La chirurgie de l'implantation cochléaire a pour but d'insérer le porte-électrodes dans la cochlée en respectant au maximum les structures intracochléaires. Ce geste va permettre de stimuler directement les cellules ganglionnaires du nerf cochléaire pour rendre une audition utile chez les patients. La partie basale de la cochlée permet de définir un axe d'insertion du porte-électrodes. Dans notre première étude, nous avons observé que ces caractéristiques anatomiques particulières rendent difficile la représentation mentale de l'axe. Dans notre deuxième étude, nous avons observé que seul un système robotisé automatisé a permis de s'aligner avec précision avec cet axe d'insertion. Dans notre troisième travail, nous avons observé qu'une insertion dans l'axe optimal permettait de diminuer le traumatisme intracochléaire par rapport à un axe erroné, le nerf facial est une structure qui ne permet pas une insertion selon l'axe idéal et oblige une insertion selon un axe optimal. Dans notre quatrième travail, en utilisant une technique optimisée, nous avons montré une diminution du traumatisme par rapport à la technique conventionnelle d'insertion. Bien que la relation entre l'axe d'insertion et les résultats auditifs n'ait pas été formellement démontrée, nous avons constaté dans un travail réalisé en parallèle au laboratoire, chez l'animal, une relation entre traumatisme intracochléaire et les résultats auditifs. L'essentielle de ce travail permet de démontrer le rôle important de l'axe d'insertion au cours de l'implantation cochléaire et les avantages d'une approche robotisée lors de l'implantation cochléaire. / The goals of cochlear implant surgery are to insert the electrode array into the cochlea with minimal intracochlear trauma. The electrode array will then electrically stimulate the ganglion cells of the cochlear nerve and restore hearing in deaf patients. The electrode array insertion has a duration of a few seconds, but the quality of the insertion will influence over the auditory performance of the implant during lifetime. The cochlea is a snailed-shape structure, but an insertion axis can be defined in the basal turn of the cochlea. In a first study, we observed that these anatomical particularities led difficult the cochlear visualization, and to obtain an accurate mental representation of the insertion axis in surgical conditions. In a second work, we observed that only a robotized automated system allowed to precisely align an insertion tool with the insertion axis. In a third work, we used this robotised system to insert the array in a constant speed. Although an optimal insertion axis reduced the intracochlear trauma in relation to an inaccurate axis, the facial nerve is an essential structure that leads to an angle variation between the optimal axis and the scala tympani axis. The size of the angle is finally related to the intracochlear trauma during the electrode array insertion. Once observed the superiority of an optimized technique consisting by both an insertion of the electrode array in an optimal axis and in a constant speed, in the fourth part of this work, we observed that this technique was also less traumatic for the intracochlear structures than a manual insertion technique.

Concepts are widely agreed to be the basic constituents of thought. Amongst philosophers and psychologists, however, the question of how concepts are structured has been a longstanding problem and a locus of disagreement. I draw on recent work describing how representational content is ascribed to populations of neurons to develop a novel solution to this problem. Because disputes over the structure of concepts often reflect divergent explanatory goals, I begin by arguing for a set of six criteria that a good theory ought to accommodate. These criteria address philosophical concerns related to content, reference, scope, publicity, and compositionality, and psychological concerns related to categorization phenomena and neural plausibility. Next, I evaluate a number of existing theoretical approaches in relation to these six criteria. I consider classical views that identify concepts with definitions, similarity-based views that identify concepts with prototypes or exemplars, theory-based views that identify concepts with explanatory schemas, and atomistic views that identify concepts with unstructured mental symbols that enter into law-like relations with their referents. I conclude that none of these accounts can satisfactorily accommodate all of the criteria. I then describe the theory of representational content that I employ to motivate a novel account of concept structure. I briefly defend this theory against competitors, and I describe how it can be scaled from the level of basic perceptual representations to the level of highly complex conceptual representations. On the basis of this description, I contend that concepts are structured dynamically through sets of transformations of single source representation, and that the content of a given concept specifies the set of potential transformations it can enter into. I conclude by demonstrating that the ability of this account to meet all of the criteria introduced beforehand. I consider objections to my views throughout.

Concepts are widely agreed to be the basic constituents of thought. Amongst philosophers and psychologists, however, the question of how concepts are structured has been a longstanding problem and a locus of disagreement. I draw on recent work describing how representational content is ascribed to populations of neurons to develop a novel solution to this problem. Because disputes over the structure of concepts often reflect divergent explanatory goals, I begin by arguing for a set of six criteria that a good theory ought to accommodate. These criteria address philosophical concerns related to content, reference, scope, publicity, and compositionality, and psychological concerns related to categorization phenomena and neural plausibility. Next, I evaluate a number of existing theoretical approaches in relation to these six criteria. I consider classical views that identify concepts with definitions, similarity-based views that identify concepts with prototypes or exemplars, theory-based views that identify concepts with explanatory schemas, and atomistic views that identify concepts with unstructured mental symbols that enter into law-like relations with their referents. I conclude that none of these accounts can satisfactorily accommodate all of the criteria. I then describe the theory of representational content that I employ to motivate a novel account of concept structure. I briefly defend this theory against competitors, and I describe how it can be scaled from the level of basic perceptual representations to the level of highly complex conceptual representations. On the basis of this description, I contend that concepts are structured dynamically through sets of transformations of single source representation, and that the content of a given concept specifies the set of potential transformations it can enter into. I conclude by demonstrating that the ability of this account to meet all of the criteria introduced beforehand. I consider objections to my views throughout.

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Renato Rodrigues Kinouchi / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do ABC, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2017. / Figura central no programa logicista de fundamentação da aritmética, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) elencou uma série de objeções àquilo que, dentro da história da filosofia, veio a ser denominado de "psicologismo", entendendo por este qualquer postura epistemológica que outorga à psicologia a tarefa de fundamentação das ciências, notadamente das ciências da lógica e da matemática. A dissertação abordará as críticas feitas por Frege àquilo que ele denominou de "métodos psicológicos de reflexão" no campo da teoria do significado, notadamente sua crítica à tese psicologista de que os significados são representações mentais (Vorstellungen). Recorrendo sobretudo às obras Fundamentos da aritmética (1884) e à Lógica de 1897, o trabalho analisará tais críticas tendo por enfoque as influências exercidas no pensamento fregeano pela consolidação da psicologia científica e as inter-relações por ele detectadas entre questões postas pela nova ciência da psicologia e certos problemas de epistemologia. Em última instância, buscar-se-á elucidar se a necessidade de Frege em postular a existência de um terceiro reino (drittes Reich) de entidades objetivas não-reais, para explicar a possibilidade do conhecimento objetivo, foi ou não uma necessidade motivada por problemas próprios ao contexto científico de sua época. / As the central figure in the logicist program in the foundations of mathematics, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) brought forth a series of objections to what, in the history of philosophy, would be called "psychologism". This term denotes any epistemological position that gives to psychology the task of laying the foundations of the sciences, especially the sciences of logic and mathematics. The present dissertation examines the criticisms made by Frege to what he called the "psychological methods of reasoning", in the context of the theory of meaning, particularly his criticism to the psychologist thesis that meanings are mental representations (Vorstellungen). Based especially on the Foundations of arithmetic (1884) and on his Logic of 1897, the monograph analyzes such criticisms, focusing on the influences exerted on Frege¿s thought by the consolidation of scientific psychology, and on the interrelations that he detected between the questions posed by the new science of psychology and certain problems of epistemology. In the end, we will try to clarify whether the need for Frege to postulate the existence of a third realm (drittes Reich) of non-real objective entities, to explain the possibility of objective knowledge, was or not a need motivated by the problems pertaining to the scientific context of his time.

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Orientadores: Gisele Busichia Baioco, Antonio Carlos Zambon / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Tecnologia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-21T15:53:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Magrin_DiegoHenrique_M.pdf: 4704743 bytes, checksum: cd0c8f6e54316061a8c808a2d38e5cc1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: A necessidade de aquisição e organização do conhecimento para posterior compartilhamento representa um grande problema nas organizações humanas. Para se produzir efetivamente conhecimento compartilhado, é necessário considerar a estrutura do pensamento dos agentes que possuem e compartilham conhecimento. Desse modo, visando ao compartilhamento efetivo do conhecimento por parte das organizações humanas, este trabalho considera o conhecimento representado por meio de modelos mentais de acordo com o Modelo Orientado à Representação do Pensamento Humano - MORPH, propondo consultas por similaridade a essas representações de modelos mentais. O trabalho também desenvolveu um Sistema de Gerenciamento de Conhecimento que implementa as regras do MORPH para representação e armazenamento do conhecimento e as consultas por similaridades para manipulação desse conhecimento. O sistema desenvolvido foi utilizado em um estudo de caso que teve como objetivo analisar em um grupo de empresas, quais seguiam as recomendações da Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo - BOVESPA com relação as práticas de governança sustentável / Abstract: The need for acquisition and organization knowledge for further sharing represents a major problem in human organizations. In order to produce effectively shared knowledge, is necessary to consider the structure of thought of the agents that have and share knowledge. Thus, in order to obtain an effective sharing of knowledge by the human organizations, this work considers the knowledge represented by mental models according to the Human Thinking Representation Oriented Model, called MORPH, and proposes similarity queries to these mental model representations. The work also developed a Knowledge Management System that implements the rules of MORPH for knowledge representation and storage, and similarity queries to manipulate this knowledge. The developed software was used in a case study that aimed to analyze in a group of companies, which followed the recommendations of the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange - BOVESPA concerning sustainable governance practices / Mestrado / Tecnologia e Inovação / Mestre em Tecnologia

<div>Philosophers who affirm the existence of propositions contend that the contents of declarative sentences, beliefs, doubts, and so on are entities (the things picked out by the term “propositions”), and that these entities have truth-values. Unsurprisingly, there’s rampant disagreement among those philosophers about sorts of things are called “propositions”. Propositions have been identified with sui generis abstract objects, interpreted facts, properties, and types of cognitive acts (this is not an exhaustive list). Despite this debate, most agree that propositions are representations (this is how they come to have truth-values), and that propositions are not to be identified with token mental representations. I agree that propositions are representations, but argue that propositions are mental representation tokens. The view I defend has sparse contemporary support, but has an impressive pedigree—ancestral views were widely popular in the late medieval, and early modern periods. In this dissertation I argue at length against contemporary criticisms that this view is still credible.</div><div>In chapter one, I defend a mentalist semantics; that is, I argue that linguistic representation is parasitic on mental representation: for a sentence to mean that p is for it to express (or be conventionally used to express) the thought that p. Once this is established, I argue in chapter two that mental representations (as opposed to non-mental ones) are ideal candidates to serve as the contents of sentences and propositional attitudes. I compare my preferred view, that propositions are token mental representations, against rival views (sorted into two groups) and show that a cost benefit analysis of each favors my position. In chapter three, I start exploring what these mental representations might be like. I argue that they’re structured entities whose constituents are modes of presentation of the things represented. I decline to analyze the relation which unites these modes of presentation, but argue (contra some contemporary philosophers) that this relation is not predication. Finally, in chapter four, I argue against the widely popular view that propositions have the things they’re about as constituents. I show that such a view cannot accommodate thoughts about nonexistent entities. I propose that the modes of presentation which are constituents of propositions are non-descriptive, but criticize the mental file conception of non-descriptive modes of presentation.</div>

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In this thesis, the phenomenon of intercategorial polysemy is approached from two related but previously unconnected perspectives, namely that of linguistic creativity and mental representation. It is argued that the creativity that is part and parcel of the linguistic abilities of each and every human being, has been neglected in the study of linguistics, and should, in fact, form the basis of studies such as these in cognitive lexical creativity. It is argued that structural productivity (the generative view of linguistic creativity) and conceptual creativity lie on a continuum, the middle ground of which is covered by phenomena which are both productive and creative and which have both a formal and a semantic aspect to them. One such a phenomenon is intercategorial polysemy. Explaining the way in which speakers of a language such as English can systematically and productively produce and interpret words that belong to more than one syntactic category (for example, hammerN - hammerV, tableN - tableV, skyN - skyV), which may range from the conventionalised to the completely innovative, has long been a problem for linguists. Traditional morphological accounts involving theoretical notions such as zero derivation have always been found to be inadequate, mostly because zero derivation does not account for the variation in meaning and the background knowledge that is needed to produce and interpret novel instances. The main problem addressed in this thesis then is the question as to the nature of the lexical knowledge of speakers and its mental representation, so that it can form the basis for the cognitive processes that will enable language users to be linguistically creative. Various theoretical models that have been proposed to account for intercategorial polysemy, namely the representationalderivational model, the network-activation model, as well as the theory of conceptual integration (also called blending), are presented and evaluated in the light of a representative sample of completely novel instances of intercategorial polysemy. / Linguistics / D. Litt. et Phi. (Linguistics)

In this thesis, the phenomenon of intercategorial polysemy is approached from two related but previously unconnected perspectives, namely that of linguistic creativity and mental representation. It is argued that the creativity that is part and parcel of the linguistic abilities of each and every human being, has been neglected in the study of linguistics, and should, in fact, form the basis of studies such as these in cognitive lexical creativity. It is argued that structural productivity (the generative view of linguistic creativity) and conceptual creativity lie on a continuum, the middle ground of which is covered by phenomena which are both productive and creative and which have both a formal and a semantic aspect to them. One such a phenomenon is intercategorial polysemy. Explaining the way in which speakers of a language such as English can systematically and productively produce and interpret words that belong to more than one syntactic category (for example, hammerN - hammerV, tableN - tableV, skyN - skyV), which may range from the conventionalised to the completely innovative, has long been a problem for linguists. Traditional morphological accounts involving theoretical notions such as zero derivation have always been found to be inadequate, mostly because zero derivation does not account for the variation in meaning and the background knowledge that is needed to produce and interpret novel instances. The main problem addressed in this thesis then is the question as to the nature of the lexical knowledge of speakers and its mental representation, so that it can form the basis for the cognitive processes that will enable language users to be linguistically creative. Various theoretical models that have been proposed to account for intercategorial polysemy, namely the representationalderivational model, the network-activation model, as well as the theory of conceptual integration (also called blending), are presented and evaluated in the light of a representative sample of completely novel instances of intercategorial polysemy. / Linguistics and Modern Languages / D. Litt. et Phi. (Linguistics)