk sluit verder in die skep van ‘n regsverhoog waarop die vroue geposisioneer kan word. Dit word daargestel deur gebruik te maak van regsbronne soos wetsverslae, asook wette en besluite. Eers wanneer so ‘n uitvoerige raamwerk gekonstrueer is, kan die hofsake bestudeer word vir kwessies rondom wit Transvaalse vroue se regsposisie, en hulle betrokkenheid by hulle eie agenda. Copyright / Dissertation (MHCS)--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Historical and Heritage Studies / unrestricted

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / This study examines the history of Indian-settler legal relations in Indiana, from the state’s pre-territorial period to the late-nineteenth century. Through a variety of interdisciplinary sources and methods, the author constructs a broad narrative on the evolution and co-existence of Native and non-Native customary legal systems in the region, focusing on matters related to marriage, property rights, and testimony. The primary thesis—which emphasizes reciprocally formative relations, rather than persistent conflict—suggests that Indiana’s pre-modern legal past involved an ad hoc yet highly effective process of cultural brokerage, reciprocity and inter-personal accommodation. That the American Indians lost much of their self-governing status following the period of contact is clear; however, a closer look at the ways in which nations historically defined, exercised, asserted, and shared jurisdiction, reveals a more intricate story of influence, authority, and concession. During the French and British colonial and American territorial periods, settler society adjusted to and often accommodated Native concepts of law and justice. Through a complex order of social obligations and community-based enforcement mechanisms, a shared set of rules and jurisdictional practices merged, forming a hybrid system of Indian-settler norms that bound these individuals across the cultural divide. When Indiana entered the Union in 1816, legal pluralism defined jurisdictional practice. However, with the nineteenth-century rise of legal positivism—the idea of law as the sole command of the nation-state, a sovereign entity vested with exclusive authority—territorial jurisdiction and legal uniformity became guiding principles. Many jurists viewed the informal, pre-existing custom-based regulatory structures with contempt. With the shift to a state-centered legal order, lawmakers established strict standards for recognizing the law of the “other,” ultimately rejecting the status of the tribes as equal sovereigns and forcing them to concede jurisdiction to the settler polity.

Coutelle, Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas / En 1763, la Proclamation Royale crée quatre nouveaux gouvernements parmi les territoires qu’acquiert la Grande-Bretagne : la Province de Québec, la Floride Orientale, la Floride Occidentale et Grenade. La Proclamation prévoit que le droit anglais et les institutions britanniques y soient transférés. Le droit de conquête, encadré par la doctrine européenne et jusnaturaliste, garantit aux peuples conquis certains droits. De plus, les capitulations acceptées par les Britanniques et leur attitude durant le régime militaire laissent présager d’une certaine continuité juridique. Le transfert juridique et la création d’institutions britanniques varient beaucoup d’une colonie à l’autre, cela tient en grande partie à des contextes locaux très différents, qui conduisent à une application non-uniforme de la Proclamation Royale. L’intégration des populations conquises à la vie publique est facilitée par la conservation de tout ou partie de leur anciens droit et institutions, à condition que l’accès aux fonctions publiques soit permis aux Catholiques. Cette dynamique d’intégration se met en place au Québec, dès les premières années du règne britannique ; cependant, elle est très vite abandonnée en Floride, et finit par échouer brutalement à Grenade. En outre, la création d’assemblées représentatives, tel que prévu par la Proclamation Royale est difficile. Elle suscite des antagonismes entre les « vrais » sujets Britanniques et les peuples conquis, qui sont de « nouveaux » sujets, essentiellement Catholiques. Ces derniers ne peuvent, selon les lois de la Grande-Bretagne siéger dans ces assemblées. Cette période de transfert (1760-1783) interroge tous les champs juridiques, elle conduit à l’avènement d’un régime mixte, sui generis au Québec, et des régimes de plein transfert dans les trois autres colonies. Cette thèse concentre l’analyse sur les enjeux juridiques ; tout en faisant appel à d’autres perspectives, comme celles de la démographie, de l’économie, de la religion, et de la sociologie. Elle démontre comment se forment des systèmes juridiques mixtes à partir de deux systèmes qui se succèdent, ou bien comment le nouveau droit remplace totalement l’ancien. Dans le cas d’un remplacement total du droit, les Français se trouvent exclus du nouveau régime, et cela vaut plus largement pour les peuples conquis et colonisés mentionnés dans cette thèse, qu’ils soient Euro-américains ou Autochtones. / In 1763, the Royal Proclamation created four new governments among the territories acquired by Great Britain: the Province of Quebec, Eastern Florida, Western Florida and Grenada. The Proclamation stated that English law and British institutions would be transferred there. Yet, according to the law of conquest, framed by European and natural law doctrine, conquered peoples would be in some regards protected. Moreover, the capitulations accepted by the British and their attitude during the military regime foreshadowed a certain legal continuity. The legal transfer and the creation of British institutions varied greatly between these governments, due to very different local contexts, which lead to a non-uniform enforcement of the Royal Proclamation. The integration of the conquered populations into public life was made easier by the preservation of all or part of their ancient law and institutions, as long as Catholics were allowed to be involved in the institutions and public functions. This dynamic was set up in Quebec in the early years of British reign; however, it was soon abandoned in Florida, and ended up failing in Grenada. In addition, the creation of representative assemblies, as planned by the Royal Proclamation was difficult, it gave rise to conflicts between the "real" British subjects and the conquered peoples, who were called "new" subjects (mainly Catholics). According to the laws of Great Britain, the latter could not sit in those assemblies. This period of transfer (1760-1783) questioned all legal fields and led to the advent of a mixed, sui generis regime in Quebec and to a full transfer in the other three colonies. This thesis focuses on legal issues, while using other perspectives (such as demography, economics, religion, and sociology) if needed. It demonstrates how mixed legal systems were formed from two successive systems, or how the new law completely replaced the old one. Finally, the integration of the conquered peoples was tied with the preservation of their former legal system. In the event of a full change of law, the French would be excluded from the new regime and this would apply more widely to all the conquered and colonised peoples mentioned in this thesis, whether Euro-Americans or Native Americans.

[pt] Quadros comparativos entre as relações raciais no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos abundam no campo dos estudos raciais e da história comparada. Mas a prática de comparar essas duas sociedades transborda o meio estritamente acadêmico. Elaborar uma visão sobre o local a partir de comparações com outras porções do mundo é uma prática comum à circulação atlântica de sujeitos e ideias. Assim, é possível encontrar discursos que sistematicamente opõem Brasil e Estados Unidos desde o século XIX, cujas autorias são bastante diversas. Esta tese busca mergulhar nesse universo comparativo a partir de um fio condutor específico: as visões norte-americanas de um paraíso racial brasileiro. O paraíso racial consiste na miragem de uma idílica sociedade com duas grandes características: um sistema escravista mais suave e a ausência de barreiras raciais legais. Perseguir a história dos coautores do paraíso racial significa, portanto, adentrar a longa história da democracia racial, que remonta a dinâmicas que antecedem a sua nomeação e posterior denúncia como mito. A partir da revisão bibliográfica e do acesso a fontes primárias – como imprensa, cartas e discursos – foram identificados e analisados sujeitos históricos produtores dessa visão do Eldorado brasileiro. Esses interlocutores da tese estão dispostos em quatro grandes tempos, entre 1833 e 1947: começando pelos abolicionistas imediatistas do pré-Guerra Civil, em 1833; a seguir, os abolicionistas do pós-Guerra Civil, em 1865; na década de 1920, são evocados os ativistas negros entusiastas da migração para o Brasil; por último, atravessando a década de 1920 até 1947, estão Gilberto Freyre e Frank Tannenbaum, responsáveis por uma consolidação científica do paraíso racial. O amplo recorte se volta aos momentos de criação e sedimentação da ideia de democracia racial, antes da sua crescente derrocada, na segunda metade do século XX. O objetivo é analisar de que forma esses sujeitos, ao retratarem o Brasil como um paraíso racial, apresentavam os aspectos jurídicos dessa sociedade idílica. De pronto se conclui que as duas dimensões caracterizadoras do paraíso racial estão bastante intrincadas com o direito. Por um lado, a noção de escravidão suave se sustenta na notícia de uma elevada taxa de alforrias, que teria sido possibilitada por normas e instituições sistematicamente favoráveis à liberdade. Por outro lado, a imagem de uma sociedade na qual negros e negras livres não possuiriam diante de si qualquer barreira racial frequentemente usa como parâmetro a ausência de lei impeditiva do acesso a cargos militares, eclesiásticos e políticos. Mas além do endosso, durante a longa trajetória dos discursos estadunidenses sobre paraíso racial houve movimentos de contestação dessa mesma imagem, e neles a crítica jurídica se mostrou um argumento central. A partir da polivalência estratégica dos discursos, entendeu-se que direito e raça foram associados por sujeitos num amplo espectro político e, ainda que os sinais táticos fossem invertidos, elementos de continuidade permaneceram. / [en] Comparative charts between Brazil and the United States race relations abound in the field of racial studies and comparative history. But the practice of comparing these two societies goes beyond the strictly academic milieu. Drawing up a local view based on comparisons with other parts of the world is a common practice in the Atlantic circulation of individuals and ideas. Thus, it is possible to find discourses that systematically oppose Brazil and the United States since the 19th century, whose authors are quite diverse. This thesis seeks to delve into this comparative universe based on a specific guideline: North American visions of a Brazilian racial paradise. The racial paradise consists of the mirage of an idyllic society with two great characteristics: a softer slave system; the absence of legal racial barriers. Pursuing the history of the co-authors of the racial paradise means, therefore, entering the long history of racial democracy, which goes back to dynamics that precede its naming and subsequent denunciation as a myth. Based on the bibliographic review and access to primary sources – such as the press, letters and speeches – historical subjects who produced this vision of the Brazilian Eldorado were identified and analyzed. These interlocutors are arranged in four main periods, between 1833 and 1947: starting with the immediate abolitionists of the pre-Civil War, in 1833; then post-Civil War abolitionists in 1865; in the 1920s, the subjects are black activists who were enthusiastic about migrating to Brazil; Finally, spanning the 1920s to 1947, there are Gilberto Freyre and Frank Tannenbaum, responsible for the scientific consolidation of the racial paradise. The broad sample goes back to the moments of creation and consolidation of the idea of racial democracy, before its increasing colapse during the second half of the 20th century. The objective is to analyze how these subjects, when portraying Brazil as a racial paradise, presented the legal aspects of this idyllic society. It is immediately concluded that the two dimensions that characterize the racial paradise are quite intricate with the law. On the one hand, the notion of soft slavery is supported by the news of a high rate of manumissions, which would have been made possible by norms and institutions systematically favorable to freedom. On the other hand, the image of a society in which free black men and women would not have any racial barrier against them often uses the absence of a law preventing access to military, ecclesiastical and political positions as a defining parameter. But in addition to the endorsement, during the long trajectory of US discourses on racial paradise, there were movements to contest this same image, and in them legal criticism proved to be a central argument. From the strategic polyvalence of the speeches, it was understood that law and race were associated by subjects in a wide political spectrum, but even if the tactical signs were inverted, elements of continuity remained.

[pt] Esta pesquisa se propõe a reescrever a história do direito à saúde desde a perspectiva da saúde da população negra enquanto campo em construção. Partimos do pressuposto de que as doenças e os agravos em saúde que acometem a população negra resultam, em grande parte, do racismo que não reconhece e invisibiliza os corpos negros. Neste sentido, o trabalho discute a saúde da população negra desde a História do Direito e é influenciada pela Lei número 10.639/2003, que institui a obrigatoriedade do ensino de cultura afro-brasileira e africana nos diferentes níveis e modalidades de ensino. Discute alguns aspectos da luta pelo direito à saúde na Assembleia Nacional Constituinte e advogamos a necessidade de enegrecimento do Direito Sanitário. Demonstramos algumas singularidades que marcam o processo de constituição do campo da saúde da população negra e, por fim, apresentamos o percurso de elaboração da Política Nacional de Saúde Integral da População Negra. O objetivo deste trabalho consiste em problematizar a ausência de pesquisas sobre saúde da população negra no Direito, mais especificamente no Direito Sanitário e na História do Direito. / [en] This research proposes to rewrite the history of the right to health from the perspective of the health of the black population as a field under construction. We assume that the diseases and health problems that affect the black population are largely the result of racism that does not recognize and make black bodies invisible. In this sense, the work discusses the health of the black population since the History of Law and is influenced by Law no. 10,639 / 2003, which establishes the obligation to teach Afro-Brazilian and African culture at different levels and modes of education. It discusses some aspects of the struggle for the right to health in the National Constituent Assembly and we advocate the need for blackening of the Health Law. We demonstrate some singularities that mark the process of constitution of the health field of the black population and, finally, we present the route of elaboration of the National Policy for Integral Health of the Black Population. The objective of this work is to problematize the absence of research on health of the black population in Law, more specifically in Health Law and in the History of Law.

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