This dissertation locates the origins of the modern conservative movement in the intellectual history of the 1930s and 1940s. I argue that it was during the years of the Great Depression, when laissez-faire capitalism was most discredited, that a group of conservative academics and intellectuals began to lay the foundations for its postwar resurgence. Angered by the New Deal, those intellectual activists honed their free market ideology and began to develop a network through which to distribute it. As a result, they began to lay the intellectual and institutional foundation for the conservative movement. This dissertation recovers a number of narratives that reveal the rudimentary makings of a movement. It was during the 1930s and 1940s that economist Henry Simons worked to turn the University of Chicago's economics department into a bastion of free market sentiment; Leonard Read, after a decade of free market advocacy, created the first libertarian think tank, the Foundation for Economic Education, in 1946; legal scholar Roscoe Pound, worried by the spread of legal realism in the academy and growth of government in Washington, dramatically moved to the political right to make common cause with conservatives; Albert Jay Nock, his protégé Frank Chodorov and Felix Morley created a network of conservative writers and publications that paved the way for William F. Buckley's National Review ; and writers such as Rose Wilder Lane and Isabel Paterson made the case for laissez-faire in the pages of popular publications such as the Saturday Evening Post and the New York Herald Tribune . Historians have generally attributed the rise of the modern right to the conservative political mobilization in response to the civil rights movement, campus agitation of the 1960s, and the campaign for women's rights. As a result, historians tend to view the modern conservative movement as a distinctly postwar social and political phenomenon. This dissertation enriches that account by revealing the ties the modern conservative movement has to the years of the Great Depression and the debate over the government's role in the economy.

The motivation for the thesis was to discover whether Finnish Red Cross Youth Shelters can be evaluated and developed from legal and moral standpoints, such as the Human Rights. A special focus is put on how the international law gets interpreted and practiced in a local (Youth Shelter) context. Findings from the collected data are based on the experiences of the Youth Shleter’s employees and volunteers through workshop discussions, surveys and interviews. This observational work done within the thesis is an initial mapping of how “things are at the moment”. Data is analysed with The New Legal Realism (NLR) theory, which main focus is to study law’s context-based interpretations and mobility ie. how international law creates meanings in a local setting. (Dagan & Kreitner, 2018; 534.) The value of the findings will increase through new ideas, support measures and a better identification of the needs of employees and volunteers arising from the findings. The observational work is inspired by the idea that if someone has an obligation to ensure rights, they are also entitled to get support with knowledge of how to implement them properly.

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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:19:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigo de Camargo Cavalcanti.pdf: 1574791 bytes, checksum: 8193e91042e48d6844f6d8d731c1b710 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-11-05 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / This work aims to bring a perspective about law that underlies smoldering in life itself, lived by the sentient ever-changing beings, entering, mainly, in the lessons of García Maynez and his three circles theory, that will alow us to evoque the integrity fo law in all its strands privileging, in this work, the reading of Gunther Teubner and his legal realism, with the critical conception of compassionate view of Theodor Adorno, and Deleuze and his ritornello, aways with the solid and capital ground of the Humanistic Capitalism´s Theory, essencialy in its jushumanistic principality, according was brilliantly conceived by Ricardo Hasson Sayeg. For this, the Triad makes presence in the whole text in many ways: validity, applicability and effectiveness, freedom, equality and fraternity, text, metatext and intratext; territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization; past, present and future. Aways for the densification, Walking in a spiral, away from a linear historical meaning of law, but in order of consideration of the "minor literature" that permeates society and that is urgent in the relevance of the application of law and its role as a promoter of a creative freedom, overly human / Este trabalho visa, por si só, pois toma vida a partir do momento em que se imprime do ato criativo do pensar, trazer uma perspectiva sobre o direito que subjaz latente na própria vida, vivida pelos seres sensíveis e em eterna mutação, adentrando, principalmente, nas lições de García Maynez e sua teoria dos três círculos, que nos permitirá evocar a integralidade do direito em todas as suas vertentes privilegiando nós, no presente trabalho, a leitura de Gunther Teubner e o seu realismo jurídico, adensada à concepção crítica da ótica compassiva de Theodor Adorno e de Deleuze e o seu ritornelo, sempre com a base sólida e primordial da Teoria do Capitalismo Humanista, essencialmente no principado jushumanista, consoante brilhantemente concebido por Ricardo Hasson Sayeg. Para tanto, a Tríade se faz presente em todo texto de diversas formas: validade, vigência e eficácia; liberdade, igualdade e fraternidade; texto, metatexto e intratexto; territorialização, desterritorialização e reterritorialização; passado, presente e futuro. Sempre pelo adensamento, num caminhar em espiral, longe de uma acepção linear histórica do direito, mas, sim, afim da consideração da ―literatura menor que permeia a sociedade e que se faz urgente na consideração da aplicação do direito e do seu papel enquanto promotor de uma liberdade criadora, demasiadamente humana

O objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é analisar a assimilação antropofágica (Utilizarei, nesta dissertação a metáfora da expressão Antropofagia realizada pelo Movimento Modernista brasileiro. Assim como os índios canibais devoravam seus inimigos, acreditando que assim assimilavam as suas qualidades, os artistas Modernistas propunham uma devoração simbólica da cultura estrangeira, aproveitando suas inovações artísticas sem perder a identidade cultural brasileira.) do debate jurídico norte-americano produzido em torno da questão social durante a Era Roosevelt por parte do pensamento jurídico brasileiro da Era Vargas. Desse modo, estudar-se-á a forma como os autores norte-americanos da Sociological Jurisprudence e do Realismo Jurídico foram utilizados pela doutrina jurídica brasileira do período entre guerras na formação de um pensamento jurídico antiliberal e anticonceitualista. No centro da crise do capitalismo mundial, as universidades (Roscoe Pound, 1870-1964, e Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, 1893-1962), a Suprema Corte (Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 1870-1938, e Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1856-1941) e o corpo burocrático do governo (1933-1945) Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) (James MacCauley Landis, 1899-1964) produziam alternativas ao mecanicismo judicial e ao modelo liberal. Na periferia do capitalismo mundial, o corpo burocrático de Vargas (Oliveira Vianna, Francisco Campos e Francisco Sá Filho) e as revistas e debates jurídicos (João Mangabeira e Alípio Silveira) questionavam o liberalismo da República Velha (1889-1930) e buscavam, no mercado global de idéias, modelos institucionais que pudessem ser antropofagizados, substituindo as idéias fora do lugar implantadas pelo bacharelismo utópico da República Velha. Era o momento de explicar o Brasil, encontrar o desenho institucional mais adequado à realidade nacional, construir uma opinião pública e descobrir as soluções para converter o atraso em modernização. Assim, nos principais palcos do debate jurídico dos dois países e, em especial, na Suprema Corte norte-americana e na doutrina jurídica brasileira, percebia-se essa tentativa de revisão do método jurídico, como uma forma de se adequar o direito a um novo quadro de relações do capitalismo industrial. Desse modo, não só se via a necessidade de implantação de um aparato jurídico apto a tratar a questão social (como a regulação das relações do trabalho), como também se observava a necessidade de se reconstruir a forma como se aplicava o direito. O modelo formalista e conceitualista que havia se consolidado sob uma perspectiva privatista e liberal durante o século XIX, mostrava-se ineficiente para atender as novas demandas da sociedade. Esse aspecto de integração entre a questão social e o antiformalismo é essencial para compreender o paralelo entre o pensamento jurídico norte-americano e brasileiro durante o período entre guerras, uma vez que é por meio desse eixo comum que se estabeleceram os principais canais de leitura antropofágica do pensamento jurídico norte-americano pelo pensamento jurídico brasileiro. / The objective of this Master\'s Degree dissertation is to analyze the \"anthropophagical\" (I will use, in this dissertation, the metaphor of the word Anthropophagy made by the Brazilian Modernist Movement. Like the cannibal Indians used to devour their enemies, with the belief that, as such, they would assimilate their qualities, the Modernist artists used to propose a symbolic devouring of the foreign culture, taking advantage of their artistic innovations without losing the Brazilian cultural identity) assimilation of the North-American legal debate, arising from the social issue during the Age of Roosevelt, by the Brazilian legal thought of the Age of Vargas. Therefore, one will study the way how the North-American authors of the Sociological Jurisprudence and of the Legal Realism have been used by the Brazilian legal doctrine of the interwar period, in the formation of an anti-liberal and anti-conceptualist legal thought. In the core crisis of the worldwide capitalism, Universities (Roscoe Pound, 1870-1964, and Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, 1893-1962), Supreme Court (Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 1870-1938, and Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1856-1941) and bureaucratic body of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) government (1933-1945) (James MacCauley Landis, 1899-1964) produced alternatives to the legal mechanicism and to the liberal model. At the periphery of the world capitalism, the bureaucratic body of Vargas (Oliveira Vianna, Francisco Campos and Francisco Sá Filho) and the legal magazines and debates (João Mangabeira e Alípio Silveira) questioned the liberalism of the Old Republic (1889-1930) and searched, in the global market of ideas, for institutional models that could be anthropophagized, replacing the out-of-place ideas implemented by the utopic bachelorism of the Old Republic. That was the time of explaining Brazil, finding the institutional drawing that is the most proper to the national reality, building a public opinion and discovering the solutions to convert the delay into modernization. Thus, in the main background legal debate of the two countries legal debate, and especially in the United States Supreme Court and in the Brazilian legal doctrine could be perceive such attempt of review of the legal method, as a way of fitting the law to a new picture of relations of the industrial capitalism. Therefore, it would be seen not only the need of implementation of a legal apparatus proper to treat the social issue (such as the regulation of the work relations), as well as one would observe the need of rebuilding the way how the law was applied. The formalist and conceptualist model that would be consolidated under a privativistic and liberal perspective during the 19th Century showed to be ineffective to deal with the new demands of the society. This aspect of integration between the social issue and the anti-formalism is essential to understand the parallel between the North-American and Brazilian legal thought during the interwar period, since the main channels of anthropophagic reading of the North-American legal thought by the Brazilian one have been established by means of this common axis.

No ano de 2016, o Brasil passou a ser o terceiro país com maior população carcerária do mundo. Levantamentos recentes indicam que o sistema de justiça tende a banalizar o uso da prisão cautelar (40% dos presos brasileiros são provisórios), em dissonância à legislação processual penal que traz a prisão preventiva como medida excepcional, assegurando a liberdade como regra até a decisão condenatória definitiva. O estudo dessa questão paradoxal é de interesse da comunidade jurídica por investigar se a tomada da decisão não está associada apenas ao conteúdo das regras jurídicas, mas a fatores extrajurídicos, desafiando as clássicas teorias da argumentação racional sobre a decisão judicial. Também de todo cidadão, potencial vítima de arbitrariedades no direito de liberdade, e da sociedade brasileira, já que o encarceramento em massa resulta em rebeliões, mortes, aumento da violência e canalização de recursos públicos de áreas produtivas para a contenção de pessoas. São os seguintes os problemas da pesquisa: 1) Para os magistrados, os sentidos da prisão preventiva e as razões de sua decretação são mais amplos do que os limites previstos na lei? 2) Em caso afirmativo, quais os sentidos construídos por eles e quais são os fatores considerados ou de influência para as decisões? Analisamos a questão a partir de premissas do realismo jurídico norte-americano, enquanto teoria descritiva da decisão judicial, para a qual o direito não é o único nem o principal elemento determinante das decisões. Objetivamos verificar quais são os sentidos construídos pelos juízes acerca da prisão preventiva e identificar como fatores extrajurídicos influenciam as decisões sobre ela. A investigação foi realizada coletando-se dados por meio de entrevistas semiestruturadas, a partir de amostra formada com dez participantes voluntários (juízes federais e estaduais). Procedemos à análise qualitativa, a partir da metodologia da produção de sentidos, na epistemologia do Construcionismo Social, oriundo da Psicologia Social. Os resultados encontrados indicam que os sentidos construídos pelos juízes acerca da prisão preventiva coincidem em parte, mas são mais amplos do que os conteúdos da legislação. Também revelam alguns fatores extrajurídicos de influência sobre as decisões de prisões cautelares. E demonstram como regras legais podem ser desconsideradas nas decisões quando elas não estiverem em consonância com as concepções individuais que os juízes constroem como solução justa ou correta. Concluímos, que de acordo com esta pesquisa, estão corretas as premissas do realismo jurídico: as regras legais têm influência, mas não exclusiva e nem necessariamente determinante, sobre as decisões. Para se compreender a extensão dos fatores extrajurídicos sobre as decisões judiciais é preciso prosseguir nas pesquisas empíricas interdisciplinares, que busquem compreender o fenômeno jurídico sob a perspectiva e com o instrumental de outros ramos do saber, já que estudos convencionais herméticos e meramente dogmáticos não conseguem revelar todos os seus aspectos, nem permitem conhecer o funcionamento operacional efetivo do sistema de justiça criminal. / Since 2016 Brazil has the third higher prison population in the world. Recent surveys indicate that the justice system tends to overuse pretrial detention (40% of Brazilian prisoners are pretrial detainees), in dissonance with the criminal procedural law that regulate preventive custody as exceptional measure, ensuring freedom to defendants as a rule until definitive conviction. The study of this paradoxical situation concerns to the law community once it investigates if the decision making is not only related to the content of the legal rules but also to extralegal factors, challenging the classic theories of rational argumentation about the judicial decision making. The inquiry matters to all citizens, potential victims of arbitrary imprisonment, and to the Brazilian society, since mass incarceration results in rebellions, deaths, increase of violence and channeling of public resources of productive areas for the containment of people. The research problems are as follows: 1) Are the meanings of pretrial detention for judges and the reasons for their enactment broader than the limits established by law? 2) If so, what are the meanings constructed by them and what are the factors considered or influencing decisions? We analyze the question from the premises of American legal realism as a descriptive theory of judicial decision, for which legal rules are not the only nor the main determinants of decisions. The purpose of the study was to verify which are the meanings constructed by the judges about the preventive custody and to identify extralegal factors influences at the decisions. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews, based on a sample of ten volunteer participants (federal and state judges). We proceed to the qualitative analysis, utilizing the production of meanings methodology, in the epistemology of Social Constructionism, from Social Psychology. The results indicate that the judges\' meanings about pretrial detention coincides in part, but they are broader than the contents of the legal rules. They also reveal some extralegal factors of influence on the decisions. And they demonstrate how legal rules can be disregarded in decisions when they are not in line with the individual conceptions that the judges construct as a just or right solution. We conclude that, according to this research, the premises of legal realism are correct: legal rules have influence, but not exclusively and not necessarily decisive, on decisions. In order to understand the extent of extralegal factors over judicial decisions, it is necessary to continue with interdisciplinary empirical research that seeks to understand the legal phenomenon from the perspective and with the instruments of other branches of knowledge, since hermetic, merely dogmatic studies cannot reveal aspects of how the criminal justice system functions.

O objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é analisar a assimilação antropofágica (Utilizarei, nesta dissertação a metáfora da expressão Antropofagia realizada pelo Movimento Modernista brasileiro. Assim como os índios canibais devoravam seus inimigos, acreditando que assim assimilavam as suas qualidades, os artistas Modernistas propunham uma devoração simbólica da cultura estrangeira, aproveitando suas inovações artísticas sem perder a identidade cultural brasileira.) do debate jurídico norte-americano produzido em torno da questão social durante a Era Roosevelt por parte do pensamento jurídico brasileiro da Era Vargas. Desse modo, estudar-se-á a forma como os autores norte-americanos da Sociological Jurisprudence e do Realismo Jurídico foram utilizados pela doutrina jurídica brasileira do período entre guerras na formação de um pensamento jurídico antiliberal e anticonceitualista. No centro da crise do capitalismo mundial, as universidades (Roscoe Pound, 1870-1964, e Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, 1893-1962), a Suprema Corte (Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 1870-1938, e Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1856-1941) e o corpo burocrático do governo (1933-1945) Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) (James MacCauley Landis, 1899-1964) produziam alternativas ao mecanicismo judicial e ao modelo liberal. Na periferia do capitalismo mundial, o corpo burocrático de Vargas (Oliveira Vianna, Francisco Campos e Francisco Sá Filho) e as revistas e debates jurídicos (João Mangabeira e Alípio Silveira) questionavam o liberalismo da República Velha (1889-1930) e buscavam, no mercado global de idéias, modelos institucionais que pudessem ser antropofagizados, substituindo as idéias fora do lugar implantadas pelo bacharelismo utópico da República Velha. Era o momento de explicar o Brasil, encontrar o desenho institucional mais adequado à realidade nacional, construir uma opinião pública e descobrir as soluções para converter o atraso em modernização. Assim, nos principais palcos do debate jurídico dos dois países e, em especial, na Suprema Corte norte-americana e na doutrina jurídica brasileira, percebia-se essa tentativa de revisão do método jurídico, como uma forma de se adequar o direito a um novo quadro de relações do capitalismo industrial. Desse modo, não só se via a necessidade de implantação de um aparato jurídico apto a tratar a questão social (como a regulação das relações do trabalho), como também se observava a necessidade de se reconstruir a forma como se aplicava o direito. O modelo formalista e conceitualista que havia se consolidado sob uma perspectiva privatista e liberal durante o século XIX, mostrava-se ineficiente para atender as novas demandas da sociedade. Esse aspecto de integração entre a questão social e o antiformalismo é essencial para compreender o paralelo entre o pensamento jurídico norte-americano e brasileiro durante o período entre guerras, uma vez que é por meio desse eixo comum que se estabeleceram os principais canais de leitura antropofágica do pensamento jurídico norte-americano pelo pensamento jurídico brasileiro. / The objective of this Master\'s Degree dissertation is to analyze the \"anthropophagical\" (I will use, in this dissertation, the metaphor of the word Anthropophagy made by the Brazilian Modernist Movement. Like the cannibal Indians used to devour their enemies, with the belief that, as such, they would assimilate their qualities, the Modernist artists used to propose a symbolic devouring of the foreign culture, taking advantage of their artistic innovations without losing the Brazilian cultural identity) assimilation of the North-American legal debate, arising from the social issue during the Age of Roosevelt, by the Brazilian legal thought of the Age of Vargas. Therefore, one will study the way how the North-American authors of the Sociological Jurisprudence and of the Legal Realism have been used by the Brazilian legal doctrine of the interwar period, in the formation of an anti-liberal and anti-conceptualist legal thought. In the core crisis of the worldwide capitalism, Universities (Roscoe Pound, 1870-1964, and Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, 1893-1962), Supreme Court (Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 1870-1938, and Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1856-1941) and bureaucratic body of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) government (1933-1945) (James MacCauley Landis, 1899-1964) produced alternatives to the legal mechanicism and to the liberal model. At the periphery of the world capitalism, the bureaucratic body of Vargas (Oliveira Vianna, Francisco Campos and Francisco Sá Filho) and the legal magazines and debates (João Mangabeira e Alípio Silveira) questioned the liberalism of the Old Republic (1889-1930) and searched, in the global market of ideas, for institutional models that could be anthropophagized, replacing the out-of-place ideas implemented by the utopic bachelorism of the Old Republic. That was the time of explaining Brazil, finding the institutional drawing that is the most proper to the national reality, building a public opinion and discovering the solutions to convert the delay into modernization. Thus, in the main background legal debate of the two countries legal debate, and especially in the United States Supreme Court and in the Brazilian legal doctrine could be perceive such attempt of review of the legal method, as a way of fitting the law to a new picture of relations of the industrial capitalism. Therefore, it would be seen not only the need of implementation of a legal apparatus proper to treat the social issue (such as the regulation of the work relations), as well as one would observe the need of rebuilding the way how the law was applied. The formalist and conceptualist model that would be consolidated under a privativistic and liberal perspective during the 19th Century showed to be ineffective to deal with the new demands of the society. This aspect of integration between the social issue and the anti-formalism is essential to understand the parallel between the North-American and Brazilian legal thought during the interwar period, since the main channels of anthropophagic reading of the North-American legal thought by the Brazilian one have been established by means of this common axis.

The theme of this thesis is "formalism in law" as a concept that permeates an essential part of modern legal thinking. This work shows that it is usually perceived as a critical concept, but without a clear and steady meaning. In recent times, however, the discussion involving this concept changed so that it now includes individuals positively acknowledging themselves as formalists. An overview of this debate (only marginally concerning the Czech environment yet, however) forms the bulk of the thesis. The second essential part of it is a separate rethinking of the place of formalism in law, in all its aspects - in interpretation and application of law, in the creation of law, even in legal education and legal scholarship. This thesis consists of three unequal parts, the first of which is further divided into three sections. The first part deals with the formalism as a topic of discussion in legal philosophy during the entire 20th century, and the intention is to present this debate to Czech readers. Its first section is devoted to a topic typically linked to criticism of formalism in law in Western legal scholarship, as it presents the American legal realism of the interwar period. It shows it as a strong and visible culmination of earlier critical efforts visible on both sides of the Atlantic...

Este trabalho tem como objetivo traçar um perfil da evolução das pesquisas sobre decisão judicial. Foi dada certa ênfase àquelas teorias e modelos influenciados pela teoria da decisão proposta pelo Realismo Jurídico Americano, ou seja, teorias e modelos que consideram fatores extrajurídicos que influenciam a decisão judicial e/ou que consideram que juízes decidem os casos primeiro com sua intuição, para somente depois racionalizar e fundamentar a decisão com argumentos jurídicos. O trabalho, em primeiro lugar, busca detalhar o pensamento realista, em seus aspectos históricos - como reação a formalismos existentes até então - e em seus aspectos teóricos - propondo (i.) uma teoria do direito; (ii.) instrumentalismo jurídico; e, especialmente (iii.) uma teoria da decisão judicial. Após a retomada do pensamento realista, o trabalho debate três modelos (ou teorias) modernos da decisão judicial: o modelo atitudinal, o modelo estratégico e o modelo psicológico. Posteriormente, e como último capítulo teórico, o trabalho aborda as novas possibilidades de estudo do comportamento judicial, especialmente trabalhos e experiências que utilizam a tecnologia e modelos computadorizados e algoritmos para a previsão de decisões. Alguns modelos computacionais serão examinados bem como alguns aspectos sobre base de dados e dados estruturados e não estruturados no direito, além de experiências com Mercados de Previsão e com a \"Sabedoria das Multidões\". Após toda as abordagens teóricas, o trabalho adentra em um capítulo prático e empírico, sobre o estudo da decisão judicial no Brasil. Foram analisados alguns elementos de todas as dissertações e teses de mestrado e doutorado em direito defendidas nos anos de 2011 a 2014, para que se pudesse entender como a matéria do comportamento judicial é abordada na academia jurídica brasileira. Conclui-se, com os dados, que a pesquisa sobre decisão judicial no Brasil ainda é incipiente, predominantemente normativa e quase nada se debate a respeito de teorias ou modelos descritivos ou preditivos, tais quais as que foram examinadas nos capítulos anteriores. / This dissertation aims to study the evolution of research on judicial decision. Special emphasis was placed on those theories and models influenced by the decision theory proposed by the American Legal Realism, which means those theories and models that consider extralegal factors that influence the judicial decision and/or theories and models that believe that judges decide cases first with their intuition, to only then rationalize and justify the decision using legal arguments. The dissertation first aims to break down the legal realist thought into two aspects: into its historical aspects, as being a reaction to existing formalisms, and into its theoretical aspects - as proposing (i.) a theory of law; (ii.) legal instrumentalism; and, finally (iii.) a theory of adjudication. After the analysis of the legal realism, the dissertation studies three modern models of judicial decision: the attitudinal model, the strategic model and the psychological model. Later, in the last theoretical chapter, this dissertation discusses new possibilities in the study of judicial decision, especially addressing works and experiences that uses technology, computer models and algorithms for predicting decisions. Some models will be examined in addition to some aspects of structured and unstructured data and databases in law, as well as experiences with Prediction Markets and with the \"Wisdom of the Crowds\". After this theoretical approach, this dissertation enters into a practical and empirical chapter on the research of judicial decision in Brazil. All masters and doctoral thesis and dissertations in Law defended in the years 2011-2014 were analyzed, so that one could understand how the matter of judicial behavior is addressed in the Brazilian legal academy. The empirical research concludes that the research on judicial decision in Brazil is still incipient, predominantly normative and there is almost nothing regarding descriptive or forecasting theories or models such as those examined in the previous chapters.

Les problèmes que pose, traditionnellement, la notion d'interprétation en droit (l'idéologie du juge comme bouche de la loi) sont encore multipliés lorsque l'on se place au niveau constitutionnel : ce qui est généralement considéré comme les techniques permettant de garantir la juridicité des interprétations de la loi exposent d'autant plus visiblement leurs lacunes, qu'il n'existe plus de norme supérieure donnant l'apparence de les garantir. En théorie, certains courants ont cherché, après Kelsen, à fonder rationnellement l'interprétation, afin de pouvoir juger de sa vérité. A chaque fois, cependant, il leur a été nécessaire de se rattacher à des éléments externes en droit et dont le caractère de vérité pouvait, de plus, être contesté. A l'opposé, le réalisme juridique se contente d'affirmer le pouvoir créateur du juge, et sa liberté d'interprétation ; ce faisant, pourtant, il ne peut pas rendre compte du processus interprétatif en fait (comment le juge décide-t-il lorsqu'il n'a pas de préjugé ?). La thèse cherchera donc, au moyen d'une étude empirique, à dégager des éléments qui pourraient servir de futurs développements théoriques sur la question de l'interprétation. Pour ce faire, elle mettra en œuvre des outils tirés des sciences littéraire, linguistique et sociologique et construira à partir de là une perspective autre que celle généralement proposée par les travaux sur l’interprétation. Afin d’asseoir plus solidement ses développements, ce travail adopte une méthode comparatiste (France – Allemagne) : les deux cours, fort éloignées à l'origine, mais en train de se rapprocher, ne peuvent manquer d'offrir les tensions nécessaires. / When one admits with legal realism that methods of interpretation cannot give the one good answer to a juridical case, and thus cannot assure that the judge is bound to the limits the separation of powers imposes on him, it becomes possible to change the perspective on these techniques. They now can be regarded as revealing the institutional constraints which affect the judge. The first part of this dissertation examines how the judge is writing the constitution. Based on G. Genette’s theories on hypertextuality (hypertextualité) it is possible to describe two different types of interpretation (imitation and transposition). The different interpretational choices made by the French and German judges seem to confirm the general impressions: the German Federal constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has a bigger power on shaping the constitution than the French Conseil constitutionnel. The second chapter demonstrates how this difference has a bearing on the two court’s institutional actions. The German judge is more straightforward when it comes to dealing with the legislator, deliberately using the instruments his position as a constitutional judge are offering. The French judge, on the other hand, seems more reluctant in this respect. Vis-à-vis the other judges, the constitutional judge (supported by more direct means of action, such as the constitutional complaint) can take a more and more preponderant position, corresponding to his understanding of the constitution. In France however, the lack of constraining procedures between the different courts results in a system of negotiations – oftentimes to redound to the normal judge’s advantage. Both constitutional courts are exposed to a similar constraint (the articulation between existing juridical system and the system of the constitution). The methods of interpretation are useful to them in order to bring different answers. / Einmal angenommen, wie im Legal realism, dass die Auslegungsmethoden nicht zur einzigen richtigen Lösung eines Falles führen und daher nicht für die richterliche Beachtung der von einem System der Gewaltenteilung gesetzten Schranken bürgen können, wird ein Perspektivenwechsel möglich und aufschlussreich. Somit können die Auslegungsmethoden als Ausdruck der institutionellen Zwänge, denen die Richter ausgesetzt sind, betrachtet werden. Der erste Teil dieser Dissertation beschäftigt sich damit, wie die Verfassung durch den Richter geschrieben wird. Anhand der von G. Genette entwickelten Hypertextualitätstheorie werden zwei allgemeine Auslegungsmodelle (Mimesis und Übertragung) ausgearbeitet. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass der vom deutschen und französischen Richter jeweils unterschiedlich gewählte Pfad einen ersten Eindruck bestätigt: das Bundesverfassungsgericht ist mächtiger wenn es darum geht, die Verfassung zu gestalten. Gleichzeitig hat jener Unterschied eine spürbare Wirkung auf das institutionelle Handeln der Gerichte, worauf im zweiten Teil der Arbeit eingegangen wird. Dem Gesetzgeber gegenüber wagt das deutsche Gericht mehr und ist freimütiger als das französische Gericht mit den ihm (als Verfassungsgericht) genauso wie seinem Homolog in Paris zur Verfügung stehenden Instrumenten. Auch nimmt er in seinen Beziehungen zu den anderen Richtern er eine fast überragende Stellung ein (was Verfahren wie die Verfassungsbeschwerde erleichtern), die seinem Verständnis des Grundgesetzes entspricht. Im Gegenteil dazu führt in Frankreich die strenge Trennung zwischen den drei hohen Gerichten zu einem System der Verhandlung, meistens zugunsten des Fachrichters. Anhand der Auslegungsarbeit beantworten somit beide Gerichte die Frage der Eingliederung der herkömmlichen Rechtsordnung und der Verfassungsordnung unterschiedlich.