Corporate governance, and the role of executive pay in particular, has received increased attention from the media, government, and the business arena in recent years. The study reported in this thesis adds to our understanding of both the components and determinants of Australian remuneration packages for the top management team. It does so in four main ways: 1. The study examines the determinants of compensation of a range of senior executives within the organisation, in addition to the CEO. No Australian research, to date, explores the structure and determinants of remuneration beyond the CEO; 2. The research is conducted in a contemporary setting and timeframe, where corporations are subject to expanded disclosure requirements, when compared to the subjects of prior Australian research; 3. It examines an expanded range of factors documented in overseas research as likely to relate to remuneration, some of which have not been previously examined in Australian work; 4. Finally, in developing hypotheses concerning factors expected to relate to remuneration, the study reconciles the perspectives provided by both agency and managerial power theories in terms of how they present similar and differing propositions. The research examines both cash and incentive components of executive compensation disclosed by a sample of top 300 Australian companies in 2005. The model incorporates measures of firm performance, economic characteristics, board monitoring and governance characteristics, and ownership characteristics in an attempt to explain the level of executive compensation. The study extends analysis beyond the CEO to incorporate an investigation of both the structure and determinants of compensation of the top five executives, in addition to the CEO. Results indicate that the structure of CEO compensation has changed since prior Australian research was conducted, to include a more heavy reliance on incentive pay. In contrast to the US, the structure of CEO remuneration differs from that of non-CEO executives. As managers move progressively up the senior executive hierarchy, short-term cash bonus and share-based incentive pay both become more important as components of remuneration. There is also a greater reliance on performance hurdles than has been documented in prior Australian and international research. The expectation that remuneration is now more strongly tied to firm performance is supported. The size and complexity of the firm are also considered to be important in determining the level of various components of both CEO and non-CEO executive compensation. This supports the view that larger, more complex entities attract higher quality executives, and pay for such quality and expertise. Growth firms are more likely to pay higher levels of incentive pay and total compensation to CEOs than non-growth firms. Executive remuneration also relates to the strength of various monitoring and governance mechanisms, although to a greater extent for CEOs than for other senior executives. Managers are able to influence the remuneration-setting process where governance structures are weak, or where they have greater influence. In some cases factors relating to CEO compensation differ from those associated with compensation of lower-level executives.

Bakgrund Det diskuteras mycket idag om ersättningar till verkställande direktörer (Vd) och storleken på dessa. Många har synpunkter på den enligt dem väldigt höga ersättningen och framförallt är många kritiska till de stora bonusar som tilldelas till företagsledare. Samtidigt är det ägarna som genom representation i styrelse och på bolagstämma bestämmer ersättningen. Syfte Syftet med studien är att undersöka om det föreligger ett samband mellan ägarbilden och andel rörlig lön till den verkställande direktören. Metod I studien tillämpas en deduktiv forskningsansats där vi utgått från existerande teorier och tidigare empirisk forskning för att skapa en hypotes som sedan kan bekräftas eller förkastas. Hypotesen testas genom en kvantitativ metod där data samlats in över 56 stycken svenska bolag för att sedan testas med statistisk regressionsanalys. Slutsats Undersökningen visar att det finns ett negativt samband mellan ett större ägande och andel rörlig ersättning till verkställande direktör.

Yes / Despite the widespread recognition of the paybacks of “going green” and “going clean”, limited research has focused on the impact of lean-green strategy on firm growth. In this study, we contribute to strategy and environmental sustainability literatures by investigating the possibility that the influence on lean-green strategy and firm growth is driven by different levels of industry competition, managerial power and family ties. Using panel data from 732 firms in four major industrialised economies (the US, Germany, France and the UK), we found that lean-green strategy positively relates to firm growth and this relationship is amplified at higher levels of competition, managerial power and family ties. Theoretical and practical implications of the study are also discussed.

The CEO bonus of banking companies has become a hot media topic around the world accelerated by the recent financial crisis of 2007-2008 where the excessive pay and risk-taking in the banking sector were recognized. This has raised public concerns around executive remuneration and the transparency of the companies. According to the regulations, the bonus of the CEO is indexed to the firm´s performance. However, the compensation of many CEO’s has been paid out during the financial crisis although the firms have lost money. This has consequently led to rigorous regulations of the financial institutions with the attempt to ensure long-term focus and consider outstanding risk through variable remuneration payments.   Although the remuneration, and specifically annual bonus, has caught a lot of attention by the public and the media, it has been mostly overlooked by regulatory authorities and academics up until today. This research represents the first attempt to examine the disclosure and transparency of CEO annual bonus plans of twenty leading EU banks through the employment of in-depth and descriptive approach.. The purpose of this study is to explore the issue of CEO annual bonus plan with respect to the disclosure of the information provided in the banking companies’ financial reports of 2011. The level of transparency of the companies are scrutinized and measured accordingly to five bonus features, which may contribute to the transparency of annual bonus plans. The bonus plan is regarded as transparent if the majority of the following bonus criteria are fulfilled by the companies; (1) the application of simple targets through a single performance condition; (2) the application of published targets accessible to shareholders; (3) the disclosure of methods applied in order for shareholders and other stakeholders to determine whether the given performance target(s) has been fulfilled; (4) bonus payments in form of cash; (5) the disclosure of annual bonus cap.   The findings of this study show that a significant part of the banks can be considered as non-transparent due to the failure of fulfilling the given bonus plan features, meaning that the issue of disclosure and transparency of annual bonus plans should raise concern for shareholders and regulators, both on the EU-level and nationally. This study evidently shows that the level of information disclosed as to bonus plans of CEO various tremendously between the countries and sometimes also between the companies in the same country, which indicate the issue of disclosure and transparency of annual bonus plans need to be enhanced through regulations.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the effect of two specific external, to the principal-agent relationship, influences on executive pay practices in the UK, namely pay consultants and the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The thesis consists of three essays. In the first essay, I examine the role of pay consultants in UK CEO pay practices. The results illustrate that their role is not consistent with the predictions of the managerial power theory. More specifically, pay consultants do not try to help managers towards the expropriation of shareholders' wealth; on the contrary I show strong indications that pay consultants urge firms towards the adoption of more incentive based CEO compensation. Moreover, I report that economic characteristics (e.g. firm size, complexity of the contract) rather than CEO power explain the firm's choice to hire a compensation consultant. These results are robust to selection bias controls. The results of this essay indicate that pay consultants play a less "sinister" role than what the managerial power theory suggests and that their advice and expertise can assist firms design an optimal executive pay contract. In the second essay, I examine the existence of managerial opportunism at the switch from UK GAAP to IFRS. I find strong indications that the restatements from UK GAAP to IFRS have not been manipulated by managers. I examine the existence of such behaviour under different specifications and for different types of CEOs that one would expect to engage in opportunistic behaviour to maximise the expected personal wealth. The research design that I adopt makes the results less prone to methodological issues common in studies in this area. Positive Accounting Theory literature has established that managerial opportunism seriously affects accounting choice. The results of this essay imply that with respect to IFRS restatements, where managers had strong incentives to manage future earnings, I find no signs of manipulation. This essay thus puts into question the Positive Accounting Theory Paradigm. In the third essay, I examine the effect of IFRS on the use of performance measures for evaluating and rewarding managers. This essay illustrates that firms make less use of accounting based performance measures due to the introduction of IFRS. I explain these results based on the predictions of optimal contacting theory. I claim that IFRS adds unnecessary "noise" to accounting numbers not relevant to the managers' actions. This is mainly due to the adoption of "fair value" accounting, which makes accounting earnings more value relevant and therefore useful for firm valuation purposes; however, "fair value" accounting also makes accounting numbers more volatile and sensitive to market movements. If this increase in volatility is related to events outside the managers' control, this makes the use of accounting based performance measures less useful for evaluating and rewarding managers. The results of this essay imply that IFRS might have made accounting earnings more useful for stock market purposes, e.g. firm valuation, but this has happened at the expense of other purposes that accounting serves, e.g. contracting.

No description available.

本研究主要針對目前企業績效不佳，董事會成員坐領高額董監酬勞之情況進行研究。本研究首先從權力與監督兩構面分析目前影響董監酬勞水準之因素，並進一步從權力與監督構面探討執行業務董監領取員工分紅產生之激勵或稀釋效果對公司價值與股東權益之影響。 實證結果顯示，董事會成員之權力擴張會導致較高水準之董監酬勞，尤其是執行業務董監之員工分紅部分，且執行業務董監領取員工分紅對於公司股東權益及公司未來價值具有負向之影響。家族企業之董監酬勞並不會隨著權力擴張而有較高的水準。在內部監督機制方面，獨立董監之監督效果較不明顯；在外部監督機制方面，主動機構投資人相較於被動機構投資人，具有抑制董監酬勞自利行為之效果。 / Based on a sample of Taiwanese companies listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange over the period of 1996-2004, this thesis examines the determinans of compensation of board directors from the power and monitoring perspectives. In addition, this thesis investigates the effect of equity-based compensation of executive directors on firm value and return on equity. The empirical result indicates that the entrenchment of managerial power determines the level of directors’ pay, especially on equity-based compensation. The more powerful the board of directors, higher the level of compensation, lower the company value and the return on stockholders` equity. However, as compared to non-family-controlled firms, the directors of family-controlled firms tend to have lower level of compensation. Moreover, we find that active institutional investors have greater monitoring effect on the compensation level of board of directors.

La problématique de la protection de la vie personnelle est très ancienne et a fait l’objet d'études dans diverses disciplines scientifiques. Un principe d’indifférence à la vie personnelle a été reconnu dans l’ensemble des systèmes étudiés à partir desannées 1980. Malgré l’existence d’un cadre juridique protecteur à première vue, avec la reconnaissance d’un droit à la protection de la vie personnelle - qui limite et rationalise indubitablement les pouvoirs de direction de l’employeur - la protection connaît des tempéraments et des restrictions, afin d'atteindre un équilibre avec les intérêts légitimes et les droits de l’employeur. La vie personnelle se trouve donc limitée par les pouvoirs patronaux, aspect très largement sous-estimé. Tant le législateur que la pratique et la jurisprudence cherchent à définir les conditions de cet équilibre, que cette étude s’attache à décrire, en soulignant les obstacles techniques et en proposant des solutions pour les résoudre. Son objectif est de démontrer qu’il y a une tendance claire et nette à reconnaître à l’employeur un droit de plus en plus poussé à la restriction de la vie personnelle du salarié et que ceci risque de mettre en péril l’ensemble de la construction. / The notion of the protection of personal life has already been the subject of various scientific disciplines. A principle of immunity of the employee’s personal life has been recognized in all the systems compared in this study, since the early 80’s. Despite the establishment of a protective legal framework, acknowledging a right to the protection of privacy, which undoubtedly limits and rationalises the employer’s powers, the actual protection is often limited, so as the employer’s legitimate interests and rights to be balanced with such protection of privacy. Personal life is, thus, limited by the employer’s powers. Both the legislation and the legal theory and practice seek to define the conditions of this balance. This study attempts to describe and highlight the various aspects of this balancing, as well as its technical barriers. It seeks to demonstrate that there is a clear and strong tendency torecognize an advanced right of the employer to restrict the employee’s personal life and that this puts the whole framework of protection into question.

L’établissement distinct est devenu un concept incontournable dans la vie des entreprises et une notion récurrente dans les textes légaux et la jurisprudence. Dans l’hypothèse la plus simple, l’entreprise n’est dotée que d’une seule unité de travail, constituée d’activités et de personnels réunis en un même lieu. L’entreprise et l’établissement unique se confondent alors. Mais dès lors qu’elle développe un effectif important et que sa structure complexe impose la mise en place d’une organisation adaptée, elle se démembre et se divise en établissements. L’établissement distinct devient alors un centre d’activité de l’entreprise géographiquement ou matériellement isolé. Le droit du travail tente de saisir l’établissement distinct dans de multiples dimensions et n’adopte pas la même approche selon l’utilité que sa reconnaissance peut apporter dans l’entreprise. L’objet de cette recherche est de saisir la multiplicité des réalités que recouvre l’établissement distinct et d’éclaircir la manière dont le législateur et les tribunaux tendent à l’optimiser en fonction du rôle qui lui est assigné. Concomitamment, il est question de vérifier l’opportunité d’opérer un recentrage des rapports du droit du travail au niveau de l’établissement plutôt qu’au niveau de l’entreprise et les conséquences qui en résultent. / The separate establishment has become an unavoidable concept in the life of the companies and a recurring notion in the legal texts and the jurisprudence. In the simplest case, the company has only one work unit, consisting of activities and personnel in one place. The enterprise and the single establishment are then merged. But since it develops a large workforce and its complex structure requires the establishment of a suitable organization, it is dismembered and divided into establishments. The separate establishment then becomes a center of activity of the company geographically or materially isolated. Labor law attempts to seize the distinct establishment in multiple dimensions and does not adopt the same approach depending on the utility that its recognition can bring to the company. The purpose of this research is to grasp the multiplicity of realities encompassed by the distinct institution and to clarify how the legislature and the courts tend to optimize it according to the role assigned to it. Concomitantly, it is a question of verifying the desirability of refocusing the relations of labor law at the level of the establishment rather than at the level of the enterprise and the resulting consequences.