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20世紀的80至90年代初期，國際形勢發生劇烈動盪與變化，蘇聯於發生解體、東歐局勢劇變，過去美蘇「兩強對峙」之兩極格局所造成40多年的冷戰終告結束，國際體系由「一超多強」，轉變成多極化方向發展。此時中國在綜合國力發展上也有很大的變化，態勢積極的朝大國關係方向調整，除專注內部發展外，更重視與周邊國家的安全關係。中國知到，一個穩定、和睦的周邊環境，才有利於中國持續性發展，在周邊建立安全與穩定的緩衝帶後，可避免與其他大國發生衝突。因為，有安全的環境，才會有安定的社會，才能全面發展經濟，而維繫這種關係的要件，是安全互需和經濟互利與合作。 「上海合作組織」的前身是建立於1996年的「上海五國」機制，是中蘇兩國關於邊境的雙邊談判，蘇聯崩解後改為「上海五國」雙邊談判，再演變成「上海五國」的多邊會談。不但開啟有關邊境軍事安全的會談協商機制，同時亦開啓了穩定區域安全的多邊關係及區域合作模式。烏茲別克加入後，於2001年6月15日，6國元首共同宣布在「上海五國」機制的基礎上成立「上海合作組織」(Shanghai Cooperation Organization)，並發表「上海合作組織成立宣言」。這是中國第一個促成的多邊組織，也是第一個以中國城市命名的政府間組織，成員國包括中國、俄羅斯、哈薩克、吉爾吉斯、塔吉克及烏茲別克等6個國家。 「上海合作組織」創立的首要任務是確保該組織內的和平、安全與穩定，堅決打擊「三股勢力」、毒品及走私等非法交易。並認知當前的國際安全必須建立在各國平等、互信、互利及合作的基礎上，藉由每年定期舉行的元首峰會、總理會議、外交部長會議及不定期舉行的國家協調員會議、各部門領導人會議形成組織運作機制。而位於北京的秘書處及塔什干的地區反恐機構，這兩個常設機構的設立，使上海合作組織朝向更寬廣的方向邁進。本篇論文試圖瞭解冷戰終止及美國「911」恐怖攻擊事件發生後，「上海合作組織」運作與發展方向，直接或間接影響區域經濟及軍事安全的程度為何?另外，就「上海合作組織」與其他大國或國際組織的關係，對全球戰略所產生的影響為何?尤其是中國、美國、日本與俄羅斯的多方戰略關係的發展，非常值得予以持續觀注。 / 1980 to early 1990s, the international system develops from " one superpower and several powers " into a multi-polar direction due to severe turbulences and changes of the international situation, the disintegration of Soviet Union and the drastic changes of Eastern Europe, and the end of the 40-years Cold War which caused by the "a two-confrontation" bipolar situation between U.S.A and the Soviet Union in the past. At this point, there are also great changes in China’s the overall national development, For instance, a positive trend towards big power relations reorientation. Except to focus on internal development, China places more importance on security relations with neighboring countries. China knows that a stable, harmonious surrounding is conducive to China's sustainable development. To establish security and stability buffer zone in the surrounding can avoid conflict with other powers. Since a secure environment is the key to a stable society and a fully develop economic while interdependence and cooperation of security need and economic benefit is the essential element of maintaining this relationship. "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" develops from the "Shanghai Five" mechanism which established in 1996. It was the Sino-Soviet bilateral talks about border between the two countries, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became the "Shanghai Five" bilateral negotiations which is followed into the "Shanghai Five State "in multilateral talks. This development not only opened consultation mechanism talks on the border military security, also opened a stable regional security, multilateral relations, and regional cooperation. After Uzbekistan joined in June 15, 2001, six heads of state announced the establishment of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" which based on the "Shanghai Five" mechanism and issued a "Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization." This is the first multilateral organization which promoted by China and is the first intergovernmental organization in the name of Chinese city. The member States includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and other six countries. The first and foremost task of "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" is to ensure peace, security and stability of the organization, and resolutely combat the "three forces", drugs, smuggling and other illegal transactions. And to aware that the current international security must be based on national equality, mutual trust, mutual benefit and cooperation. By holding annual heads of states summit meeting, Prime Ministers meeting, Foreign Ministers meeting, and occasional meetings of national coordinators, leaders of various departments to form the operating mechanism of organizations. The establishments of two permanent organizations, the Secretariat in Beijing and the 4 regional anti-terrorism agency in Tashkent, lead the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to move towards a broader direction. This paper attempts to find out the operation and development direction of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" after the end of Cold War and "911" terrorist attacks in the United States, and the degree of how does this directly or indirectly affect the regional economic and military security so far? In addition, what is the impact that the relationships of the"Shanghai Cooperation Organization" between other major countries or international organizations affects on global strategic? Especially the development of multi-strategic relations between China, the United States, Japan and Russia, is very worthwhile continuing being concerned. Keywords：Shanghai Cooperation Organization, economic security, military security, Central Asia, relations among major powers

La fin de la guerre froide, marquée par l'accord retrouvé des cinq grandes puissances membres permanents au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, au lieu de connaître un déclin dans les interventions militaires extérieures de celles-ci, a vu au contraire leur nombre se multiplier, ce qui portait atteinte à la règle générale, considérée comme une norme impérative (de jus cogens), celle de l'interdiction du recours à la force dans les relations internationales. Malgré les tentatives de justification des différentes interventions de grande envergure, menées au nom de la sécurité collective (interventions autorisées par le Conseil de sécurité) ou unilatéralement, celles-ci se sont écartées des prescriptions du droit international et de la Charte des Nations unies. En conséquence, elles s'avèrent à des degrés divers des actions entachées d'illégalité En effet, elles ont été fondées sur des interprétations extensives des dispositions de la Charte ou en violation de celles-ci, voire en violation des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité lui-même, ainsi qu'on peut le percevoir à travers les grandes interventions menées en Irak par les coalisés en 1991, celles de l'OTAN au Kosovo en 1999, des États-Unis en Afghanistan, à travers l'occupation américano-britannique de l'Irak en2003, l'intervention de la Russie en Géorgie (2008), de l'OTAN en Libye (2011) et celle de la France au Mali (2013). Cela n'a pas manqué de relancer le débat, récurrent dans les instances internationales concernées, sur la nécessité de réformer le Conseil de sécurité (élargissement de sa composition et règlementation du veto) ainsi que d'instituer un véritable contrôle de légalité sur ses actes. / The end of the cold war, marked by the agreement between the five major permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council, instead of a decline in their external military interventions, has, on the contrary, increased in number, which detracted from the general rule, considered as an imperative norm Qus cogens), that of the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. Despite the attempts to justify the various large-scale interventions carried out in the name of collective security (interventions authorized by the Security Council) or unilaterally, they have departed from the requirements of international law and the United Nations Charter. As a result, they appear to be in varying degrees to illegal actions. Indeed, they have been based on extensive interpretations of the Charter or on the breach of it or even in violation of the resolutions of the Council Security itself, as can be seen from the major interventions carried out in IRAK by the allies in 1991, those of NATO in KOSOVO in 1999, the US in AFGHANISTAN, through the US and British occupation of IRAQ in 2003, the intervention of Russia in GEORGIA (2008), NATO in LIBYA (2011) and that of FRANCE in MALI (2013). This did not fail to revive the debate, recurrent in the international bodies concerned, on the need to reform the Security Council (enlargement of its composition and regulation of the veto) as well as to establish a real contrai of legality on its acts.

This diploma thesis is focused on the analysis of Russian foreign policy towards Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The actions of the external players, namely the US (NATO), the EU and China are discussed in order to see how these foreign entities can modify Russia's actions in its backyard. The current state of affairs demands a careful examination of Russian foreign policies. As Russia has demonstrated in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, it is willing to protect its interests at any cost. Thus, it was decided to analyze whether the foreign involvement in Kazakhstan would provoke Russian aggression. The primary aim is to provide a complex examination of Russian involvement in Kazakhstan and Ukraine along with the increasing influence from external players. This thesis is expected to contribute to the existing research on Russian foreign policy by providing an essential background for future researches as well as by presenting previously incomparable cases. This work presents a significant historical background that provides a reader with the in- depth analysis of Russia's relations with Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Geopolitical, military, economic, social factors are analyzed to present a broader perspective of the regional interconnections. Thus, this work analyzes how Russia has established its dominance in the...

L’argument central de notre thèse est qu’une structure internationale unipolaire non hégémonique favorise la sécurité collective. Après avoir montré que telle est la structure actuelle et avoir justifié notre positionnement théorique néolibéral, nous avons eu recours au modèle d’interaction du « leader-suiveur de Stackelberg », pour démontrer qu’une coopération conflictuelle entre États rationnels est possible, ce qui leur permet de surmonter leur dilemme de l’action collective. Une coopération possible en raison de l’existence d’un intérêt mutuel et d’un leader favorisant la coopération entre ces États, ainsi que de conditions leur permettant de mettre en place une ‘stratégie de la réciprocité’. Ils forment alors ce qu’on appelle le « groupe de Stackelberg ». Le suiveur de la périphérie, ou ‘défecteur’ doit, pour sa part, non seulement s’ajuster à l’intérêt mutuel ainsi défini, mais aussi coopérer et négocier avec le groupe, et ce, sous la pression de sanctions, voire d’un usage ultime de la force si besoin est. Après l’éventuel succès de ces négociations, un équilibre de Stackelberg favorisé par le leader, soit la puissance unipolaire et non hégémonique, est alors atteint et la coopération permet, alors, à chacun de retirer un bénéfice de cet intérêt mutuel. Dans notre cas, le groupe de Stackelberg est constitué des membres du G5 + 1, soit les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU et de l’Allemagne, agissant sous le leadership américain; l’Iran est un suiveur de la périphérie, soupçonné de défection, et l’intérêt mutuel est celui de la lutte contre la prolifération des ADM. Notre évaluation empirique montre que les conditions de la réciprocité des membres de ce groupe sont réunies et que celles de l’Iran sont en cours de négociation. / The main argument of our thesis is that a unipolar and non hegemonic structure of the international system furthers collective security. After having shown that the present international structure is as such and having justified our neoliberal theoretical approach, we have adopted the interaction model of the Stackelberg leadership model to demonstrate that a conflicting cooperation between rational States, that are respectful of the international order, is possible, which allows them to overcome their collective action dilemma. This cooperation depends on the existence of shared interests, on the ability of the leader to foster cooperation among them, and on structural conditions as well, which enable the setting up of “a reciprocity strategy”. They, thus, form what we call as a “Stackelberg’s group”. With regard to the periphery follower, or defector, he should adjust to the mutual interest of the group, as defined by this latter, as well as cooperate and negotiate with it, under the pressure of sanctions or the use of force if necessary. In the event of a successful negotiation, a Stackelberg equilibrium, furthered by the leader of the group, that is the unipolar and non hegemonic power, is then reached where cooperation between the members of the group, i.e. the States, allows them to get their share, that is a benefit from their mutual interest. In our case study, the Stackelberg’s group includes the five permanent members of the U.N Security Council plus Germany, all acting under the US leadership. Iran is a periphery follower suspected of defection, and the mutual interest is the international security against WMD proliferation. Our empirical assessment shows that the respective conditions, which enable a reciprocity strategy within the Stackelberg’s group, are then met by its members, whereas those of Iran are still under negotiations.

L’argument central de notre thèse est qu’une structure internationale unipolaire non hégémonique favorise la sécurité collective. Après avoir montré que telle est la structure actuelle et avoir justifié notre positionnement théorique néolibéral, nous avons eu recours au modèle d’interaction du « leader-suiveur de Stackelberg », pour démontrer qu’une coopération conflictuelle entre États rationnels est possible, ce qui leur permet de surmonter leur dilemme de l’action collective. Une coopération possible en raison de l’existence d’un intérêt mutuel et d’un leader favorisant la coopération entre ces États, ainsi que de conditions leur permettant de mettre en place une ‘stratégie de la réciprocité’. Ils forment alors ce qu’on appelle le « groupe de Stackelberg ». Le suiveur de la périphérie, ou ‘défecteur’ doit, pour sa part, non seulement s’ajuster à l’intérêt mutuel ainsi défini, mais aussi coopérer et négocier avec le groupe, et ce, sous la pression de sanctions, voire d’un usage ultime de la force si besoin est. Après l’éventuel succès de ces négociations, un équilibre de Stackelberg favorisé par le leader, soit la puissance unipolaire et non hégémonique, est alors atteint et la coopération permet, alors, à chacun de retirer un bénéfice de cet intérêt mutuel. Dans notre cas, le groupe de Stackelberg est constitué des membres du G5 + 1, soit les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU et de l’Allemagne, agissant sous le leadership américain; l’Iran est un suiveur de la périphérie, soupçonné de défection, et l’intérêt mutuel est celui de la lutte contre la prolifération des ADM. Notre évaluation empirique montre que les conditions de la réciprocité des membres de ce groupe sont réunies et que celles de l’Iran sont en cours de négociation. / The main argument of our thesis is that a unipolar and non hegemonic structure of the international system furthers collective security. After having shown that the present international structure is as such and having justified our neoliberal theoretical approach, we have adopted the interaction model of the Stackelberg leadership model to demonstrate that a conflicting cooperation between rational States, that are respectful of the international order, is possible, which allows them to overcome their collective action dilemma. This cooperation depends on the existence of shared interests, on the ability of the leader to foster cooperation among them, and on structural conditions as well, which enable the setting up of “a reciprocity strategy”. They, thus, form what we call as a “Stackelberg’s group”. With regard to the periphery follower, or defector, he should adjust to the mutual interest of the group, as defined by this latter, as well as cooperate and negotiate with it, under the pressure of sanctions or the use of force if necessary. In the event of a successful negotiation, a Stackelberg equilibrium, furthered by the leader of the group, that is the unipolar and non hegemonic power, is then reached where cooperation between the members of the group, i.e. the States, allows them to get their share, that is a benefit from their mutual interest. In our case study, the Stackelberg’s group includes the five permanent members of the U.N Security Council plus Germany, all acting under the US leadership. Iran is a periphery follower suspected of defection, and the mutual interest is the international security against WMD proliferation. Our empirical assessment shows that the respective conditions, which enable a reciprocity strategy within the Stackelberg’s group, are then met by its members, whereas those of Iran are still under negotiations.