Frege and Husserl are both recognized for their significant contributions to the overthrowing of logical psychologism, at least in its 19th century forms. Between Frege's profound impact on modern logic that extended the influence of his anti-psychologism and Husserl's extensive attempts at the refutation of logical psychologism in the Prolegomena to Logical Investigations, these arguments are generally understood as successful. This paper attempts to account for the development of these two anti-psychologistic conceptions of logical objects and for some of the basic differences between them. It identifies some problems that are common to strongly anti-psychologistic conceptions of logic and compares the extent to which Frege's and Husserl's views are open to these problems. Accordingly, this paper is divided into two parts. Part I develops a conception of the problems of logical psychologism as they are distinctively understood by each philosopher, out of the explicit arguments and criticisms made against the view in the texts. This conception is in each case informed by the overall historical trajectories of each philosopher's philosophical development. Part II examines the two views in light of common problems of anti-psychologism.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--McMaster University, 2004. / Advisor: Nicholas Griffin. Includes bibliographical references (p. 345-353). Also available via World Wide Web.

<p>Cognitive neuroscience is an interdisciplinary enterprise aimed at explaining cognition and behavior. It appears to be succeeding. What accounts for this apparent explanatory success? According to one prominent philosophical thesis, cognitive neuroscience explains by discovering and describing mechanisms. This "mechanist thesis" is open to at least two interpretations: a strong metaphysical thesis that Carl Craver and David Kaplan defend, and a weaker methodological thesis that William Bechtel defends. I argue that the metaphysical thesis is false and that the methodological thesis is too weak to account for the explanatory promise of cognitive neuroscience. My argument draws support from a representative example of research in this field, namely, the neuroscience of decision-making. The example shows that cognitive neuroscience explains in a variety of ways and that the discovery of mechanisms functions primarily as a way of marshaling evidence in support of the models of cognition that are its principle unit of explanatory significance.</p><p> </p><p>The inadequacy of the mechanist program is symptomatic of an implausible but prominent view of scientific understanding. On this view, scientific understanding consists in an accurate and complete description of certain "objective" explanatory relations, that is, relations that hold independently of facts about human psychology. I trace this view to Carl Hempel's logical empiricist reconceptualization of scientific understanding, which then gets extended in Wesley Salmon's causal-mechanistic approach. I argue that the twin objectivist ideals of accuracy and completeness are neither ends we actually value nor ends we ought to value where scientific understanding is concerned. </p><p>The case against objectivism motivates psychologism about understanding, the view that understanding depends on human psychology. I propose and defend a normative psychologistic framework for investigating the nature of understanding in the mind sciences along three empirically-informed dimensions: 1) What are the ends of understanding? 2) What is the nature of the cognitive strategy that we deploy to achieve those ends; and 3) Under what conditions is our deployment of this strategy effective toward achieving those ends? To articulate and defend this view, I build on the work of Elliot Sober to develop a taxonomy of psychologisms about understanding. Epistemological psychologism, a species of naturalism, is the view that justifying claims about understanding requires appealing to what scientists actually do when they seek understanding. Metaphysical psychologism is the view that the truth-makers for claims about understanding include facts about human psychology. I defend both views against objections.</p> / Dissertation

Husserl’s Logical Investigations contain an apparent discrepancy in their account of meaning. They first present meanings, contra psychologism, as commonly available, reiterable, invariant, possibly valid, and independent of our “acts of meaning”. They then present meaning, almost psychologistically, as a kind of intentional experience on which all truths and other transcendent meanings depend. I offer a critical developmental study of this problem within Husserl’s semantics. I argue (1) that Husserl had reason to adopt his dyadic account of signification, (2) that this “two-sided” account shaped, and was reciprocally informed by, the two-step phenomenological method, and (3) that Husserl’s proposed resolution to the strain within his semantics, while driven by legitimate motivations, is precarious. I begin with the Logical Investigations and their context. I represent their two sets of semantic claims, recalling how the discord between claims of those sets would have been especially conspicuous when the Investigations were published, amid much debate over psychologism, in 1900-01. I then show why Husserl embraced two discordant views of meaning. I survey the 19th century sources for these views, confirming Jocelyn Benoist’s genealogical thesis that Husserl’s semantics took its psychological and logical sides primarily from Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, respectively. And I present the Bolzanian arguments and Brentanian descriptions that served as grounds for Husserl’s semantics, showing how these pieces of reasoning were appropriated, and weighing their strength. Next, I trace how Husserl’s two-sided theory of meaning, and its apparent incoherence, both inspired and determined the transcendental and eidetic reductions. I then examine how Husserl subsequently used the phenomenological method to reinforce, to integrate, and to revise his theory of meaning. And I address a methodological criticism that this circular development prompts. Finally, I assess Husserl’s attempt to explain the division within the phenomenon of meaning by reference to what he called “transcendental subjectivity”. I consider two contrary objections to this explanation. I indicate how Husserl’s explanation is responsive to the insight behind each objection, but contend that it is perhaps not adequately responsive to the insight behind either.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Caio Augusto de Andrade.pdf: 348728 bytes, checksum: 688bf46d40efbb0cdc0b7cee0ee8ca70 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-10-18 / The objective of this study is to show how Husserl overcame psychologism through epoché, from lessons given in the year 1906/7 at the University of Göttingen, that are posthumously published as the title: Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge and The Idea phenomenology. The study on the epoché is justified by the fact that it is the determining methodological element for the change in thinking of Husserl between the publication of the Logical Investigations (1900/1) and Ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy (1913). This methodological element provided three changes: the passage of conception of phenomenology form descriptive psychology to science of pure consciousness; the distinction between immanence reell and immanence real, and the more accurate understanding of the motivating factor and the various forms of psychologism. This study presents the following hypothesis: epoché overcome psychologism, suspending all transcendent knowledge consciousness by giving it an index of questionableness. This suspension permits that cogitations, which are genuinely (reell) immanent to consciousness, are the unquestioned starting point to phenomenological research of the purely intuitive given. The result of this study allows to distinguish the epoché of Cartesian methodical doubt and to delimit the understanding Husserl's Theory of Knowledge and Philosophy First and as critique of reason / O objetivo deste estudo é mostrar como Husserl superou o psicologismo por meio da epoché, a partir das aulas proferidas nos anos 1906/7 na universidade de Göttingen que são postumamente publicadas sob o título: Introdução à Lógica e à Teoria do Conhecimento e A Ideia de Fenomenologia. O estudo sobre a epoché se justifica pelo fato de ela ser o elemento metodológico determinante para a mudança de pensamento de Husserl entre a publicação das Investigações Lógicas (1900/1) e Ideias para uma fenomenologia pura e para uma filosofia fenomenológica (1913). Esse elemento metodológico proporcionou três mudanças: a passagem da concepção de fenomenologia de psicologia descritiva para ciência da consciência pura; a distinção entre imanência reell e imanência real; e a compreensão mais apurada do elemento motivador e das várias formas do psicologismo. Esse estudo apresenta a seguinte hipótese: a epoché supera o psicologismo, suspendendo todo o conhecimento transcendente à consciência por atribuir-lhe um índice de questionabilidade. Essa suspensão permite que as cogitationes, que são genuinamente (reell) imanentes à consciência, sejam o ponto de partida inquestionável para a investigação fenomenológica dos dados puramente intuitivos. O resultado deste estudo possibilita distinguir a epoché da dúvida metódica cartesiana e delimitar a compreensão de Husserl sobre Teoria do Conhecimento como Filosofia Primeira e como crítica da razão

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucas Kattah Macedo.pdf: 706900 bytes, checksum: da3ca8b84a3cccb7d501d2844e463b34 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-31 / This text aims to present a translation of the Chapter "The World of Ideas" of Hermann Lotze's Logic (1874), along with the translation of other extracts and with an introductory study for their understanding. Realize the importance of such work to the extent that we can grasp the concept of the philosopher's own logic, characterized by a theory of validity and an anti-psychologism / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar uma tradução do Capítulo O Mundo das Ideias da Lógica de Hermann Lotze (1874), juntamente com a tradução de outros excertos e com um estudo introdutório para a compreensão dos mesmos. Percebe-se a importância de tal trabalho na medida em que buscamos compreender a noção de lógica própria do autor, caracterizada por uma teoria da validade e por um anti-psicologismo

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:26:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Josiane Beatriz Piccin Barbieri.pdf: 715222 bytes, checksum: 2a07023f6fa1931804df1d8d7633a576 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-20 / The relationship between Psychology and Phenomenology has been a relevant subject regarding the philosopher Edmund Husserl masterpiece (1859-1938), taking into account the Phenomenology founder and one of the representative thinkers of the XIX century which influenced his philosophical workflow at his time and also sciences in a general point of view. Psychology has been one of the most tackled subjects in his writings turning possible the foundation of a new flow, recognized as Phenomenological Psychology. The aim of such dissertation is to contribute with studies on phenomenology and it´s practical contrast in psychology side. From the work review&#8223;s and analysis&#8223; ones furnished with the title Phenomenology and Psychology (1917), the aim is to have it in a brief writing from Husserl, in only one time, inside an introduction side to Phenomenology and also such method. This work begins by bringing up a critical discussion by Husserl to Psychologysm term used to detail philosophical positioning that would reduce the cognoscitive content to psychological mechanisms and phenomenon subject to the conscious concept and also introduce Husserl´s point of view in Psychology and Phenomenology. In order to define phenomenology it is focused in particular the phenomenon idea providing the adequate amplitude to it, by clarifying it sense inside the phenomenological view and relating it with the idea of an object . Phenomenon, in the phenomenological side it´s not about the truth as an object of nature and this is the aim of such study. In order to establish relations between phenomenon and object, Husserl takes back the conscience concept and it will provide the origin to two different sciences: conscience science itself and objective sciences in general. Once such characteristics are presented, the conscience science makes explicit its close relationship with psychology, especially when it comes to Husserl naming it as pure psychology . From such relation on, this work originates in the connection between psychology and transcendental personal nature of it. Finally, Husserl´s aim in phenomenology as a performer of this idea is logical psychology of phenomenology besides the opening of an enormous field in rational knowledge and, thus, not having the lighter, but a heavier weight on the chance of having empiric psychology knowledge taking place / relação entre Psicologia e Fenomenologia foi um tema relevante na obra do filósofo alemão Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), considerado o fundador da Fenomenologia e um dos pensadores expoentes do século XIX que influenciou, através de sua obra, tanto as correntes filosóficas de seu tempo como as ciências de forma geral. A psicologia foi uma das disciplinas mais abordadas em seus escritos, tornando possível a fundação de uma nova corrente, a designada Psicologia Fenomenológica. A finalidade desta dissertação é contribuir com os estudos sobre a fenomenologia e seu contraponto prático na ciência psicológica, a partir da revisão e análise da obra intitulada Fenomenologia e Psicologia (1917), um breve escrito de Husserl que se constitui, a um só tempo, numa introdução à fenomenologia e ao método fenomenológico. O trabalho inicia abordando a crítica husserliana ao Psicologismo termo empregado para caracterizar as posições filosóficas que reduzem o conteúdo cognoscitivo aos mecanismos psicológicos e aos fenômenos subjetivos da consciência e introduz a visão husserliana da psicologia e da própria fenomenologia. Para definir a fenomenologia, é dado enfoque particular ao conceito de fenômeno , dando-lhe a devida amplitude, clarificando o seu sentido na ótica fenomenológica e relacionando-o com o conceito de objeto . Fenômeno, na abordagem fenomenológica, não é a verdade objetiva da natureza, que é objeto de estudo das ciências da natureza. Para o estabelecimento das relações entre fenômeno e objeto, Husserl retoma o conceito de consciência , o que dará origem a duas diversas ciências: a ciência da consciência em si mesma e a totalidade das ciências objetivas. Uma vez apresentadas as características da fenomenologia, ciência da consciência em si mesma, explicita-se sua estreita relação com a psicologia, em especial com aquela que Husserl nomeia psicologia pura . Desta relação, o trabalho deriva na relação entre a psicologia e fenomenologia transcendental, abordando o problema da distinção entre subjetividade psicológica e subjetividade transcendental. Para concluir, é apresentada a proposta husserliana da fenomenologia como realizadora da ideia de uma psicologia racional ou fenomenológica e da abertura de um enorme campo de conhecimento racional e não de menor, mas de maior peso para a possibilidade de conhecimento psicológico-empírico

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Renato Rodrigues Kinouchi / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do ABC, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2017. / Figura central no programa logicista de fundamentação da aritmética, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) elencou uma série de objeções àquilo que, dentro da história da filosofia, veio a ser denominado de "psicologismo", entendendo por este qualquer postura epistemológica que outorga à psicologia a tarefa de fundamentação das ciências, notadamente das ciências da lógica e da matemática. A dissertação abordará as críticas feitas por Frege àquilo que ele denominou de "métodos psicológicos de reflexão" no campo da teoria do significado, notadamente sua crítica à tese psicologista de que os significados são representações mentais (Vorstellungen). Recorrendo sobretudo às obras Fundamentos da aritmética (1884) e à Lógica de 1897, o trabalho analisará tais críticas tendo por enfoque as influências exercidas no pensamento fregeano pela consolidação da psicologia científica e as inter-relações por ele detectadas entre questões postas pela nova ciência da psicologia e certos problemas de epistemologia. Em última instância, buscar-se-á elucidar se a necessidade de Frege em postular a existência de um terceiro reino (drittes Reich) de entidades objetivas não-reais, para explicar a possibilidade do conhecimento objetivo, foi ou não uma necessidade motivada por problemas próprios ao contexto científico de sua época. / As the central figure in the logicist program in the foundations of mathematics, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) brought forth a series of objections to what, in the history of philosophy, would be called "psychologism". This term denotes any epistemological position that gives to psychology the task of laying the foundations of the sciences, especially the sciences of logic and mathematics. The present dissertation examines the criticisms made by Frege to what he called the "psychological methods of reasoning", in the context of the theory of meaning, particularly his criticism to the psychologist thesis that meanings are mental representations (Vorstellungen). Based especially on the Foundations of arithmetic (1884) and on his Logic of 1897, the monograph analyzes such criticisms, focusing on the influences exerted on Frege¿s thought by the consolidation of scientific psychology, and on the interrelations that he detected between the questions posed by the new science of psychology and certain problems of epistemology. In the end, we will try to clarify whether the need for Frege to postulate the existence of a third realm (drittes Reich) of non-real objective entities, to explain the possibility of objective knowledge, was or not a need motivated by the problems pertaining to the scientific context of his time.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:12:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 909251 bytes, checksum: f9883bf7dcc4b47a3888ca6bf9dd40b0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-12-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This research's main motivation is to understand how significant Gottlob Frege's criticism of psychologism was, in the nineteenth century, as well as to determine its real theoretical basis. One points to the most significant Fregean a ntipsychologist attacks, especially to Frege's arguments that support the antipsychologist criticism, having as one of the problems to attempt for psychologist reduction of logic. To this end, one understands as central to the ontological aspects. In this work, one will see Frege's point of view confroted with psychologism in naturalistic bases, as it emerges from nineteenth-century scientificism, leading clearly to an opposition between a knowledge based on empirical facts, on the one hand, and a speculative philosophical knowledge, on the other hand. In the end, one recognizes the Fregean undertaking against psychologism as preservation not only of the "objective non-effective", but also as recognition of the need for a priori speculation in philosophy itself. / Esta investigação teve como principal motivação entender de que maneira se fez pertinente a crítica de Gottlob Frege ao psicologismo do século XIX, assim como garimpar as reais bases teóricas deste. Aponta-se quais os mais relevantes ataques antipsicologistas de Frege, e se concentra, mais especificamente, nas críticas ao empirismo/psicologismo de J. S. Mill. Esta dissertação analisa ainda os argumentos que corroboram para a crítica antipsicologista, tendo como um dos problemas a tentativa de redução psicologista da lógica. Para isso, entende-se como fundamental para as críticas de Frege sua própria noção de objetividade, através de seus aspectos semânticos e ontológicos. No decorrer deste trabalho, depara-se com um psicologismo de caráter naturalista, baseado em um emergente cientificismo oitocentista, levando claramente a uma oposição entre, de um lado, um conhecimento amparado em fatos empíricos e, de outro, um saber especulativo filosófico. No fim, reconhece-se a empreitada fregeana contra o psicologismo como uma redenção não somente do "objetivo não-efeito", mas do reconhecimento da necessidade de bases especulativas e a priori para a própria filosofia.

Dans Literal Meaning, François Recanati cherche à montrer que ce qui est dit lorsqu’une phrase est prononcée correspond à un contenu fondamentalement pragmatique. À cet effet, il propose deux arguments généraux qui consistent à faire valoir que ce qui est dit est indéterminé si l'on s'en tient aux règles de la sémantique. Le premier de ces deux arguments tente d’établir que dans bien des cas, le contenu sémantique supposément associé à une phrase ne correspond pas à ce qui est dit. Le second est plutôt une élaboration de la thèse wittgensteinienne suivant laquelle la signification des types linguistiques est indéterminée. Pour ma part, je soutiens que si nous adoptons effectivement une conception wittgensteinienne de la signification, certains des exemples supposés illustrer le premier de ces deux arguments peuvent et doivent être critiqués. / In Literal Meaning, François Recanati argues that what is said when a sentence is uttered corresponds to a content that is fundamentally pragmatic. To this end, he proposes two general arguments according to which what is said will be indeterminate if we stick to the rules of semantics. The first of these two arguments tries to establish that in many cases, the semantic content supposedly associated with a sentence does not correspond to what is said. The second one is rather an elaboration of Wittgenstein’s thesis to the effect that the meaning of linguistic types is indeterminate. As for me, I claim that if we indeed adopt a wittgensteinian conception of meaning, some of the examples that are supposed to illustrate the first of these two arguments can and should be criticized.