This thesis is about the viability of meta-normative expressivism. On what I take to be the dominant conception of the view, it subscribes to two theses. First, that the meaning of sentences is to be explained in terms of the mental states these sentences conventionally express. Second, that there is a fundamental difference in the roles of the states expressed by normative sentences and the states expressed by descriptive sentences: descriptive sentences, according to expressivists, express mental states which are representational and non-motivational, while normative sentences express non-representational and motivational states. Expressivism has attracted many naturalistically inclined philosophers for its ability to explain many of the distinctive features of normative discourse and thought, without adding entities to our ontology that are metaphysically and epistemologically problematic. In this way, expressivism promises to preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary normative practice within a naturalistic world-view, without giving up on any of its distinctive features. Despite it’s benefits, expressivism also faces significant problems. While one of these problems, the Frege-Geach Problem, has attracted a lot of attention, there are several other problems that have not been sufficiently addressed by . But, given that the reasonable assumption that the plausibility of philosophical theories needs to be assessed holistically, it seems that one should pay attention to these problems to be able to assess expressivism’s overall plausibility. In this thesis I explain how expressivists can solve two of these problems. The first problem the dissertation is concerned with is the normative attitude problem. This is a dilemma based on the challenge that expressivists need to give an account of the nature of the attitude that normative thinking consists in. The dilemma is then that expressivists could either do this by holding that normative thinking consists in sui generis attitudes, which is uninformative and potentially in conflict with naturalism, or by holding that normative thinking reduces to attitudes fully describable in non-normative terms, which is in conflict with our intuitions about normative thinking. I argue that this dilemma is structurally identical to a dilemma which meta-normative representationalism faces (expressivism’s dialectical rival) and that expressivists can use the same theoretical resources to address the normative attitude problem meta-normative representationalists have used to address their version of the dilemma. I also argue that these resources will not only help more traditional versions of expressivism, according to which normative thinking reduces to familiar kinds of attitudes fully describable in non-normative terms, but opens up the possibility of an expressivist view according to which normative thinking consists in sui generis attitudes. The second problem I consider is a challenge to a particular expressivist project: quasi-realism. Part of this project is to show that expressivism is compatible with a web of closely connected assumptions, namely, that normative thought and discourse are truth-apt and normative judgements are beliefs. While quasi-realists have made some progress in this direction, there is one relevant phenomenon that has so far been neglected, namely, those uses of that-clauses that are associated with propositional content. This is a problematic neglect, because that-clauses figure prominently in platitudes characterizing our ordinary notions of “truth-aptitude” and “belief ”, and so expressivists need to provide a plausible account of these uses of that-clauses which fits with their allowing that normative thought and discourse are truth-apt and normative judgements are beliefs. I address this challenge as follows: I first remove any worries that one might have that a plausible account of that-clauses that helps the quasi-realist could be given, by introducing the distinction between semantics and meta-semantics and locating expressivism at the level of metasemantics. I then develop a deflationist view of that-clauses which suits the quasi-realist’s purposes. I start by giving such a view for the use of that-clauses in meaning-attributions by expanding on the work of Wilfried Sellars. I then go on to explain how the account can be generalized to the use of that-clauses in belief-attributions and propositional attitude ascriptions more generally, in a way that allows expressivists to say that normative judgements are beliefs.

This thesis is concerned with the debate between absolutists and relativists about generality. Absolutists about quantification contend that we can quantify over absolutely everything; relativists deny this. The introduction motivates and elucidates the dispute. More familiar, restrictionist versions of relativism, according to which the range of quantifiers is always subject to restriction, are distinguished from the view defended in this thesis, an expansionist version of relativism, according to which the range of quantifiers is always open to expansion. The remainder of the thesis is split into three parts. Part I focuses on generality. Chapter 2 is concerned with the semantics of quantifiers. Unlike the restrictionist, the expansionist need not disagree with the absolutist about the semantics of quantifier domain restriction. It is argued that the threat of a certain form of semantic pessimism, used as an objection against restrictionism, also arises, in some cases, for absolutism, but is avoided by expansionism. Chapter 3 is primarily engaged in a defensive project, responding to a number of objections in the literature: the objection that the relativist is unable to coherently state her view, the objection that absolute generality is needed in logic and philosophy, and the objection that relativism is unable to accommodate ‘kind generalisations’. To meet these objections, suitable schematic and modal resources are introduced and relativism is given a precise formulation. Part II concerns issues in the philosophy of mathematics pertinent to the absolutism/relativism debate. Chapter 4 draws on the modal and schematic resources introduced in the previous chapter to regiment and generalise the key argument for relativism based on the set-theoretic paradoxes. Chapter 5 argues that relativism permits a natural motivation for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. A new, bi-modal axiomatisation of the iterative conception of set is presented. It is argued that such a theory improves on both its non-modal and modal rivals. Part III aims to meet a thus far unfulfilled explanatory burden facing expansionist relativism. The final chapter draws on principles from metasemantics to offer a positive account of how universes of discourse may be expanded, and assesses the prospects for a novel argument for relativism on this basis.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-05-18T13:49:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Sandra Regina Klafke Verbist_.pdf: 1801726 bytes, checksum: f3874e60fef1614b68ee7fe0cde719fc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-05-18T13:49:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sandra Regina Klafke Verbist_.pdf: 1801726 bytes, checksum: f3874e60fef1614b68ee7fe0cde719fc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-14 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / FAPERGS - Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul / Esta tese se apresenta como um produto de metassemântica por criar um discurso a respeito da possibilidade de a arte que se realiza em imagem fotográfica constituir-se como testemunho da experiência humana na linguagem. Pelo caminho que conduz à semiologia de segunda geração, o estudo aborda a arte como potência testemunhal representativa da experiência do homem na linguagem, tendo como objeto a fotografia organizada no formato de narrativa, tal como arranjada na obra fotográfica Arquipélago, de Cristiano Sant’Anna. As bases para este estudo são a teoria da enunciação derivada da obra de Émile Benveniste (1995, 2006, 2014) e a noção de testemunho derivada do pensamento filosófico de Giorgio Agamben (2008a). O produto gerado por esta pesquisa contém uma possibilidade teórica que inclui a enunciação, mas que não se esgota nela, indicando que arte fotográfica é testemunho da experiência humana na linguagem quando evoca a realidade positiva que revolve o conjunto do simbólico e estimula o homem a, na e pela linguagem, realocar-se e a procurar uma nova posição para si no universo discursivo, em um tempo infinitamente presente, mobilizando a cadeia significante da qual faz parte a favor de sua necessidade de existir na e pela língua. / This thesis is presented as a product of metasemantics because it creates a discourse about the possibility of art held in photographic image to establish itself as a testimony of human experience in language. Through the road leading to the second-generation semiology, this study addresses art as a representative force of testimony of man's experience in language, having as its object photography organized in a narrative format, as arranged in the photographic work Arquipélago, Cristiano Sant'Anna. The bases for this study are derived from the theory of enunciation in Émile Benveniste's work (1995, 2006, 2014) and the notion of testimony derived from the philosophical thought of Giorgio Agamben (2008a). The product generated by this research contains a theoretical possibility which includes the enunciation, but does not stop there, indicating that photographic art is a testimony of the human experience in language when it evokes the positive reality that revolves the symbolic and stimulates man to, in and through language, relocate himself and to look for a new position for himself in the discursive universe, in an infinitely present time, mobilizing the chain of signifiers of which he is part, in order to meet his need to exist in and through language.

This essay investigates Haukioja's (2010) notion of actuality-dependence. This notion is an attempt to explain the rigid behaviour of some kind terms; in particular natural kind terms like “water” and “tiger”. A definition of rigidity for kind terms has to take in account speakers' semantic intentions. This, together with the fact that actuality-dependence can only be applied successfully to a kind term if the members of its extension all share an underlying, non-trivial property, makes the notion of actuality-dependence face the problem of reference failures. A speaker's intention for a certain term to be actuality-dependent might fail, in the sense that the members of the kind picked out by the term in question lack underlying properties of the right sort. Three ways to solve this issue are shown to be unsatisfactory, ultimately leading to the conclusion that actuality-dependence cannot be the semantic feature that single out natural kind terms as semantically special.

A presente pesquisa tem como fundamento epistemológico a Teoria da Enunciação de Émile Benveniste e visa à elaboração de uma metassemântica. Esta noção é nomeada no texto Semiologia da língua, quando Benveniste concebe a ultrapassagem do signo saussuriano como princípio único por duas vias: na análise intralinguística, pelo discurso, o semântico; na análise translinguística, pela elaboração de uma metassemântica que se construirá sobre a semântica da enunciação e será uma semiologia de segunda geração. O método de análise define a partir do estudo intrateórico de Problèmes de linguistique générale, 1, e Problèmes de linguistique générale, 2, seis princípios que possibilitam a análise translinguística no campo metassemântico. São: 1- A metassemântica é uma semiologia de segunda geração: tem como objeto o estudo das relações que se estabelecem entre sistemas semióticos linguísticos e não linguísticos. 2- A metassemântica é a análise das formas complexas do discurso: é a análise de qualquer fato humano, em que seja possível construir a relação entre o método global de apreensão do sentido e o método analítico, tendo por base a semântica da enunciação. 3- A metassemântica tem forma e sentido: sentido e forma são as necessárias faces do importante problema da significação, são noções gêmeas. 4- A metassemântica tem níveis de análise: a noção de nível permite que se reconheça, na complexidade das formas, a arquitetura singular das partes e do todo. 5- A metassemântica possibilita a construção de diversos aparelhos de enunciação: sistemas semióticos não linguísticos estabelecem relações que se definem por enunciações não linguísticas. 6- A metassemântica é sempre uma interpretação parcial do analista: o analista tem uma condição espaço-temporal diferente da condição espaçotemporal de seu objeto de análise. A pesquisa conclui que foi elaborada a metassemântica da metassemântica. / This research is epistemologically based on the Enunciation Theory of Émile Benveniste and proposes to achieve a metasemantics. This notion appears in the text Semiology of the language, when Benveniste conceives two ways to overthrown Saussurian sign as the only principle. Firstly, in the intralinguistic analysis, the discourse, the semantics. Secondly, in the translinguistic analysis by the elaboration of a metasemantics that will be built on the enunciation semantics and it will be a second generation semiology. The method of analysis defines, through an intratheorical study of Problèmes de linguistique générale 1, and Problèmes de linguistique générale 2, six principles that allow the translinguistc analysis in the metasemantics field. They are: 1- Metasemantics is a second generation semiology: its object of study is the relationship between linguistic and non-linguistic semiotic systems. 2- Metasemantics is the analysis of complex forms of discourse: it is the analysis of any human fact in which it is possible to reconstruct the relation between the global method of capturing the meaning and the analytical method based on the enunciation semantics. 3- Metasemantics has form and meaning: meaning and form are the two faces of signification, two twinned notions. 4- Metasemantics presents levels of analysis: this concept is the condition to recognize unique architectures of complex forms partially or as a whole. 5- Metasemantics is the possibility of the construction of several apparatus of enunciation: non-linguistic semiotic systems establish relations capable to allow non-linguistic enunciations. 6- Metasemantics is always a partial interpretation of the analyst: the space-time of the analyst is not the same space-time of his/her object. As conclusion, this research has developed the metasemantics of the metasemantics.

A presente pesquisa tem como fundamento epistemológico a Teoria da Enunciação de Émile Benveniste e visa à elaboração de uma metassemântica. Esta noção é nomeada no texto Semiologia da língua, quando Benveniste concebe a ultrapassagem do signo saussuriano como princípio único por duas vias: na análise intralinguística, pelo discurso, o semântico; na análise translinguística, pela elaboração de uma metassemântica que se construirá sobre a semântica da enunciação e será uma semiologia de segunda geração. O método de análise define a partir do estudo intrateórico de Problèmes de linguistique générale, 1, e Problèmes de linguistique générale, 2, seis princípios que possibilitam a análise translinguística no campo metassemântico. São: 1- A metassemântica é uma semiologia de segunda geração: tem como objeto o estudo das relações que se estabelecem entre sistemas semióticos linguísticos e não linguísticos. 2- A metassemântica é a análise das formas complexas do discurso: é a análise de qualquer fato humano, em que seja possível construir a relação entre o método global de apreensão do sentido e o método analítico, tendo por base a semântica da enunciação. 3- A metassemântica tem forma e sentido: sentido e forma são as necessárias faces do importante problema da significação, são noções gêmeas. 4- A metassemântica tem níveis de análise: a noção de nível permite que se reconheça, na complexidade das formas, a arquitetura singular das partes e do todo. 5- A metassemântica possibilita a construção de diversos aparelhos de enunciação: sistemas semióticos não linguísticos estabelecem relações que se definem por enunciações não linguísticas. 6- A metassemântica é sempre uma interpretação parcial do analista: o analista tem uma condição espaço-temporal diferente da condição espaçotemporal de seu objeto de análise. A pesquisa conclui que foi elaborada a metassemântica da metassemântica. / This research is epistemologically based on the Enunciation Theory of Émile Benveniste and proposes to achieve a metasemantics. This notion appears in the text Semiology of the language, when Benveniste conceives two ways to overthrown Saussurian sign as the only principle. Firstly, in the intralinguistic analysis, the discourse, the semantics. Secondly, in the translinguistic analysis by the elaboration of a metasemantics that will be built on the enunciation semantics and it will be a second generation semiology. The method of analysis defines, through an intratheorical study of Problèmes de linguistique générale 1, and Problèmes de linguistique générale 2, six principles that allow the translinguistc analysis in the metasemantics field. They are: 1- Metasemantics is a second generation semiology: its object of study is the relationship between linguistic and non-linguistic semiotic systems. 2- Metasemantics is the analysis of complex forms of discourse: it is the analysis of any human fact in which it is possible to reconstruct the relation between the global method of capturing the meaning and the analytical method based on the enunciation semantics. 3- Metasemantics has form and meaning: meaning and form are the two faces of signification, two twinned notions. 4- Metasemantics presents levels of analysis: this concept is the condition to recognize unique architectures of complex forms partially or as a whole. 5- Metasemantics is the possibility of the construction of several apparatus of enunciation: non-linguistic semiotic systems establish relations capable to allow non-linguistic enunciations. 6- Metasemantics is always a partial interpretation of the analyst: the space-time of the analyst is not the same space-time of his/her object. As conclusion, this research has developed the metasemantics of the metasemantics.

A presente pesquisa tem como fundamento epistemológico a Teoria da Enunciação de Émile Benveniste e visa à elaboração de uma metassemântica. Esta noção é nomeada no texto Semiologia da língua, quando Benveniste concebe a ultrapassagem do signo saussuriano como princípio único por duas vias: na análise intralinguística, pelo discurso, o semântico; na análise translinguística, pela elaboração de uma metassemântica que se construirá sobre a semântica da enunciação e será uma semiologia de segunda geração. O método de análise define a partir do estudo intrateórico de Problèmes de linguistique générale, 1, e Problèmes de linguistique générale, 2, seis princípios que possibilitam a análise translinguística no campo metassemântico. São: 1- A metassemântica é uma semiologia de segunda geração: tem como objeto o estudo das relações que se estabelecem entre sistemas semióticos linguísticos e não linguísticos. 2- A metassemântica é a análise das formas complexas do discurso: é a análise de qualquer fato humano, em que seja possível construir a relação entre o método global de apreensão do sentido e o método analítico, tendo por base a semântica da enunciação. 3- A metassemântica tem forma e sentido: sentido e forma são as necessárias faces do importante problema da significação, são noções gêmeas. 4- A metassemântica tem níveis de análise: a noção de nível permite que se reconheça, na complexidade das formas, a arquitetura singular das partes e do todo. 5- A metassemântica possibilita a construção de diversos aparelhos de enunciação: sistemas semióticos não linguísticos estabelecem relações que se definem por enunciações não linguísticas. 6- A metassemântica é sempre uma interpretação parcial do analista: o analista tem uma condição espaço-temporal diferente da condição espaçotemporal de seu objeto de análise. A pesquisa conclui que foi elaborada a metassemântica da metassemântica. / This research is epistemologically based on the Enunciation Theory of Émile Benveniste and proposes to achieve a metasemantics. This notion appears in the text Semiology of the language, when Benveniste conceives two ways to overthrown Saussurian sign as the only principle. Firstly, in the intralinguistic analysis, the discourse, the semantics. Secondly, in the translinguistic analysis by the elaboration of a metasemantics that will be built on the enunciation semantics and it will be a second generation semiology. The method of analysis defines, through an intratheorical study of Problèmes de linguistique générale 1, and Problèmes de linguistique générale 2, six principles that allow the translinguistc analysis in the metasemantics field. They are: 1- Metasemantics is a second generation semiology: its object of study is the relationship between linguistic and non-linguistic semiotic systems. 2- Metasemantics is the analysis of complex forms of discourse: it is the analysis of any human fact in which it is possible to reconstruct the relation between the global method of capturing the meaning and the analytical method based on the enunciation semantics. 3- Metasemantics has form and meaning: meaning and form are the two faces of signification, two twinned notions. 4- Metasemantics presents levels of analysis: this concept is the condition to recognize unique architectures of complex forms partially or as a whole. 5- Metasemantics is the possibility of the construction of several apparatus of enunciation: non-linguistic semiotic systems establish relations capable to allow non-linguistic enunciations. 6- Metasemantics is always a partial interpretation of the analyst: the space-time of the analyst is not the same space-time of his/her object. As conclusion, this research has developed the metasemantics of the metasemantics.