Après avoir montré l’existence d’un impact inflationniste des biocarburants de première génération sur les prix agricoles via un renforcement du lien entre les prix agricoles et du pétrole, nous soulignons l’absence d’un réel effet positif de leur expansion sur les économies émergentes et en développement. De plus, la hausse des prix agricoles a contraint certains pays importateurs de ces produits agricoles à mettre en place des politiques de protection de leurs marchés domestiques. Ces résultats prouve qu’il s’avère impératif de développer une production de biocarburants ne nécessitant pas de matières premières à visée alimentaire. Or, nous mettons en évidence la préférence de la population française pour ces biocarburants de deuxième génération, d’autant plus pour une production issue de résidus agricoles. Enfin, nous établissons – en prenant l’exemple d’un marché américain – que la mise en place de marchés dérivés des biocarburants en Europe pourrait permettre aux industriels de se protéger efficacement face à la volatilité des prix. / Having shown the existence of an inflationary impact of first-generation biofuels on agricultural prices through a stronger link between agricultural and oil prices, we highlight the lack of a real positive effect of their expansion on the emerging and developing economies. In addition, the rise in agricultural prices has required some importing countries of these agricultural products to implement policy measures to protect their domestic markets. These results prove that it is imperative to develop a production of biofuels that do not use food crops. However, we highlight the preference of the French population for these second-generation biofuels, especially for a production based on agricultural residuals. Finally, we establish – using the example of the US market of ethanol – that the establishment of biofuel derivatives markets in Europe could enable industrials to protect themselves efficiently against price volatility.

La présente étude consiste en l’analyse comparative de l’Autorité des Marchés Financiers et du Comité d’Etat de la Bourse, les autorités de régulation actuelles des marchés de capitaux de France et du Vietnam, deux pays qui partagent un héritage historique commun et des relations particulières dans de nombreux domaines, dont celui juridique. Non seulement le CEB et l’AMF connaissent des mutations dues au contexte économique global, mais le régulateur vietnamien a vu sa charge de travail s’accroître considérablement suite à l’accession du Vietnam à l’OMC. Organes d’encadrement voulus par les pouvoirs publics de la France et du Vietnam, le Comité et l’Autorité assurent la protection de l’épargne et veille à l’équilibre des marchés, en exerçant leurs attributions en matière de contrôle et en recourant à leur pouvoir normatif et d’élaboration d’actes non-décisoires de manière constante. Si leurs relations avec les autres entités du système financier varient sensiblement pour chacun d’eux, les disparités de leurs pouvoirs répressifs respectifs s’estompent de plus en plus pour aller dans le même sens. / This study consists of the comparative analysis between the Autorité des Marchés Financiers and the State Securities Commission, the current regulatory authorities of the capital markets in France and Vietnam, two countries which have a common historical heritage and particular relations in many fields, even legal industry. Not only the SSC and the AMF know changes due to global economic context, but also the Vietnamese regulator had its workload considerably increased following accession for Vietnam. Being management bodies which creation was wanted by public authorities in France and in Vietnam, the Commission and the French authority ensure the saving protection and attend to the market equilibrium, by performing their supervisory powers and by using their normative capacities and developing non-constraining acts in a constant way. If their relations with others entities of the financial system vary appreciably for each one, the disparities of their respective repressive capacities decrease and go more and more in the same direction.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

This dissertation argues on the necessity for an efficient and credible recovery and resolution framework for central clearing counterparties (CCPs).Following the 2008 subprime crisis and the failure of Lehman Brothers, several reforms have been undertaken in order to reinforce the strength of the financial system and, in particular, the over the counter (OTC) derivatives market. Two streams of reforms are of particular relevance in the present context: a) The development of resolution regimes for financial institutions, in particular for systemic “too big to fail” banks. The key objectives of these resolution regimes are to ensure the continuity of the critical functions performed by systemic institutions, the preservation of financial stability and the protection of taxpayers (i.e. avoiding public bailouts). This stream completed regulatory initiatives to reinforce the existing prudential framework acknowledging the natural limits of the latter and the observed forbearance by supervisory authorities in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The academic literature analysing the development and implementation of resolution regimes for banks essentially looked at issues such as the respect of the shareholders’ fundamental rights, the existence of appropriate safeguards for creditors and the execution of bail-in operations. b) The obligation to clear centrally OTC derivatives markets in order to prevent and control the possible contagion of risks across the financial system. The objectives of this stream of reform are to increase the transparency of the OTC derivatives markets and reduce the counterparty credit risk in the system by forcing transactions through professional risk managers, i.e. central clearing counterparties (CCPs). This however assumes that CCPs have the capability and the capacity to manage this centralisation of risks. Therefore, the literature showed interest in the risk management practices of CCPs, in particular margining methodologies, and agency problems created by the ownership structure and the loss allocation mechanisms of CCPs, in particular analysing the effects of a CCP’s skin-in-the-game (i.e. own contributions to the loss allocation mechanisms) on the incentives of shareholders and clearing members. Although recent history has been rather merciful in terms of CCPs' failures, the inherent cross-border and international nature of their activities, their level of interconnectedness with other financial institutions and their growing importance following the G20 commitments on OTC derivatives make them critical nodes of the financial system. It is therefore important to consider carefully the recovery and resolution of CCPs that actually stands at the crossroad of the two streams of regulatory reforms mentioned above and completes them. Similarly, this dissertation intends to build the bridge between the literature on CCPs and the literature on banks’ recovery and resolution. It aims at providing a better understanding of the resolution framework developed for CCPs, associated policy choices and possible issues with a specific insight on the situation in Europe. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Cette thèse étudie l'affectation centralisée des enseignants aux écoles et un nouveau modèle d'appariement inspirée par cette dernière.Dans le premier chapitre, nous développons un modèle théorique de réaffectation afin d'étudier le problème de réaffecter des enseignants titulaires enseignant au sein d'un établissement et demandant une mutation. Le problème est similaire à celui d'affecter des élèves dans des écoles. Dans ce cas, l'algorithme à Acceptation Différée a été identifié comme étant le seul algorithme qui: i) est stable, ii) efficace et qui iii) incite les élèves à soumettre sincèrement leurs préférences. La différence principale avec le problème d'affecter des élèves aux écoles est que les enseignants ont déjà une position initiale au sein d'un établissement. On doit donc prendre en compte une contrainte additionnelle, la Rationalité Individuelle (RI): un enseignant doit être affecté dans un établissement qu'il préfère faiblement à son établissement d'origine. Pour prendre en compte cette contrainte, une modification de l'algorithme à Acceptation Différée a été identifiée dans la littérature académique et utilisé en pratique pour affecter les enseignants aux écoles en France. Nous montrons que cet algorithme modifié souffre d'un important défaut: il n'est pas efficace au sens fort. Il est en effet possible de réaffecter les enseignants aux écoles de telle sorte que: i) les enseignants obtiennent une école qu'ils préfèrent et ii) les écoles obtiennent des enseignants mieux classés. Partant de ce constat, nous identifions la classe de tous les algorithmes, les algorithmes Block-Exchange (BE), qui ne souffrent pas de ce défaut. Parmi eux, nous montrons qu'il en existe un unique qui incite les enseignants à soumettre leurs préférences sincèrement: le Teacher Optimal Block-Exchange algorithm (TO-BE). En utilisant un modèle de marché large, nous montrons théoriquement que ces algorithmes ont de meilleures performances en termes de mouvement et de bien-être des enseignants que l'algorithme actuel. Nous utilisons ensuite une base de données sur l'affectation des enseignants aux écoles du secondaire en France en 2013 pour quantifier les gains possibles que nos algorithmes peuvent apporter. Dans un cadre de réaffectation pur sans enseignant néotitulaire et places vacantes, nous montrons qu'il est possible de plus que double le nombre d'enseignants obtenant une nouvelle affectation.Dans le second chapitre, nous concevons un algorithme pratique, inspiré de nos résultats du chapitre précédent, pour la procédure française d'affectation des enseignants du secondaire. Plus globalement, cette conception a également pour but de fournir un outil face à deux problèmes importants communs aux pays de l'OCDE: i) le manque d'attractivité de la profession enseignants et ii) les importantes inégalités de réussites des élèves issus de milieux sociaux différents. Nous considérons l'ensemble du marché français composé des enseignants titulaires demandant une réaffectation, les enseignants sans affectation initiale et des places vacantes. Améliorer la mobilité des enseignants permet de leur donner de meilleures perspectives de carrière ce qui peut potentiellement attirer plus d'entrants dans la profession. Mais cette mobilité accrue peut entrainer l'affectation de plus d'enseignants peu expérimentés au sein d'académies déjà très défavorisées, affectant in fine la réussite des élèves au sein de celles-ci. Nous proposons un algorithme flexible qui permet de mieux contrôler le mouvement et la distribution des enseignants au sein de régions, notamment celles très désavantagées. En utilisant les données françaises d'affectation de 2013, nous simulons plusieurs scénarios contre factuels et montrons que notre algorithme peut prendre en compte plusieurs objectifs de politique publique. / This thesis studies the centralized assignment of teachers to schools and a new matching framework inspired by it. In the first chapter, we develop a theoretical model of reassignment to study the problem of reassigning tenured teachers who already have a position and are willing to move to another school. The problem is similar to the one of assigning students to schools. In this case, the well known Deferred Acceptance algorithm has been identified as the only algorithm that: i) is stable ii) efficient and iii) gives incentives to students to report their true preferences. The main difference with the problem of assigning students to schools is that teachers have an initial assignment. One has to consider an additional constraint, Individual Rationality (IR): a teacher must receive a school that he weakly prefers to his initial one. To incorporate this constraint, a modification of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm has been identified in the academic literature and used in practice to assign teachers to schools in France. We show that this modified algorithm has a serious drawback: it is not efficient in a strong sense. Indeed, it is possible to reassign teachers to schools such that both: i) teachers obtain a school that they prefer and ii) schools are assigned teachers that they rank higher. Thus, we identify the class of all algorithms, the Block-Exchange (BE) algorithms, that do not suffer from this drawback. Among them, we show that there is a unique one that gives good incentives to teachers to report their true preferences, the Teacher Optimal Block-Exchange algorithm (TO-BE). In using a large market setting, we theoretically show that these algorithms perform better in terms of movement and welfare for teachers than the currently used one. We then use a dataset on the assignment of teachers to schools in France in 2013 to quantify the possible gains that can bring our algorithms. In a reassignment setting with no newly tenured teachers or empty seats, we show that we can more than double the number of teachers obtaining a new assignment. In the second chapter, we aim to design a practical algorithm, inspired by our findings in the previous chapter, for the French assignment system of teachers to schools. More generally, this design also aims to provide a tool about two important issues common to OECD countries: i) the lack of attractiveness of the teaching profession and ii) the high achievement inequality between students from different social backgrounds. We consider the complete French market composed of tenured teachers looking for a reassignment, newly tenured teachers with no initial assignment and empty positions. In improving the mobility of teachers, one can give them better career perspectives and so potentially attract more teachers into the profession. But in doing so, it can also hurt deprived regions in assigning more teachers with low experience to them and ultimately the students from these regions. We propose a flexible algorithm that allows to better control the movement and distribution of teachers across regions, especially deprived ones. Using the data of the French assignment of teachers in 2013, we simulate several counter factuals and show that our algorithm can accommodate a wide range of policy objectives.

L'introduction récente, dans la littérature financière, d'agents aux comportements imparfaits permet une représentation des marchés d'actions plus proche de la réalité. Nous pensons surtout au concept de bruiteurs qui insiste sur l'impuissance de certains agents rationnels à posséder et utiliser toute l'information disponible et pertinente. Cette thèse consiste en une description de l'impact de ces agents sur les marchés financiers et la recherche d'outils adéquats pour mesurer les conséquences de leur présence sur l'efficience des marchés. La première vision théorique des marchés financiers composés de froids calculateurs parfaitement rationnels et homogènes laisse la place à l'intégration d'agents aux anticipations hétérogènes. Les changements intervenant dans les hypothèses de comportements se sont accompagnés d'une modification du modèle testable dérivé (marche aléatoire, martingale). Mais tout cela s'effectue au sein de ce que nous appelons le paradigme probabiliste de l'investisseur rationnel même si l'introduction de modèles non linéaires (ARCH ...) permet une avancée significative. Le chaos déterministe offre une autre voie de développement de la non linéarité qui permet en plus de se libérer de la contrainte inhérente à l'emploi de modèles probabilistes. Nous montrons qu'une révision des tests d'efficience découle de ces techniques du chaos avec notamment l'emploi du test BDS que nous interprétons ici comme un test de l'efficience “classique” des marchés contre une hypothèse que nous appelons Efficience Bruitée. L'Efficience Bruitée définit un marché où coexistent agents rationnels parfaitement informés et bruiteurs. L'étude empirique menée sur le marché français des actions semble confirmer le bien fondé de notre concept. Elle met à jour les insuffisances des tests et modèles qui reposent sur la linéarité pour décrire la grande diversité des investisseurs présents sur les marchés financiers.

The three chapters all address solvency regulation issues, with a focus on market risks under the Solvency II framework. Chapter 1 deals with “high-level” aspects of Solvency II as main principles and the general structure. Chapters 2 and 3 will be devoted to quantitative issues. Chapter 1 describes the main evolutions that led to the development of Solvency II. The insurance sector has dramatically evolved during the last two decades. Among others developments, we stress the new risks faced by the sector as natural catastrophes, changing demographics or market risks. Insurers become international companies, investing almost 10 trillion € of assets in Europe at the end of 2014 and being increasingly intertwined with banks and other financial sectors. Financial innovation and the refinement of risk management techniques and models developed by companies have gained momentum among the major European insurance companies. Have these evolutions changed the needs for the supervisory of insurance companies? The economic foundation for regulation is based on the presence of market failures, including severe asymmetric information problems and principal-agent conflicts. Insurance consumers, particularly individuals and households, face significant challenges in judging the financial risk of insurers. But the importance of the insurance sector for financial stability has been increasing. A sound regulatory and supervisory system is necessary to maintain efficient, safe, fair and stable financial markets and promote growth and competition in the insurance sector. The difficult conditions experienced by the industry and the shortcomings of the previous regulatory and supervisory framework have forced regulators to take action to change the way in which they regulate insurance companies’ solvency. Recognizing the shortcomings of Solvency I, EU policy-makers undertook the Solvency II project. Solvency I was not consistently applied throughout EU as the directive allowed countries to implement insurance regulation in different ways. Moreover Solvency I did not consider risks fully or in detail. In life business, the major criticism was the lack of consideration of asset risks. Allowances for latest developments in risk management were also inadequate and companies could not use an internal model to calculate the solvency capital. Finally, the increasing presence of conglomerates and groups forced the insurance regulator to align some requirements with the banking regulation, Basel II/III. Due to the differences in their core business activities, banks and insurers regulators’ goal does not imply comparability of the overall capital charges. However, considering the asset side of the balance sheets, the investment portfolios of banks and insurers contain the same asset classes. In order to avoid regulatory arbitrage, the capital charges for the same amount and type of asset risk should be similar. Chapter 2 compares the main regulatory frameworks in Europe: Solvency II and the Swiss Solvency Test, SST, in Switzerland, with a focus on potential market implications. Both systems are quite advanced but some key differences need to be highlighted, including the treatment of assets, in particular sovereign bonds, the consideration of diversification or the risk measure applied. Solvency II uses a Value at Risk at 99.5% whereas the SST is based on a Tail Value at Risk at 99%. Our approach is both qualitative and quantitative. In particular, based on a numerical example, we aim at quantifying the level of regulatory capital prescribed by the standard models. The numerical analysis reveals large differences between capital charges assigned to the same asset class under Solvency II and the SST. Solvency II penalizes investment in stocks, mainly due to a lower diversification benefit under the standard formula. On the other hand the SST model requires a higher capital for bonds, primary due to a stringent risk measure and confidence level. The treatment of EU sovereign bonds under Solvency II is another area of concern as it does not require any capital for spread risk. The question arises to what extent an internal model leads to different capital requirements as compared to the SST and Solvency II models. Therefore we apply an internal approach based on Monte Carlo simulation to derive the necessary capital based on the Value at Risk at 99.5% (in line with the Solvency II standard model) and on the Tail Value at Risk at 99% (in line with the SST standard model). Internal models calculate capital requirements that more closely matches risks of insurers and promote a culture of risk management. To develop internal models, companies need incentives to properly manage their risks, i.e. decreasing capital requirements. One potential benefit of the standard model is that insurers who use it can be compared to one another, whereas internal models are by definition specific to individual insurers. One argument against the standard model is the possibility of some systemic risk. An unusual event in the capital or insurance market could encourage all insurers to take the exact same response, thereby causing a run in the market. The analysis shows that standard and internal models still display large discrepancies in their results, suggesting a long way ahead to achieve a harmonized view between the regulators and the insurance sector. The choice of a statistical model or the refinement of parameters are key concepts when setting up an internal model and appear to be critical in the Solvency Capital Requirement calculation. By calculating and comparing the market risk capital charges for a representative insurer under the Solvency II and the SST standard approach as well as an internal model, we are able to provide evidence that the regulatory framework might have an impact on asset portfolios. The main impacts would be a shift from long-term to shorter-term debt, an increase in the attractiveness of higher-rated corporate debt and government bonds, in particular EU sovereign bonds as the consequence of the special treatment under Solvency II, as well as low level of equity holdings. But it is unlikely that large-scale reallocations will happen in the short term, as transitional arrangements are likely to phase in the implementation of Solvency II over several years. The likely impact on assets portfolios could have also already been anticipating by insurers. Chapter 3 studies the effectiveness of the Solvency II reform to prevent the default probability faced by a life insurance company. The default risk leads to a consequence that policyholders might not get back their initial investment upon default of the insurance company. Therefore, policyholders are concerned with the issues like what probability the insurance company will become bankrupt and which amount they can expect to obtain after taking account of the default risk of the insurer. Starting from a theoretical life insurance company which sells a participation insurance policy containing only a savings component and a single premium inflow, we simulate a life insurance company on an eight-year time horizon. We focus only on market risks as there is no mortality risk attached to the insurance contract. Finally several policies and investment strategies will be analysed. The purpose of the chapter is to evaluate how Solvency II can prevent the company to collapse. The papers discussing Solvency II effectiveness are qualitative in nature. In particular there is little research on the accuracy of the standard formula with regard to the proclaimed ruin probability of 0.5% per year. To do so we compare the probability of default at maturity of the life insurance policy, i.e. if the company has to enough assets to pay what was promised to the policyholders, with the early probability of default forced by Solvency II based on standard and internal models. We have first to calculate the Solvency Capital Requirement as laid down in the directive. One crucial point is the evaluation of liabilities. To do so we use an approach recently applied by the insurance sector called Least-squares Monte Carlo (LSMC). The aim of Solvency II is to monitor insurers on an annual basis. The SCR level can then be interpreted as a regulatory barrier, consistent with a model developed by Grosen and Jørgensen (2002). Key drivers of the ruin probability at maturity include interest rate parameters, portfolio riskiness and investment strategies in bonds. The continuously decrease of interest rates creates a challenge for insurers, especially life insurers that suffer a double impact on their balance sheet: a valuation effect and a decreasing reinvestment returns of premiums and maturing bonds. The latter explain also the riskiness of rolling-bond strategies compared to duration matching strategies. By setting the confidence level to 99.5% per year, the regulator wants to ensure that the annual ruin probability equals to 0.5%. Since the SCR from our internal model equals the 0.5% quantile of the distribution, it exactly matches the targeted ruin probability. Our analysis reveals that the set-up and calibration of the Solvency II standard model are inadequate as the solvency capital derived by the standard formula overestimates the results of the internal model. This is mainly the consequence of an overestimated equity capital and a lower diversification benefit. The 0.5% proclaimed goal under Solvency II is not reached, being too conservative. One declared goal of the directive is to decrease the duration gap between assets and liabilities. Solvency II penalizes then rolling-bond strategies. The long-term feature of our policy should impact the level of regulatory capital. As Solvency II is based on a quantile measurement, we define the solvency capital using the default probability objective for different horizons. SCR is not systematically a decreasing function of the time horizon even if a decreasing form appears on long-term. This shows undoubtedly that a horizon effect exists in terms of measurement of solvency. As the standard model overestimated the internal model capital we expect a forced default probability higher than 0.5% under the Solvency II framework. The SCR barrier stops the company more often than it should be. This can be interpreted as one cost of regulation, i.e. closing down financially sound at maturity companies. The analysis of the evolution of default probabilities as a function of time horizon reveals that ruin probabilities at maturity lie always below the Solvency II objective. Furthermore the gap between the observed default at maturity and the Solvency II objective is increasing over time; the situation is even worse for longer-term insurance products. Finally stakeholders are more interested in their expected return than in the default probability. A cost of regulation defined as the difference between stakeholder’s returns with and without regulatory framework exists, particularly for shareholders. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

De nombreuses études et écrits ont été réalisés sur le thème du plafonnement de carrière au cours de ces trente dernières années. Cependant, peu se sont penchés sur le degré de volonté qu’une personne peut avoir dans la construction d’un plafonnement de carrière, dès lors que celui-ci apparaît, non pas comme la conséquence de caractéristiques personnelles ou structurelles, mais comme un moyen d’atteindre un objectif précis. Existe-t-il des personnes qui peuvent accepter une situation de plafonnement de carrière ? Y a-t-il des raisons qui les amènent à rechercher une telle situation ? C’est au travers de l’analyse de personnes en situation de plafonnement au sein d’une banque française, que ces questions seront abordées. Les résultats de notre recherche font ressortir une idée maîtresse : l’impact de la présence d’une ou plusieurs ancres de Schein sur les attentes vis-à-vis de la carrière et la volonté d’être en situation de plafonnement. Ces résultats permettent ainsi de proposer un modèle du plafonnement volontaire. / Many studies and writings have been made on the them of plateauing career over the last thirty years. However, few have examined the degree of commitment a person can have in builgind a plateauing career, since it appears, not as the result of personal characteristics or structural, but as means achieve a specific objective. Are there peopel who can accept a situation of plateauing career ? Are there reasons that lead them to seek such a situation ? Is it through the analysis of people suffering in plateauing career in a French Bank, that these question will be addressed. The results or our research reveal a key insight : the impact of the presence of one or more Schein anchor’s expectations to the career and will be a plateauing. These results thus suggest a model of voluntary plateau.

La conduite du présent mémoire repose essentiellement sur la caractérisation de la nature de la Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentaires du Québec (RMAAQ) et l’analyse de sa gouvernance. Cette institution s’inscrit dans le système québécois de la mise en marché collective et se trouve, plus précisément, à l’interface entre le cadre général de la Loi sur la mise en marché des produits agricoles, alimentaires et de la pêche et l’ensemble des acteurs et organisations qui gouvernent les transactions de cette industrie. La RMAAQ traverse un moment charnière, affectée par ce qui semble être la judiciarisation des litiges. Ainsi, il devient de plus en plus pertinent de s’y intéresser, notamment en regard du rôle essentiel qu’elle joue dans cet écosystème, soit celui de régulateur économique et d’arbitre. Une meilleure compréhension de cette institution est possible que par l’entreprise d’un important déchiffrage de connaissances théoriques sur cette institution. À cet égard, les outils descriptifs et le cadre analytique explorent les notions et concepts qui permettent de mieux comprendre la nature institutionnelle, les interventions et l’environnement légal de la RMAAQ. Sur la base des attributs recensés, un guide d’entretien a été développé et soumis à dix-sept (17) utilisateurs de l’organe de résolution des litiges de la RMAAQ, en l’occurrence certains offices de commercialisation, associations accréditées d’acheteurs et leurs représentants (avocats). L’objectif était de connaître leurs perceptions à l’égard de la résolution des litiges et des interventions connexes de la RMAAQ. Les résultats empiriques qui en ressortent permettent de classer ses caractéristiques institutionnelles et économiques, selon qu’elles soient en concordance ou en écart avec ce qui est prédit par les approches théoriques. Ainsi, nous proposons une réponse schématique, qui se rapproche de la réalité, où sont exposées les nombreuses composantes du processus décisionnel. Enfin, nous discutons des forces et des faiblesses apparentes de la gouvernance de la résolution des litiges, notamment en termes de coûts de transaction. / This search relies essentially on the characterization of the institutional nature and analyzing the governance of a regulatory body, called Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentaires du Québec (RMAAQ), supervising activities and arbitrating disputes in the agricultural products marketing. This institution is inserted between the general rules established by the Act respecting the marketing of agricultural, food and fish products and the organizations making transactions and using those rules. The RMAAQ is going through a particular moment, with the pressure of the apparent litigiousness of disputes. In this perspective, it is increasingly relevant to be concerned by this institution, especially in view of its important role in the global ecosystem that is an economic regulator and arbitrator. A better understanding is only possible if a significant decryption of academic knowledge is undertaken. Therein, the theoretical tools and the analytic framework browse notions and concepts that allow to understand the institutional nature, the interventions and the legal environment of the RMAAQ. On the basis of the identified attributes, an interview guide has been developed and administered to seventeen (17) users of the dispute’s resolution body: marketing boards, certified associations of buyers and their legal agents (lawyers). The objective was to know the perceptions toward disputes resolution and the related RMAAQ’s interventions. Empirical results involved make it achievable ranking institutional attributes (gap or matching) according to theoretical conjectures. In doing so, we propose a schematic representation, close to reality, where the numerous constitutive parts of the decision-making process are exposed. Finally, we discuss apparent strengths and weaknesses in the institution framing the dispute’s resolution governance, especially in terms of transaction costs.

La couverture du risque de prix via les marchés à terme constitue un outil permettant aux agriculteurs d'endiguer les conséquences financières de la volatilité des prix des produits agricoles. Plusieurs critères ont été développés dans la littérature afin de guider les décisions de couverture de manière optimale. Cependant, ces approches reposent sur une conception limitée du risque et de ses conséquences financières du point de vue de l’exploitation agricole. S’enquérant du cas des producteurs porcins finisseurs du Québec, la présente thèse élabore un critère de couverture conjuguant le risque de prix encouru et dénoté par une mesure de valeur à risque (VaR), au risque de prix soutenable pour l’entreprise. Des simulations de couverture de risque comparant l’efficience du critère par rapport à l’absence de couverture et par rapport à l’efficience des critères alternatifs du ratio de couverture optimal et de la marge cible pour différents profils d’entreprises sont réalisés sur une période de 14 années, soit de 2006 à 2019. Les résultats montrent qu’en moyenne, le critère VaR proposé améliore la marge de sécurité sur charges (MSC) des entreprises de manière statistiquement significative. Le critère est également plus efficient que les critères alternatifs pour certains profils d’entreprises, bien que l’ampleur de l’effet soit faible à modéré. L’amélioration de la situation financière découlant de l’application du critère VaRest cependant plus prononcée lors d’épisodes de hausses marquées du prix des intrants. De plus, la méthodologie développée permet de soulever que même si la couverture mène à une diminution marquée du risque tel que défini par la mesure conventionnelle de variance des rendements, ses impacts tels que mesurés par la MSC sont considérablement moindres. Ceci souligne que la mesure d’efficience choisie peut ne pas refléter les impacts de la couverture sur la situation financière réelle de l’entreprise. La thèse contribue à la littérature portant sur l’application de la VaR en agroéconomie en offrant une description détaillée des répercussions de la couverture du risque du point de vue de l’entreprise agricole. Des pistes de réflexions quant à la mesure du risque de prix et d’efficience de la couverture à utiliser sont également proposées. / Hedging price risk using futures markets is a tool that farmers can use in order to decrease the consequences of agricultural commodity price volatility. Numerous criteria have been developed by authors as a means to optimize hedging decisions. However, these approaches are based on a limited conceptualization of risk and of its financial consequences from the view point of the farm as an enterprise. This thesis develops a hedging criterion that combines the incurred price risk denoted by a value-at-risk (VaR) measure and the price risk the farm can sustain and applies the method to the case of Quebec hog finishers. Hedges are simulated for various farm profiles over a 14-year period (2006 to 2019) and an effectiveness measure is compared with the absence of hedging and that of alternative criteria, namely the optimal hedge ratio and the target margin. Results show that on average, the VaR criterion improves the security margin on cost (SMC) of farms in a statistically significant way and is more effective than the alternative criteria for certain farm profiles, albeit to a small to moderate degree. Improvements with regard to the financial situation of farms following the application of the VaR criteria are more pronounced during episodes of markedly rising input prices. Moreover, the developed methodology signals that even if hedging leads to a large decrease of risk as measured by the variance of returns, its impacts as measured by the SMC are considerably less. This suggests that the chosen effectiveness measure may not reflect the impacts of hedging on the actual financial situation of the farm. This thesis contributes to the literature concerned with the use of VaR in agricultural economics by addressing price hedging from a clinical rather than inferential level of analysis. A more detailed account of the repercussions of hedging on farm finances is presented and potential avenues with regard to price risk and hedging effectiveness measurement are offered.