Inaug.-diss. - Breslau. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Univ., Diss. u.d.T.: Kamesar, Adam: Studies in Jerome's Quaestiones Hebraicae in Genesim--Oxford, 1987.

Specimen Litterarium Inaugurale--Utrecht. / "Stellingen": leaf, inserted. "Libri saepius laudati": p. [141].

Univ., Diss.--Freiburg (Breisgau), 1993.

This dissertation seeks to demonstrate Lucan's profound engagement and conflict with two ancient intellectual and literary traditions that can both be regarded as escapist, that is, as promising or postulating a sanctuary (whether physical or spiritual) from the world's troubles, and that were both active in Lucan's own day: utopian writing about science, exemplified in Latin by Lucan's uncle Seneca the Younger, as well as by the astronomical poet Manilius, and utopian Egyptology, as reflected in a wide variety of texts ranging from Herodotus, through Diodorus Siculus, to Lucan's contemporary, the Alexandrian polymath Chaeremon. To this end, I have examined two closely related sequences in the De Bello Civili that have received little attention from scholars of Lucan, namely Pompey's journey to Egypt in Book Eight and Caesar's Egyptian sojourn in Book Ten, during which Lucan's two main characters are each shown attempting to take refuge from the poem's ubiquitous violence through the double avenue of travel to Egypt (to which the defeated Pompey flees, and where his pursuer Caesar hopes to leave the civil war behind) and the practice of natural science (with Pompey's astronomical inquiry and Caesar's investigation of the Nile). In this context, I have also considered Cato's Libyan adventures, from the intervening Book Nine. Both Pompey and Caesar discover that escape through either method is impossible, for the fabled Egyptian Shangri-La is now embroiled in the political, social, and economic crisis of the outside world, while not only the natural universe but even the very act of inquiry into nature are alike contaminated by the ethos of civil war. The virtuous Cato, on the other hand, does not even make the attempt, maintaining a single-minded focus on his civic duties. By revealing such escape to be both immoral (through Cato's example) and impossible (through the examples of Pompey and Caesar), Lucan signals his decisive rejection of the escapist predilections of many of his contemporaries (including his uncle Seneca and his own father Annaeus Mela), who tried to distance themselves from the vicissitudes of political life under the later Julio-Claudians through retirement into a state of philosophical otium.

This dissertation seeks to demonstrate Lucan's profound engagement and conflict with two ancient intellectual and literary traditions that can both be regarded as escapist, that is, as promising or postulating a sanctuary (whether physical or spiritual) from the world's troubles, and that were both active in Lucan's own day: utopian writing about science, exemplified in Latin by Lucan's uncle Seneca the Younger, as well as by the astronomical poet Manilius, and utopian Egyptology, as reflected in a wide variety of texts ranging from Herodotus, through Diodorus Siculus, to Lucan's contemporary, the Alexandrian polymath Chaeremon. To this end, I have examined two closely related sequences in the De Bello Civili that have received little attention from scholars of Lucan, namely Pompey's journey to Egypt in Book Eight and Caesar's Egyptian sojourn in Book Ten, during which Lucan's two main characters are each shown attempting to take refuge from the poem's ubiquitous violence through the double avenue of travel to Egypt (to which the defeated Pompey flees, and where his pursuer Caesar hopes to leave the civil war behind) and the practice of natural science (with Pompey's astronomical inquiry and Caesar's investigation of the Nile). In this context, I have also considered Cato's Libyan adventures, from the intervening Book Nine. Both Pompey and Caesar discover that escape through either method is impossible, for the fabled Egyptian Shangri-La is now embroiled in the political, social, and economic crisis of the outside world, while not only the natural universe but even the very act of inquiry into nature are alike contaminated by the ethos of civil war. The virtuous Cato, on the other hand, does not even make the attempt, maintaining a single-minded focus on his civic duties. By revealing such escape to be both immoral (through Cato's example) and impossible (through the examples of Pompey and Caesar), Lucan signals his decisive rejection of the escapist predilections of many of his contemporaries (including his uncle Seneca and his own father Annaeus Mela), who tried to distance themselves from the vicissitudes of political life under the later Julio-Claudians through retirement into a state of philosophical otium.

La tesi analizza un testo conosciuto con il nome di Questioni giuridiche esplicative della Carta de Logu. L’opera fu così chiamata proprio a causa della collocazione in appendice al testo della Carta de Logu di Eleonora d’Arborea, compilazione di diritto proprio della Sardegna giudicale (1390 ca.). Scritta in volgare sardo, tale appendice è costituita da una raccolta di casi redatti in forma di quaestiones, risolti dall’autore, rimasto anonimo, facendo riferimento ai libri legales della tradizione giustinianea. Vi si trovano infatti allegati, seppur gravemente storpiati, il Digesto nella sua tradizionale tripartizione (Vetus, Infortiatum e Novum), il Codice con le Authenticae Codicis, le Novelle e le Istituzioni di Giustiniano. In diversi casi, l’autore dimostra inoltre una discreta conoscenza della Glossa di Accursio e delle principali impostazioni dottrinali del maturo diritto comune. La tesi comprende l’edizione critica delle Questioni: la scelta è caduta sull’edizione sinottica del testo tramandato dai due testimoni più antichi. L’unico manoscritto superstite (databile intorno alla metà del XV secolo) e l’editio princeps, incunabola (c. 1480), sono conservati nella Biblioteca Universitaria di Cagliari, dove è stato possibile accedere ad un esame di prima mano. L’apparato critico apposto al testo riporta per esteso i frammenti dei libri legales rintracciabili nel testo, che rendono palesi i legami dell’opera con il diritto comune. La ricerca ha consentito di sottoporre a critica le ipotesi formulate in passato dalla storiografia giuridica, tendenti a ridurre le Questioni a semplici note esplicative o a postularne la natura per così dire integrativa della raccolta normativa di diritto locale. Inquadrando le Questioni nella cornice più ampia della dialettica fra diritto comune e diritto proprio, la tesi propende invece per la natura propriamente interpretativa – nel senso in cui i medievali intesero il termine interpretatio – delle Questioni in relazione alla Carta de Logu, dunque come insieme di interpretazioni di natura prevalentemente correttiva delle norme di diritto proprio. La tesi è corredata inoltre da un’Appendice Documentaria, in cui si riproduce il testo delle Questioni secondo le due redazioni dell’incunabolo e del manoscritto.

Dans la question 10 du livre II de son commentaire au traité De l’âme d’Aristote, Nicole Oresme soulève la question suivante : est-ce que le sens se trompe relativement à son objet propre? S’attaquant à la problématique de l’illusion sensible, il soutient qu’il y a effectivement place pour l’erreur dans la connaissance sensible puisque les facultés sensitives de l’âme ont la capacité de former des jugements. Influencé par le modèle perspectiviste de la vision, Oresme met l’accent sur le rôle des sens internes, plutôt que les sens externes, dans la perception. Ce mémoire de maîtrise a pour but d’élucider les notions de « concept » (conceptus), « jugement » (iudicium) et « discours » (discursus) telles qu’Oresme les emploie dans le deuxième livre de ses Quaestiones De anima et est accompagné d’une traduction des questions I.4, II.8-15 et II.21 des Quaestiones De anima. / In question 10 of book II of his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, Nicole Oresme asks whether the senses can be deceived about their proper objects. Tackling the issue of sense illusion, he maintains that there is indeed error in sense cognition since the sensitive faculties of the soul can form judgments. Influenced by the perspectivist account of vision, Oresme highlights the role of the internal senses, rather than the external senses, in perception. This master’s thesis aims to elucidate the notions of « concept » (conceptus), « judgment » (iudicium) and « discourse » (discursus) as Oresme uses them in book II of his Quaestiones De anima and includes a French translation of questions I.4, II.8-15 and II.21 of the Quaestiones De anima.

Dans la question 10 du livre II de son commentaire au traité De l’âme d’Aristote, Nicole Oresme soulève la question suivante : est-ce que le sens se trompe relativement à son objet propre? S’attaquant à la problématique de l’illusion sensible, il soutient qu’il y a effectivement place pour l’erreur dans la connaissance sensible puisque les facultés sensitives de l’âme ont la capacité de former des jugements. Influencé par le modèle perspectiviste de la vision, Oresme met l’accent sur le rôle des sens internes, plutôt que les sens externes, dans la perception. Ce mémoire de maîtrise a pour but d’élucider les notions de « concept » (conceptus), « jugement » (iudicium) et « discours » (discursus) telles qu’Oresme les emploie dans le deuxième livre de ses Quaestiones De anima et est accompagné d’une traduction des questions I.4, II.8-15 et II.21 des Quaestiones De anima. / In question 10 of book II of his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, Nicole Oresme asks whether the senses can be deceived about their proper objects. Tackling the issue of sense illusion, he maintains that there is indeed error in sense cognition since the sensitive faculties of the soul can form judgments. Influenced by the perspectivist account of vision, Oresme highlights the role of the internal senses, rather than the external senses, in perception. This master’s thesis aims to elucidate the notions of « concept » (conceptus), « judgment » (iudicium) and « discourse » (discursus) as Oresme uses them in book II of his Quaestiones De anima and includes a French translation of questions I.4, II.8-15 and II.21 of the Quaestiones De anima.

In 13th century Europe, the German bishop and scholastic philosopher Albertus Magnus was one of the most influential writers on the natural world and theology. This thesis investigates the relationship between humans and animals in his Quaestiones super de animalibus and De animalibus. In writings on medieval history the theologically enforced boundary between humans and animals is both emphasized and treated as a given. This study nuances the picture presented by previous scholars by highlighting an alternative natural philosophical discourse on humans and animals. Using discourse analysis, I argue that the differences that Albertus used to differentiate humans from animals were based on an understanding of similarities rather than opposites. To Albertus, the human was one species in the animal kingdom, thus sharing many basic functions with other animals. His understandings entailed a theory of essential differences between species but also allowed for divisions based on gradation and relativity. This study sheds new light on the complex relationship between humans and animals in medieval Europe.