To which extent can local governments in a federal state, which compete with each other, gain some latitude of discretion to draw some additional grants from the common pool of federal funds. How must a federal transfer scheme be designed that tackles common pool fishing and at the same time fulfills the allocative and distributive objectives of the federal government?

This master thesis deals with the design of stack stackers travel mechanism for height from 10m to 44m. Next it deals with the strength analysis travel unit for one-pillar stacker for hight of pillar 26m. In the first part is done brief introduction to problems of stocking and description basic parts of stack stacker. After that follows structural design, calculation of travel wheel, drive, shaft and bearings. In the second part of thesis is deals travel unit frame, calculation of transport capacity and is done safety concept of stack stackers. An integral part of the thesis is drawing documentation.

To which extent can local governments in a federal state, which compete with each other, gain some latitude of discretion to draw some additional grants from the common pool of federal funds. How must a federal transfer scheme be designed that tackles common pool fishing and at the same time fulfills the allocative and distributive objectives of the federal government?

In this dissertation auction formats are developed and discussed that focus on three specific economic environments. Regarding the impossibility results from mechanism design, the main task for the implementation of auction designs is to balance allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility – the main characteristics a mechanism should provide. Therefore, the dissertation investigates the limits of conceivable relaxations of allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility for complex settings such as double auctions, interdependent-valuation environments and electricity market designs. The overall aim is to carefully weigh up the advantages and disadvantages for either relaxing allocative efficiency or respectively incentive compatibility.

Diese Arbeit enthält drei unabhängige Kapitel, jedes davon im Bereich der Dynamischen Vertragstheorie. Kapitel I zeigt, dass deterministische dynamische Prinzipal-Agenten-Verträge immer mindestens so ertragreich sind wie stochastische, falls die sogenannte Methode erster Ordnung des dynamischen Mechanismus-Designs erfüllt ist. Meine Ergebnisse legen dar, dass die in der Literatur übliche Einschränkung auf deterministische Verträge zulässig ist, so lange die Methode erster Ordnung gültig ist. Kapitel II basiert auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Ilia Krasikov und Rohit Lamba. Ein Großanbieter (Prinzipal) handelt mit einer kleinen Firma (Agent) einen wiederkehrenden Geschäftsvertrag aus, wobei sich der Agent als ungeduldiger erweist. Der optimale Vertrag wird durch zwei Schlüsseleigenschaften beschrieben: Neustart und Abbruch, die vielerlei Eigenschaften der angebotenen Verträge darlegen. Kapitel III basiert schließlich auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Rohit Lamba. Darin besitzt der Agent dynamische private Information, die einem Markovprozess folgt. Ein monopolistischer Prinzipal verkauft dem Agenten ein nicht-dauerhaftes Gut und er verpflichtet sich in jeder Periode an den ursprünglich ausgehandelten Vertrag. Die entstehenden Informationskosten verhindern erst-beste Verträge bei auftretender Persistenz im Typ des Agenten. Diese Arbeit stellt einen Weg bereit, wie man den optimalen deterministischen Vertrag in dynamischen Prinzipal-Agenten-Modellen erhält. Der gewöhnliche Weg mit lediglich lokal nach unten bindenden Anreizverträglichkeitsbedingungen misslingt bei hoher Persistenz der Typrealisierungen und bei stark differenzierender Diskontierung. Zudem zeigt die Arbeit wann mit Gewissheit stochastische Verträge ausgeschlossen werden können. / This dissertation consists of three independent chapters, each in the field of dynamic contracting. Chapter I shows that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and an agent are always at least as profitable to the principal as stochastic ones, if the so-called first-order approach in dynamic mechanism design is satisfied. My results demonstrate that the usual restriction in the literature to deterministic contracts is admissible, as long as the first-order approach is valid. Chapter II is based on joint work with Ilia Krasikov and Rohit Lamba. We consider a large supplier (principal) who contracts with a small firm (agent) to repeatedly provide working capital in return for payments. The agent is less patient than the principal. The optimal contract is characterized by two key properties: restart and shutdown, which capture various aspects of contracts offered in the marketplace. Finally, Chapter III is based on joint work with Rohit Lamba. We consider the problem of optimal contracting where the agent has dynamic private information, which follows a Markov process. In each period, a monopolistic principal sells a nondurable good to the agent and she commits to the contract she made in the initial period. The emerging information costs prevent first-best contracts whenever there is persistency in the agent’s type. This thesis provides a strategy on how to obtain the optimal deterministic contract in dynamic principal-agent models with Markovian type realizations. We see that the usual approach with only local downward binding incentive compatibility constraints does not work for highly persistent type realizations and for large differences in discounting. Furthermore, I show in which situations we with certainty can exclude stochastic contracts.

In this dissertation auction formats are developed and discussed that focus on three specific economic environments. Regarding the impossibility results from mechanism design, the main task for the implementation of auction designs is to balance allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility – the main characteristics a mechanism should provide. Therefore, the dissertation investigates the limits of conceivable relaxations of allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility for complex settings such as double auctions, interdependent-valuation environments and electricity market designs. The overall aim is to carefully weigh up the advantages and disadvantages for either relaxing allocative efficiency or respectively incentive compatibility.:Preface … 7 1. Introduction … 8 1.1. Applications of auction design … 8 1.2. Optimal use of information in allocation processes … 12 1.3. Modeling non-cooperative situations … 14 1.4. Motivation for the dissertation … 16 2. An Incentive Compatible Double Auction for Multi-Unit Markets with Heterogeneous Goods … 21 2.1. Introduction into double auctions … 21 2.2. Setting of a multi-unit market with heterogeneous goods … 25 2.3. Concept of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) … 29 2.4. Definition of the allocation rule … 31 2.5. Creation of the price vector and the trading bundles … 37 2.6. Characteristics of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) … 40 2.7. Discussion of the properties of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) … 43 3. An Alternating-Price Auction for Interdependent-Valuation Environments … 46 3.1. Introduction into ex-post efficient auction design … 46 3.2. Setting of an interdependent-valuation environment … 50 3.3. Concept of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) … 54 3.4. Characteristics of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) 62 3.5. Discussion of the properties of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) … 64 4. Facilitating Short-Term and Long-Term Efficiency with an Integrated Electricity Market Design … 66 4.1. Introduction into electricity market designs … 66 4.2. Setting of an electricity market … 72 4.3. Concept of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) … 78 4.4. Characteristics of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) … 88 4.5. Discussion of the properties of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) … 91 5. Conclusion ... 94 Reference List … 96

Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei unabhängigen Artikeln in dem Forschungsfeld der Informationsökonomik. Ein wiederkehrendes Motiv in allen drei Artikeln ist die ambivalente Rolle von privater Information. In Kontrast zur klassischen Entscheidungstheorie, in der mehr Informationen Individuen niemals schlechter stellt, analysiere ich drei verschiedene Umgebungen, in denen mehr Konsumenteninformation die Konsumentenrente verringern kann. / This dissertation comprises three independent chapters in the field of information economics. The recurrent theme of all three chapters is the ambiguous role of information: While in standard decision theory additional information enables individuals to weakly increase utility through making better choices, I analyze three di erent environments in which more information to consumers may actually be detrimental to consumer utility.