Of the maritime boundaries yet to be delimited between Canada and the United States, the Beaufort Sea might be the more pressing one, considering its strategic location in a rapidly developing Arctic region and its vast economic potential. In accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), maritime boundaries are to be delimited by agreement on the basis of international law as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to reach an equitable solution. When an agreement cannot be reached, parties can resort to third-party arbitration. While jurisprudence has determined that international law does not mandate a particular method of delimitation, it requires the consideration of equitable principles, also called special circumstances or factors. The notion of equity is therefore the foundation of boundary determination. But, what is equity and how is it applied? This thesis examines the various forms of equity, their origins in legal philosophy and domestic law and how they have been incorporated in international law. The main focus, however, is to analyse the differences between how international tribunals or courts have interpreted and applied equity in boundary determination and how States have applied it in negotiated agreements. While tribunals have tended to consider equitable principles as equivalent to geographical proportionality, States have considered those principles more in keeping with the notion of distributive justice and, more and more, are taking a globalised approach to boundary determination. On the basis of this analysis, this thesis evaluates the potential outcome of a third-party arbitration of the Beaufort Sea boundary dispute between Canada and the United States as well as the options for settlement negotiations between the Parties. In the Beaufort Sea area where hydrocarbon development is intrinsically linked not only to the development of the local population but also to the entire Arctic region, be it on issues related to the environment, navigation or security, the thesis concludes that a third-party adjudication would not serve the interests of the States. As delimiting boundaries nowadays is only one aspect of the management of oceans related issues, interests are best served when delimitation is understood as part of this global approach.

Of the maritime boundaries yet to be delimited between Canada and the United States, the Beaufort Sea might be the more pressing one, considering its strategic location in a rapidly developing Arctic region and its vast economic potential. In accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), maritime boundaries are to be delimited by agreement on the basis of international law as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to reach an equitable solution. When an agreement cannot be reached, parties can resort to third-party arbitration. While jurisprudence has determined that international law does not mandate a particular method of delimitation, it requires the consideration of equitable principles, also called special circumstances or factors. The notion of equity is therefore the foundation of boundary determination. But, what is equity and how is it applied? This thesis examines the various forms of equity, their origins in legal philosophy and domestic law and how they have been incorporated in international law. The main focus, however, is to analyse the differences between how international tribunals or courts have interpreted and applied equity in boundary determination and how States have applied it in negotiated agreements. While tribunals have tended to consider equitable principles as equivalent to geographical proportionality, States have considered those principles more in keeping with the notion of distributive justice and, more and more, are taking a globalised approach to boundary determination. On the basis of this analysis, this thesis evaluates the potential outcome of a third-party arbitration of the Beaufort Sea boundary dispute between Canada and the United States as well as the options for settlement negotiations between the Parties. In the Beaufort Sea area where hydrocarbon development is intrinsically linked not only to the development of the local population but also to the entire Arctic region, be it on issues related to the environment, navigation or security, the thesis concludes that a third-party adjudication would not serve the interests of the States. As delimiting boundaries nowadays is only one aspect of the management of oceans related issues, interests are best served when delimitation is understood as part of this global approach.

The purpose of this study was to clarify the ambiguity in the law relating to the extended continental shelf in Article 76 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Another aim was to study the application of the law in a more focused part of the world, the region of East Asia, and in particular, Malaysia. The study also sought to propose solutions to issues relating to the extended continental shelf. The history of the law relating to the continental shelf, the codification of the law, and the enforcement of the law by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is presented. Besides that, Article 76 was also thoroughly discussed in order to identify the problems involved. Besides that, the two biggest issues which determine the outer limits of the continental shelf are examined. These are issues relating to ridges and submarine elevations and the application of the foot of continental slope provisions. The study examined the problems involved with the legal and scientific interface found in Article 76 and addressed them by referring to the legislative history of Article 76, State practice and the practice of the Commission. The continental shelf in the East Asian region is also analysed in order to provide an overview of the continental shelf issues in the region. Special reference to Malaysia is made as a State that has made a submission on its outer limits of the continental shelf. A thorough analysis was made based on the findings made in this study. This study also explored possible solutions to the continental shelf issues discussed.

每一個沿岸國皆多多少少擁有島嶼，不論是近岸島嶼或洋中島嶼。而全球島嶼面積共3,823,000平方英里，佔地表的百分之七(不包括內陸河流及湖泊中之島嶼)，有些國家甚至完全由島嶼構成。據統計，全球島嶼中，大於1,000平方英里者(相當於牙買加或賽浦路斯的大小)者至少有123個，其中共有61個面積達4,000平方英里(相當於盧森堡的大小)者。這些數據顯示了島嶼地位的重要性，因為在今日，島嶼的存在已不再只是一個單純的地理問題，在國際海洋法上，它不僅可以影響一國海域管轄權(領海、鄰接區、專屬經濟區和大陸礁層)的劃定，甚至足以引起海岸相鄰或相向國家海域管轄權的衝突。解決海域管轄權衝突的最基本辦法，即為針對重疊 區域的「平均分攤」。但此一「平均分配」有時反會因島嶼的存在而導致「不公平劃界」或「疆界線的扭曲」。由於上述結果易使當事國之一方劃得不成比例的海域，[甚至引發更複雜的海域糾紛，因此有必要在海疆劃界中適當控制島嶼的海域管轄權，即---藉賦與島嶼適當之效力，以達公平劃界之目的。本文之研究動機即在於此。而研究目的，則在於就公約規定、學者意見、國際司法判例及國家實踐四者，探討島嶼對海疆劃界的影響，找出解決島嶼造成劃界不公平之方，以及賦與島嶼適當效力之道。本文第一章為「島嶼」的概念性介紹，即何謂島嶼，其定義、種類、存在的形式及形成的過程為何?而一般所謂的島嶼與國際法上的島嶼又有何分別? 此皆為本章重點。第二章為島嶼與領海的關係，討論的焦點包括:(一)領海基線的劃定與島嶼的關係、(二)海灣島嶼的效力、(三)島嶼對領海劃界原則的影響以及(四)島嶼在海岸相鄰或相向國家領海劃界中可得之效力程度等等。三章重點在於介紹島嶼與大陸礁層、專屬經濟區劃界原則之關係，並從公約規定、學者意見、國際司法判例及國家實踐等方面探討島嶼存在時，大陸礁層與專屬經濟區的衡平劃界，以及島嶼在「衡平考量﹞U應得的效力。第四章除介紹「群島制度」的內涵，主要重點則為(一)關於劃定群島基線的國家實踐，以及(二)群島基線的劃定對劃界的影響。此外 南海問題亦是本章重點之一。

On January 27, 2014 the International Court of Justice, principal judicial organ of the United Nations ruled in the case of the maritime dispute (Peru v. Chile), being Peru the one that brought forth the case in January 2008. During the proceedings in Court, the parties presented fundamentally different positions on the existence of a maritime boundary between them and how the Court should proceed solving the dispute. The Court should have considered the multiple legal reasonings presented by the States parties over the years to arrive to its ruling. Particularly, some of the legal reasonings presented by Peru were accepted by the Court and considered in the ruling, beginning from the interpretation given to the proclamations of Peru and Chile in 1947, going through the reasonings Peru presented about the 1952 Santiago Declaration (It was the main topic presented by Chile, which was discarded by the Court) until the reasoning presented by Peru saying that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement didn’t create a zone of tolerance that extends to 200 nautical miles. However, the Court considered that in the 1954 agreement the parties accepted the existence of a tacit agreement, but this existence was not presented by them in the Court even though it has a legal support in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. Then, the Court had to determine the extent of the tacit agreement, a very difficult duty because the parties hadn’t considered the existence of that situation and its extension. After establishing the implied legal agreement was for 80 nautical miles along a parallel of latitude, the Court proceeded to establish a maritime boundary applying thoroughly the rules and principles of maritime delimitation presented by Peru, which applied to the case determine the presence of an equidistant line. In relation to the starting-point of the maritime boundary, the Court didn’t use the point presented by Peru but, in a correct way, made it clear that the starting-point of the maritime boundary and the starting-point of the land boundary don’t have to match necessarily. Finally, the way how the Court established the maritime boundary recognizes, with no doubt, that the area previously named “outer triangle” belongs to Peru, as this country claimed and as Chile opposed repeatedly over the years. In summary, it is a decision based on International Law and adopted under the evidence presented in Court. The Court applied and confirmed various legal arguments presented by Peru during the process, in spite of the opposing position of Chile. / El 27 de enero de 2014, la Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ), órgano judicial principal de la organización de las Naciones Unidas, dio su sentencia en el caso de la controversia marítima (Perú c. Chile), el cual el Perú presentó ante ella en enero de 2008. Durante el proceso ante la Corte, las partes presentaron posiciones fundamentalmente distintas sobre la existencia de un límite marítimo entre ellas y sobre cómo la Corte debía proceder para resolver este caso. Para llegar a su fallo, la Corte debió evaluar esos múltiples argumentos legales planteados por ambos Estados a lo largo de años. En particular, varios de los argumentos legales planteados por el Perú fueron aceptados por la Corte y acogidos en el fallo, desde la interpretación que dio a las proclamaciones de Perú y Chile de 1947, pasando por los argumentos que planteó el Perú sobre la Declaración de Santiago de 1952 (que había sido el núcleo del caso argumentado por Chile, el cual fue descartado por la Corte), hasta el argumento peruano en el sentido de que el Convenio sobre Zona Especial Fronteriza Marítima de 1954 no creó una zona de tolerancia que se extienda por doscientas millas marinas. Sin embargo, la Corte consideró que en ese tratado de 1954 las partes reconocieron la existencia de un acuerdo tácito, figura que no argumentaron las partes ante la Corte, pero que tiene su fundamentación legal en jurisprudencia previa de la CIJ. La Corte luego tuvo que determinar la extensión de ese acuerdo legal tácito, labor sumamente difícil ya que las partes no habían contemplado la existencia de esa figura ni argumentado hasta dónde se habría extendido la misma. Luego de establecer que el acuerdo legal tácito se extendía por ochenta millas marinas a lo largo de un paralelo de latitud, la Corte procedió a establecer un límite marítimo siguiendo exactamente las normas y principios sobre delimitación marítima planteados por el Perú, los cuales aplicados al caso determinan el establecimiento de una línea equidistante. Con relación al punto de inicio del límite marítimo, la Corte no empleó el punto planteado por el Perú pero, correctamente, dejó en claro que el punto de inicio del límite marítimo y el punto de inicio del límite terrestre no tienen necesariamente que coincidir. Finalmente, la manera como la Corte estableció el límite marítimo reconoce sin lugar a duda que el área antes llamada «triángulo exterior» corresponde exclusivamente al Perú, como ese Estado argumentó y Chile se opuso repetidas veces a lo largo de los años. En resumen, se trata de una decisión ajustada al derecho internacional y tomada sobre la base de la evidencia a disposición de la Corte, en la que esta emplea y confirma diversos de los argumentos legales planteados por el Perú durante el proceso, a pesar de todo lo que Chile argumentó contrariamente.

This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China???s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China-Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government???s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ???fit??? between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature.

This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China???s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China-Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government???s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ???fit??? between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature.