Die Gesamtheit der musikwissenschaftlichen Tätigkeitsformen kann mit einem großangelegten Betrieb oder - noch genauer ausgedrückt - mit einem Markt verglichen werden.

Latvia has been an independent state twice, the first time during the years 1918-1940 and the second time from the year 1991 and ahead. During these two periods Latvia has been a destination for tourists. The aim of this study is to describe how Latvia as a destination has developed during the years of independence. One further aim is to compare what Latvia’s tourism industry looked like during the same periods to descry similarities and differences. Qualitative interviews in a combination with material from reports, articles and travel guidebooks constitute the empirical material of the study. The results have been analyzed on the basis of Halls (2008), Frisks (2000), Elbes (2002) and Butlers (1980) theoretical perspective of destination development. When the tourism industry during the first investigated period is compared with the tourism industry during the second investigated period some similarities and differences are descried. The most significant similarities are destinations within Latvia which are the most important and with the highest numbers of tourists are the same ones during the two periods; Riga, Jurmala and Sigulda. Another notable similarity during both periods is that the same factors are being marketed abroad. Significant similarities are that the state gave priority to the tourism industry and actively supported it with resources during the years 1918-1940 but has from 1991 until today been taken a passive role in the coherence and given a relatively small amount of resources. Another significant similarity is that the destination had a positive image of the “Baltic Riviera” and a good status during the years 1918-1940. From 1991 the status has not been at the same level and the image seem to be more diffuse and less positive than during the years 1918-1940. The study shows a few distinctive key factors which have influenced the development of Latvia as a destination. From 1918 the destination development was going relatively well. The status of the destination was good already before 1918 and rose during the 1920s and the 1930s. Decisive key factors for the destination development during these years were that the state gave priority to the tourism industry and supported it with necessary resources. Another key factor was the positive status of the destination for the time, the positive image of the “Baltic Riviera”. Together these factors developed the destination in a positive way. The development of Latvia as a destination from 1991 until today has been varied. A key factor which prevented/reduced the development between the years 1991 and 2004 was that almost nothing happened within the tourism industry and the development during those years. 2004 Latvia joined EU and that was a second key factor which affected the destination development during this period. It resulted in the abolishing of the demand on visa and more open country borders. At the same time many low price airlines started to operate to and from Riga. This affected the destination development in a more positive way than in the beginning of the same period.

Univ., Diss u.d.T.: Schmied-Kowarzik, Robin: Die Minderheitenpolitik der Europäischen Union--Marburg, 2007.

Zugl.: Münster (Westfalen), Univ., Diss., 2005 / Hergestellt on demand

Zugl.: Kiel, Univ., Diss., 2007

Rezension zum Werk Gadsimtu skaņulokā, erschienen 1997 in Riga

<p>During and after World War II Sweden was spying in the occupied Baltic countries which had been occupied, from 1943 by Nazi Germany and from 1944 by the Soviet Union. It began in 1943, with the Germans still occupying the Baltic countries, when Sweden and its intelligence service “C-byrån” recruited volunteers among the Baltic refugees in Sweden and sent them back to the countries they had fled from. Many of the Baltic refugees to Sweden were men aged 25-45 so the Swedish intelligence service had a good recruiting source. This started the first period of intelligence operations in the three Baltic countries. In 1946 Swedish intelligence was reorganized and Thede Palm was appointed head of, what was named, T-kontoret. He ran the T-kontoret until 1965. Palm transformed the intelligence to the situation needed for the Cold War and he expanded co-operation with the British Military Intelligence Service, MI6. This constitutes the second phase of Swedish intelligence operations in the Baltics. The first two years did not produce any exciting results. The reports from T-kontoret contained information mostly about the resistance movements in the three Baltic countries but not much about the military installations. The Swedish Defence Ministry and the Swedish High Commander of the Defence, Helge Jung, developed plans, based on a Soviet Union attack on Sweden, which was believed to be a real threat at that time. Besides, and in spite of Swedish neutrality, Helge Jung was very oriented to the West and often in opposition to parts of the Swedish Government which meant that the Government was not always fully informed about Swedish secret military operations in the Baltics and the Baltic Sea. When the Cold War intensified in 1948, the Swedes planned and carried out the setting-up of agents in the Baltics. This constitutes the third period of the operations. It all happened in co-operation with MI6. What they did not know about was that most of the operations were infiltrated by the Soviet MGB (the name of the Soviet secret police from 1946 to 1953) and therefore doomed to failure. This thesis focuses on the third period and the following questions: i) how did the results from the operations change between period 2 (1946-1948), and period 3 (1948-1953); ii) what was reported; and iii) did Swedish intelligence put the emphasis on special geographical areas and on specific targets? The results from the third period of intelligence operations in the Baltics were much better than before. The reports from the Baltics produced by T-kontoret increased from 10-20 per half-year to an average of 20-40 per half-year. The quality of the reports also improved (based on the scoring of the source and the message given by the Swedish Intelligence Service itself). The targets in the Baltics became more focused and the reports from Latvia followed by Estonia became more frequent than those from Lithuania, a fact that could have been influenced by Soviet immigration policies to the Baltic countries. In Latvia the focus was given to military targets, such as harbours and airports and the port in Liepaja and the airport Spilve outside Riga became top priorities. The thesis is based on documentation from the Swedish War Archives (Krigsarkivet) where access was given to the reports produced by T-kontoret from 1946 until 1953. We know from other sources that in 1957 the Soviet Union handed a protest note to the Swedish Government. The note was of course denied by the Swedes but after that the operations were ended both by the Swedes and the British Military Intelligence Services.</p>

<p>Denna artikel undersöker kulturella skillnader mellan Sverige och Lettland samt hur dessa skillnader påverkar verksamhetsstyrningen för svenska företag som etablerat verksamhet i Lettland. Artikeln utgår från Hofstedes teorier kring kulturella skillnader. Resultaten av enkäter som delades ut till respondenter i Sverige och Lettland visar att länderna skiljer inom dimensionerna maktdistans, osäkerhetsundvikande samt maskulinitet. För att undersöka hur dessa resultat påverkar verksamhetsstyrningen har sedan intervjuer genomförts med företagsledare på svenska företag i Lettland. Resultaten visar att skillnader inom dimensionen maktdistans framförallt leder till centraliserat beslutsfattande och mer direktstyrning i Lettland jämfört med i Sverige. Skillnaden inom dimensionen osäkerhetsundvikande leder framförallt till mer detaljstyrning, mindre initiativtagande samt kortare tidsperspektiv inom planering i Lettland jämför med i Sverige. Skillnaden i dimensionen maskulinitet leder till att strävan för status och ekonomisk framgång är högre i Lettland jämfört med i Sverige. Denna artikel argumenterar för att det är viktigt för svenska företag i Lettland att vara medvetna om dessa skillnader eftersom det kan påverka deras verksamhetsstyrning. Resultaten visar dock att letterna kan anpassa sig till svensk verksamhetsstyrning och trots skillnaderna mellan länderna har ett flertal svenska företag genom utbildning av anställda lyckats etablera svenska verksamhetsstyrningsmetoder i Lettland.</p>

Denna artikel undersöker kulturella skillnader mellan Sverige och Lettland samt hur dessa skillnader påverkar verksamhetsstyrningen för svenska företag som etablerat verksamhet i Lettland. Artikeln utgår från Hofstedes teorier kring kulturella skillnader. Resultaten av enkäter som delades ut till respondenter i Sverige och Lettland visar att länderna skiljer inom dimensionerna maktdistans, osäkerhetsundvikande samt maskulinitet. För att undersöka hur dessa resultat påverkar verksamhetsstyrningen har sedan intervjuer genomförts med företagsledare på svenska företag i Lettland. Resultaten visar att skillnader inom dimensionen maktdistans framförallt leder till centraliserat beslutsfattande och mer direktstyrning i Lettland jämfört med i Sverige. Skillnaden inom dimensionen osäkerhetsundvikande leder framförallt till mer detaljstyrning, mindre initiativtagande samt kortare tidsperspektiv inom planering i Lettland jämför med i Sverige. Skillnaden i dimensionen maskulinitet leder till att strävan för status och ekonomisk framgång är högre i Lettland jämfört med i Sverige. Denna artikel argumenterar för att det är viktigt för svenska företag i Lettland att vara medvetna om dessa skillnader eftersom det kan påverka deras verksamhetsstyrning. Resultaten visar dock att letterna kan anpassa sig till svensk verksamhetsstyrning och trots skillnaderna mellan länderna har ett flertal svenska företag genom utbildning av anställda lyckats etablera svenska verksamhetsstyrningsmetoder i Lettland.

During and after World War II Sweden was spying in the occupied Baltic countries which had been occupied, from 1943 by Nazi Germany and from 1944 by the Soviet Union. It began in 1943, with the Germans still occupying the Baltic countries, when Sweden and its intelligence service “C-byrån” recruited volunteers among the Baltic refugees in Sweden and sent them back to the countries they had fled from. Many of the Baltic refugees to Sweden were men aged 25-45 so the Swedish intelligence service had a good recruiting source. This started the first period of intelligence operations in the three Baltic countries. In 1946 Swedish intelligence was reorganized and Thede Palm was appointed head of, what was named, T-kontoret. He ran the T-kontoret until 1965. Palm transformed the intelligence to the situation needed for the Cold War and he expanded co-operation with the British Military Intelligence Service, MI6. This constitutes the second phase of Swedish intelligence operations in the Baltics. The first two years did not produce any exciting results. The reports from T-kontoret contained information mostly about the resistance movements in the three Baltic countries but not much about the military installations. The Swedish Defence Ministry and the Swedish High Commander of the Defence, Helge Jung, developed plans, based on a Soviet Union attack on Sweden, which was believed to be a real threat at that time. Besides, and in spite of Swedish neutrality, Helge Jung was very oriented to the West and often in opposition to parts of the Swedish Government which meant that the Government was not always fully informed about Swedish secret military operations in the Baltics and the Baltic Sea. When the Cold War intensified in 1948, the Swedes planned and carried out the setting-up of agents in the Baltics. This constitutes the third period of the operations. It all happened in co-operation with MI6. What they did not know about was that most of the operations were infiltrated by the Soviet MGB (the name of the Soviet secret police from 1946 to 1953) and therefore doomed to failure. This thesis focuses on the third period and the following questions: i) how did the results from the operations change between period 2 (1946-1948), and period 3 (1948-1953); ii) what was reported; and iii) did Swedish intelligence put the emphasis on special geographical areas and on specific targets? The results from the third period of intelligence operations in the Baltics were much better than before. The reports from the Baltics produced by T-kontoret increased from 10-20 per half-year to an average of 20-40 per half-year. The quality of the reports also improved (based on the scoring of the source and the message given by the Swedish Intelligence Service itself). The targets in the Baltics became more focused and the reports from Latvia followed by Estonia became more frequent than those from Lithuania, a fact that could have been influenced by Soviet immigration policies to the Baltic countries. In Latvia the focus was given to military targets, such as harbours and airports and the port in Liepaja and the airport Spilve outside Riga became top priorities. The thesis is based on documentation from the Swedish War Archives (Krigsarkivet) where access was given to the reports produced by T-kontoret from 1946 until 1953. We know from other sources that in 1957 the Soviet Union handed a protest note to the Swedish Government. The note was of course denied by the Swedes but after that the operations were ended both by the Swedes and the British Military Intelligence Services.