Starting from fifty citations from primary sources, this article tries to summarize a recent doctoral thesis on the transformation of traditional ius commune contract law in moral theological treatises from the early modern Catholic world. Firstly, it will be shown how theologians borrowed from the Romano-canon legal tradition to  develop  moral  doctrine.  Secondly, this contribution will try to demonstrate that the traditional conception of contract was fundamentally changed in the works of the theologians. The conclusion will be that theologians developed a doctrine of contracts which redefined contract on the basis of the autonomy of the will, without remaining insensitive to the political, moral and spiritual context in which the homo viator tried to live a God-pleasing life. / Este artículo pretende ofrecer, empleando medio centenar de fuentes primarias, un resumen de mi tesis doctoral sobre la transformación del derecho de los contratos del ius commune en tratados de teología moral en los albores del mundo católico moderno. Se trata, en principio, de mostrar cómo los teólogos recurrieron a la tradición legal romano-canónica para desarrollar sus doctrinas morales. Luego, esta contribución detallará cómo los teólogos cambiaron sustancialmente la concepción tradicional del contrato, al redefinir el ius commune a partir de la moral cristiana y el derecho natural. La conclusión es que los teólogos elaboraron una doctrina de los contratos que los redefinió sobre la base de la autonomía de la voluntad, sin olvidar el contexto político, moral y espiritual en el que el hombre peregrino trató de vivir una vida consagrada al Señor.

O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar a gênese da tradição legal relativa à escravidão negra nas Américas castelhana e portuguesa e a sua conformação entre o início do século XVI e a primeira metade do século XVIII, período em que prevalecia a cultura jurídica do ius commune. A hipótese com a qual se trabalha é a de que a partir da articulação entre processo legislativo e prática social constituiu-se um modo de produção das leis escravistas típico aos ibéricos. Diante da infinidade de matérias abordadas na legislação, procurou-se efetuar um recorte temático que propiciasse a realização do escopo da investigação dentro das limitações de uma pesquisa de mestrado. Os temas eleitos em função da compreensão de sua importância na dinâmica dos regimes de escravidão ibero-americanos foram: manumissão e políticas de controle da rebeldia escrava. / The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the genesis of the legal tradition on African slavery in the Castilian and Portuguese Americas and its configuration from the beginning of XVIth century to the first half of XVIIIth century, a period when the legal culture of the ius commune prevailed. The hypothesis is that by the relationship between legislative process and social practice a particular Iberian slave law mode of production took shape. Due the great diversity of subjects approached by this legislation, the dissertation makes a thematic selection appropriate to a M.A. Regarding its importance to the dynamics of Iberian American slave regimes, the themes elected to the inquiry were the manumissions and the politics of controlling slave resistance.

O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar a gênese da tradição legal relativa à escravidão negra nas Américas castelhana e portuguesa e a sua conformação entre o início do século XVI e a primeira metade do século XVIII, período em que prevalecia a cultura jurídica do ius commune. A hipótese com a qual se trabalha é a de que a partir da articulação entre processo legislativo e prática social constituiu-se um modo de produção das leis escravistas típico aos ibéricos. Diante da infinidade de matérias abordadas na legislação, procurou-se efetuar um recorte temático que propiciasse a realização do escopo da investigação dentro das limitações de uma pesquisa de mestrado. Os temas eleitos em função da compreensão de sua importância na dinâmica dos regimes de escravidão ibero-americanos foram: manumissão e políticas de controle da rebeldia escrava. / The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the genesis of the legal tradition on African slavery in the Castilian and Portuguese Americas and its configuration from the beginning of XVIth century to the first half of XVIIIth century, a period when the legal culture of the ius commune prevailed. The hypothesis is that by the relationship between legislative process and social practice a particular Iberian slave law mode of production took shape. Due the great diversity of subjects approached by this legislation, the dissertation makes a thematic selection appropriate to a M.A. Regarding its importance to the dynamics of Iberian American slave regimes, the themes elected to the inquiry were the manumissions and the politics of controlling slave resistance.

The purpose of this thesis is to identify the influence of the doctrines of the Medieval European Ius Commune on the Scots law of moveable succession in the crucial period of its development: from the Reformation to approximately 1700. To this purpose, this research is dealing with the Scottish writings, case law and archival materials, comparing them with the relevant Civilian and Canonistic texts and treatises of Medieval and Early Modern Continental authors. This research specially concentrates on particular fields within the Scots law of succession. In some fields, such as the constitution and form of testamentary deeds and the destinations (tailzies), the Ius Commune influence was quite weak, but even there it is discernible in specific issues. The same can be said of the Scottish attitude to the agreements on future succession (pacta successoria); in this respect, as my thesis shows, Scots law used to have more in common with the Civil law than it has now. On the other hand, the influence of the Continental doctrines was much more noticeable in the fields of the evidential force of last wills and the donations mortis causa. However, beginning from the 1660s, Scottish practice in these fields diverged from the Continental models. This was due to various practical reasons. The regulation of the office of executor in Scotland in the 1500-1700, in many respects, seems to be heavily inspired by the Ius Commune regulation and by English practice of that time. In some respects, Scots practice on the office of executor followed the Ius Commune rules more closely than English practice. In summary, the influence of the Ius Commune on the Scots law of succession in this period was real, due both to the retaining of tradition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and to the knowledge of doctrine by the judges and litigants. However, this influence was often fragmentary and not properly expressed in the litigation and writings.

European legal history, as a field of scientific enquiry, is a relatively young discipline that can trace its roots back to the German jurist Savigny, whose work on the jurists of the medieval ius commune is commonly seen as the first of its kind. As one of the foremost German scholars of the nineteenth century and a fierce opponent of German codification, Savigny laid the foundation for generations of subsequent historians, not only in terms of the scope, but also in terms of the method of enquiry. Thus, in the generations after Savigny, European legal history tended to be approached in terms of general narratives charting the development of the European legal order through successive historical epochs. Within these narratives, jurists played a prominent role. Thus, the creation of the legal order of Europe was based upon a translatio studii from the Roman jurists via the medieval ius commune to civil codes of the nineteenth century. By grouping jurists into “schools” or “movements”, modern commentators, so it was argued, were able to assess the impact of these on the narrative of European legal history. Although, since the end of the Second World War, this narrative has become more nuanced, the jurists remain central to it. This has had a number of consequences. The main consequence of this focus on jurists (mostly academic figures teaching at universities) has been the marginalisation of legal practice and legal practitioners in the narrative of European legal history. And yet, as recent research on the rise of central courts in Europe has shown, legal practice clearly had an impact on the development of the European legal order. In light of these insights, this thesis seeks to contribute to the narrative of European legal history by focusing not on the works of academic jurists, but on the activities of legal practitioners. This statement requires delimitation. Rather than focusing on a number of legal practitioners over a long period of time, this thesis will focus on a single legal practitioner who flourished during a specific period in European history using the principles of a microhistory. The individual in question is the French lawyer Nicolas Bohier (1469-1539). The reasons for this specific focus are twofold. First, a focus on a specific individual and his works allows for greater scrutiny in depth, thus providing a counterbalance to (and also a means of testing and verifying) the broad sweep accounts found in most works on European legal history. In second place, Nicolas Bohier and his oeuvre cry out for a critical analysis and, until now, remain largely unstudied. As a practising lawyer and eventually president of the regional court of Bordeaux, Bohier was at the coalface of French legal practice in the sixteenth century. As a prolific writer and editor, Bohier left a rich corpus of work consisting of records of decisions of the court in Bordeaux, legal opinions as well as customs of the region. Furthermore, sixteenth-century France is a particularly exciting topic of investigation. This period not only saw the rise and solidification of Royal authority, but also saw the beginning of the homologation of customary law in France. On an intellectual level, the sixteenth century saw the rise of “legal humanism”, a particularly controversial intellectual movement in the context of European legal history as shown by recent research. This then brings us to the central point of this thesis. If, during the sixteenth century, the medieval ius commune was being replaced by “national” legal orders across Europe, as the general surveys of European legal history state, the works of a legal practitioner would show it much more clearly than the works of academic jurists. This thesis will therefore examine Bohier’s use of the term ius commune across his works to assess not only his understanding of the term, but also to assess how this concept operated in relation to other “sources of law”, for example statute and custom. Although the results of a microhistory study should not be generalised too far, it will permit us to interrogate the general narratives of European legal history of the early modern period.

El llamado control de convencionalidad ha nacido de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en relación con la primacía que debe tener la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos sobre la legislación de los países que son parte del sistema interamericano. Aparecido por vez primera en el caso «Almonacid» en 2004 busca que la normativa interamericana y la jurisprudencia de la Corte sean observados por la legislación de los países miembros, tanto en sus Constituciones como en su legislación interna.Desde entonces se ha ido desarrollando y ha creado diversos problemas de aplicación e interpretación. Tiene, pues, cierta relación con el llamado control de constitucionalidad que se practica al interior de los Estados, pues el control de convencionalidad está creado para proteger el derecho que surge de la Convención Americana y de su jurisprudencia. No obstante esto en los últimos años ha tenido un desarrollo y avance vertiginoso, ocasionando muchos problemas que no han llamado la atención de los estudiosos y de los que aquí se quiere dar cuenta, así como de los excesos que se ha visto en ciertos casos. Es un enfoque de simpatía por este sistema de control, pero critico al mismo tiempo.

La tesi analizza un testo conosciuto con il nome di Questioni giuridiche esplicative della Carta de Logu. L’opera fu così chiamata proprio a causa della collocazione in appendice al testo della Carta de Logu di Eleonora d’Arborea, compilazione di diritto proprio della Sardegna giudicale (1390 ca.). Scritta in volgare sardo, tale appendice è costituita da una raccolta di casi redatti in forma di quaestiones, risolti dall’autore, rimasto anonimo, facendo riferimento ai libri legales della tradizione giustinianea. Vi si trovano infatti allegati, seppur gravemente storpiati, il Digesto nella sua tradizionale tripartizione (Vetus, Infortiatum e Novum), il Codice con le Authenticae Codicis, le Novelle e le Istituzioni di Giustiniano. In diversi casi, l’autore dimostra inoltre una discreta conoscenza della Glossa di Accursio e delle principali impostazioni dottrinali del maturo diritto comune. La tesi comprende l’edizione critica delle Questioni: la scelta è caduta sull’edizione sinottica del testo tramandato dai due testimoni più antichi. L’unico manoscritto superstite (databile intorno alla metà del XV secolo) e l’editio princeps, incunabola (c. 1480), sono conservati nella Biblioteca Universitaria di Cagliari, dove è stato possibile accedere ad un esame di prima mano. L’apparato critico apposto al testo riporta per esteso i frammenti dei libri legales rintracciabili nel testo, che rendono palesi i legami dell’opera con il diritto comune. La ricerca ha consentito di sottoporre a critica le ipotesi formulate in passato dalla storiografia giuridica, tendenti a ridurre le Questioni a semplici note esplicative o a postularne la natura per così dire integrativa della raccolta normativa di diritto locale. Inquadrando le Questioni nella cornice più ampia della dialettica fra diritto comune e diritto proprio, la tesi propende invece per la natura propriamente interpretativa – nel senso in cui i medievali intesero il termine interpretatio – delle Questioni in relazione alla Carta de Logu, dunque come insieme di interpretazioni di natura prevalentemente correttiva delle norme di diritto proprio. La tesi è corredata inoltre da un’Appendice Documentaria, in cui si riproduce il testo delle Questioni secondo le due redazioni dell’incunabolo e del manoscritto.

La thèse propose de confronter, pour la première fois, les plus importantes théories du droit ayant pour objet l’économie afin de découvrir si l’une d’elles peut être érigée en paradigme des rapports du droit et de l’économie. L’analyse critique qui en est livrée fait ressortir tout d’abord que la Law and Economics, et plus spécialement l’Ecole de Chicago, en enfermant le droit dans une logique utilitariste, aboutit à nier les fondements mêmes de notre discipline : les règles juridiques, simples instruments au service de l’économie, sont envisagées par le juge en termes de prix avec lequel il faut jouer pour abaisser les coûts. A l’inverse, le droit économique, en imposant le juste en matière de concurrence par le biais de la régulation, conduit à mener une politique consumériste qui, parfois, contrevient aux objectifs économiques. Ces deux théories, bâties sur des idéologies (i.e. des systèmes de valeurs) différentes, ont cependant en commun de concevoir hiérarchiquement les rapports du droit et de l’économie. Les limites de cette conception expliquent que le droit et l’économie peuvent être ensuite placés dans un rapport d’égalité, ce qu’a tenté la théorie autopoïétique du droit à travers la notion de couplage. Toutefois, en écartant la dimension axiologique des deux matières, l’autopoïèse est un système contestable car elle met l’accent sur la communication au détriment de l’homme. La thèse montre que systématiser d’emblée les rapports du droit et de l’économie aujourd’hui n’est pas la voie à suivre : dans un contexte de mondialisation, il faut construire un droit commun qui doit s’appuyer sur le principe régulateur du raisonnable. Les rapports du droit et de l’économie ne doivent plus se penser de manière verticale mais horizontale, en réseaux, ce qui explique que la norme ne soit pas dégagée a priori mais se constitue progressivement dans le débat démocratique par une prise en compte des aspirations de la société civile et par un recours simultané du juge aux raisonnements économique et juridique. / This thesis’ purpose is to compare, for the first time, the most important theories of law regarding economy in order to find out if one of them can be built into a paradigm of the relationship between law and economics. Critical analysis reveals that the Law and Economics, especially the Chicago School, by enclosing the law in an utilitarian logic, leads to deny the very foundations of our discipline: the legal rules, simple instruments for the economy, are considered by the judge in terms of price which must be played on to obtain lower costs. In contrast, economic law, imposing fair competition through regulation, leads to conduct a consumer policy which sometimes contravenes economic objectives. Both theories built on different ideologies (ie value systems) and have a common will to hierarchically conceive values of law and the economy. Therefore, this concept’s limitations explain how the law and economics can be placed in an equal relationship, which was attempted by the autopoietic theory of law through the concept of coupling. However, discarding the axiological dimension of the two subjects, autopoiesis is a questionable system because it focuses on communication at the expense of man. This thesis shows that native systematization of the law and economy relationships is not the way to go: in a context of globalization, we must build a ius commune which must be based on the regulator principle of reasonable. Relationships between law and economy should no longer be thought vertically but horizontally, through networks, which is why the standard is not clear, but gradually composes in the democratic debate by taking into account the aspirations of civil society and a simultaneous use of the judge to economic and legal reasoning.

La présente thèse démontre l’existence d’un véritable contrôle juridictionnel du respect par les États membres des droits fondamentaux garantis par l’Union européenne. Elle repose principalement sur le raisonnement selon lequel le contrôle juridictionnel s’est renforcé, en lien avec le processus d’intégration caractérisant le système juridique de l’Union. Le droit français est étudié en tant que droit constitutif de ce système. Historiquement, la Cour de justice a commencé à produire les normes de référence du contrôle par le biais du renvoi préjudiciel. Ce contrôle a émergé progressivement, il a un champ d’application fondé sur celui du droit de l’Union. Ce dernier est, par principe, son périmètre d’exercice. Indissociable de ces bases jurisprudentielles, le contrôle juridictionnel connait un renforcement global qui a pour caractéristique d’être intégratif. Cette évolution s’engage par l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne et la force juridique contraignante qu’il confère à la Charte des droits fondamentaux. Il en résulte la consécration du contrôle juridictionnel dans le droit « dispositionnel ». Ce renforcement se poursuit par un élargissement du contrôle, initié par ce traité et produit par différents juges du système juridique de l’Union. Le contrôle opéré par les juges de droit commun se développe incontestablement, tandis que la Cour de justice a peu l’occasion d’intervenir dans le cadre du recours en manquement. De nouveaux organes de contrôle apparaissent avec leurs singularités. Il s’agit du juge constitutionnel et de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. / This thesis demonstrates the existence of a genuine judicial review of compliance by Member States regarding fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union. It is based mainly on the reasoning that this control has been reinforced, in line with the integration process characterizing the Union's legal system; French law, as a constituent right of this system, is studied. Historically, the Court of Justice started to produce the reference standards for control by means of the reference for a preliminary ruling, allowing them to progressively emerge, adhering to the scope of EU law. This framework is, in principle, the scope of its exercise. The integrative strengthening of the review, inseparable from these legal bases, entails the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the binding legal force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.. The recognition of review in “dispositional” law is a strong illustration of this. It has continued with this expansion, initiated by this treaty, and also brought about by different judges within the Union’s legal system. This has weakened the principle of its exercise within the scope of the Union’s law. Furthermore, this strengthening has been amplified by an overall consolidation of the courts’ review function. Indeed, it’s common law judges – in principle, ordinary national judges – who operate as a review on developments, in particular; a contrario, the Court of Justice has not had much of a chance to do so within the framework of this action, failing to fulfil its obligations. Yet, - the demonstration continues – new review bodies emerge. These will be the constitutional judge, and in the longer term, the European Court of Human Rights.

Dans une actualité où l’institution matrimoniale est devenue l’expression d’une liberté individuelle, s’élevant au niveau du droit constitutionnel et du droit international, on se demande d’abord si un nouveau droit commun à cet égard est né à la base des traditions européenne et chinoise, et puis dans quelle mesure. Ces réponses dépendent étroitement d’un regard sur le passé de cette institution à la lumière du droit comparé. Fondé sur le droit romano-canonique, le ius commune europaeum avait laissé une grande liberté comme le consensualisme romain à la conclusion du mariage mais exclu le divorce, ce qui avait été suivi par les droits français, allemand et anglais jusqu’au XVIème siècle. C’est la Réforme protestante au XVIème siècle et les codifications nationales au XVIIIème et XIXème siècle qui ont fait l’éclatement de ce vieux droit commun. Toutefois, la notion de liberté individuelle et la réclamation d’égalité juridique ont jeté des bases d’un nouveau droit commun de la liberté matrimoniale qui évoque non seulement la liberté de se marier mais celle de divorcer. C’est depuis le XXème siècle que la notion européenne de liberté matrimoniale, du moins en tant qu’« état d’esprit », a pénétré dans l’ordre juridique chinois, aboutissant à la rupture chinoise avec son héritage traditionnel qui avait rendu défavorisée et inégalitaire la liberté individuelle des époux, et à la naissance d’un nouveau droit commun qui traverse les deux traditions. Néanmoins, une telle convergence, en raison de la contrainte culturelle étant le fruit d’évolutions historiques distinctes, n’est encore qu’un rapprochement conceptuel et idéologique. / In the current situation where the matrimonial institution has become the expression of an individual freedom, rising to the level of constitutional law and international law, questions may arise as to, first, whether a new ius commune in this respect has been born on the basis of Chinese and European legal traditions, and then, to what extent. The answers closely depend on a glance at the past of this institution in the light of comparative law. Based on Romano-Canon law, the ius commune europaeum had left a considerable freedom as Roman consensus to the conclusion of marriage, but excluded the divorce, which had been followed by French, German and English laws until the 16th century. It is the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century and national codifications of the 18th and 19th century that maked this old ius commune burst. Nevertheless, the notion of individual freedom and the claim of legal equality provided the basis for a new ius commune of matrimonial freedom that evokes not only the freedom to marry but also the freedom to divorce. It is since the 20th century that the European notion of matrimonial freedom, at least as a “state of spirit”, penetrated into the Chinese legal order, leading to China’s break with its traditional heritage that had made the individual freedom of the spouses disadvantaged and unequal, and to the birth of a new ius commune crossing the two traditions. However, such a convergence, due to the cultural constraint being the fruit of distinct historical evolutions, is still only a conceptual and ideological rapprochement. / In der gegenwärtigen Situation, wo die Institution der Ehe zum Ausdruck der individuellen Freiheit geworden ist, die sich auf dem Niveau des Verfassungs- und Völkerrechts erhoben hat, ist zunächst zu hinterfragen, ob ein neues gemeines Recht in dieser Hinsicht entstanden ist, das sich aus der europäischen und chinesischen Rechtstraditionen ergibt, und dann inwieweit. Die Antworten auf diese Fragen hängen in hohem Maße von einem Blick zurück in die Vergangenheit dieser Institution im Lichte der Rechtsvergleichung. Das römisch-kanonische Ius commune, das bis zum 16. Jahrhundert von der französischen, deutschen, englischen Rechte gefolgt worden war, hatte der Eheschließung eine grosse Freiheit wie römische Konsensvereinbarung gelassen, aber die Ehescheidung ausgeschlossen. Die protestantische Reformation im 16. Jahrhundert und die Nationalkodifikationen im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert zersplitterten dieses alte gemeine Recht. Allerdings schufen der Gedanke der individuellen Freiheit und die Einforderung der Rechtsgleichheit wichtige Grundlagen für einen neuen gemeinen Recht von Ehefreiheit, das sich nicht nur auf die Eheschließungsfreiheit sondern auch auf die Ehescheidungsfreiheit beruft. Seit 20. Jahrhundert ist der europäische Begriff von Ehefreiheit zumindest als eine „Geisteshaltung“ in die chinesische Rechtsordnung eingeführt worden. Dies hat dazu geführt, dass China mit dem traditionellen Erbe gebrochen hat, das die individuelle Freiheit der Ehegatten benachteiligt hatte, und dass ein neues gemeines Recht quer durch diese zwei Rechtstraditionen entstanden ist. Aufgrund der kulturellen Einschränkung, die auf unterschiedliche historische Entwicklungen zurückzuführen sind, ist dennoch eine solche Angleichung noch immer eine konzeptionelle und ideologische Annäherung. / 当前，婚姻制度已经演进成为个人自由的表达，并且上升到了宪法与国际法的层面，于是人们不禁要问，在这一方面基于中欧两大法律传统的新的“共同法”是否已经形成？如果有，在多大的范围内呢？这些答案紧紧地取决于从比较法的角度对这个制度既往史的考察。根植于中世纪罗马教会法的“欧洲共同法”对婚姻的缔结赋予了极大的自由，如罗马式意思一致，但却排除了离婚自由，并在十六世纪以前被法国法、德国法以及英格兰法所共同遵循。正是欧洲十六世纪的宗教改革以及十八和十九世纪的民族国家法典化运动打碎了旧的“共同法”秩序。尽管如此，个人自由的观念和法律平等的诉求为婚姻自由新一轮的“共同法”奠定了基础，不仅涉及结婚自由，还扩大到离婚自由。正是二十世纪以来，婚姻自由的欧洲观念，起码作为一种“精神状态”，被引入中国法律秩序，使中国与其传统遗产（夫妻个人自由的不尊重和不平等）相决裂，横跨两大法律传统的新一轮“共同法” 也相应诞生。然而，由于不同历史演进所带来的文化束缚，这样的一种趋同，目前还只是处于一种概念上和观念形态上的接近。