The aim of this thesis is to discuss the concepts of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect (R2P), and; to investigate how best to apply the concepts in the face of humanitarian crises, in order to address concerns about their implementation. The failure of the Security Council to react to grave human rights abuses committed in the humanitarian crises of the 1990s, including Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1993-1995) Haiti (1994-1997), and Kosovo (1999),triggered international debatesabout: how the international community should react when the fundamental human rights of populations are grossly and systematically violated within the boundaries of sovereign states, and; the need for a reappraisal of armed humanitarian intervention. Central to the debate was whether the international community should continue to adhere unconditionally to the principle of non-intervention enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, or take a different course in the interest of human rights. The debate culminated in the establishment of the Canadian International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000, with the mandate to find a balance between respect for sovereignty and intervention, for purposes of protecting human rights. Much of the scholarly literature on military intervention for human protection purposes deals with the legality and legitimacy of the military dimension of the concepts. The significance of the thesis is that: it focusesthe investigation on the potential abuse of the use of force for human protection purposes, when moral arguments are used to justify an intervention that is primarily motivated by the interests of the intervener, and; the propensity to use disproportionate force in the attainment of the stated objective of human protection, by powerful intervening states. The central argument of the thesis is that there are double standards, selectivity, abuses, andindiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in the implementation of R2P by powerful countries, and; that, whether a military intervention is unilateral, or sanctioned by the UN Security Council, there is the potential for abuse, and in addition, disproportionate force may be used.The thesis makes recommendations to address these concerns, in order to ensure the survival of the concept. / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL.D.

The aim of the research was to consider the relationship of political ends and the use of military force and, using empirical data gathered from South Africa's experience from 1987 to 1988, to consider whether there might be any implications for existing theory. The question that was formulated for research was: What relationship could be distinguished between the South African government's use of military force in Angola and the government's political ends? The conclusion was reached that the relationship of the application of military force by the South African government to the attainment of political ends was one of inhibition. The concept of 'inhibitive war', refers to the severe .restraint on the use of military force, resulting from the influences of environmental conditions on political ends, so that the political ends themselves become a restriction on the achievement of military aims. / Political Sciences / M.A. (Strategic Studies)

Situated at the heart of Africa, the DRC has been transformed into a battlefield where several African states and national armed movements are simultaneously fighting various wars. In order to achieve peace, security, and stability in the DRC, SADC intervened with the international collaboration of the UN and AU. The aim of this dissertation is to investigate SADC’s role in the DRC conflict resolution process from 1998 to 2003. A qualitative research method has been chosen and two theories, namely New Institutionalism theories and Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation were adopted. The research concludes that SADC military and diplomatic efforts to end the war have been positive. It is true that violence continues and peace remained fragile, but the conflict had ended. The weakness of the DRC government has allowed continued violence. As an organisation of states, SADC has not been able to do anything about this fragility. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

美國擁有豐富的石油儲量，目前已探明的石油儲量即達到 485 億桶，居世界 第 9 位；同時也於 2014 年追過沙烏地阿拉伯，以平均每日 1164 萬桶的產量成為 世界上最大石油生產國。但另一方面，美國每日的石油消耗量，更大於歐洲及歐 亞大陸內 29 個國家的每日消耗量的總合，成為世界上最大的石油消費國。身為 世界上最大的能源消費國及戰後世界秩序的主導者，同時歷經一、二次世界大戰 及石油危機的重大衝擊後，深知能源的穩定供應是國家安全的重要基礎，美國必 須盡全力透過外交甚至軍事手段以確保能源的安全，所以歷屆政府都以能源安全 作為國家安全及外交政策的重點。 中東是目前全球己探明石油儲量最大的地區，也是全球石油產量最大的地區， 是以美國以能源戰略為導向的外交政策（簡稱能源外交）傳統上是以中東石油為 重心，美國也將中東地區的均勢與穩定、確保石油運輸通道的安全等視為其最根 本的國家利益之一。二次世界大戰之後，美國為了擴張或鞏固其在中東地區的影 響力而投入了大量的資源進行政治、經濟及軍事的干預。而頁岩油的出現使得美 國石油自給率大幅提高，對中東地區石油的依賴也迅速下滑。 頁岩油的出現是否會讓美國改變其向中東傾斜的外交政策，進一步將其全球 戰略部署重心進行調整至快速崛起的亞洲地區，值得我們觀察與探討。本論文以 文獻研究之方式，透過分析美國對石油進口的依賴程度與其在中東發生軍事衝突 時所採用的外交政策工具之間的關聯，嘗試探討在頁岩油革命大幅提高美國能源 自給率後，是否會影響美國對中東地區事務的干預程度。 本研究發現，石油進口比例的確影響了美國在中東地區所運用的外交政策工 具。石油進口比例高時，美國面對中東的跨國軍事衝突時傾向採取強度較高的外 交政策工具；石油進口比例低時，則採取干預強度較低的外交政策工具。是以本 研究認為，在頁岩油革命使美國進一步降低對進口石油的依賴後、將使中東這個 提供美國主要石油來源的地區的重要性降低。但另一方面，中東除了提供美國重 要的石油來源，亦是全球的石油供應中心，美國對中東地區的影響力不僅關係到 美國的能源安全，亦關係到美國全球霸權的地位。 / United States has abundant oil reserves that reserves reached 485 billion barrels, ranking No. 9 in the world; and also chase in 2014 over Saudi-Arabia, to 1164 million barrels of production per day on average to become the world largest oil producer. On the other hand, the US daily oil consumption, the greater the total combined daily consumption in Europe and Eurasia in the 29 countries, the world's largest oil consumer. As the world's largest energy consumer and the postwar world order leader, after a while, after the Second World War and the significant impact of the oil crisis, we know that stable supply of energy is an important basis for the national security of the United States must do efforts through diplomatic and even military means to guarantee energy security, the successive governments have focused on energy security as national security and foreign policy. The Middle East is currently the world's largest oil reserves in the region have been proven, is the world's largest oil production area, based on the US foreign policy-oriented energy strategy (referred to energy diplomacy) is traditionally focus on Middle East oil, the United States will in the Middle East balance and stability in the region, to ensure the safety of oil transport corridor, etc. regarded as one of the most fundamental interests of their country. After World War II, the United States in order to expand or consolidate its influence in the Middle East and put a lot of resources, political, economic, and military intervention. The emergence of shale oil self-sufficiency rate of such a substantial increase in US oil dependence on Middle East oil is also declining rapidly. Shale oil occurs whether the United States will change its foreign policy towards the Middle East tilt further its global strategic center of gravity to adjust to the rapid rise of Asia, we should observe and discuss. In this paper, after the manner of literature, through the analysis of foreign policy tools related U.S. dependence on oil imports and its military conflict in the Middle East used between attempts to discuss a substantial increase in US energy self-sufficiency rate in shale oil revolution, whether the United States will affect the level of intervention in the Middle East affairs. The study found that the proportion of imported oil does affect US foreign policy tool in the Middle East by the use of. A high proportion of oil imports, the United States when faced with cross-border military conflict in the Middle East tends to take a higher intensity of a foreign policy tool; low proportion of imported oil, then take a low intensity intervention foreign policy tool. The present study is that in the US shale oil revolution to further reduce the importance of post-import dependence on oil, the Middle East, will provide the main source of US oil region is reduced. On the other hand, the Middle East and the United States in addition to providing an important source of oil, is also a center of global oil supplies, the US forces in the Middle East not only to America's energy security, but also related to the status of US global hegemony.

Cette thèse étudie la dynamique entre les États-Unis et ses alliés privilégiés lorsque la coopération militaire est en jeu. Nous y proposons que les attentes de l’allié principal déterminent le niveau de coopération des autres pays mais que deux variables intermédiaires - la cohésion du gouvernement et la capacité militaire de l’allié - en déterminent l’exécution. Cette analyse porte aussi sur les stratégies utilisées par les états secondaires pour accroître leur pouvoir dans cette relation asymétrique : initier des négociations bilatérales dans le but d’obtenir des concessions stratégiques, faire valoir leur point de vue par le biais d’organisations internationales ou, encore, évoquer des principes d’ordre éthique et moral. Même si les alliés secondaires peuvent rarement influencer l’allié dominant, ils ont néanmoins la capacité d’agir de façon autonome et de résister aux pressions du plus fort. L’argument de la thèse repose sur trois propositions : dans une alliance asymétrique, les pays ne partagent pas nécessairement la même perception des menaces au niveau international; en cas de désaccord, le résultat des négociations entre alliés ne favorise pas toujours le partenaire dominant ; au moment de la prise de décision en matière de politique étrangère, l’allié secondaire doit protéger sa réputation en tant qu’allié fiable face à l’allié dominant, mais il doit en peser l’impact politique au niveau national. L’analyse théorique de ces alliances asymétrique s’inspire du réalisme néoclassique ce qui nous permet de mieux comprendre la relation entre les variables systémiques et étatiques. L’apport de cette recherche se situe au niveau de l’étude théorique des alliances militaires et de la prise de décision en politique étrangère et de défense. La recherche porte sur le comportement des alliés secondaires qui doivent réagir aux décisions prises par les États-Unis en temps de menace, en étudiant l’interaction entre variables étatiques et contraintes systémiques. Afin de préciser le lien causal entre la perception des menaces, les attentes de l’alliance et les contraintes du pays secondaire nous avons appliqué une méthode comparative en étudiant trois cas : La Grande Bretagne, le Canada, et l’Australie, et la réponse de chacun à l’appel de participer à la guerre en Afghanistan et en Iraq de 2001 à 2003. L’étude cible la prise de décision devant le choix de participer ou de ne pas participer dans une mobilisation conjointe avec les États-Unis. Le processus décisionnel est observé du point de vue de l’allié secondaire et nous permet de mesurer les facteurs explicatifs qui ont motivé la décision en vue d’une coopération militaire. / This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

Cette thèse étudie la dynamique entre les États-Unis et ses alliés privilégiés lorsque la coopération militaire est en jeu. Nous y proposons que les attentes de l’allié principal déterminent le niveau de coopération des autres pays mais que deux variables intermédiaires - la cohésion du gouvernement et la capacité militaire de l’allié - en déterminent l’exécution. Cette analyse porte aussi sur les stratégies utilisées par les états secondaires pour accroître leur pouvoir dans cette relation asymétrique : initier des négociations bilatérales dans le but d’obtenir des concessions stratégiques, faire valoir leur point de vue par le biais d’organisations internationales ou, encore, évoquer des principes d’ordre éthique et moral. Même si les alliés secondaires peuvent rarement influencer l’allié dominant, ils ont néanmoins la capacité d’agir de façon autonome et de résister aux pressions du plus fort. L’argument de la thèse repose sur trois propositions : dans une alliance asymétrique, les pays ne partagent pas nécessairement la même perception des menaces au niveau international; en cas de désaccord, le résultat des négociations entre alliés ne favorise pas toujours le partenaire dominant ; au moment de la prise de décision en matière de politique étrangère, l’allié secondaire doit protéger sa réputation en tant qu’allié fiable face à l’allié dominant, mais il doit en peser l’impact politique au niveau national. L’analyse théorique de ces alliances asymétrique s’inspire du réalisme néoclassique ce qui nous permet de mieux comprendre la relation entre les variables systémiques et étatiques. L’apport de cette recherche se situe au niveau de l’étude théorique des alliances militaires et de la prise de décision en politique étrangère et de défense. La recherche porte sur le comportement des alliés secondaires qui doivent réagir aux décisions prises par les États-Unis en temps de menace, en étudiant l’interaction entre variables étatiques et contraintes systémiques. Afin de préciser le lien causal entre la perception des menaces, les attentes de l’alliance et les contraintes du pays secondaire nous avons appliqué une méthode comparative en étudiant trois cas : La Grande Bretagne, le Canada, et l’Australie, et la réponse de chacun à l’appel de participer à la guerre en Afghanistan et en Iraq de 2001 à 2003. L’étude cible la prise de décision devant le choix de participer ou de ne pas participer dans une mobilisation conjointe avec les États-Unis. Le processus décisionnel est observé du point de vue de l’allié secondaire et nous permet de mesurer les facteurs explicatifs qui ont motivé la décision en vue d’une coopération militaire. / This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

COSTA, Jucélio Regis da. Os jornais em marcha e as marchas da vitória nos jornais: a imprensa e o golpe civil militar no Ceará (1961-1964). 2015. 157f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em História, Fortaleza (CE), 2015. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-12-15T13:01:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_jrcosta.pdf: 2164434 bytes, checksum: fcacab9fce36d073851b423ad5ee4e74 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-12-15T17:11:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_jrcosta.pdf: 2164434 bytes, checksum: fcacab9fce36d073851b423ad5ee4e74 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-12-15T17:11:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_jrcosta.pdf: 2164434 bytes, checksum: fcacab9fce36d073851b423ad5ee4e74 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / The main objective of this work is to analyze, through the newspapers, the mobilizations of political elites in Ceará around the events marked by the political and ideological struggle between the right and the left in Brazil’s politics that led to the isolation of the government of João Goulart and, later, led to the civil-military coup of 1964. In this work, we comprehend the press not only as a vehicle of expression of opinions and positions, but also as a producer of events and assignment of senses. Hence, we directed our attention to analyze the construction and transmission of events situated between the resignation of Jânio Quadros and the movements of opposition to the president João Goulart that culminated in the civilmilitary coup of March 31, 1964. Thus, we were concerned to understand how the press in Ceará was marching towards the coup, becoming a space of conflict between the right and the left, and of legitimacy to the movement. In Ceará, the major political events of national conjuncture caused fundamental developments for the local political groups to reorganize and to start defending the project of conspiracy against João Goulart. Therefore, we seek to understand the reorganization of the political groups during the first months after the Coup of 1964, especially when they organized the “Marches of Victory” (Marchas da Vitória), between the months of April and May, to celebrate the victory of the Coup. In addition to that, we aim to understand how the press of Ceará influenced the mobilization and the reconfiguration of political alliances immediately after the. / Este trabalho tem como principal objetivo analisar as mobilizações das elites políticas cearenses no estado, através dos jornais, em torno dos acontecimentos que ficaram marcados pelo embate político-ideológico entre as direitas e as esquerdas brasileiras levando ao isolamento do governo João Goulart e que, posteriormente, culminaram com o golpe civil militar de 1964. Neste trabalho, estamos compreendendo a imprensa não apenas como lugar de expressão de opiniões e posicionamentos, mas, sobretudo, como produtora de acontecimentos e atribuições de sentidos. Deste modo, o nosso olhar esteve direcionado para analisar a construção e repercussão dos acontecimentos os quais estiveram situados entre a renúncia de Jânio Quadros e as mobilizações em oposição ao presidente João Goulart e que, de modo bastante tenso, culminaram no Golpe civil-militar de 31 de março de 1964. Assim, preocupamo-nos em compreender o modo como a imprensa cearense esteve marchando em direção ao Golpe tornando-se um espaço de embate e conflito entre as direitas e esquerdas e de legitimidade para o movimento golpista. No Ceará, os principais acontecimentos políticos da conjuntura nacional causaram desdobramentos fundamentais para que os grupos políticos locais se reorganizassem e passassem a defender o projeto de conspiração golpista contra João Goulart. Deste modo, buscamos compreender a forma como os grupos políticos se reorganizaram durante os primeiros meses após a concretização do golpe de 1964, especialmente quando esses, organizaram as “Marchas da Vitória”, manifestações ocorridas entre os meses de abril e maio, visando comemorar a vitória do golpe. Além disso, compreender o modo como a imprensa cearense exerceu o papel de mobilização e reconfiguração das alianças políticas imediatamente após a intervenção militar.

The aim of the research was to consider the relationship of political ends and the use of military force and, using empirical data gathered from South Africa's experience from 1987 to 1988, to consider whether there might be any implications for existing theory. The question that was formulated for research was: What relationship could be distinguished between the South African government's use of military force in Angola and the government's political ends? The conclusion was reached that the relationship of the application of military force by the South African government to the attainment of political ends was one of inhibition. The concept of 'inhibitive war', refers to the severe .restraint on the use of military force, resulting from the influences of environmental conditions on political ends, so that the political ends themselves become a restriction on the achievement of military aims. / Political Sciences / M.A. (Strategic Studies)

Situated at the heart of Africa, the DRC has been transformed into a battlefield where several African states and national armed movements are simultaneously fighting various wars. In order to achieve peace, security, and stability in the DRC, SADC intervened with the international collaboration of the UN and AU. The aim of this dissertation is to investigate SADC’s role in the DRC conflict resolution process from 1998 to 2003. A qualitative research method has been chosen and two theories, namely New Institutionalism theories and Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation were adopted. The research concludes that SADC military and diplomatic efforts to end the war have been positive. It is true that violence continues and peace remained fragile, but the conflict had ended. The weakness of the DRC government has allowed continued violence. As an organisation of states, SADC has not been able to do anything about this fragility. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

This paper examines causal mechanisms of the process leading up to the Russian military intervention in Syria that began in September 2015. It aims to concretize the causal processes of three different hypotheses that are based on commonplace assumptions of Russian foreign policy on Syria. It thoroughly explores three different causal paths, mapping events that may have had implications to the apparent change of heart within the Russian leadership. The paper analyses the relevance of these processes through a rational choice theory framework.