欲探尋中共和知識份子的關係，必先回顧其歷史發展。早在1940年代，中共已藉由「整風運動」，發展出一套「馴服」和「利用」知識份子的辦法。1949年中共建立新政權，更將此邏輯推及全國，對於當代中國知識份子而言，無疑是一巨大變化與挑戰。 　　胡風，作為一位與中共關係密切的作家、知識份子，其政治立場向來親共，乃被中共視為「同路人」。儘管如此，胡風仍有諸多意見，未能與中共全然契合。1954年，胡風向中共中央遞交「萬言書」，直陳中共文藝政策的缺失。1955年，毛澤東欽定「胡風反革命集團」一案，胡風和友人多遭逮捕、審查，並牽連甚廣。胡風一派因言獲罪，堪稱中共建政以來首宗「文字獄」，亦為重大政治冤獄。 　　本研究以胡風事件為主軸，圍繞胡風其人進行個案研究。第一章為導論，簡述本文研究動機，以及當代以來中國知識份子的思想變化。第貳章、第叁章為胡風之個人歷史，描述胡風求學、出洋、創作、涉入政治的人生歷程，作為討論胡風事件的背景介紹。第肆章為主文，詳述胡風事件的原委，進一步探討胡風事件的成因，分析中共黨政高層（特別是毛澤東）所扮演之關鍵決策角色，藉此釐清其政治責任。第伍章結論，為筆者的研究心得和展望。透過胡風事件的探究，筆者針對毛澤東的個人權威、中共與知識份子的特殊關係，以及中共政治文化提出檢討。 / To realize the relationship between the CCP and the intellectuals, we should review the historical development. Early in the 1940s, the CCP has already progressed the method of “using” the intellectuals. In 1949, the new regime was built by the CCP. Furthermore, they spread this strategy to whole mainland. Obviously, it was a big change and challenge to the contemporary Chinese intellectuals. Hu Feng, as an intellectual and a “comrade”, whose political position had been closed to the CCP. However, Hu Feng still had some opinions which differ from the CCP. In 1954, Hu Feng submitted his proposal which criticizing the CCP’s literature and art policy. In 1955, Mao ZeDong judged this case as “Hu Feng counterrevolutionary group”. After that, Hu Feng and his companions were arrested and investigated by the government. The Hu Feng Incident seemed to be such a literary persecution and injustice case. 　　This research mainly focuses on the Hu Feng Incident. Firstly, Chapter 1 is the “Introduction”, which introduces the reasons of this research and the changing thought of modern Chinese intellectuals. Secondly, the focus of Chapter 2 is the life course and career pattern of Hu Feng. Chapter3 is the narration of the big change to the intellectuals on 1949. Chapter 4, which includes the main idea of this research, not only analyzes the causes of the Hu Feng Incident, but also seeks the crucial role of Mao. In Conclusion, Chapter 5 summarized the reflection and the vision upon this research. The writer reviews Mao’s personal authority and the political culture of the CCP. Finally, the special relationship between the CCP and the Chinese intellectuals will still be a major issue, that will need further study on it.

Based on newfound family letters, factory archives, oral history, and offiicial publications in Shanghai and other Chinese cities, this dissertation examines how urban Chinese families weathered the economic aftermath of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution by negotiating with the austerity measures, official ideology, and street-level bureaucracy. Such multivalent negotiations gave rise to "xiaokang", a “Confucianized” doctrine of depoliticized economic development, providing a durable basis for socialist China’s integration with the capitalist world order. A Shanghai-focused history of urban household economy and grassroots ideology in socialist China, this dissertation explains how urban families shaped modern China’s state-society dynamics and charted China’s unique transition away from Communism. Urban families’ experiences in late Maoist China were profoundly shaped by “revolutionary austerity”, characterized by ideological mobilization of urban families to bear the costs of Mao’s continuous revolution. By separating millions of teenagers from their families, the send-down youths movement (1968-1980) marked the austerity's apex. Instead of continuing the revolution, the send-down youths movement and other revolutionary austerity measures transformed urban families into smaller, more efficient, and depoliticized economic units. Once the ideologically disillusioned and economically strained sent-down youths negotiated the difficult bureaucratic terrain to achieve family reunion, they reinvested the virtue of sacrifice to the “possessive vision” of family life and the cultivation of their single child. By examining eight collections of Mao-era family letters in the context of larger historical processes, this dissertation demonstrates a significant shift in the late Maoist household economy and grassroots sentiments undergirding China’s "xiaokang" ideology.

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Deux décennies après la chute de l'URSS (1991), ce mémoire propose une réévaluation de la thèse de Francis Fukuyama sur la Fin de l'Histoire, élaborée en 1989, qui postule qu'avec la chute de l'URSS aucune idéologie ne peut rivaliser avec la démocratie libérale capitaliste; et de la thèse de Samuel P. Huntington sur le Choc des civilisations, élaborée en 1993, qui pose l'existence d'un nombre fini de civilisations homogènes et antagonistes. Pourtant, lorsque confrontées à une étude approfondie des séquences historiques, ces deux théories apparaissent pour le moins relatives. Deux questions ont été traitées: l'interaction entre Idéologie et Conditions historiques, et la thèse de l'homogénéité intracivilisationnelle et de l'hétérogénéité antagoniste intercivilisationnelle. Sans les invalider complètement, cette recherche conclut toutefois que ces deux théories doivent être nuancées; elles se situent aux deux extrémités du spectre des relations internationales. La recherche effectuée a montré que les idéologies et leur poids relatif sont tributaires d'un contexte, contrairement à Fukuyama qui les pose dans l'absolu. De plus, l'étude de la Chine maoïste et particulièrement de la pensée de Mao Zedong montre que les traditions politiques locales sont plus hétérogènes qu'il n'y paraît au premier abord, ce qui relativise la thèse de Huntington. En conclusion, les rapports entre États sont plus dynamiques que ne le laissent penser les thèses de Fukuyama et de Huntington. / The central purpose of this research is a revaluation, two decades after the 1991 demise of the USSR, of Francis Fukuyama's 1989 "End of History" theory, which postulates that with the fall of the USSR no major ideology is a challenger to the domination of liberal capitalist democracy; and of Samuel P. Huntington's 1993 "Clash of Civilizations" theory that postulates the existence of a finite number of antagonistic homogeneous civilizations. When confronted with the actual unfolding of historical events, these two absolute and uncompromising theories appear increasingly relative. Two questions were researched: the interaction between Ideology and Historical conditions in the case of Fukuyama, and that of the presupposed Intra-civilizational homogeneity and Inter-civilizational antagonistic heterogeneity. This research, not dismissing them totally, comes to the conclusion that they constitute the two opposite poles of a continuum that encompass most types of interactions between polities. First, this thesis comes to the conclusion that ideologies and their relative weight are part of a broader picture rather than absolutes in themselves, as Fukuyama argues. Furthermore, the study of Maoist China and especially of the thoughts of Mao Zedong strongly suggests the heterogeneity of political traditions locally, contrary to Huntington's thesis. In other words, interactions between polities seem more dynamic than the simplistic linear approaches of Fukuyama and Huntington.

Deux décennies après la chute de l'URSS (1991), ce mémoire propose une réévaluation de la thèse de Francis Fukuyama sur la Fin de l'Histoire, élaborée en 1989, qui postule qu'avec la chute de l'URSS aucune idéologie ne peut rivaliser avec la démocratie libérale capitaliste; et de la thèse de Samuel P. Huntington sur le Choc des civilisations, élaborée en 1993, qui pose l'existence d'un nombre fini de civilisations homogènes et antagonistes. Pourtant, lorsque confrontées à une étude approfondie des séquences historiques, ces deux théories apparaissent pour le moins relatives. Deux questions ont été traitées: l'interaction entre Idéologie et Conditions historiques, et la thèse de l'homogénéité intracivilisationnelle et de l'hétérogénéité antagoniste intercivilisationnelle. Sans les invalider complètement, cette recherche conclut toutefois que ces deux théories doivent être nuancées; elles se situent aux deux extrémités du spectre des relations internationales. La recherche effectuée a montré que les idéologies et leur poids relatif sont tributaires d'un contexte, contrairement à Fukuyama qui les pose dans l'absolu. De plus, l'étude de la Chine maoïste et particulièrement de la pensée de Mao Zedong montre que les traditions politiques locales sont plus hétérogènes qu'il n'y paraît au premier abord, ce qui relativise la thèse de Huntington. En conclusion, les rapports entre États sont plus dynamiques que ne le laissent penser les thèses de Fukuyama et de Huntington. / The central purpose of this research is a revaluation, two decades after the 1991 demise of the USSR, of Francis Fukuyama's 1989 "End of History" theory, which postulates that with the fall of the USSR no major ideology is a challenger to the domination of liberal capitalist democracy; and of Samuel P. Huntington's 1993 "Clash of Civilizations" theory that postulates the existence of a finite number of antagonistic homogeneous civilizations. When confronted with the actual unfolding of historical events, these two absolute and uncompromising theories appear increasingly relative. Two questions were researched: the interaction between Ideology and Historical conditions in the case of Fukuyama, and that of the presupposed Intra-civilizational homogeneity and Inter-civilizational antagonistic heterogeneity. This research, not dismissing them totally, comes to the conclusion that they constitute the two opposite poles of a continuum that encompass most types of interactions between polities. First, this thesis comes to the conclusion that ideologies and their relative weight are part of a broader picture rather than absolutes in themselves, as Fukuyama argues. Furthermore, the study of Maoist China and especially of the thoughts of Mao Zedong strongly suggests the heterogeneity of political traditions locally, contrary to Huntington's thesis. In other words, interactions between polities seem more dynamic than the simplistic linear approaches of Fukuyama and Huntington.

The Sino-Soviet Split of the late 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s was a multidimensional crisis of nationalism, national interests, domestic politics, personal problems, cultural differences, border issues, Soviet-American détente, communication misunderstanding, and different interpretations of ideology. The goal of this diploma thesis is to analyse the important domestic and foreign factors which contributed to the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations. In this interdisciplinary study, the author wants to over bridge the differences between Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory, the subfields of History and Political Science. In the first part, there is an analysis of current Sino-Soviet Split historiography (Lorenz Lüthi, Sergey Radchenko, Xia Yafeng, Austin Jersild) by using theories of International Relations (liberalism, realism and constructivism). The second part provides a historical description of the Sino-Soviet Split. Emphasis is placed on the Chinese side and especially regarding the role of Mao Zedong. This thesis focuses on the period between 1958 and 1964, nevertheless it is neccessary to include preceding and subsequent phases of the relations. It is essential due to cultural, ideological and national factors. These factors endured a long time and it would be impossible to...

羅欣欣. / 論文(哲學碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院藝術學部, 1998. / 附參考文獻. / 中英文摘要. / Luo Xinxin. / 序言 --- p.1 / 論文摘要 --- p.2 / 插圖目錄 --- p.5 / 緒論 --- p.14 / Chapter 第一章 --- 中共建國前的毛澤東繪畫圖像(1927-1949) / Chapter I. --- 毛澤東政治地位的確立 --- p.28 / Chapter II. --- 土地革命戰爭時期(1927-1937)：毛澤東繪畫圖像的起源 --- p.30 / Chapter III. --- 抗口戰爭時期(1937-1945)的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.31 / Chapter 1 . --- 魯藝木刻工作團的成立1938 --- p.32 / Chapter 2. --- 晉西北木刻工廠1941 --- p.33 / Chapter 3. --- 《延安文藝座談會上的講話》1942 --- p.34 / Chapter 4. --- 赤色郵政 1944 --- p.40 / Chapter 5. --- 中共黨報 1945 --- p.41 / Chapter IV. --- 全國解放戰爭時期(1945-1949)的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.43 / 小結 --- p.47 / Chapter 第二章 --- 中共建國後的毛澤東繪畫圖像(1949-1966) / Chapter I. --- 中華人民共和國成立初年的毛澤東繒畫圖像發展 --- p.53 / Chapter 1. --- 中華人民共和國的成立194 9 --- p.53 / Chapter a. --- 延安藝術傳統的毛澤東漫畫圖像 --- p.54 / Chapter b. --- 王朝聞的繪畫領袖像指示 --- p.56 / Chapter 2. --- 土地改革 1950-1952 --- p.59 / Chapter a. --- 新年畫創作運動 --- p.59 / Chapter 3. --- 建國初年的整黨整風1950-52 --- p.66 / Chapter a. --- 革命歷史畫創作計劃 --- p.67 / Chapter II. --- 中蘇親密外交下的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.70 / Chapter 1. --- 全盤蘇化1950-55 --- p.70 / Chapter a. --- 蘇聯宣傳畫的影響 --- p.70 / Chapter b. --- 蘇聯油畫的影響 --- p.72 / Chapter c. --- 蘇聯領袖像選材的影響 --- p.74 / Chapter III. --- 中共社會經濟改革下的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.76 / Chapter 1. --- 第一個五年計劃1953-1957 --- p.76 / Chapter a. --- 中國畫的改造 --- p.78 / Chapter b. --- 油畫民族化 --- p.81 / Chapter 2. --- 大躍進及人民公社運動1958-60 --- p.84 / Chapter 3. --- 社會主義教育運動1962-65 --- p.88 / Chapter a. --- 革命歷史繪畫運動 --- p.59 / 小結 --- p.91 / Chapter 第三章 --- 文革時期的毛澤東繪畫圖像(1966-1976) / Chapter I. --- 文化大革命發動的原因 --- p.105 / Chapter 1. --- 文化大革命序幕：海瑞罷官1965 --- p.105 / Chapter 2. --- 毛澤東個人崇拜 --- p.107 / Chapter II. --- 文革時期毛澤東繪畫圖像的發展 --- p.107 / Chapter 1. --- 紅衛兵運動1966 --- p.107 / Chapter a. --- 紅衛兵藝術 --- p.108 / Chapter b. --- 《毛澤東思想照亮安源工人革命運動展覽》 --- p.113 / Chapter c. --- 「紅、光、亮」的藝術手法 --- p.115 / Chapter 2. --- 工農兵領導下的文化大革命1969 --- p.117 / Chapter a. --- 工農兵繪畫運動 --- p.118 / Chapter 3. --- 毛澤東的親密戰友一林彪的叛變1971 --- p.124 / Chapter 4. --- 毛澤東的接班人一華國鋒1976 --- p.125 / 小結 --- p.126 / Chapter 第四章 --- 文革後及改革開放時期的毛澤東繪畫圖像(1976-1997) / Chapter I. --- 文革後的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.132 / Chapter 1. --- 後文革時期的藝術1976-1978 --- p.132 / Chapter a. --- 《熱烈慶祝華國鋒同志任中央主席、中央軍委主席 、熱烈慶祝粉碎四人幫篡黨奪權陰謀的偉大勝 利全國美術作品展覽》 --- p.133 / Chapter b. --- 《慶祝中國人民解放軍建軍50周年美術作品展覽》 --- p.134 / Chapter c. --- 毛主席紀念堂的落成 --- p.136 / Chapter d. --- 《毛主席永遠活在我們心中´ؤ毛主席逝世一周 年美術作品展覽》 --- p.137 / Chapter 2. --- 傷痕藝術1978-1979 --- p.139 / Chapter 3. --- 星星美展1979-1980 --- p.140 / Chapter II. --- 改革開放時期的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.141 / Chapter 1. --- 美術新思潮下的毛澤東圖像 --- p.141 / Chapter a. --- 後八九的中國新藝術一政治波普中的毛澤東圖像 --- p.143 / Chapter b. --- 毛澤東藝術圖像的拍賣熱潮 --- p.151 / Chapter 2. --- 宮方持續創作的毛澤東繪畫圖像 --- p.152 / 小結 --- p.156 / 結語 --- p.161 / 附錄一 ：1.中國藝術史中毛澤東書法圖像的社會文化意義 --- p.1-1 / 2.美術展覽中的毛澤東繪畫圖像畫目 --- p.1-6 / 附錄二：參考書目 --- p.2-1 / 附錄三：現代中國藝術史中毛澤東繪畫圖像畫目 --- p.3-1 / 附錄四：圖版 --- p.4-1

In the years since Mao Zedongs death, the people of China have been impelled to reevaluate the legacy and character of their still iconic leader. One of the more notable trends in this process of posthumous reevaluation is the tendency of some individuals and groups (most often, the rural peasantry) to interpret the deceased Chairman along theological lines, assuming that his still efficacious spirit will provide protection and good fortune to those who honour him.<p>In exploring the genesis (and continued salience) of these beliefs and practices, the present research delves into popular Chinese religiosity, exploring the porosity of the traditional cosmology, the centrality of perceived spiritual efficacy (ling) in determining the popularity of religious cults, and the theological and cosmological resonances extant within traditional understandings of political leadership. The body of metaphors, narratives, and tropes drawn from this historical overview are then applied to popular characterizations of Mao, with the resulting correspondences helping to explicate the salience of these modern religious interpretations. To further investigate the source of Maos persistent symbolic capital, the present research also explores the role of Cultural Revolution-era ritual in valorizing and reifying the power and efficacy then popularly ascribed to the Great Helmsmans person and teachings. This studys conclusion, in brief, is that participants in the posthumous cult of Mao are utilizing these cultural materials in both traditional and creative ways, and that such interpretations speak to the exigencies of life in the turbulent, ideologically ambiguous culture of modern China. <p>In performing this evaluation, the present research makes use of the standard phenomenological/historiographic approach of religious studies scholarship, though it is also informed by narrative methods, cognitive science, and current perspectives on the role and function of ritual. In particular, the analysis of Mao-era rituals (as a source of Maos continued symbolic potency) is performed using the cognivistic typology of ritual proposed by E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley, with additional materials drawn from the research of Catherine Bell, Roy Rappaport, Pascal Boyer and Adam Chau.

In the years since Mao Zedongs death, the people of China have been impelled to reevaluate the legacy and character of their still iconic leader. One of the more notable trends in this process of posthumous reevaluation is the tendency of some individuals and groups (most often, the rural peasantry) to interpret the deceased Chairman along theological lines, assuming that his still efficacious spirit will provide protection and good fortune to those who honour him.<p>In exploring the genesis (and continued salience) of these beliefs and practices, the present research delves into popular Chinese religiosity, exploring the porosity of the traditional cosmology, the centrality of perceived spiritual efficacy (ling) in determining the popularity of religious cults, and the theological and cosmological resonances extant within traditional understandings of political leadership. The body of metaphors, narratives, and tropes drawn from this historical overview are then applied to popular characterizations of Mao, with the resulting correspondences helping to explicate the salience of these modern religious interpretations. To further investigate the source of Maos persistent symbolic capital, the present research also explores the role of Cultural Revolution-era ritual in valorizing and reifying the power and efficacy then popularly ascribed to the Great Helmsmans person and teachings. This studys conclusion, in brief, is that participants in the posthumous cult of Mao are utilizing these cultural materials in both traditional and creative ways, and that such interpretations speak to the exigencies of life in the turbulent, ideologically ambiguous culture of modern China. <p>In performing this evaluation, the present research makes use of the standard phenomenological/historiographic approach of religious studies scholarship, though it is also informed by narrative methods, cognitive science, and current perspectives on the role and function of ritual. In particular, the analysis of Mao-era rituals (as a source of Maos continued symbolic potency) is performed using the cognivistic typology of ritual proposed by E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley, with additional materials drawn from the research of Catherine Bell, Roy Rappaport, Pascal Boyer and Adam Chau.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 11, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.