São Justino fala da missa, o mais comum e mais celebrado de todos os ritos dentre os cristãos; porém, a missa nada tem de comum, ela é o Céu na Terra. A missa justina não é, no conjunto, diferente do rito de missa apresentado por são Paulo ela se mostra um amálgama do rito praticado nas sinagogas dos séculos I e II com o rito da fração do pão, como fora instituído na Última Ceia por Jesus Cristo. No entanto, apesar de semelhantes, o rito justino é bem mais abreviado que o paulino. São Justino, ao falar da missa, fala de Deus e mostra que ela é, ao mesmo tempo, ação de graças; presença de Cristo nas espécies consagradas, caminho de salvação para os homens e sacrifício divino. Dos textos do Santo tem-se como a missa era praticada no séc. II, em Roma. / St. Justin talks about the mass, the most common and the most celebrated among all Christian rites, but the mass is not common: it is the heaven on earth. Justine mass, after all, is not different from that presented by St. Paul it is an amalgam of the rites of synagoges of the first and second centuries with the rite of the breaking breads, as instituted by Jesus in the Last Supper. However, although similar, the justine rite is much more abbreviated than the pauline rite. St. Justin speaks on mass, on God and shows that the mass is, at the same time: a thanksgiving rite, a presence of Christ, a way of men salvation, a divine sacrifice. St. Justin presents the Holy Mass as practiced in the second century, at Rome.

Meister Eckhart exhibits an unprecedented confidence in the transcendental way of thought in medieval philosophy. Eckhart, unlike his predecessors, identifies being as such (ens commune) and God, allowing the most primary determinations metaphysics – ‘being,’ ‘one,’ ‘true,’ ‘good,’ – to function as both metaphysical and theological first principles. Eckhart placed them at the head of his projected Tripartite Opus, a vast work of quaestiones and commentaries whose intelligibility, he insists, requires the prior foundation of a supposed series of a thousand axioms. The table of contents remains, the opus propositionum does not. This thesis argues that what enables Eckhart to pursue the direct application of the transcendentals to the divine also makes it unrealizable. His determination of unity is twofold: as (i) indivisibility, and the standard transcendental conception of unity as a negation of the given positive content of being (ens); as (ii) indistinction, comprehending both the negation of otherness which produces the indivisible and the otherness that is negated. There is an inherent tension between Peripatetic metaphysics and Procline henology. Consequently, the Good is devalued when the Procline One appears within the transcendental perspective. Metaphysics, theology and, a fortiori for Eckhart, ethics, take no consideration of Goodness. I show how this tension gives rise to Eckhart’s association of the divine essence with the Neoplatonic One, while the Peripatetic One and the transcendental “true” function as the explanans of the Trinitarian intellectual self-return. This, in turn, gives rise to the constitutive function of the imago dei, and every imago as such, within that self-relation. Ultimately, this produces a standpoint wherein every essence, only as idea, contains the divine uniform infinity.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:23:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2010-09-30Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:50:25Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 diebe_ep_me_mar.pdf: 264602 bytes, checksum: 3d1b3d7f97082522e77484e146964b90 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / A investigação de Pedro Abelardo acerca das intelecções inicia-se na primeira metade do século XII, período vinculado à lógica vetus. Na psicologia de Abelardo, o Tractatus de Intellectibus é a obra que irá se ocupar principalmente no Periermenias de Aristóteles e nos comentários sobre Periermenias de Boécio, da análise do processo de intelecção no homem, do ponto de vista das intelecções da gramática e das intelecções da lógica, necessárias à doctrina sermonum. Mostraremos que, no decorrer do processo de intelecção, o homem inteligirá as coisas de dois modos, a saber: pela razão, único processo que produzirá intelecções sãs e verdadeiras, e pela existimatio, isto é, processo ligado à opinião. Entenderemos que somente Deus, criador de todas as coisas, intelige tudo de forma plena, e o que é concedido ao homem será apenas uma pequena parte deste conhecimento. O nosso objetivo neste trabalho, portanto, será primeiramente investigar como Pedro Abelardo concebe o processo de intelecção do homem através das palavras universais e verificar, no decorrer desse processo, o significado da existimatio, que, apesar de ser limitada, se mostrará uma forma genuína de conhecer / Peter Abelard‟s investigation on intellections started during the first half of the XII century, period bind to the Logica vetus. In Abelard‟s psychology, the Tractatus de Intellectibus is the work that mainly on Aristotle‟s Periermenias and Boethius‟ comments on Periermenias, contains the analysis of man‟s process of intellection from the point of view of the intellections of grammar and the intellections of logics, necessary for the doctrina sermonum. We will show that in the process of intellection man constitutes intellections of things in two ways, namely, by reason, the only process that produces valid and true intellections, and by existimatio¸ that is, a process related to opinion. We will understand that only God, the Creator of all things, fully intellects all things and man will only be allowed a little part of this knowledge. Therefore our aim in this study firstly is to investigate how Peter Abelard conceives man‟s process of intellection by means of universal words and, during the process, verify the meaning of existimatio, which, though limited, will reveal a genuine form of knowing

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-29T15:08:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_7448_Renata Aparecida Lucas.pdf: 1032548 bytes, checksum: 87d4f957aa60bfdd611028ab707cef79 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-03-11 / Este trabalho aborda um tema fundamental da mística de Mestre Ekchart: o nascimento de Deus na alma do homem. Esse evento, que permeia todo o pensamento eckhartiano, apenas é abordado como tema central no ciclo de sermões almães 101 a 104, conhecidos como o coração da obra de Eckhart. Esses sermões refletem a dimensão mística das obras em língua alemã do dominicano, e, neles, a partir de uma exposição filosófica e de forma original e singular, Eckhart convida o ouvinte à interioridade, ao silêncio e ao desapego como condições para iluminação do homem pelo nascimento de Deus no fundo de sua alma. A mensagem de Meister é articulada, no Sermão 101, em três pontos fundamentais: o lugar onde ocorre o nascimento divino, a atitude a ser adotada para que ele ocorra e os frutos desse acontecimento. A partir do nascimento do divino, eterno, presente e ininterrupto, as relações do homem consigo mesmo, com a divindade e com o mundo são radicalmente transformadas. Com isso, observa-se que a proposta da teoria relacional presente no pensamento eckhartiano é a resignificação do homem e do mundo que o cerca, por meio de um processo nitidamente intelectivo. Pela superação das imagens, pelo abandono de toda subjetividade e pela interioridade genuína, indispensáveis à geração divina no íntimo do homem e ao seu autoconhecimento, o mundo exterior deixa de ser um obstáculo à iluminação para se tornar um meio de manifestação da divindade que há em todo ser humano. / This paper addresses a fundamental issue of the mystic Meister Eckhart: the birth of God in the soul of man. This event, which permeates the whole Eckhartian thought, is only addressed as a central theme in the cycle of German sermons 101-104, known as the heart of the Eckhart`s work. These sermons reflect the mystical dimension of the works of the German Dominican, and in them, from a philosophical exposition and in a unique and singular form, Eckhart invites the listener to interiority, silence and detachment as conditions for illumination of man by birth of God in the depths of his soul. The message of Meister is articulated in the Sermon 101, in three fundamental points: the place where the divine birth occurs, the attitude to be adopted for it to occur and the fruits of such event. From the divine birth, eternal, and uninterrupted, man's relationships with himself, with the divinity (deity) and with the world are radically transformed. Thus, it is observed that the proposed relational theory present in the Eckhartian thought is the redefinition of man and the world that surrounds him, by means of a clearly intellective process. The overcoming of the images, by the abandonment of all subjectivity and by the genuine interiority which is necessary for the generation of the divine within man and his self-knowledge, the outside world ceases to be an obstacle to enlightenment to become a means of manifestation of the divinity that is in every human being.

Este trabalho tem por objetivo fazer uma análise textual do Tractatus de Intellectibus de Pedro Abelardo, esmiuçando o estudo ali apresentado sobre a ordenação das afecções humanas. Destacamos no primeiro capítulo como Abelardo apresenta uma ambivalência das afecções sensitiva e imaginativa que resulta, simultaneamente, em uma impossibilidade de conhecer as coisas particulares e os conceitos universais, uma vez que cada sensação ou imaginação estará atrelada a um sentido particular. À essa \"confusão dos sentidos\" será oposta uma potência atentiva do intelecto, a qual permite tomar qualquer natureza ou propriedade e, aplicando-a às sensações ou imaginações, formar intelecções. Em seguida, focamos na ordenação interna do intelecto e na proposta de categorização das intelecções a partir de critérios discursivos. Nesta etapa, nosso principal objetivo é determinar a amplitude desta proposta, que apresenta um projeto de desreificação do intelecto - que não é fundado no conhecimento das coisas, mas na atenção da alma - e simultaneamente circunscreve o intelecto à sua origem nos sentidos. Para compreender essa operação interna do intelecto, Abelardo mobiliza conceitos oriundos da gramática e da lógica, como predicação e estado, e apresenta uma série de procedimentos mentais, como a ligação predicativa entre intelecções e a abstração, que permitem o intelecto extrapolar os limites impostos pela origem do conhecimento humano e formular para si conceitos, cuja validade e veracidade dependerão do desnudamento da atenção. / This work aims to make a textual analysis of Peter Abelards Tractatus de Intellectibus, by examining the study on the organization of human affections there presented. In the first chapter we emphasize how Abelard presents an ambivalence of sensitive and imaginative affections that results, simultaneously, in the impossibility of knowing particular things and universal concepts, considering that each sensation or imagination is associated with a particular sense. An attentive potency of the intellect will be opposed to this confusion of sensation, which allows it to take any nature or property and apply to sensations or imaginations and thereafter form intellections. We then focus on the internal organization of the intellect and in Abelards categorization of intellections with a discursive criteria. In this part, our first objective is to determine the range of Abelards proposal which presents a project of de-objectification of the intellect which is not founded in the knowledge of things, but in the souls attention and at the same time circumscribes the intellect to its origin in sensation. To understand this internal movement of the intellect, Abelard employs concepts from grammar and logic, such as the predicate and status, and presents a series of mental procedures, as the predicative connection between intellections and abstraction, which allows the intellect to extrapolate the limits imposed by the origin of human knowledge and formulate concepts to itself, whose validity and veracity will depend on the denudation of attention.

Um estudo sobre a razão prática em Tomás de Aquino, analisada sob a luz de seus primeiros princípios. Parte-se da pergunta de como o ser humano descobre o que é bom e mau para si o que requer cobrir dois momentos distintos de sua obra: o tratamento dado à synderesis e, em seguida, como os princípios por ela apreendidos se articulam e como funcionam na mente humana. Defende-se, por fim, que é um equívoco ler os princípios da lei natural como primariamente normativos no sentido deontológico do termo. São, antes, diretivos, conferindo à razão prática individual os bens de cuja posse depende a felicidade humana. As implicações dessa leitura para a ética de Tomás de Aquino que aparece agora sob forte roupagem eudaimonista são, por fim, analisadas. / The present study focuses on Aquinass exposition of practical reason, analyzed in light of its first principles. We begin with the question of how an individual human being discovers what is good and bad for himself, which is at the root of natural law, that is, rationally grounded morality. This requires covering two distinct moments of Aquinass work: his treatment of synderesis and, after it, how the principles apprehended by synderesis relate to one another and what kind of knowledge they give to the human mind. It is argued that it is a mistake to see the first practical principles as normative in the deontological sense. Rather, they are directive, furnishing practical reason with the goods on whose possession human happiness depends. The implications of this reading for Aquinass ethics are then analyzed and his ethical stance emerges as strongly eudaimonistic.

Orientador: Fátima Regina Rodrigues Évora / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-26T02:38:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Monteiro_MatheusHenriqueGomes_M.pdf: 957559 bytes, checksum: 7f381cab42fe9058be420eb9be7d637b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: A presente dissertação tem como objetivo estudar a realidade dos possíveis, dentro da filosofia de Tomás de Aquino. Para isso, pretende-se estudar os modos de dizer o possível, focando-se, principalmente, nos possíveis ditos absolutamente e que não foram criados. Para isso, aprofundar-se-á a discussão sobre cinco teses que sustentam a pergunta pela realidade dos possíveis, a saber: (1) que aquilo que é possível não é contraditório; (2) que, antes de algo ser feito, era possível que isso fosse feito; (3) que Deus faz o que é possível; e (4) tudo o que de algum modo é, é por causa de Deus; e (5) que aquilo que é contraditório, nada é. Além disso, explorar-se-á a viabilidade de defender que os possíveis não-criados existem como ideias no intelecto divino / Abstract: This dissertation investigates the reality of the possibles in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. It intends to study how many ways one says "possible", specially the possible said absolutely and not created. It investigates deeply the five theses that hold the question on possibles¿ reality, scilicet: (1) that which is possible it isn¿t contradictory; (2) before something is made, it was possible for it to be made; (3) God does what is possible; (4) if one is somehow, it is because of God; (5) that which is contradictory it isn¿t anything. In addition, this dissertation investigates the defense of not-created possibles as ideas in divine intellect / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: Márcio Augusto Damin Custódio / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T11:32:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_MatheusBarretoPazosde_M.pdf: 952011 bytes, checksum: e54788366ad16d580c88882bc959ac5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: A presente dissertação tem por escopo analisar a noção de bem na metafísica de Tomás de Aquino. Para tanto, investigar-se-á como Tomás apresenta essa noção a partir de uma dupla caracterização, qual seja: o bem entendido como uma das noções gerais do ente, isto é, uma propriedade transcendental, e o bem entendido como um dos atributos divinos próprios, isto é, uma propriedade transcendente. Nesse sentido, analisar-se-á, por um lado, as características gerais dos transcendentais e o modo segundo o qual Tomás determina que o bem, sendo convertível ao ente, pode ser entendido como um transcendental. Por outro lado, analisar-se-á como Tomás determina que esta noção pode ser dita transcendente, entendendo, nesse ponto, que o bem é uma das perfeições divinas. Contudo, tal caracterização do bem, aparentemente, gera uma contradição: como essa noção pode ser dita um transcendental e, simultaneamente, ser transcendente? Para investigar essa aparente contradição na caracterização do bem, faz-se necessário explicitar como Tomás salvaguarda este duplo aspecto utilizando-se do modelo de predicação por participação. Assim, a presente dissertação visa explicitar a justificativa encontrada por Tomás para estabelecer a relação entre uma propriedade transcendental e uma propriedade transcendente na utilização de um modelo específico de predicação por participação que, nesse contexto, é mobilizado como fundamento metafísico à dupla caracterização da noção de bem. Nessa medida, para Tomás, as criaturas são ditas boas porque participam da bondade divina. Ao mobilizar, portanto, as noções de predicação e participação, mostrar-se-á como a doutrina dos transcendentais constitui-se como um modelo peculiar de análise de um problema filosófico que recebeu, da parte de Tomás, um tratamento distinto da tradição que o precedera e que não se restringe à mera recepção das fontes que ele tinha acesso / Abstract: This dissertation aims to analyze the notion of good in Thomas Aquinas' metaphysics. In order to do so, it will be inquired how Aquinas introduces this notion through a double characterization: good understood as one of the general notions of the being, i.e., a transcendental property, and good regarded as one of the proper divine attributes, i.e., a transcendent property. In this sense, it shall be analyzed, first, the general characteristics of the transcendentals and the way Aquinas asserts that the good, once it is convertible to the being, may be regarded as a transcendental. Secondly, it will be analyzed how Aquinas states that this notion may be said to be transcendent, provided that the good is one of the divine perfections. However, such a characterization of the good apparently brings out a contradiction: How can this notion be said to be a transcendental and, simultaneously, to be transcendent? In order to inquire this apparent contradiction in the characterization of the good, it is necessary to make explicit the way Aquinas preserves this double aspect by using the model of predication by participation. Thus, this dissertation aims to highlight the justification found by Aquinas to establish the relation between a transcendental property and transcendent one by making use of a specific model of predication by participation which, in this context, is taken as a metaphysical foundation to the double characterization of the notion of good. According to Aquinas, creatures are said to be good because they participate in divine goodness. As this study deals with the notions of predication and participation, it will be presented how the doctrine of transcendentals constitutes a peculiar model of philosophical analysis which has received, from Aquinas, a distinct treatment from the tradition before him and is not only the reception of the sources available to him / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

At the center of all medieval Christian accounts of both metaphysics and ethics stands the claim that being and goodness are necessarily connected, and that grasping the nature of this connection is fundamental to explaining the nature of goodness itself. In that vein, medievals offered two distinct ways of conceiving this necessary connection: the nature approach and the creation approach. The nature approach explains the goodness of an entity by an appeal to the entity’s nature as the type of thing it is, and the extent to which it fulfills or perfects the potentialities in its nature. In contrast, the creation approach explains both the being and goodness of an entity by an appeal to God’s creative activity: on this view, both a thing’s being and its goodness are derived from, and explained in terms of, God’s being and goodness. Studies on being and goodness in medieval philosophy often culminate in the synthesizing work of Thomas Aquinas, the leading Dominican theologian at Paris in the 13th century, who brought together these two rival theories about the nature of goodness. Unfortunately, few have paid attention to a distinctively Franciscan approach to the topic around this same time period. My dissertation provides a remedy to this oversight by means of a thorough examination of John Duns Scotus’s approach to being and goodness—an approach that takes into account the shifting tide toward voluntarism (both ethical and theological) at the University of Paris in the late 13th century. I argue that Scotus is also a synthesizer of sorts, harmonizing the two distinct nature approaches of Augustine and Aristotle with his own unique ideas in ways that have profound implications for the future of medieval ethical theorizing, most notably, in his rejection of both the natural law and ethical eudaimonism of Thomas Aquinas. After the introduction, I analyze the nature of primary goodness—the goodness that Scotus thinks is convertible with being and thus a transcendental attribute of everything that exists. There, I compare the notion of convertibility of being and goodness among Scotus and his contemporaries. While Scotus agrees with the mainstream tradition that being and goodness are necessarily coextensive properties of everything that exists, he argues that being and good are formally rather than conceptually distinct. I argue that when the referents of being and good are considered, both views amount to the same thing. But when the concepts of being and good are considered, positing a formal distinction does make a good deal of difference: good does not simply add something to being conceptually, but formally: it is a quasi-attribute of being that exists in the world independently of our conception of it. Thus Scotus’s formal distinction provides a novel justification for the necessary connection between being and goodness. Furthermore, I argue that Scotus holds an Augustinian hierarchy of being. This hierarchical ranking of being is based upon the magnitude or perfection of the thing’s nature. But since goodness is a necessarily coextensive perfection of being, it too comes in degrees dependent upon the type of being, arranged in terms of the same hierarchy. This account, while inspired by Augustine’s hierarchical nature approach, is expressed in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics. But this necessary connection between being and goodness in medieval philosophy faced a problem: Following Augustine, medievals claimed that “everything that exists is good insofar as it exists.”’ But how is that compatible with the existence of sinful acts: if every being, in so far as it has being, is good, then every act, insofar as it has being, is good. But if sinful acts are bad, then we seem to be committed to saying either that bad acts are good, or that not every act, in so far as it has being, is good. This first option seems infelicitous; the second denies Augustine’s claims that “everything that exists is good.” Lombard and his followers solve this problem by distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness and claiming that moral goodness is an accident of some acts and does not convert with being. So the sinful act, qua act, is (ontologically) good. But the sinful act, qua disorder is (morally) bad. Eventually, three distinctive grades of accidental or moral goodness will be applied to human acts: generic, circumstantial, and meritorious. I argue that Scotus follows the traditional account of Peter Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure in distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness, and claiming that only the former converts with being, while the latter is an accident of the act. Aquinas, in contrast, writing in the heyday of the Aristotelian renaissance, focuses instead on the role of the act in the agent’s perfection and posits his convertibility thesis of being and goodness in the moral as well as the metaphysical realm. Thus, when one begins a late medieval discussion with Aquinas, and then considers what Scotus says, it seems as though Scotus is the radical who departs from the conservative teachings of Aquinas. And this is just false: we need to situate both Aquinas and Scotus within the larger Sentence Commentary tradition extending back to Peter Lombard and his followers in order to understand their agreement and divergence from the tradition. Next, I turn the discussion to Scotus’s analysis of rightness and wrongness. I first explore the relationship between rightness and God’s will, and situate Scotus’s account within contemporary discussions of theological voluntarism. I argue Scotus holds a restricted-causal-will-theory —whereby only contingent deontological propositions depend upon God’s will for their moral status. In contrast to Aquinas, Scotus denies that contingent moral laws—the Second Table of the 10 Commandments (such do not steal, do not murder, etc.)—are grounded in human nature, and thus he limits the extent to which moral reasoning can move from natural law to the moral obligations we have toward one another. In conjunction with these claims, I argue that Scotus distinguishes goodness from rightness: An act’s rightness will depend on its conformity to either (1) a necessary moral truth or (2) God’s commanding some contingent moral truth. The moral goodness of an act, in contrast, involves right reason’s determination of the suitability or harmony of all factors pertaining to the act. In establishing this, also argue that much of the disparity among contemporary Scotus scholarship on the question of whether Scotus was a divine command theorist or natural law theorist should be directly attributed to a failure to recognize Scotus’s separation of the goodness of an act from the rightness of an act.

This dissertation examines the Liber consolationis phisonomie by Pietro d'Abano (c. 1250-1316) and places the work both in the context of medieval psychological theories and of scholastic culture. Physiognomy, the practice of studying a person's physical appearance in order to discern his or her emotions, personality, moral character, and intellectual capacities, rests on the assumption that the physical body is somehow connected to the spiritual self. This study explores how medieval people conceived of that relationship through a broader examination of theories about emotion, personality, and intelligence. Pietro d'Abano was an unusual figure who bridged the occupational identities of physician and philosopher, just as the study of psychology bridged the disciplines of medicine and philosophy. Pietro was highly materialist in his conception of human nature. While scholars of Pietro's work have noticed this tendency in his more mature thought, especially his medical text the Conciliator, his Liber consolationis phisonomie, his earliest known work, has been largely overlooked. This is understandable, as it is largely an aphoristic summary of what physical traits indicate what mental ones. However, it provides valuable insights into the development of Pietro's thought as well as the role of physiognomy in medieval learned and popular culture. This study concludes with an examination of Pietro's legacy, namely the reputation he obtained in the Renaissance for being a magician. It examines medieval theories about magic, the role of spurious attributions in creating textual authority, and how Pietro's own materialist conception of the universe and human nature may have contributed to his constructed posthumous identity.